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Preface and Acknowledgements  
Founded in 2003, the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) has become an 
institutional, multi-disciplinary entity.  In 2006 the ARP made significant and sustaining 
progress toward realizing its goals to:  
1. Position NPS as a recognized leader in defense acquisition research.   
2. Establish NPS acquisition research as an integral part of policy-making for 
Department of Defense officials.   
3. Create a stream of relevant information concerning the performance of DoD 
Acquisition policies with viable recommendations for continuous process 
improvement.   
4. Prepare the DoD workforce to participate in the continued evolution of the 
defense acquisition process.  
5. Collaborate with other universities, think tanks, industry and government in 
acquisition research.  
Since inception, over 100 reports and papers have been published, thereby making a 
significant contribution to the body of literature on the defense acquisition process.   
Through these research products, ARP sponsors are receiving substantial help with and 
insights into the pressing business issues of the day. 
The synergy between faculty research and student classroom instruction has been 
exceptional with many relevant and current instructional materials emerging from research 
products, thus enhancing the student educational experience. Faculty are “refreshed” in 
defense-relevant subject matter, and students are better prepared to enter the acquisition 
work force.  In recognition of these successes, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) provided $1M in funding for additional 
projects.  This funding expands the ARP by 30% and is a pilot for future increases in 
research funding.   
Researcher opportunities provided by the Chair offer significant benefits to 
researchers: (1) provision of funding saving researchers “marketing“ time; (2) ties with 
sponsor POCs thus assuring DOD relevant research; (3) assistance with final formatting, 
editing and publishing thus relieving researchers from the “non-intellectual” aspects of their 
research.  Each of these is a substantial benefit but the growing connectivity between 
researchers and sponsors is paying large dividends to all concerned.  While we at the Naval 
Postgraduate School like to think of our institution as the world’s leader in defense 
acquisition research, we also recognize that, because of our limited size and resources, we 
are able to study only a few of acquisition’s myriad of complex issues and challenges.  We 
know that genuine progress in acquisition research can be achieved and sustained only to 
the extent that scholars from a broad range of institutions and disciplines are engaged to 
participate.  Once this “critical mass” of researchers is formed, we may anticipate that 
acquisition will become a field of its own, with perhaps a variety of acquisition journals, 
acquisition conferences, and university courses in acquisition management and policy.  
Such intellectual capacity, we may hope, will before long prevail against acquisition’s 
perennial and often pernicious problems. 
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Accordingly, the year 2006 was especially significant for the NPS Acquisition 
Research Program in taking major strides toward expanding the program’s reach in 
important ways to other institutions.  The number of research institutions participating as 
collaborators grew to 35 with the formation of a Virtual University Consortium.  Most 
noteworthy was, as mentioned above, our securing sponsorship from USD(AT&L) to fund 
research proposals selected from a nationwide call, or Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) 
(copy available at www.acquisitionresearch.org).  We’re truly excited at the prospects of 
receiving innovative and cutting edge proposals from the top minds around the country.  We 
trust that this new sponsorship will act like good seeds sown in fertile soil, yielding rich fruits 
of profitable acquisition research for many years to come. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 
• Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) 
• Program Manager (Infantry Combat Equipment) 
• Program Executive Officer (Integrated Warfare Systems) 
• Program Executive Officer (Littoral and Mine Warfare) 
• Project Manager (Modular Brigade Enhancements) 
• Program Executive Officer (Ships) 
• Dean of Research, Naval Postgraduate School 
We also thank UGS Corporation and the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and 
acknowledge their generous contributions in support of this symposium.  
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, US Navy (ret)    Associate Professor 
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The NPS “A Team” 
Rear Admiral James B. Greene, Jr. USN (Ret.) — Acquisition Chair, Naval 
Postgraduate School. RADM Greene develops, implements and oversees the Acquisition 
Research Program in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. He interfaces with 
the DoD, industry and government leaders in acquisition, supervises student MBA projects 
and conducts guest lectures and seminars. Before serving at NPS, RADM Greene was an 
independent consultant focusing on Defense Industry business development strategy and 
execution (for both the public and private sectors), minimizing lifecycle costs through 
technology applications, alternative financing arrangements for capital-asset procurement, 
and “red-teaming” corporate proposals for major government procurements.  
RADM Greene served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) 
in the Pentagon from 1991-1995. As Assistant Deputy, he provided oversight, direction and 
budget development for worldwide US Navy logistics operations. He facilitated depot 
maintenance, supply-chain management, base/station management, environmental 
programs and logistic advice and support to the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of his 
focuses during this time were leading Navy-wide efforts to digitize all technical data (and, 
therefore, reduce cycle time) and to develop and implement strategy for procurement of 
eleven Sealift ships for the rapid deployment forces. He also served as the Senior Military 
Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) from 1987-1990 where he advised 
and counseled the Under Secretary in directing the DoD procurement process.  
From 1984-1987, RADM Greene was the Project Manager for the Aegis project. This 
was the DoD’s largest acquisition project with an annual budget in excess of $5 Billion/year. 
The project provided oversight and management of research, development, design, 
production, fleet introduction and full lifecycle support of the entire fleet of Aegis cruisers, 
destroyers and weapons systems through more than 2500 industry contracts. From 1980-
1984, RADM Greene served as Director, Committee Liaison, Office of Legislative Affairs 
followed by a tour as the Executive Assistant, to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Shipbuilding and Logistics). From 1964-1980, RADM Greene served as a Surface Warfare 
Officer in various duties, culminating in Command-at-Sea. His assignments included 
numerous wartime deployments to Vietnam as well as the Indian Ocean and the Persian 
Gulf.  
RADM Greene received a BS in Electrical Engineering from Brown University in 
1964; he earned a MS in Electrical Engineering and a MS in Business Administration from 
the Naval Postgraduate School in 1973.  
Keith F. Snider — Associate Professor of Public Administration and Management in 
the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, where he teaches courses related to defense acquisition management.  
He also serves as Principal Investigator for the NPS Acquisition Research Program and as 
Academic Associate for resident NPS acquisition curricula.   
Professor Snider has a PhD in Public Administration and Public Affairs from Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, a Master of Science degree in Operations 
Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Bachelor of Science degree from the 
United States Military Academy at West Point.  He served as a field artillery officer in the US 
Army for twenty years, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.  He is a former member of 
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the Army Acquisition Corps and a graduate of the Program Manager’s Course at the 
Defense Systems Management College.   
Professor Snider’s recent publications appear in American Review of Public 
Administration, Administration and Society, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Journal of Public 
Procurement, Acquisition Review Quarterly, and Project Management Journal.   
Karey L. Shaffer — Program Manager for the Acquisition Research Program at the 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. As PM, Shaffer 
is responsible for operations and publications in conjunction with the Acquisition Chair and 
the Principal Investigator. She has also catalyzed, organized and managed the Acquisition 
Research Symposiums hosted by NPS.  
Shaffer has also served as an independent Project Manager and Marketing 
Consultant on various projects. Her experiences as such were focused on creating 
marketing materials, initiating web development, assembling technical teams, managing 
project lifecycles, processes and cost-savings strategies.  
From 2001-2002, Shaffer contracted to work as the Executive Assistant to the Vice 
President for Leadership and Development Human Resources for Metris Companies in 
Minneapolis.  In this capacity, she introduced project lifecycle and process improvements to 
increase efficiency. Likewise, as a Resource Specialist contractor at Watson Wyatt 
Worldwide in Minneapolis, she developed and implemented template plans to address 
continuity and functionality in corporate documents; in this same position, she introduced 
process improvements to increase efficiency in presentation and proposal production in 
order to reduce the instances of corruption and loss of vital technical information.  
Shaffer has also served as the Project Manager for Imagicast, Inc. and as the 
Operations Manager for the Montana World Trade Center. At Imagicast, she was asked to 
take over the project management of four failing pilots for Levi Strauss in the San Francisco 
office. Within four months, the pilots were released; the project lifecycle was shortened; and 
the production process was refined. In this latter capacity at the MWTC, Shaffer developed 
operating procedures, policies and processes in compliance with state and federal grant 
law. Concurrently, she managed $1.25 million in federal appropriations, developed 
budgeting systems and secured a $400,000 federal technology grant. As the Operations 
Manager, she also designed MWTC’s Conference site, managed various marketing 
conferences, and taught student practicum programs and seminars.  
Shaffer has her BA in Business Administration (focus on International Business, 
Marketing and Management) from the University of Montana. She is currently earning her 
MBA from San Francisco State University.  
A special thanks to our editor Jeri Larsen for all that she has done to make this 
publication a success, to David Wood and Carl Matsen for production, to Ian White for 
graphic support, to Lindsay D’Penha for CD programming, to Jordy Boom for conference 
website development. We would like acknowledge Arlene Pulido, Jennifer Watson, Bon 
Troung, Toan Tran and Jason Munoz of the staff at the Graduate School of Business & 
Public Policy for all the administrative support on the backend to make the Symposium a 
success. Our program success is directly related to the combined efforts of many.  
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Announcement and Call for Proposals 
The Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
announces the 5th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium to be held May 14-15, 2008 
in Monterey, California.   
This symposium serves as a forum for the presentation of acquisition research and 
the exchange of ideas among scholars and practitioners of public-sector acquisition.  We 
seek a diverse audience of influential attendees from academe, government, and industry 
who are well placed to shape and promote future research in acquisition.   
The Symposium Program Committee solicits proposals for panels and/or papers 
from academicians, practitioners, students and others with interests in the study of 
acquisition.  The following list of topics is provided to indicate the range of potential research 
areas of interest for this symposium: acquisition and procurement policy, supply chain 
management, public budgeting and finance, cost management, project management, 
logistics management, engineering management, outsourcing, performance 
measurement, and organization studies.   
Proposals must be submitted by November 9, 2007.  The Program Committee will 
make notifications of accepted proposals by December 7, 2007.  Final papers must be 
submitted by April 4, 2008 to be included in the Symposium Proceedings. 
Proposals for papers should include an abstract along with identification, affiliation, 
and contact information for the author(s).  Proposals for papers plan for a 20 minute 
presentation. Proposals for panels (plan for 90 minute duration) should include the same 
information as above as well as a description of the panel subject and format, along with 
participants’ names, qualifications and the specific contributions each participant will make 
to the panel.   
Submit paper and panel proposals to www.researchsymposium.org . 
ACQUISITION RESEARCH: 
CREATING SYNERGY FOR INFORMED CHANGE 
5th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium 
May 14 - 15, 2008 
Monterey, California 
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Primary objective is to attract outstanding researchers and scholars to 
investigate topics of interest to the defense acquisition community. The 
program solicits innovative proposals for defense acquisition management and 
policy research to be conducted during fiscal year (FY) 2008 (1 Oct 07 -30 Sep 08).  
Defense acquisition management and policy research refers to 
investigations in all disciplines, fields, and domains that (1) are involved in the 
acquisition of products and/or services for national defense, or (2) could 
potentially be brought to bear to improve defense acquisition.  It includes but is 
not limited to economics, finance, financial management, information systems, 
organization theory, operations management, human resources management, and 
marketing, as well as the “traditional” acquisition areas such as contracting, 
program/project management, logistics, and systems engineering management.  
This program is targeted in particular to U.S. universities (including U.S. 
government schools of higher education) or other research institutions 
outside the Department of Defense.  
The Government anticipates making multiple awards up to $100,000 each for 
a basic research period of twelve months.  NPS plans to complete proposal 
evaluations and notify awardees in early August 2007. 
 







BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT 
Acquisition Research Program 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Open until 4:00 pm PDST 1 June 2007 
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May 16, 2007 
Keynote Speaker 
8:00 a.m. – 
9:15 a.m.  
Keynote Speaker 
The Honorable Delores M. Etter – Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition 
 
The Honorable Delores M. Etter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Research, Development and Acquisition, was nominated on 
September 6, 2005 by President George W. Bush to serve as the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition. Dr. Etter was then sworn in on November 7, 2005. As 
the Navy's Senior Acquisition Executive, Dr. Etter is responsible for 
research, development, and acquisition within the Department of 
the Navy. From August 2001 to November 2005, Dr. Etter was a 
member of the Electrical Engineering faculty at the United States 
Naval Academy. She was also the first recipient of the Office of 
Naval Research Distinguished Chair in Science and Technology. 
Her academic interests were in digital signal processing and 
communications. Her research interests included biometric signal 
processing, with an emphasis on identification using iris recognition. 
She has also written several textbooks on computer languages and software engineering. 
From June 1998 through July 2001, Dr. Etter served as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Science and Technology. In that position, she was responsible for Defense Science and Technology 
strategic planning, budget allocation, and program execution and evaluation for the DoD Science and 
Technology Program. Dr. Etter was the Principal U.S. representative to the NATO Research and 
Technology Board. She was also responsible for the Defense Modeling and Simulation Organization, 
the High Performance Computing Modernization Office, and for technical oversight of the Software 
Engineering Institute. Dr. Etter was also the senior civilian in charge of the DoD high-energy laser 
research program. 
From 1990-98, Dr. Etter was a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of 
Colorado, Boulder. During 1979-89, Dr. Etter was a faculty member in Electrical and Computer 
Engineering at the University of New Mexico. She served as Associate Vice President for Academic 
Affairs in 1989. During the 1983-84 academic year she was a National Science Foundation Visiting 
Professor in the Information Systems Laboratory in the Electrical Engineering Department at Stanford 
University. 
Dr. Etter is a member of the National Academy of Engineering. She is also a former member of the 
National Science Board and the Defense Science Board. She is a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 
and the American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE). She served as President of the IEEE 
Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing Society from 1988-89, and was Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE 
Transactions on Signal Processing from 1993-95.  
Dr. Etter was a member of the Naval Research Advisory Committee from 1991-97, and chaired the 
committee from 1995-97. She has received the Department of the Navy Distinguished Public Service 
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Award, the Secretary of Defense Outstanding Public Service Medal, and the Department of Defense 
Distinguished Public Service Medal. 
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Panel 1 - Plenary Panel - Acquisition Reform 
 
Wednesday, 
May 16, 2007 
Panel 1 - Plenary Panel - Acquisition Reform 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m.  
Chair:  
Jacques S. Gansler, Director, Center for Public Policy & Private 
Enterprise, University of Maryland, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
Discussants:  
William C. Greenwalt, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial 
Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics) 
Robert H. Trice, Senior Vice President, Business Development, 
Lockheed Martin Corporation 
Pierre Chao, Senior Fellow and Director of Defense Industrial Initiatives, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies  
 
Chair: Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, is the first holder of the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise. As the 
third ranking civilian at the Pentagon from 1997 to 2001, Professor Gansler was responsible for all 
research and development, acquisition reform, logistics, advanced technology, environmental 
security, defense industry, and numerous other security programs. Before joining the Clinton 
Administration, Dr. Gansler held a variety of positions in government and the private sector, including 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material Acquisition), Assistant Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering (Electronics), Vice President of ITT, and engineering and management positions 
with Singer and Raytheon Corporations. Throughout his career, Dr. Gansler has written, published 
and taught on subjects related to his work. He is the author of Defense Conversion: Transforming the 
Arsenal of Democracy, MIT Press, 1995; Affording Defense, MIT Press, 1989, and The Defense 
Industry, MIT Press, 1980. He has published numerous articles in Foreign Affairs, Harvard Business 
Review, International Security, Public Affairs, and other journals as well as newspapers and frequent 
Congressional testimonies. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a Fellow of 
the National Academy of Public Administration. 
Discussant: William C. Greenwalt, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), is the principal advisor to 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) and the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) on all matters relating to the defense industrial 
base. His office is responsible for ensuring that DoD policies, procedures, and actions stimulate and 
support vigorous competition and innovation in the industrial base supporting defense; and establish 
and sustain cost-effective industrial and technological capabilities that assure military readiness and 
superiority.  
Prior to joining DoD, Mr Greenwalt was a Professional Staff Member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (Senator John Warner, Chairman) from March 1999 until March 2006 and was 
responsible for defense acquisition policy, industrial base, export control, and management reform 
issues. In addition, from January 2004, he served as deputy to the staff director and provided 
oversight and management direction of the committee’s legislative activities. He was also a lead staff 
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member for the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support and the Subcommittee on 
Strategic Forces. Previously, he served on the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (Senator 
Fred Thompson, Chairman) as a Professional Staff Member responsible for federal management 
issues and committee press relations. 
Mr Greenwalt also served as a staff member for the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management (Senator William Cohen, Chairman) where he was responsible for 
legislative efforts to reform federal information technology acquisition culminating in the Clinger-
Cohen Act of 1996. Prior to coming to the Senate in 1994, Mr Greenwalt was a visiting fellow at the 
Center for Defense Economics, University of York, England, worked for the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service in Frankfurt, Germany and served as an evaluator with the US General 
Accounting Office in Los Angeles, California where he specialized in defense acquisition issues. 
Mr Greenwalt graduated from California State University at Long Beach in 1982 with a degree in 
political science and economics and received his MA in defense and security studies from the 
University of Southern California in 1989. He is married to Paula Mathews and they live with their son, 
Geoffrey, and daughter Jenna, in Arlington, VA. 
Discussant: Pierre Chao is a Senior Fellow and Director of Defense Industrial Initiatives, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. Before joining CSIS in 2003, Pierre was a managing director and 
senior aerospace/defense analyst at Credit Suisse First Boston from 1999-2003, where he was 
responsible for following the U.S. and global aerospace/defense industry. He remained a CSFB 
independent senior adviser from 2003-2006.  
Prior to joining CSFB, Pierre was the senior aerospace/defense analyst at Morgan Stanley Dean 
Witter from 1995-1999. He served as the senior aerospace/defense industry analyst at Smith Barney 
during 1994 and as a director at JSA International, a Boston/Paris-based management-consulting 
firm that focused on the aerospace/defense industry (1986-88, 1990-93). Pierre was also a co-
founder of JSA Research, an equity research boutique specializing in the aerospace/defense 
industry. Before signing on with JSA, he worked in the New York and London offices of Prudential-
Bache Capital Funding as a mergers and acquisitions banker focusing on aerospace/defense (1988-
90).  
Pierre garnered numerous awards while working on Wall Street. Institutional Investor ranked Pierre's 
team the number one global aerospace/defense group every year eligible from 2000-02 and he was 
on the Institutional Investor All-America Research Team every year eligible from 1996-2002. He was 
ranked the number one aerospace/defense analyst by corporations in the 1998-2000 Reuters Polls, 
the number one aerospace/defense analyst in the 1995-99 Greenwich Associates polls, and 
appeared on the Wall Street Journal All-Star list in four of seven eligible years.  
In 2000, Pierre was appointed to the Presidential Commission on Offsets in International Trade. He 
was a member of the 2005 Defense Science Board Summer Study (Assessment of Transformation), 
2006 DSB Summer Study (Strategic Technology Vectors), and the 2006/2007 DSB Task Force on 
the Health of the Defense Industry. He is also a guest lecturer at the National Defense University and 
the Defense Acquisition University. Pierre has been sought out as an expert analyst of the defense 
and aerospace industry by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Science Committee, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD Defense Science Board, Army Science Board, NASA, DGA 
(France), NATO and the Aerospace Industries Association Board of Governors. 
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May 16, 2007 
Panel 2 – Crossing the Valley of Death: Technology Transition 




John J. Kubricky, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advance Systems 
and Concepts) 
Discussant:  
Allan Shaffer, Director, Plans Programs and Office, Director Defense 
Research and Engineering 
Papers: 
Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DoD Technology Transition 
Practices 
Michael Sullivan, US Government Accountability Office 
Crossing the Technology Transfer Chasm: Network Externalities, 
Coordination Games and Lessons Learned from ACTDs 
Peter Coughlan, Nicholas Dew and William (Bill) Gates, Naval 
Postgraduate School 
Development vs. Deployment: How Mature Should a Technology Be 
before It Is Considered for Inclusion in an Acquisition Program? 
Michael J. Pennock, William B. Rouse and Diane L. Kollar, Tennenbaum 
Institute, Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
 
Chair:  John J. Kubricky, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Systems and Concepts), 
has oversight responsibilities for technology transition and transfer programs to include: Advanced 
Concept and Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations, Joint Warfighting Program, Foreign 
Comparative Test, Defense Acquisition Challenge, Technology Transition Initiative, ManTech, 
Defense Production Act Title III, Dual Use S&T, Independent Research and Development, and 
TechLink.  
Prior to taking this position in October, 2006, Mr. Kubricky was the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Director of Systems Engineering and Development with the Science & Technology 
Directorate. Mr. Kubricky’s primary responsibility was to integrate proven technologies into systems 
for demonstration, operational test and evaluation, and pre-production prototypes, which adaptation 
and deployment of military technologies for homeland security applications. He had also served as 
the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (HSARPA) acting director since July 
2005, where more than 100 advanced technology programs were managed by the agency under 
contracts with the private sector. HSARPA initiatives include a Small Business Innovative Research 
(SBIR) program, Technology Transfer, and Rapid Technology Application Program, each of which 
transitioned new security technologies to operational customers.  
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Before his service in the Federal government, Mr. Kubricky’s career in industry was as a prime 
systems integrator of tactical intelligence systems on airborne, ground and marine platforms. He is 
credited with designing, integrating and fielding the US Army’s first multi-sensor aircraft; for 
developing real-time multi-sensor fusion work-stations that became a baseline for today’s tactical 
intelligence processing systems; and for prototypes of Unmanned and Optionally Piloted Airborne 
Vehicles, which achieved over 25,000 flight hours in world-wide deployments. In addition to 
innovations in tactical intelligence programs, Mr. Kubricky is a veteran program manager of strategic 
reconnaissance development, manufacturing and test/evaluation programs.  
Mr. Kubricky holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Johns Hopkins University, where he also 
attended the graduate program for Industrial Management. Mr. Kubricky’s service with the US Army 
includes a tour with the Ninth Infantry Division in Vietnam during 1968 and 1969. He and his wife Joy, 
have one son, and live in Maryland. 
Discussant: Allan Shaffer, Director, Plans Programs and Office, Director Defense Research and 
Engineering, is responsible for budget and planning oversight of the entire Department of Defense 
Science and Technology Program. Mr. Shaffer earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mathematics 
from the University of Vermont in 1976, and was commissioned in the United States Air Force. He 
was then assigned to the University of Utah, where he earned a second Bachelor of Science Degree 
in Meteorology. He also earned a Master of Science in Meteorology from the Naval Postgraduate 
School (with distinction). 
He then had a number of assignments in weather, intelligence, and science and technology 
management. He was assigned to Mather AFB, Sacramento, California, as the Wing Weather Officer 
to the 323d Flying Training Wing and the 320th Bombardment Wing (Heavy). In 1984, he was 
assigned to the Foreign Technology Division (FTD), where he was an intelligence analyst and staff 
meteorologist, assessing the technical capabilities of the Former Soviet Union, as well as the 
performance of Soviet weapons systems, including assessment of the impact of the atmosphere on 
Soviet military laser systems. While at Wright-Patterson, Mr. Shaffer had an extended temporary duty 
as officer in charge, Weather Support Force, Palmerola Air Base, Honduras. He was also named Air 
Weather Service Junior Officer of the Year. 
From Ohio, he became Commander, Detachment 2, 7th Weather Squadron, Hanau, Germany, 
providing all weather support to the 3rd Armored Division, then Chief, Plans and Programs at the 5th 
Weather Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. In this position, Mr. Shaffer was responsible for all 
combat support plans and financial matters for approximately 50 weather units assigned to Air 
Combat Command and the US Army Forces Command. Additionally, he planned and integrated 
technology capabilities from defense laboratories into operations. From Langely, in 1993, he was 
assigned to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Ft. McNair, D. C., where he was awarded a 
Master of Science in National Resource Management. 
Next, he was assigned to Hq Air Force, with assignments as Chief, Plans Division; Chief Interagency 
Affairs; and Chief, Resources Division, USAF Directorate of Weather. In these positions, he planned 
and assigned resource allocation for existing and future Air Force systems. In 1996, he was assigned 
as Specialist for Battlespace Environments, Defense Research and Engineering. In this position, he 
was responsible for oversight of the DoD technology base programs in Oceanography, Terrain and 
Topography, Meteorology and Space Physics. In 1998, he became the Military Assistant to the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology) 
In 1999, he took his last military position as Director, Plans and Programs, Air Force Weather 
Agency, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Upon retirement from active military duty in 2000, he returned to the 
Pentagon as a career civil servant and became Director, Multi-Disciplinary Systems, Office of the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology. He assumed his current position in 
March 2001.  
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Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DoD Technology 
Transition Processes 
Presenter: Michael Sullivan currently serves as Director, Acquisition and Sourcing 
Management, at the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). This group has responsibility 
for examining the effectiveness of agency acquisition and procurement practices in meeting their 
mission performance objectives and requirements. In addition to directing reviews of major 
weapon system acquisitions, Mr. Sullivan has developed and directs a body of work examining 
how the Department of Defense (DoD) can apply best commercial practices to the nation’s 
largest and most technically advanced weapon systems. This work has spanned a broad range of 
issues critical to the successful delivery of systems, including quality assurance, transition to 
production, technology inclusion, requirement setting, design and manufacturing, reducing total 
ownership cost, software management, and affordability. His team also provides the Congress 
with early warning on technical and management challenges facing these investments.  
Mr. Sullivan has been with GAO for 20 years. He received a BS in Political Science from Indiana 
University and an MS in Public Administration from the School of Public and Environmental 
Affairs, Indiana University. 
Michael Sullivan 
Phone: (202) 512-4841  
E-mail: sullivanm@gao.gov  
What GAO Found 
Leading commercial companies use three key techniques for successfully 
developing and transitioning technologies, with the basic premise being that 
technologies must be mature before transitioning to the product line side.  
 Strategic planning at the corporate level: Strategic planning precedes technology 
development so managers can gauge market needs, identify the most desirable 
technologies, and prioritize resources.  
 Gated management reviews: A rigorous process is used to ensure a technology’s 
relevancy and feasibility and enlist product line commitment to use the technologies 
once the labs are finished maturing them.  
 Corroborating tools: To secure commitment, technology transition agreements 
solidify and document specific cost, schedule, and performance metrics labs need to 
meet for transition to occur. Relationship managers address transition issues within 
the labs and product line teams and across both communities. Meaningful metrics 
gauge project progress and process effectiveness.  
Not only does DOD lack the breadth and depth of these techniques, the 
department routinely accepts high levels of technology risk at the start of major weapon 
acquisition programs. The acquisition community works with technologies before they 
are ready to be transitioned and takes on responsibility for technology development and 
product development concurrently, as shown in the following figure. A defined phase for 
technology transition is not evident. These shortcomings contribute significantly to 
DOD’s poor cost and schedule outcomes.  
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Why GAO did this Study 
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on its science and technology 
community to develop innovative technologies for weapon systems, spending $13 billion 
on basic, applied, and advanced technology research. Several GAO reports have 
addressed problems in transitioning technologies to the acquisition community. This 
report, which was prepared under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct 
evaluations, compares DOD’s technology transition processes with commercial best 
practices. Specifically, GAO identifies technology transition techniques used by leading 
companies and assesses the extent to which DOD uses the techniques.  
What GAO Recommends 
GAO recommends that DOD strengthen its technology transition processes by 
developing a gated process with criteria to support funding decisions; expanding the use 
of transition agreements, relationship managers, and metrics; and setting aside funding 
for transition activities. DOD generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations with the 
exception of adopting process-oriented metrics and setting aside funding for transition. It 
cited ongoing initiatives it believes address several of the recommendations. GAO 
believes DOD’s actions to date are incomplete and all recommendations warrant further 
attention.  
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-883.  
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. 
For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 
sullivanm@gao.gov. 
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Crossing the Technology Transfer Chasm: Network 
Externalities, Coordination Games and Lessons Learned 
from ACTDs 
Presenter: Pete Coughlan is an Associate Professor of Economics and Strategic Management at 
the Naval Postgraduate School.  His research focuses on game theory and experimental economics.  
He received a PhD in economics from the California Institute of Technology and taught strategy for 
five years in the MBA program at the Harvard School of Business before joining the NPS faculty.  He 
has published numerous Harvard Business School Case Studies as well as several publications in 
academic journals. 
Author: Nick Dew is an Assistant Professor of Strategic Management at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA.  His research focuses on entrepreneurial decision-making and industry 
evolution.  He has a PhD in management from the University of Virginia, a MBA from the Darden 
School, and a BA in history from the University of York (UK).  His work experience includes eight 
years working internationally for British Petroleum.  He has published in several academic journals, 
including Strategic Management Journal, the Journal of Business Venturing, the Journal of Business 
Ethics, the Journal of Evolutionary Economics and Industrial and Corporate Change. 
Author: Bill Gates is Associate Professor of Economics and Associate Dean of Research in the 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School.  He received his PhD in 
Economics from Yale University and worked as an economist at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory before 
joining the NPS faculty.  His research focuses on public goods, game theory, incentives and 
asymmetric information, and cost-benefit analysis.  He has published in the Journal of Defense and 
Peace Economics, International Studies Quarterly, Research Policy, International Public 
Management Journal and Defense and Security Analysis. 
Abstract 
Technology transfer, getting new and improved weapon systems into the hands of 
our warfighters, has been a persistent problem in the Department of Defense.  Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), more recently re-designated Joint Concept 
Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs), have been introduced to help facilitate the technology 
transfer process.  ACTDs programs are designed to demonstrate commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) technologies that can be modified to serve joint service requirements.  COTS 
technology and joint service requirements are two essential features for ACTDs.  Once the 
technology has been demonstrated, the ACTD is expected to be transferred to a program of 
record for acquisition and fielding.   
Unfortunately, ACTDs have frequently experienced trouble crossing what has been 
referred to as the “chasm,” the transition from successful technology demonstration and 
usage by early adopters to acquisition and fielding by a significant share of potential users.  
In actuality, the transition from technology demonstration to acquisition and fielding for joint 
service technologies involves coordination across several stakeholders and network 
externalities (network externalities are present when adoption by one stakeholder affects the 
benefits of adoption by other stakeholders—a characteristic common in joint service 
programs).   
Analysis of these programs inevitably raises questions about the causes of relative 
“success” or “failure” of technology transfer, particularly when the programs involve a large 
number of DoD stakeholders.  Much research on the success of acquisition programs 
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focuses on program management.  For example, a recent GAO report criticized the 
management of the DoD’s passive RFID acquisition program (Solis, 2005, September).  We 
think that experimenting with coordination (weak-link) games and/or network externality 
models in the lab might shed some light on why certain types of coordination problems arise 
in the first place, how decision-makers can be expected to respond, and what might be done 
about them. 
Research has long explored these issues. The key insight this research brings to the 
table is that all coordination problems generally exhibit the same underlying properties—i.e., 
they can be reduced to a single simple and parsimonious “game” called a “weak-link” game 
that is played by multiple individuals who depend on each other for the overall result or 
outcome of the game.  This weak-link game has already been “played” in experimental 
economics laboratories, and there is emerging research literature on the properties of this 
game and the implications of these lab discoveries for real-life situations that are analogous 
to the weak-link game.  In part, this research plans to extend this model to coordination in 
technology transfer. 
At the same time, the theory of network externalities is well developed; but, there is 
limited experimental data indicating how decision-makers might respond to alternative policy 
mechanisms.  In theory, decision-makers will under-value their decisions to adopt new 
technology because they will not internalize the value their adoption decisions have on other 
potential adopters.  This might help explain the reluctance of individual services to be early 
adopters for joint service technologies.  Empirically exploring network externalities in 
experimental settings might help shed light on how to best address this market imperfection 
in military technology diffusion, particularly as ACTDs face the technology transfer chasm. 
This research examines the past transition successes and failures of ACTD 
programs and uses this experience to develop a model(s) of the coordination issues and/or 
network externalities involved in the technology transfer process.  Once developed, this 
research proposes to develop economic experiments involving coordination games and 
network externalities to see if this empirical evidence can emulate the technology transfer 
chasm.   
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Development vs. Deployment: How Mature Should a 
Technology be Before it is Considered for Inclusion in an 
Acquisition Program? 
 
Presenter: Michael Pennock is a research fellow for the Tennenbaum Institute for Enterprise 
Transformation as well as a PhD candidate in Industrial and Systems Engineering at Georgia Tech.  
He has previously worked as a systems engineer for the Northrop Grumman Corporation, and he 
earned his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Systems Engineering from the University of Virginia.  
His research focuses on adapting economic analysis to address problems in systems engineering. 
Author: Bill Rouse is the Executive Director of the Tennenbaum Institute at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology.  He is also a professor in the College of Computing and School of Industrial and 
Systems Engineering.  Rouse has written hundreds of articles and book chapters, and has authored 
many books, including most recently People and Organizations: Explorations of Human-Centered 
Design (Wiley, 2007), Essential Challenges of Strategic Management (Wiley, 2001) and the award-
winning Don’t Jump to Solutions (Jossey-Bass, 1998).  He is editor of Enterprise Transformation: 
Understanding and Enabling Fundamental Change (Wiley, 2006), co-editor of Organizational 
Simulation: From Modeling & Simulation to Games & Entertainment (Wiley, 2005), co-editor of the 
best-selling Handbook of Systems Engineering and Management (Wiley, 1999), and editor of the 
eight-volume series Human/Technology Interaction in Complex Systems (Elsevier).  Among many 
advisory roles, he has served as Chair of the Committee on Human Factors of the National Research 
Council, a member of the US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, and a member of the DoD Senior 
Advisory Group on Modeling and Simulation.  Rouse is a member of the National Academy of 
Engineering, as well as a fellow of four professional societies— Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), the Institute for 
Operations Research and Management Science, and the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. 
Author: Diane Kollar is Director of Industry and Government Relations for the Tennenbaum Institute 
at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Prior to this position, she was the Director of Development for 
the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering at Georgia Tech. She has held several positions at 
Georgia Tech before which she was Associate Director of Development at The Carter Center. She 
has served in various other development roles in a range of nonprofits, including positions in 
corporate relations and public relations. Her interests and expertise include resource-development 
strategy formulation and organizational implementation, particularly in public sector and nonprofit 
enterprises, as well as public policy issues associated with such strategies and organizations. Ms. 
Kollar received her BA in Government and International Studies and Master of Public Administration 
from the University of South Carolina. She also attended the Bryce Harlow Institute on Business and 
Government Affairs at Georgetown University and studied organizational behavior at Florida Atlantic 
University. 
Michael J. Pennock 
Research Fellow 
Tennenbaum Institute 
755 Ferst Drive 
Atlanta, GA 30332-0205 
mpennock@ti.gatech.edu 
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Modern military systems increasingly rely on the integration of multiple advanced 
technologies.  While these technologies vastly increase warfighter capabilities, they also 
introduce risk into the system design and development process that tends to increase both 
its cost and duration.  As acquisition cycle-times increase, warfighters must make do with 
dated technology for longer periods.  Thus, there is an incentive to push as many advanced 
technologies as possible into each program to maximize warfighter capability over the next 
acquisition cycle.  Unfortunately, the more new technologies a system has, the more risky its 
acquisition becomes, and consequently, its duration and cost increase even further.  Thus, 
there is a feedback effect that exacerbates the problem.  Open-architecture designs can 
partially alleviate this problem, but some technology decisions are so integral to a system’s 
design that they cannot be relegated to future upgrades.  Consequently, there is a tradeoff 
between incorporating these technologies now and increasing program risk or developing 
and evaluating them further but potentially postponing their application to future acquisition 
cycles.   Our paper will examine this tradeoff by considering a new technology’s contribution 
to program risk. 
Introduction 
Despite repeated attempts at reforming the defense acquisition process, Defense 
Department programs continue to experience substantial cost overruns, schedule delays, 
and performance shortfalls.  While there are likely multiple causes for reform failure, this 
paper aims to address only one of the critical issues that contribute to these acquisition 
challenges. That issue is the maturity of critical technologies employed in major defense 
acquisition programs. 
There have been repeated calls for the Department of Defense to use evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary acquisition strategies.  In fact, the DoD has revised its acquisition 
polices to that end (GAO, 2003).  Despite these new policies, recent GAO reports have 
indicated that most major acquisition programs are still revolutionary rather than evolutionary 
and do not follow current DoD guidelines for knowledge-based acquisition (GAO, 2006, April 
5; 2006, April 13; 2006, December 21).  It seems that every program is an exception. Why is 
this? 
To that end, this paper investigates two key questions:  What level of maturity is 
acceptable for a technology to be included in a major acquisition program, and what 
obstacles prevent the DoD from implementing an evolutionary acquisition process? 
Our findings will show that, relatively speaking, it is better to employ mature 
technologies; thus, an evolutionary strategy is superior under most circumstances to a 
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revolutionary strategy in terms of getting capabilities delivered to the warfighter.  We also 
found, however, that when a program relies on multiple, critical technologies, especially 
those intended for a multi-mission role, the evolutionary strategy is unstable.  There is a 
natural tendency to revert to the revolutionary technology strategy even though it is not in 
the best interest of the warfighter. 
This paper is structured in the following manner.  First, we discuss the background of 
knowledge-based, evolutionary acquisition and why it is considered important for defense 
acquisition.  Second, we develop a high-level simulation model of acquisition to help us 
investigate these issues.  Third, we use the model to analyze defense acquisition policy 
alternatives regarding technological maturity.  Finally, we conclude with the policy 
implications of this analysis.  
Background 
The troubled history of the DoD acquisition system (as well as the repeated attempts 
to reform it) are well known, and we will not recount them here (See Pennock, Rouse & 
Kollar, 2007 and GAO, 2006, April 13).  Instead, our focus will be on the more recent 
attempts to reform the acquisition system by employing knowledge-based business 
practices and evolutionary acquisition. 
A common criticism of the defense acquisition process is that it tends to emphasize 
large leaps in capability achieved by utilizing promising but immature technology.  Changes 
to defense acquisition policy over the last several years have attempted to reverse this trend 
by creating a milestone process in which programs must meet certain requirements before 
proceeding from one phase to the next (DOD, 2003a, 2003b). (See Figure 1.)  Part of this 
milestone process is an assessment of the maturity of technologies to be employed in 
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Figure 1. Defense Acquisition Management Framework 
 (DoD, 2003b) 
 
Technological maturity is typically assessed using the Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL) scale (Table 1).  The TRL scale is a qualitative assessment scale that is designed to 
aid decision-makers by providing some sense of a given technology’s level of risk.  In 
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general, one assumes that the higher the TRL level, the less uncertainty a technology brings 
to a program.  It is important to note that the TRL scale evaluates a technology in isolation 
and does not consider the integration risks (Smailing & deWeck 2007).  Regardless, the 
aforementioned policy changes encourage programs to utilize more mature, demonstrated 
technologies (i.e., higher TRL levels) rather than more immature and, consequently, more 
risky technologies.  For example, qualification to enter the system development phase 
nominally requires all critical technologies to be at TRL level 6 or higher (though the GAO 
recommends at least TRL level 7 (GAO 2006, April 13)). 
Technology Readiness Level Description 
1.  Basic principles observed 
and reported. 
Lowest level of technology readiness.  Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and 
development.  Examples might include paper studies of a 
technology's basic properties. 
2.  Technology concept and/or 
application formulated. 
Invention begins.  Once basic principles are observed, practical 
applications can be invented.  Applications are speculative, and 
there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the 
assumptions.  Examples are limited to analytic studies. 
3.  Analytical and experimental 
critical function and/or 
characteristic proof of concept. 
Active research and development is initiated.  This includes 
analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically validate 
analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology.  Examples include components that are not yet 
integrated or representative. 
4.  Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
laboratory environment. 
Basic technological components are integrated to establish that 
they will work together.  This is relatively "low fidelity" compared 
to the eventual system.  Examples include integration of "ad 
hoc" hardware in the laboratory. 
5.  Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
relevant environment. 
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.  The 
basic technological components are integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so it can be tested in a simulated 
environment.  Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory 
integration of components. 
6.  System/subsystem model 
or prototype demonstration in a 
relevant environment. 
Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment.  Represents a major step up in a technology's 
demonstrated readiness.  Examples include testing a prototype 
in a high-fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated 
operational environment. 
7.  System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational environment. 
Prototype near, or at, planned operational system.  Represents 
a major step up from TRL 6, requiring demonstration of an 
actual system prototype in an operational environment such as 
an aircraft, vehicle, or space.  Examples include testing the 
prototype in a test-bed aircraft. 
8.  Actual system completed 
and qualified through test and 
demonstration. 
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under 
expected conditions.  In almost all cases, this TRL represents 
the end of true system development.  Examples include 
developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended 
weapon system to determine if it meets design specifications. 
9.  Actual system proven 
through successful mission 
operations. 
Actual application of the technology in its final form and under 
mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational 
test and evaluation.  Examples include using the system under 
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operational mission conditions. 
Table 1. DoD Technology Readiness Levels 
(DoD, 2006, Ch. 10.5.2) 
 
What is the rationale behind a policy that requires a relatively mature level of 
technology?   The issue is that development of immature technology is fairly unpredictable 
in terms of cost, schedule, and efficacy.  When a program contains multiple immature 
technologies, these tend to delay the program and add cost.  If technology development is 
done in concurrence with system development, the problem can be exacerbated because 
unforeseen outcomes can lead to significant rework.  The net result is that, on average, 
programs with immature technologies will take longer and cost more.  Consequently, 
warfighters must make due with obsolete equipment longer, thus increasing the chances 
that they will engage in combat operations with less capability than they could have had 
otherwise. 
As a result, it would seem that a superior approach would be to reduce cycle-time by 
setting more modest goals for each deployed increment of capability.  This is often referred 
to as an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary acquisition process, and there are several 
ways to achieve such a process.  First, one can make use of open-architecture design and 
spiral development.  The idea behind spiral development is that the system can be deployed 
with an initial mature technology, which can then be upgraded over time (Johnson & 
Johnson, 2002).  This approach can work well for technologies that are loosely coupled to 
the system design.  In other words, there is a clear, well-defined interface such that changes 
in the implementation of the subsystem or technology to be upgraded do not interfere with 
the rest of the system.  Open architecture design is perfect for a technology such as a 
software algorithm.  Assuming that the software interface has been standardized, it is 
comparatively straightforward to replace an old software component with a new one.  This 
approach, in fact, has been demonstrated successfully on submarine acoustic systems 
(Boudreau, 2006). 
When technologies or subsystems are tightly coupled to the overall system, 
however, any changes to the design of the subsystem impact the design of the whole 
system.  Thus, open-architecture design is not always a feasible alternative.  An extreme 
example would be the hull-form of a surface combatant.  Take, for instance, the tumblehome 
hull design of the new Zumwalt-class destroyer.  If some critical issues were to arise with the 
hull design, it is likely that a significant portion of the ship would have to be redesigned.  Of 
course, hull form is a rather obvious case, but there are many mission-critical systems in any 
modern military system that exhibit varying degrees of interaction with the rest of the system 
design.  Since changes to these systems would require substantial rework, it is imperative 
that they be mature prior to system integration, hence the appeal of evolutionary acquisition. 
Under evolutionary acquisition, system acquisition cycles are more rapid and make 
use of mature, available technology.  The development of new technologies is detached 
from the acquisition process, so that the fate of a program does not hinge on the success or 
failure of any one risky technology.  The evolutionary design process is enforced via a 
knowledge-based acquisition process.  The program contains a number of evaluation points 
or milestones.  At each milestone, the program must demonstrate that it has met certain 
developmental requirements in order to proceed to the next phase.  For example, Milestone 
A entails requirements such as an Initial Capabilities Document, an Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA), a Systems Engineering Plan (SEP), and Technology Readiness Assessment. 
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Despite the fact that the DoD acknowledges evolutionary and knowledge-based 
acquisition as best practices and has committed them to policy, recent GAO reports have 
indicated that most major acquisition programs do not follow these polices (GAO, 2006, April 
5; 2006, April 13; 2006, December 21).  Consequently, these major acquisition programs 
have continued to experience significant cost overruns and major delays.  In particular, 
these reports have indicated that most major acquisition programs are revolutionary rather 
than evolutionary, and they are permitted to bypass major milestone requirements.  Most 
rely on multiple immature technologies that are not fully developed before overall system 
development begins.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has acknowledged that 
this is a common practice (GAO 2006, April 13). 
One example in particular that makes the consequences of this acquisition approach 
clear is the case of WIN-T and JNN-N.  The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-
T) is the next generation tactical communications network for the US Army and will provide a 
major leap forward in battlefield communications.  However, when the program moved into 
the system-development phase, 9 of the system’s 12 critical technologies were immature 
(GAO 2006, December 21).  As a result, WIN-T has been unavailable for both Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.  Because it was determined that there was 
an urgent need for better battlefield communications to support these two operations, the 
Joint Network Node-Network (JNN-N) program was created.  To address this urgent need, 
the JNN-N program bypassed many of the normal acquisition procedures to accelerate 
fielding of the system.   While this may be understandable given the urgency of the situation, 
acquisition procedures are in place to ensure that acquired systems function properly and 
are cost-effective.  As the GAO points out:  
When the Army opted to pursue large technology advances in networking 
capabilities to support the future forces through WIN-T, rather than pursuing a 
more incremental approach, it accepted a gap in providing tactical networking 
capabilities to the warfighter […] If the Army had followed DOD’s acquisition 
policy preferences, which emphasize achieving capabilities in increments 
based on mature technologies to get capabilities into the hands of the user 
more quickly, it might have been able to get needed communications 
capabilities to the warfighter sooner. (GAO 2006, December 21) 
Thus, a more evolutionary approach to acquisition may have reduced the risks to the 
warfighter by both avoiding capability gaps as well as mitigating the need for emergency 
programs that bypass the usual acquisition procedures. 
To summarize, the Department of Defense claims to favor evolutionary acquisition, 
but does not follow through in practice.  The GAO asserts that there are a number of causes 
for this, one of which is the lack of mandatory controls on the milestone process (GAO 2003, 
2006, April 5, 2006, April 13, 2006, December 21).  But if evolutionary acquisition is 
superior, why would the DoD not follow its tenets even without the mandatory controls?  
There are really two possibilities.  Either evolutionary acquisition is not the best approach 
and when given the flexibility program managers avoid it, or the nature of the acquisition 
system itself works against the successful implementation of evolutionary methods. 
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To better understand the nature of evolutionary acquisition, we must model the 
impact of a program’s technology strategy on the level of capability actually deployed in the 
field.  In particular, a technology strategy consists of the technologies selected to improve 
each capability that a system provides.  A technology policy that emphasizes major 
increases in capability would likely rely on immature technology and, thus, would be a 
revolutionary strategy.   Consequently, the acquisition program will require a substantial 
technology development phase.  On the other hand, a technology strategy that emphasizes 
small improvements in technology would rely on more mature technology and could be 
considered an evolutionary strategy.  This type of strategy effectively detaches technology 
development from the acquisition program and, consequently, would have a relatively short 
technology-development phase. 
What we would like to examine is the impact of the selected technology strategy over 
the long-term.  Thus, we are concerned with the deployed capability resulting from a 
sequence of acquisition programs.  In particular, we are assuming that our objective is to 
improve the capabilities of a particular class of system such as a surface combatant or air 
superiority fighter.  To model this, we must establish a means to link the selected technology 
strategy to the time required to complete an acquisition program.  This will determine when a 
capability improvement is deployed.  After an acquisition program completes, we assume 
that another begins immediately to procure the next iteration of that system. 
To accomplish this, we will assume that we can model each acquisition program as a 
small PERT chart.  PERT charts are a common program management tool for managing 
schedule risk.  For our particular model, we will assume a fairly simple formulation.  We will 
assume that there is a technology-development stage followed by a system-integration 
stage.  Each acquisition program contains a number of critical technologies that must be 
developed for the program to reach a successful conclusion.  We will assume that each 
critical technology can be developed in parallel, but all must be complete before system 
integration can begin.  This is an admitted simplification that works both for and against the 
acquisition program.  The assumption of parallel technology development is somewhat 
optimistic as the outcome of each critical technology may be somewhat interdependent.  
The assumption that all development must be completed is somewhat pessimistic because 
some integration work can be done based on the estimated outcome of technology 
development.  However, since unanticipated outcomes in the technology-development 
phase can lead to substantial rework in the integration phase, this is not an unreasonable 
assumption.  Given those assumptions, we can structure each acquisition program as 
shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Simplified PERT Chart for an Acquisition Program 
Keeping in line with the standard PERT formulation, we will assume that the duration 
of each technology development activity is stochastic and beta distributed (Figure 3).  The 
beta distribution is appealing is this context because it has finite upper and lower bounds on 
the activity duration, hence its use in PERT. 
 
Figure 3. Example Beta Distribution (α = 2, β = 5) 
 
One notion we would like to capture is the relationship between the maturity of a 
technology selected for an acquisition program and the amount of schedule risk it entails.  It 
is fairly safe to assume that the more immature a technology is, the more schedule risk there 
is in its development.  In fact, we can go one step further and assume that it follows the law 
of diminishing returns.  In other words, each additional increment of schedule risk that we 
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accept buys a reduced amount of gain in capability.  To make this relationship more 
concrete, we must select metrics for the gain in capability and the level of schedule risk.  For 
the former, we will consider the percent gain in capability over the currently deployed 
capability.  Thus, a relatively low percent gain would be considered an evolutionary 
technology whereas a large percent gain would be a revolutionary technology.  Since we 
would only accept an immature technology in exchange for an increase in capability, we can 
assume that for the purposes of our model, the percent gain in capability is also an 
acceptable proxy for technological maturity.  As for the risk, we will assume that schedule 
risk is encapsulated in the upper bound of the probability distribution for the duration of 
technology development.  For the sake of simplicity, the lower bound and shape parameters 
of the beta distribution will remain constant.  Thus, if we select a particular percent gain in 
capability as our technology policy, it determines a particular upper bound on the distribution 
of the development time of that technology.  This is illustrated in Figure 4.  When we change 
the upper bound of the distribution, two things occur.  We increase the expected time to 
develop the technology, and we increase the spread of the distribution.   
 
Figure 4. Tradeoff between Risk (the Upper Bound on the Duration of Technology 
Development) and Return (the Growth in Capability) 
 
We define a technology policy as the targeted percent gain in capability for each 
acquisition program.  Thus, if a more aggressive target is selected, there will be a greater 
increase in capability for each new system deployed.  However, the expected duration of the 
acquisition cycle will also increase.  Given our model structure, we can use Monte Carlo 
simulation to generate possible capability trajectories.  This is accomplished in the following 
manner.  First, sample from the beta distribution for each technology is included in the 
acquisition program.  The integration phase cannot begin until all technology development is 
complete, so the longest sampled time dictates the length of the technology-development 
phase.  That time plus the time required for integration is the total time required for the 
acquisition program.  At the end of the acquisition program, each capability is increased by 
the gain targeted in the technology policy.  The process then repeats again with the next 
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acquisition program.  This yields a capability trajectory for the technology policy.  One 
example is shown in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Sample Capability Trajectory 
 
We see in Figure 5 that, with our model, the capability trajectory is a step function 
because of the discrete nature of acquisition programs.  Thus, we see that the longer the 
acquisition cycle, the longer warfighters must make due with older equipment.  To facilitate 
analysis, we would like to capture the value of any given capability trajectory as a single 
number.  We will do so through the average deployed capability.  To calculate the average 
deployed capability, we select a time horizon, say 50 years, and then calculate the average 
value of capability over that time interval.  While this is not a perfect metric, the notion we 
are trying to capture is the level of capability that warfighters can expect from their 
equipment if they are forced to engage in hostilities without warning.  This allows us to 
compare the competing strategies of small-but-rapid capability increments versus large-but-
infrequent capability increments.  If we generate many sample capability trajectories for a 
particular technology policy, we can calculate the expected average deployed capability to 
evaluate the efficacy of that policy.  
Analysis Results 
The first question we would like to consider is whether it is better to pursue an 
evolutionary vs. a revolutionary technology strategy.  From a purely performance standpoint, 
we can answer this question using the model we described above but with only a single 
technology for each acquisition program.  To make this more concrete, we will assume 
some parameter values and run our Monte Carlo simulation over a range of technology 
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between 10 and 30%.  The relationship to the upper bound of the duration distribution is 
described in Figure 4.  This is just the function: 
Function 1. ( ) 4771210Bound Upper 0718410Gain Capability ..=  
Of course, other functional forms are possible, and we will discuss these in more 
detail later.  Under this function, the upper bound of the resulting beta distribution can vary 
between 2 and 20 years.  As far as defining the rest of the beta distribution, the lower bound 
is always 2 years, and the shape parameters are α = 2 and β = 5.  For the purposes of 
calculating the average deployed capability, the initial level of capability is always one, and 
the time horizon is 50 years.  To emphasize the impact of technology development, we will 
assume that the duration of the system-integration step is zero.  When we run the Monte 
Carlo simulation for the for possible technology policies within the range of 10 to 30% 
capability gain, we obtain the results that are depicted in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Performance of Technology Policies for a Single Technology 
 
We can see in Figure 6 that there is a single optimal technology policy for our 
performance metric: expected average deployed capability.  In fact, the optimal policy is a 
relatively modest 13.8% target improvement in capability for each acquisition cycle.  This 
policy results in an expected average deployed capability of 4.31.  This result seems to 
suggest that from a performance standpoint it is better to take smaller, more frequent steps 
than larger, less frequent steps.  In other words, evolutionary is better than revolutionary.  
But is this always the case?  There are two critical features of this model that we can vary.  
First, we can alter the integration time.  In the above case, it was set to zero.  But if, for 
example, it was set to two years, the single technology optimal policy increases to 20%.  
This result is reasonable because longer integration times essentially impose more 
overhead on the acquisition process.  Consequently, it is advantageous to target a larger 
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increase in capability to compensate for the integration delay.  However, in this model, 
system integration is not linked to the maturity of the technology selected.  In some cases, a 
more immature technology may be more difficult to integrate with the rest of the system and, 
hence, would actually exacerbate delays. 
Impact of Risk vs. Return 
The second feature of the model we should consider is the shape of the curve that 
relates risk and return.  The function used in our model is displayed in Figure 4.  This curve 
exhibits the diminishing return to increasing risk that was mentioned earlier.  But what would 
happen if the penalty for additional risk were more severe?  In other words, what if taking on 
large amounts of risk resulted in very little gain in capability?  As an excursion, we will 
assume that the relationship between the gain in capability and the upper bound of duration 
is determined by the following exponential relationship. 
Function 2. 0.300001e -0.81104Gain Capability Bound Upper -0.7 +=  
We find that under this risk-return model, the optimal single technology policy 
increases to 26%.  If, on the other hand, we removed the diminishing returns to risk entirely, 
we would use the following linear relationship: 
Function 3. ( ) 0.077778 Bound Upper0.011111Gain Capability +=  
Under this function our optimal policy is 10%, the minimum allowable.  This behavior 
is perhaps better understood visually.  Figure 7 shows all three of the curves discussed.  
Note that all three pass through the same maximum and minimum points, so the issue is just 
the shape of the curve.  Notice also that the exponential curve increases sharply then 
flattens out.  The high initial derivative means that on the lower end of the curve, one can 
actually gain quite a bit of capability for very little risk.   But the curve quickly flattens out 
such that each additional gain in capability requires a huge increase in risk.  Thus, there is a 
natural optimal point.  The same is true for the baseline curve. While it is not as severe, 
there is essentially a natural optimal increment size.  For the linear curve, the derivative is 
constant, so the best strategy is to minimize the size of the increment.  In this extreme case 
in which there is no integration time, we can essentially deploy infinitesimally small 
increments of capability continuously.   Thus, the linear case ensures that the best possible 
capability is available at any time.  While this case would be desirable, it is certainly not 
realistic.  Something akin to the baseline case is more reasonable because, in reality, there 
is usually some minimum reasonable increment that can be deployed. 
 =




Figure 7. Comparison of Different Risk-return Relationships 
 
It is important to note that changing the scale of the risk-return relationship will 
certainly change the optimal policy, but here we focused on the shape. This is because the 
shape of the curve is what determines how aggressive the optimal policy is within the 
feasible ranges of capability and risk.  What we can conclude from this analysis is that, from 
a performance standpoint, there is a natural optimal technology policy, and, except in 
extreme circumstances, that policy is not going to be the maximum achievable leap in 
capability. 
Impact of Multiple Technologies 
Thus, for a single technology we find that the best policy will most likely be to take 
small steps with more mature technologies; but what happens when a program depends on 
the integration of multiple critical technologies?  First, we will assume that each technology 
provides a different capability.   For example, a multi-mission surface combatant would have 
critical technologies that provide anti-air and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.   
Presumably, stakeholders for each area or capability would want to maximize their 
respective average deployed capability.  But with multiple technologies in the same 
program, the actions of one affect the outcome for others.  For example, the selection of an 
immature technology for anti-air warfare could delay the delivery of the next ship class and, 
consequently, delay the deployment of the next generation of anti-submarine warfare 
technology.  From the perspective of stakeholders in anti-submarine warfare, the expected 
delay means that if they must wait, they should target a larger gain in capability for their area 
to compensate for the delay.  But since program completion depends on both technologies, 
the reciprocating decision could actually exacerbate delays further. In order to understand 
stakeholder behavior when a program incorporates multiple critical technologies, we will 
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employ game theory. (For an introductory treatment of game theory see Gibbons (1992).  
For a more advanced treatment see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).) 
Game theory allows us to consider the strategies of rational competing parties.  A 
technology policy would be the targeted percent increase for each capability for each 
acquisition cycle.  For example, for anti-air we might target a 15% increase per cycle, while 
for anti-submarine we might target a 10% increase.  Presumably, stakeholders for each area 
want to maximize the average deployed capability for their area of concern.  To employ 
game theory, we must find the best response functions for the stakeholders for each of the 
capability areas.  We can accomplish this by finding the optimal response to each possible 
action by the other player.  Any intersection points between the best response functions 
constitute Nash equilibria.  A Nash equilibrium is a stable point in strategy at which either 
player would be worse off if they deviated from that strategy.  To demonstrate this concept, 
we will assume that there are two critical technologies in each acquisition program.  Both 
have the identical risk-return behavior from the baseline case above. The resulting best 
response functions can be seen in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Stakeholder Best Response Functions for a System with Two Critical 
Technologies  
(The intersection of the two functions is the Nash equilibrium.) 
 
The plotted points in Figure 8 represent the best responses over the selected 
policies.  Since Monte Carlo simulation was used, there is some statistical noise in these 
results.  Consequently, a linear function was fit to the best response data for each player.  
We can see from the best response functions that the two players engage in reciprocating 
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the other player is to increase his as well.  Since we assumed two identical players, the 
Nash equilibrium is symmetric and much more aggressive than what is optimal for a system 
with single critical technology.  In fact, the equilibrium solution is for each player to target a 
23% increase in capability for each acquisition cycle—resulting in an average deployed 
capability of 2.7 for each.  This is far below the optimal single technology result of 4.31.  The 
practical implication is that older generations of technology stay in the field much longer. 
The resulting Nash equilibrium would seem to corroborate the behavior described 
previously.  If one player chooses a particular technology policy, it is in the best interest of 
the other player to choose one that is just slightly more aggressive.  Consequently, the first 
player might as well choose a more aggressive one himself, and so on.  The result is an 
equilibrium state with a much more aggressive technology policy than we would expect from 
the single technology analysis.  To better understand this result, let us consider the case in 
which there are still two critical technologies, but the two players cooperate in selecting a 
technology policy. 
To find the best cooperative technology policies, we can search over a grid of 
possible policy combinations.  The results are plotted in Figure 9.   The plotted points form 
the space of all possible policy outcomes.  Since we would like to maximize the performance 
over each capability, we must find the Pareto optimal set of polices.  A Pareto optimal policy 
is defined such that to improve performance of one capability would mean sacrificing 
performance on another.   The Pareto optimal set is designated by the squares in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Performance Space of all Possible Technology Policies  
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We note that the Pareto optimal frontier allows us to trade off some performance 
between the two capabilities; but even so, the entire frontier is superior to the Nash 
equilibrium achieved in the non-cooperative case.  For the sake of comparison, let us 
consider the optimal symmetric policy from the frontier.  Under this policy, the target is a 
12% improvement per acquisition cycle and an expected average deployed capability of 
3.99.  Note that this is a significant improvement over the non-cooperative solution but not 
as good as the single technology solution. 
What does this result tell us?  We can conclude several things.  First, the best 
solution for a program that relies on multiple critical technologies is a cooperative one in 
which a small amount of capability is sacrificed from each area to bring the overall cycle-
time down.  We can see this sacrifice when we compare the optimal symmetric policy to the 
single technology policy.  Thus, we see that there is a price to pay for including multiple 
capabilities in a single system.  While there are likely cost advantages, there will be some 
sacrifice in performance (barring synergistic effects) because the integration of multiple 
technologies increases acquisition cycle-time.  More importantly, however, is that the 
optimal solution is not stable in that it is not a Nash equilibrium.  Therefore, there is always 
an incentive to deviate.  Let us say, for example, that we select the optimal symmetric 
technology policy for our system.  Assuming that everyone else follows this policy, it is in the 
best interest of anyone supporting a particular capability to push for a slightly more 
aggressive technology for his area.  He will end up better off.  But since all have an incentive 
to deviate, if one deviates, all will likely deviate, and we end up at the Nash equilibrium.  
This is exactly where we do not want to be. 
To better elaborate on this point, it is instructive to consider the cartel problem from 
economics.  In a cartel, several firms make a price-fixing agreement so that they can all earn 
greater profits than if they competed.  Thus, they set a price higher than the market 
equilibrium price.  However, there is an incentive to deviate.  If one firm in the cartel charges 
slightly less than the agreed-upon price, it will capture the market and make much more 
money than it would by following the cartel agreement.  Consequently, cartels tend to be 
unstable without strict monitoring and enforcement. 
We see that our situation here is quite analogous.  For a given system, it is in the 
best interest of all stakeholders and decision-makers to sacrifice a little bit of capability in 
each critical area in order to pursue an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary policy.  
However, it is always in the best interest for any given stakeholder to push for just a little bit 
more capability in his respective area.  Thus, the best solution is unstable.  This 
phenomenon could explain, at least in part, why the acquisition system in the Department of 
Defense consistently pursues revolutionary rather than evolutionary acquisition programs 
despite policies to the contrary.  The above game theory analysis indicates that in the 
absence of enforcement, the rational actions of decision-makers with good intentions will 
lead to poor acquisition policy.  The implication here is that if the Department of Defense is 
serious about evolutionary acquisition, it cannot expect voluntary compliance.  Compliance 
must be enforced. 
In the interests of robustness, we should consider the sensitivity of this result.  If we 
increase the integration time to two years, the competitive policy is a 29% increase in 
capability per cycle for an average deployed capability of 1.78—whereas the optimal 
symmetric cooperative policy is an 18% increase in capability per cycle with an average 
deployed capability of 2.05.  Thus, an increase in the integration delay makes both policies 
more aggressive, but the relationship between competition and cooperation is preserved.  
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As for the shape of the risk-return curve, if we examine the exponential case, we find that 
the competitive-cooperative relationship is still preserved but becomes less dramatic.  The 
competitive policy is a 27% increase in capability per cycle resulting in an average deployed 
capability of 11.7—whereas the optimal symmetric cooperative policy is a 24% increase in 
capability per cycle with an average deployed capability of 12.74. (Note that these average 
deployed capabilities are very high because the exponential curve allows for large increases 
in capability very quickly.)  Finally, what happens as we increase the number of critical 
technologies?  It turns out that the situation gets worse.  If there are three critical 
technologies, the competitive policy is to pursue a 33% increase in capability per cycle for 
an average deployed capability of 1.76.  Meanwhile, the optimal symmetric cooperative 
policy for three identical technologies is to target a less-than-11% gain in capability per cycle 
resulting in an average deployed capability of 3.93.   
Thus, the key result from this analysis is that when an acquisition program relies on 
more than one critical technology, the relationship between competitive and cooperative 
behavior is fairly robust.  The cooperative policy yields superior performance through smaller 
capability increments but is unstable.  Without enforcement, the situation devolves to a 
suboptimal Nash equilibrium that achieves inferior performance through larger capability 
increments.  
Cost Considerations 
Up until this point we have only considered performance, and we have omitted any 
discussion of cost.  An evolutionary approach to acquisition may achieve a higher deployed 
performance on average, but is it more cost-effective?  This question is a little more difficult 
to answer; it depends in large part on the relative costs to produce and deploy the 
replacement system (or upgrade the old system) at the end of each cycle, as well as on the 
relationship between technology maturity and development cost.  All else being equal, we 
can say that there is a tradeoff between cost and performance in terms of cycle-time.  More 
frequent, shorter cycles mean that overhead costs associated with an acquisition cycle are 
incurred more often.  Consequently, costs will increase when the cycle-time is shorter.  The 
relative magnitudes of cycle costs versus development costs will dictate the severity this 
tradeoff.  More expensive development costs reduce the contribution of cycle costs as a 
percentage of the overall acquisition bill. Thus, the tradeoff becomes less severe.  If, on the 
other hand, cycle costs are very high (e.g., from high manufacturing costs), increasing the 
length of acquisition cycles may be more appealing. 
The missing piece here is the impact of technological maturity on cost. Does the 
inclusion of immature technology in an acquisition program require the use of more 
expensive development methods than if the same technology were pursued in a research 
and development setting?  Does the inclusion of immature technology make system 
integration more difficult and expensive than when mature technology is employed?  
Conventional wisdom would suggest that the answer to both of these questions is yes, and if 
so, there could be an optimal technology policy that minimizes cost. 
We can demonstrate, at least in a simplistic way, that it is possible to achieve lower 
costs through an evolutionary strategy.  Let us assume that we have a system with a single 
capability, and we can upgrade that capability though either one large leap or multiple small 
steps.  Both achieve the same end capability, but increasing the number of cycles to 
achieve it increases the maturity of the technology we use in each cycle.  For example, we 
could achieve a 25% increase in capability all at once or through two steps that sequentially 
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increase capability by 11.8% each time.  The capability outcome is the same in either case, 
but the time to achieve it may differ.  In fact, if we use the baseline risk-return relationship 
described earlier, the one-step strategy is expected to take 5.27 years (assuming no 
integration time), whereas the two-step strategy is expected to take 4.46 years.  Of course, 
the addition of integration time could erode the time advantage provided by multiple steps, 
but at least notionally we can see that there could be some cost advantage to taking 
multiple, less-risky steps.  If we assume that the development costs are the same in both 
cases, the cost difference comes down to the overhead associated with each acquisition 
cycle.  Again, for the sake of simplicity, if we assume that the cycle costs are the same 
regardless of the aggressiveness of the technology policy, we can determine the conditions 
under which the evolutionary strategy is more cost-effective.  To make this explicit, let us 
define some variables. 
n = the number of steps in the evolutionary policy 
D(n) = the expected length of each step when there are n steps 
CD = the cost rate for development work 
CO = the overhead cost for each acquisition cycle 
As above, we assume that we have two policy options that achieve the same 
increase in capability.  However, the first policy option achieves it in one step, while the 
second achieves it in n steps.  We want to find the conditions under which the n-step policy 
is more cost-effective than the one-step policy.  
Equation 1. ( ) ( ) ODOD CCDnCCnnD +<+ 1  
Rearranging terms yields: 
Equation 2. 











Thus, we can characterize the cost-effectiveness of the evolutionary policy in terms 
of the ratio of the cycle costs to the development costs.  For the example discussed above, 
the two-stage policy is more cost-effective when the ratio of the cycle cost to the 
development cost rate is less than 0.81.  However, this analysis is admittedly oversimplified 
and only reveals the possibility that an evolutionary strategy could be less expensive. 
Additional work is needed to model cost in a more realistic manner.  Empirical 
studies regarding software development reveal that for large projects, the cost savings from 
a spiral approach can be substantial (Boehm, 2007).  This occurs because the upfront 
investment in better systems engineering and spiral risk reduction is outweighed by the 
reduction in rework.  This is especially true for complex software systems.  This result, while 
particular to software systems, is suggestive and may imply that the adverse cost impacts of 
including immature technologies in a single acquisition cycle may be substantial.  Thus, to 
effectively model cost, we must consider the possible approaches to developing 
technologies. 
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One approach is to leave technologies in the R&D process longer so that they are 
more mature when they are finally included in an acquisition program.  The advantage to 
this approach is that technologies can be managed in a portfolio setting. That means 
funding can be balanced and allocated to maximize the technological options available to 
acquisition programs.  If, for example, in the course of development, a particular technology 
proves to be problematic or not as effective as anticipated, funding may be shifted to an 
alternate approach to provide a needed capability.  In contrast, once technologies are 
included in an acquisition program, some of this flexibility is lost.  There is a great deal of 
commitment to a particular design approach, and it may be difficult or prohibitively 
expensive to change it in the event that a selected technology underperforms.  Thus, to 
really model the cost implications of evolutionary acquisition, one would need to model the 
cost impacts of withdrawing technologies from the R&D portfolios at various levels of 
maturity.  This must be relegated to future work.  
Conclusions 
What we can conclude from this analysis is that, from a performance standpoint, 
every acquisition program has some optimal technology policy that is dependent upon the 
nature of the system and technologies involved. Unfortunately, the implementation of this 
optimal acquisition strategy is not trivial.  The increased emphasis on multi-mission or multi-
capability platforms may lead to overall cost savings and increased flexibility, but it creates a 
tension between the competing missions and capabilities.  A multi-mission platform means 
that some capability must be sacrificed relative to a specialized system in order to deliver 
the system in a reasonable time frame and to maintain the optimal acquisition strategy. The 
result is that the optimal strategy requires an unstable technology policy that incentivizes 
stakeholders to deviate from that policy.  Thus, there is a tendency in the Department of 
Defense to pursue an overly aggressive technology policy.  In as much as the optimal policy 
tends to be more moderate than the stable policy, we can say that the former is more 
evolutionary, while the latter is more revolutionary.  The implication is that while evolutionary 
acquisition is more appealing from a performance standpoint, revolutionary acquisition is the 
more natural outcome. This means that the Department of Defense cannot expect programs 
to voluntarily comply with evolutionary acquisition procedures since the nature of the system 
pressures programs towards revolutionary leaps in technology.  Consequently, if the DoD is 
serious about evolutionary acquisition, technology-maturity requirements must be strictly 
enforced. 
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Abstract 
The defense industry has witnessed significant consolidation since the end of the 
Cold War. This paper explores the causes of the wave of defense mergers, as well as their 
impact. The analysis finds that the frequency of defense mergers is more strongly correlated 
with overall merger activity in the economy than with DoD outlays. In examining SAR cost 
data on weapons systems, only 50-65% of the weapons systems’ costs were affected 
following consolidation activity by the primary contractor that made them, of which 40% of 
the systems experienced a statistically significant decrease in their costs, and 15-20% 
experienced a statistically significant increase. Despite a 2/3 reduction in the number of 
prime contractors in the fixed-wing aircraft sector between 1990 and 1998, about 60% of the 
systems experienced a statistically significantly lower cost estimate. For the tactical missile 
                                                
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Maj. Russell Hoff  (US Army) and Capt. 
Grisko Alfonso (USAF) in categorizing the weapons systems and analyzing the SAR data, as well as 
the hard work of Lt. David Mazur (USAF) in collecting the SAR data and Christina Fishback in 
providing information on the dates of the defense mergers. The author appreciates the financial 
support of the US Naval Postgraduate School Acquisitions Research Program. The views in this 
article represent only those of the author and not any institution with which the author is affiliated. 
Please do not quote or cite without permission of the author. See contact information above. 
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category, in which the number of prime contractors also fell by 2/3, 28.6% of the systems 
indicated statistically significantly higher post-merger estimates and 28.6% of them indicated 
statistically significantly lower post-merger estimates. Boeing, Lockheed, and Raytheon 
were among the few main primary contractors in several sectors following the consolidation 
wave. About 70-80% of the weapons systems examined in this analysis which were 
produced by them indicated a statistically significant change in their cost estimates. For 
Boeing and Lockheed, 50-57% of the systems exhibited a statistically significant reduction in 
cost estimates, while, for Raytheon, 60% of the systems experienced a significant cost 
increase. About 2/3 of the systems made by Lockheed and Martin Marietta manifested 
significant cost declines following the Lockheed-Martin Marietta merger,, and about ½ of the 
systems made by Boeing and McDonnell Douglas experienced a statistically significant 
decline in cost estimates following their merger. This suggests that, although market 
concentration levels may have increased in certain sectors, DoD’s costs often tended to be 
lower in the post-merger period for certain weapons systems. 
Introduction 
The defense industry has witnessed significant consolidation since the end of the 
Cold War. As the number of large defense contractors has declined, key public policy 
questions have arisen concerning whether the mergers have led to greater efficiencies, 
lower costs, and improvements in quality, or whether they have led to higher costs, fewer 
choices, and larger firms with unwieldy organizational structures. The purpose of this paper 
is to examine: (a) the roles of defense spending and broader merger activity in the economy 
on the frequency and size of defense mergers, (b) the patterns of defense consolidation and 
some of the related antitrust concerns, and (c) the impact of mergers of major defense 
contractors on the costs of weapons systems facing DoD.  
The Impact of Defense Spending and Broader Merger Activity 
on Defense Mergers 
The wave of defense mergers, particularly during the 1990’s, was partially driven by 
the need to eliminate excess capacity in the industry following the end of the Cold War. 
Overall defense spending, as well as defense procurement spending, grew rapidly during 
the 1980’s, declined following the end of the Cold War, increased towards the end of the 
1990’s, and exhibited significant growth with the War on Terrorism. Indeed, overall defense 
spending grew 73.5%, and defense procurement spending grew 133.1% between 1981 and 
1991, while between 1992 and 1996, overall defense spending fell 10.9% and defense 
procurement spending fell 34.7%. Between 1997 and 2001, overall defense spending and 
defense procurement spending grew 12.7% and 15.3%, respectively, while between 2002 
and 2006, overall defense spending and defense procurement spending grew at 49.7% and 
43.6%, respectively.2  In constant FY 2001 dollars, overall defense spending declined 34.8% 
between FY 1985 and FY 1996 and declined 25.6% between FY 1990 and FY 1996. 
                                                
2 These growth rates were calculated by the author from the raw data in the Historical Tables (Table 
3.2) for the United States Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, p. 56-60. The growth rates are not annualized 
nor adjusted for inflation. 
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Defense procurement spending declined 67.2% between FY 1985 and FY 1996 and 
declined 53.77% between FY 1990 and FY 1996.3    
The wave of mergers in the defense sector was also partially linked to overall merger 
patterns within the US economy. Table 1 shows the growth rate from year to year in terms of 
the number of defense mergers and the value of defense mergers, as compared to the 
comparable growth rates for merger activity in the US economy. 
Table 1. Annual Growth Rates in Merger Activity in the Defense Sector and in the 
Overall Economy 
 
Time Period Annual growth 
rates for merger 
activity (number of 
transactions) in 
the defense sector 
Annual growth 
rates for merger 





rates for merger 
activity ($ value) 
in the defense 
sector 
Annual growth 
rates for merger 
activity ($ value 
) in the overall 
economy 
1992-1993 -44.83% 4.008% -82.37% 45.41% 
1993-1994 -6.25% 12.66% 268.1% 80.63% 
1994-1995 -33.00% 17.37% -94.13% 30.94% 
1995-1996 100.0% 66.51% 8571.4% 110.8% 
1996-1997 50.00% 33.32% -46.96% 35.68% 
1997-1998 70.00% 0.154% -59.25% 83.41% 
1998-1999 0.00% 18.94% 169.0% 19.16% 
1999-2000 -29.4% 3.28% 392.8% 832.9% 
2000-2001 -5.5% -13.37% -97.03% -94.72% 
2001-2002 26.47% -12.06% 164.7% -37.42% 
2002-2003 -34.88% 9.573% -55.97% 15.14% 
2003-2004 -10.7% 22.66% 50.50% 48.78% 
(NOTE: These annual growth rates were calculated by the author from raw data found in the 
Mergerstat Review for 2005, the Mergerstat Review for 2002, the Mergerstat Review for 1997, and 
the Mergerstat Review for 1996. The defense sector, as defined by Factset Mergerstat, encompassed 
firms in Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes 3761-3769, 3721-3728, and 3795.) 
 
  
Growth in merger activity in the defense sector, whether measured by growth in 
value or growth in number of transactions, was generally lower than growth in merger 
activity in the overall economy. Growth in merger activity in the defense sector exceeded 
growth in merger activity in the industry overall (or exhibited less negative growth) in terms 
of the number of transactions and in terms of value in 5 out of the 12 years (41.67%).  
Table 2 shows the number of defense mergers which were over $100 million in value 
as a percentage of total defense mergers, as well as the percentage of larger mergers of 
over $100 million in size in the economy as a percentage of total mergers in the economy. 
The years in which large defense mergers were over a quarter of the mergers in that sector 
                                                
3 These growth rates were calculated by the author from the raw data in the Annual Report to the 
President and Congress by the Secretary of Defense in 2000, Appendix B-1. The growth rates are 
calculated from data in constant dollar terms, although they are not annualized.  
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were 1992, 1994, 1996, and 2004. In the overall economy, large mergers tended to be a 
smaller percentage of the total number of mergers due to the total volume of mergers during 
the mid to late 1990’s. Nevertheless, the fifth column suggests that the period of the most 
mega-mergers in the economy overall stretched from 1994-2000.   
 
Table 2. Percentage of Defense Mergers and Mergers in the Overall Economy 
Exceeding $100 Million in Value 
 
Time Period Number of $100m plus 
transactions as a percentage 
of total transactions in the 
defense industry 
Number of $100m plus 
transactions as a 
percentage of total 
transactions in the 
overall economy 
1991 0.00% 8.01% 
1992 27.59% 7.54% 
1993 18.75% 9.03% 
1994 40.0% 12.64% 
1995 0.00% 13.2% 
1996 40.0% 10.84% 
1997 20.0% 11.16% 
1998 19.6% 11.55% 
1999 13.73% 11.81% 
2000 16.67% 12.00% 
2001 17.64% 8.44% 
2002 6.977% 8.33% 
2003 10.71% 8.19% 
2004 24.00% 8.60% 
(NOTE: These percentages were calculated by the author from raw data found in the Mergerstat 
Review for 2005, the Mergerstat Review for 2002, the Mergerstat Review for 1997, and the 
Mergerstat Review for 1996. The defense sector, as defined by Factset Mergerstat, encompassed 
firms in Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes 3761-3769, 3721-3728, and 3795.)  
 
Industry observers often cite defense spending and overall merger activity as the two 
forces behind defense sector mergers (Korb, 1996). But, is defense merger activity more 
linked to the level of DoD spending or to the overall level of merger activity in the economy?  
Which one of these is a more significant force? Table 3, which shows correlations between 
various measures of defense merger activity and merger activity in the overall economy, as 
well as between defense merger activity and DoD spending, suggests that merger activity is 
much more strongly linked to overall activity in the economy. This supports the hypothesis 
that merger activity was not necessarily entirely driven by the need to downsize and reduce 
excess capacity in the wake of the Cold War.  
The correlations use data covering the period between 1992 and 2004. Column 2 
shows the correlations between the number of defense mergers in a given year and: (a) the 
overall level of DoD outlays in that year, (b) the level of DoD procurement outlays in that 
year; (c) the overall level of DoD outlays in the previous year, (d) the level of DoD 
procurement outlays in the previous year, and (e) the level of overall merger activity in the 
economy. Column 3 shows the comparable correlations for defense merger activity as 
measured by dollar value, rather than by number of transactions.  
 =




Table 3. Correlations between DoD Outlays, Merger Activity in the Economy, 
and Merger Activity in the Defense Sector 
 
Correlation between: Number of defense merger 
transactions in a given year 
Dollar value of defense merger 
transactions in a given year 
Level of overall DoD outlays in 
a given year 
-0.0269 -0.2058 
Level of DoD procurement 
outlays in a given year 
-0.3591 -0.3783 
Level of overall DoD outlays in 
the previous year 
-0.1929 -0.2947 
Level of DoD procurement 
outlays in the previous year 
-0.6097 -0.3916 
Number of mergers in the 
overall economy in a given 
year 
0.6498  
Dollar value of mergers in the 
overall economy in a given 
year 
 0.9399 
(NOTE: The statistical correlations were calculated by the author from raw data found in the Historical 
Tables (Table 3.2) for the Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, p. 56-50, and from the raw data found in the 
Mergerstat Review for 2005, the Mergerstat Review for 2002, the Mergerstat Review for 1997, and 
the Mergerstat Review for 1996.) 
 
The correlations between defense merger activity (regardless of how it is measured) 
and DoD outlays (regardless of whether it is overall levels or procurement levels, and 
whether it occurred in the current year or the previous year) are negative, as would be 
expected—as defense spending goes down, defense merger activity goes up. Nevertheless, 
the correlations tend to be weak. Procurement outlays move much more strongly in the 
opposite direction from defense transactions than overall DoD outlays do. Correlating 
previous year DoD overall outlays and procurement outlays with current year merger activity 
(in terms of either transactions or value) yields a stronger relationship than correlating 
current year outlays with current year merger activity. This suggests that, since the merger 
process requires time, mergers are a delayed response to spending levels in previous 
years. The tightest negative relationship is between merger activity (as measured by the 
number of transactions) and DoD procurement outlays in the previous year.  
The correlations are strongly positive between merger activity in the defense sector 
and merger activity in the overall economy in a given year (excluding defense mergers)—as 
one increases, the other increases. The correlation is strongly positive between the number 
of defense mergers and the number of mergers in the economy overall (excluding defense 
mergers) at 0.6498, while the correlation is very strongly positive between the dollar value of 
mergers in the overall economy (excluding defense mergers) and the dollar value of defense 
mergers at 0.9399.  
In summary, Table 3 suggests that although the wave of defense mergers was 
driven by both DoD spending and by overall economic merger activity, overall economic 
merger activity was much more strongly correlated. Consequently, the decline in Cold War 
spending and its impact on excess capacity was less important than overall economic 
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growth, stock market conditions, and the need for defense firms to defensively merge as 
their rivals merged so that they would not be left out in the cold as a relatively smaller firm 
facing larger, consolidated competitors.  
Patterns of Defense Consolidation and Antitrust Concerns 
In July, 1993, Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry, at a summit known as the 
“Last Supper,” met with representatives of the major defense contractors and encouraged 
significant defense sector consolidation (Ricks & Cole, 1998; Cole, 1996).  Between 1990 
and 1998, the number of prime contractors decreased significantly due to consolidation in 
10 of the 12 key defense sectors identified by DoD. These 10 sectors included: tactical 
missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, expendable launch vehicles, satellites, surface ships, tactical 
wheeled vehicles, tracked combat vehicles, strategic missiles, torpedoes, and rotary-wing 
aircraft. Table 4 shows, for each of the 10 sectors, the number of prime contractors in 1990, 
the number of prime contractors in 1998, and the amount of the percentage decline.4 
Table 4.  Reduction in Prime Contractors in Various Weapons Systems Sectors 
between 1990 and 1998 
Sector Number of prime 
contractors in 1990 
Number of prime 
contractors in 1998 
Percentage reduction 
Tactical Missiles 13 4 -69.2% 
Fixed-wing Aircraft 8 3 -62.5% 
Expendable Launch 
Vehicles 
6 2 -66.7% 
Satellites 8 5 -37.5% 
Surface Ships 8 5 -37.5% 
Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicles 
6 4 -33.3% 
Tracked Combat 
Vehicles 
3 2 -33.0% 
Strategic Missiles 3 2 -33.0% 
Torpedoes 3 2 -33.0% 
Rotary-wing Aircraft 4 3 -25.0% 
 
The percentage reduction in contractors exceeded 60% in 3 of the 10 sectors, and 
varied between 25% and 37.5% in the remaining 7 of the 10 sectors. The major giants which 
emerged out of this consolidation across these sectors were Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and 
Northrop Grumman, and, to a lesser degree, Raytheon and General Dynamics. Between 
1990 and 1998, the three sectors which experienced the most consolidation, and which 
were dominated by contractors which only included Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop 
                                                
4 Data on the sectors and the number of contractors in 1990 and 1998 are derived from the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) Report to Congressional Committees on the Defense Industry: 
Consolidation and Options for Preserving Competition, Washington DC, April 1998.  
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Grumman, and Raytheon, were: tactical missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, and expendable launch 
vehicles.  
By 1998, Boeing was one of the prime contractors in 6 of the 10 markets: tactical 
missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, expendable launch vehicles, satellites, strategic missiles, and 
rotary-wing aircraft. Lockheed Martin was one of the prime contractors in 5 of the 10 sectors: 
tactical missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, expendable launch vehicles, satellites, and strategic 
missiles. Northrop Grumman was one of the prime contractors in 3 of the 10 sectors: tactical 
missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, and torpedoes. General Dynamics was one of the prime 
contractors in 2 of the 10 markets: tracked combat vehicles and surface ships. Finally, 
Raytheon was one of the prime contractors in 2 of the 10 markets: tactical missiles and 
torpedoes.  
With the increasing numbers of defense mergers in the mid to late 1990’s, the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) became more concerned that consolidation was leading to a reduction in competition 
and an increase in anticompetitive activity. As Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General of the 
Antitrust Division of the DOJ noted in his address before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 
June, 1998, “A number of defense mergers proceeded unchallenged over the last 5 years, 
which rationalized capacity, but if that rationalization goes too far, it can harm competition” 
(Klein, 1998). Indeed, the DOJ had challenged two mergers in 1997— Raytheon’s 
acquisition of Hughes Aircraft (the aircraft subsidiary of General Motors) and Raytheon’s 
acquisition of the defense electronics division of Texas Instruments—but then allowed both 
of them to go through provided that divestitures of certain key divisions occurred prior to the 
merger in order to protect competition. In 1998, however, the DOJ blocked the merger 
between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, since the DOJ believed that the merger 
would lead to a reduction in competition and innovation in submarine sonar systems, military 
aircraft radar, and various electronic warfare systems. This proposed $11.6 billion 
acquisition was the largest acquisition that the DOJ had challenged in its history up to that 
point (Klein, 1998), and the challenge was supported by the Pentagon since Defense 
Secretary Cohen also thought that the merger would be anticompetitive (Ricks & Cole, 
1998). Lockheed and Northrop called off the merger in July, 1998, prior to their September 
trial date (Fidler & Lewis, 1998).  
Analyzing the anticompetitive impact of consolidation in the defense sector involves 
different considerations from analyzing consolidation in other industries for several reasons. 
First, in determining the relevant geographic market of possible competitors, the analysis 
can’t always include foreign weapons manufacturers for security reasons, although, in other 
industries, foreign manufacturers can be included in defining the boundaries of the market 
that would be affected by the merger. Second, traditional industries have a broader 
spectrum of consumers for the product, whereas DoD is the main buyer for weapons 
systems. Consequently, it plays a highly significant role in the DOJ and FTC deliberations. 
Third, lower barriers to entry would allow new entrants to enter the market and reduce the 
possible anticompetitive effects of increased consolidation, such as higher pricing. 
Nevertheless, the government contracting process makes it harder for new entrants to gain 
a foothold and tends to give an advantage to incumbent firms, which know the government 
contracting system better.  
Either vertical or horizontal consolidations could contribute to a negative outcome. 
Vertical mergers might lead to foreclosure to competitors of key input suppliers or 
distributors along the vertical supply chain. For example, one of the concerns about the 
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proposed Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman merger had been that Lockheed Martin 
would have control of a key supplier of electronics which supplied Boeing’s planes, as well 
as its own planes. This could enable it to limit Boeing’s access to the supplier. On the other 
hand, Lockheed argued that the Pentagon could monitor the selections of equipment from 
outside suppliers and that the process was sufficiently transparent that this would not be an 
issue. Indeed, Lockheed argued that the mission computers in its F-16 planes came from 
Raytheon (Ricks & Cole,1998). A second example of concerns over vertical integration was 
when the CEO of McDonnell Douglas, in April, 1996, announced that McDonnell Douglas 
would stop buying parts from Loral for its jet fighters once Lockheed Martin acquired Loral. 
Paul Kaminski, the chief of procurement at the Pentagon, wrote to McDonnell Douglas, 
stating that this could ‘“increase the cost or lower the quality of the products you supply”’ 
and that if the best product is offered by a given supplier, which ‘“happens to be Loral, then 
McDonnell Douglas should continue to buy from that company”’ (Cole,1996). 
Horizontal mergers, in the absence of viable international competition or entry by 
new companies, could lead to increased market power and higher prices in certain sectors. 
For example, one of the concerns with Raytheon’s acquisition of Hughes Aircraft and the 
defense divisions of Texas Instruments in 1997 was that these acquisitions would provide 
Raytheon with a near monopoly position in spy satellite sensors, night vision equipment, and 
air-to-air missiles. Hughes and Raytheon had previously been strong competitors for missile 
contracts, and, according to the chief of acquisitions at the Pentagon, Paul Kaminiski, “their 
competition saved taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, shaving 70 percent from 
Hughes’ original price.” Raytheon, on the other hand, had argued that other companies had 
competed in missile competitions and had won, citing McDonnell Douglas’ and Lockheed 
Martin’s success in bidding for the JASSM missile contract (Mintz,1997).  
On the other hand, consolidation might also lead to more innovative or less costly 
weapons systems due to greater pooling of knowledge between consolidating contractors. 
For example, Boeing, which had acquired Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas, succeeded 
over Lockheed in winning a $5 billion contract for a National Reconnaissance Satellite in 
1999. At the time, some argued that the combination of knowledge and talent between 
McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell, and Boeing enabled the unified entity to win the contract and 
that this would not have been possible without consolidation (Flanigan, 1999). A second 
example is when the Navy in early September, 1997 thought that the proposed merger 
between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman would have actually enabled Lockheed, 
which had a weaker background in building naval aircraft, to compete more effectively 
against Boeing in the competition for the new Joint Strike Fighter (Ricks & Cole, 1998). The 
merger, as discussed earlier, did not take place. 
Consolidation activity also could lead to improved cost efficiencies from reduced 
overhead costs—combining duplicative facilities and corporate headquarters, rationalizing 
and reducing the workforce, pooling R&D funds, and more effectively using pre-existing 
capacity. Indeed, when the Lockheed-Martin Marietta merger took place in 1995, it was 
estimated that merging telecommunications operations, research divisions, and 
headquarters, would save $3 billion over the following five years (Mintz, 1994). Some of the 
mergers clearly failed to yield their projected saving, however. For example, Martin 
Marietta’s 1993 acquisition of General Electric Aerospace had only yielded half of the 
expected cost savings three years later, according to the GAO (Foote, 1996). Two years 
after the union of Hughes Aircraft and General Dynamics’ missile division in 1992, the 
Inspector General could not verify that the consolidation had saved the projected $600 
million for the Pentagon (Korb, 1996). 
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Has the wave of defense mergers led to cost savings for DoD? According to the Los 
Angeles Times in October, 1999, “Almost a decade of consolidation in the defense industry 
has failed to deliver the benefits of lower costs for the Pentagon. And the mergers of the 
‘90’s that were supposed to produce stronger and more innovative defense contractors have 
more often caused corporate indigestion” (Flanigan, 1999). Industry observers argued that 
innovation had suffered from the mergers, and that the companies had become too big and 
were expending significant effort in managing themselves (Flanigan, 1999).  
The issue of whether DoD recognized cost savings from the wave of consolidation 
was further complicated by its decision to pay the restructuring costs of consolidation 
beginning in July, 1993, provided that certain conditions from the consolidation were met, 
such as that the projected savings from the restructuring would exceed the costs. Under the 
1997 DoD Appropriations Act, projected savings needed to exceed costs by a ratio of two to 
one for business combinations occurring after September 30, 1996, in order for restructuring 
costs to be reimbursed (Cooper, 1997). In 1997, DoD calculated that, through September 
30, 1996, for every $1.00 that it paid in restructuring costs, it estimated $1.93 in savings 
because it had paid $179.2 million in restructuring costs and realized savings of $346.7 
million. Nevertheless, in several of the five business combinations reviewed, savings was 
much less than the contractors had actually estimated. For Lockheed Martin, the estimated 
savings used to certify the Lockheed-Martin Marietta merger as eligible for restructuring, as 
of September 30, 1996, was less than half of the savings estimate which had originally been 
projected (Cooper, 1997). 
Analysis of Cost Data on Weapons Systems by Type and by 
Defense Contractor 
This analysis examines whether cost estimates for weapons systems made by 
leading defense contractors increased or decreased following a merger with another major 
defense contractor. The analysis used cost data from the summary tables in the Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SARS) which are submitted to Congress by DoD and which report the 
acquisition costs of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS).5 Each SAR contains a 
variety of various items on the mission of the weapons system and the contractors involved, 
as well as data on the costs of the weapons system, including baseline cost estimates and 
quantity estimates, current cost estimates and quantity estimates, and a decomposition of 
cost changes into quantity cost changes, schedule cost changes, engineering cost changes, 
support cost changes, estimating cost changes, and other cost changes. The period 
covered in the SAR data used in this analysis encompassed March, 1981 until June, 2006.  
The analysis examined 28 weapons systems/ programs; this is only a subset of the 
weapons programs available in the SARS. These systems were selected because: (a) the 
primary contractor was involved in a merger with a major defense contractor during the 
                                                
5 MDAP (Major Defense Acquisition Program)—“Defined in 10 USC § 2430 as a Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive classified program (as determined by 
the Secretary of Defense) and that is designated by the Secretary of Defense as a major defense 
acquisition program, or that is estimated by the Secretary of Defense to require an eventual total 
expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $365,000,000 (updated to 
FY 2000 constant dollars) or an eventual total expenditure for procurement of more than 
$2,190,000,000 (updated to FY 2000 constant dollars)” (Department of Defense, 2006, August 3).  
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period covered; (b) there was enough time series data to examine the pre-merger and the 
post-merger period; (c) the weapons system was only made for one of the services; and (d) 
the contract for the weapons system, during the period covered, did not have a defense 
contractor that was not involved in the merger as its primary contractor. The research is still 
ongoing, and it is expected that more weapons systems/ programs will be included in an 
expanded version of this preliminary study.  
This analysis examines the current year cost estimates in base year dollars of each 
weapons system/program over time. This is because current year cost estimates in base 
year dollars capture overall pre- and post-merger effects better than other variables in the 
SARS, which decompose the cost change into quantity changes, schedule changes, 
engineering changes, etc. A merger could impact cost estimates through any of these 
avenues, so year-to-year changes in overall current year cost estimates in base year dollars 
provided the best measure. An expanded version of this preliminary study intends to 
examine the other components of the cost change decomposition in greater detail. Current 
year cost estimates in base year dollars were also used to minimize the impact of inflation. 
The regression model used for each of the 28 weapons systems/ programs 
regressed current year cost estimates in base year dollars for a given weapons system on a 
time trend variable and on an indicator variable that took on the value of “1” after the merger 
of its primary contractor and “0” before the merger. The time trend controlled for the 
increases in cost estimates over time. The regression model appears below: 
(Current year cost estimates in base year dollars)i = α + β1 (time trend)i + β2 (post-
merger indicator variable)i 
The regression was run over the time series data for each weapons system. In one 
set of regressions, the post-merger effect was assumed to take place beginning with the 
report date of the SAR nearest chronologically to the effective date of the merger. In the 
second set of regressions, the post-merger effect was assumed to take place beginning with 
the report date of the SAR which was the second nearest chronologically to the effective 
date of the merger. Although the timing of the impact of a merger on SAR cost estimates 
can vary between contractors and weapons systems, the analyses focused on the nearest 
SAR to the merger date or the second nearest SAR for consistency.  
Tables 5 and 6 show that the empirical results are largely robust, regardless of 
whether the post-merger effect is assumed to occur beginning with the SAR nearest 
chronologically to the effective merger date or the second nearest SAR to the effective 
merger date. The first column includes the name of the weapons system; the second 
column gives the coefficient (and its sign) for the post-merger indicator variable; the third 
column provides the p-value for the statistical significance of the post-merger effect on cost 
estimates; the fourth column gives the coefficient (and sign) on the time trend, and the fifth 
column provides the p-value for the statistical significance of the time trend.  
Table 5. Regression Results with the Post-merger Effect Beginning at the SAR 
Nearest to the Effective Date of the Merger 


















AH-64 36.9611 0.763 47.257 0.000 
AIM-9X 1554.8 0.000 4.8778 0.568 
ASAS -1419.66 0.000 16.395 0.046 
AMRAAM -2826.00 0.000 183.26 0.000 
ATACMS 134.47 0.366 29.903 0.000 
AV-8B -113.64 0.001 6.5453 0.005 
ATCCS 179.68 0.046 -12.833 0.003 
ATICRM -49.355 0.899 64.324 0.007 
C-17 17687.66 0.000 319.77 0.000 
DDG-51 -6357.78 0.001 740.82 0.000 
FA-18 -21133.99 0.002 635.6 0.014 
F-22 -8867.30 0.151 1074.1 0.000 
Javelin -78.669 0.840 14.043 0.291 
JDAM -669.47 0.032 147.651 0.000 
JSOW 542.25 0.609 -9.9954 0.827 
JSTARS -1396.20 0.003 168.99 0.000 
LHD-1 251.02 0.210 53.764 0.000 
Longbow Apache -381.75 0.612 149.51 0.000 
Longbow Hellfire -759.73 0.033 36.382 0.008 
NAVSTAR User 
Equipment 
-212.399 0.013 29.502 0.000 
Titan IV -9604.985 0.000 504.366 0.000 
DMSP 15.714 0.322 6.557 0.000 
FBCB2 -422.658 0.180 4.646 0.876 
MLRS -28.854 0.744 28.307 0.000 
Strategic Sealift 
Program 
58.530 0.685 20.624 0.029 
T45TS 143.59 0.401 47.809 0.000 
Trident -2111.671 0.056 10.3506 0.679 
JPATS 744.526 0.047 124.02 0.000 
 
 
Table 6. Regression Results with the Post-merger Effect Beginning at the Second 
Nearest SAR to the Effective Date of the Merger 














AH-64 87.88 0.48 45.65 0.000 
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AIM-9X 1279.3 0.000 9.408 0.422 
ASAS -1004.9 0.002 -8.205 0.733 
AMRAAM -2953.6 0.000 184.6 0.000 
ATACMS 234.6 0.108 27.20 0.000 
AV-8B -116.95 0.001 7.088 0.004 
ATCCS 194.91 0.033 -13.60 0.002 
ATICRM 255.64 0.504 49.295 0.031 
C-17 17138.7 0.000 336.68 0.000 
DDG-51 -7478.1 0.000 761.47 0.000 
FA-18 -24329.8 0.000 751.15 0.003 
F-22 -11220 0.067 1127.4 0.000 
Javelin 1156.99 0.002 -22.196 0.067 
JDAM -698.65 0.028 149.39 0.000 
JSOW 1631.28 0.126 -50.687 0.276 
JSTARS -1300.27 0.005 166.48 0.000 
LHD-1 144.32 0.476 55.225 0.000 
Longbow Apache -669.24 0.372 158.10 0.000 
Longbow Hellfire -789.56 0.030 38.132 0.007 
NAVSTAR User 
Equipment 
-191.89 0.024 28.756 0.000 
Titan IV -10094.5 0.000 513.14 0.000 
DMSP 30.865 0.041 5.910 0.000 
FBCB2 -606.34 0.056 22.475 0.456 
MLRS -34.901 0.693 28.377 0.000 
Strategic Sealift 
Program 
93.856 0.506 19.345 0.028 
T45TS 63.6989 0.707 49.373 0.000 
Trident -1489.63 0.178 -2.125 0.933 
JPATS 947.42 0.006 118.27 0.000 
 
Table 7 summarizes the findings of Tables 5 and 6. Again, there is little difference 
between the findings if the merger effect is assumed to begin at the SAR closest to the 
merger effective date and the findings if the merger effect is assumed to begin at the second 
nearest SAR to the merger effective date. Between 54% and 64% of the systems examined 
in the analysis experienced a statistically significant change in their cost estimates following 
a merger, controlling for the time trend. Between 39% and 43% of the systems experienced 
a statistically significant negative reduction in cost estimates in the post-merger period, 
controlling for the time trend, while between 14% and 21% of the systems experienced a 
positive, statistically significant cost increase. This suggests that defense mergers did not 
always experience a statistically significant change in their cost estimates post-merger but 
that, for those systems that did, the cost estimates were more likely to decrease than to 
increase, even controlling for the time trend.     
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Table 7. Percentage of Weapons Systems Experiencing a Post-merger Change 
in Cost Estimates 



















at the SAR 
closest to the 
merger 
effective date 
14.3% 39.3% 53.6% 
Post-merger 
effect begins 
at the second 
nearest SAR 
to the merger 
effective date 
21.4% 42.9% 64.3% 
 
Table 8 summarizes the weapons systems findings from Table 6 and categorizes 
those results based on the type of weapons system classification found in the 1998 GAO 
report, although this analysis added the strategic electronics sector and the munitions 
sector. The classification of the weapons systems into these broader categories was done 
by examining the description of the weapons systems in the SARS, consulting Jane’s, 
reading materials written by the defense contractors, examining The 2007-2008 Weapons 
Systems from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, 
and Technology, and reading detail on each system written by the Federation of American 
Scientists. 
The categories which were most affected by the mergers in the sense that 80-86% of 
the weapons systems in those categories exhibited a statistically significant post-merger 
change in cost estimates were the strategic electronics category and the fixed-wing aircraft 
category. About 57%-60% of those systems exhibited a statistically significant reduction in 
cost estimates, controlling for the time trend. Based on the data in Table 4, the number of 
prime contractors in the fixed-wing aircraft sector experienced a 62.5% decline between 
1990 and 1998. Consequently, this analysis suggests that although market concentration in 
the fixed-wing aircraft sector increased, this led to more significant cost decreases than cost 
increases in weapons systems. The evidence is less clear in the tactical missile category, in 
which, based on the data in Table 4, the number of contractors declined 69.2% between 
1990 and 1998. About 57% of the weapons in the tactical missile category exhibited 
statistically significant changes in their cost estimates, of which 28.6% of them exhibited 
significant increases and 28.6% of them exhibited significant decreases. The number of 
prime contractors in the surface ships category declined 37.5%, but the only system in that 
category that manifested a significant change exhibited a cost decline. The analysis had 
fewer systems in the rotary aircraft, strategic missile, munitions, and satellite categories, but 
a subsequent expanded version of the analysis hopes to include more systems in these 
categories.  
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 45 - 
=
=
Table 8. Percentage of Weapons Systems Experiencing a Post-merger Change 
in Cost Estimates by Equipment Type 
 Percentage of 












significantly lower cost 
estimate post-merger 
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0% 33% 33% 
Satellite 
DMSP 
100% 0% 100% 
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0% 50% 50% 
 
Table 9 summarizes the results in Table 6 by defense contractor. Between 70% and 
80% of the weapons systems made by Boeing, Raytheon, and Lockheed experienced 
statistically significant changes in their cost estimates following their mergers. Raytheon is 
the only one of the major contractors which had a higher percentage of weapons systems 
(60%) that experienced a statistically significant cost increase than the percentage of 
weapons systems (20%) that experienced a statistically significant cost decrease. Over half 
of the weapons systems made by Lockheed, General Dynamics, and Boeing experienced a 
statistically significantly lower post-merger cost estimate. As discussed earlier, by 1998, 
Boeing was one of the prime contractors in 6 of the 10 markets, and Lockheed Martin was 
one of the prime contractors in 5 of the 10 markets. Again, this evidence suggests that 
although these contractors were obtaining greater market share through their consolidation, 
the mergers were more likely to reduce cost estimates for the weapons systems than to 
increase them. Raytheon is the exception, but it was one of the prime contractors in only 2 
of the 10 markets (as delineated by the 1998 GAO report) and so had less opportunity for 




Table 9. Summary of Statistically Significant Cost Changes by Defense 
Contractor 
 Percentage of 














significantly lower cost 
estimate post-merger 
Percentage of 







(higher or lower) 
Northrop 0% 40% 40% 
Boeing 14.3% 57.1% 71.4% 
General Dynamics 0% 50% 50% 
Raytheon 60% 20% 80% 
Lockheed 25% 50% 75% 
McDonnell Douglas 14.3% 42.8% 57.1% 
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Table 10 explores the impact of the merger between Lockheed and Martin Marietta 
(effective on March 16, 1995) and the merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas 
(effective on August 1, 1997) on the weapons systems produced by these prime contractors 
for which sufficient data was available. The Lockheed-Martin Marietta merger impacted over 
80% of the weapons systems examined, but 2/3 of them experienced a statistically 
significant decline in cost estimates, controlling for the time trend. The Boeing-McDonnell 
Douglas merger impacted 2/3 of the weapons systems examined, of which 50% of them 
experienced a statistically significant decline in cost estimates, controlling for the time trend.   
Table 10. Impact of Selected Defense Mergers on Weapons Systems Cost Estimates 
 Percentage of 
systems made by the 
defense contractors 








systems made by 
defense contractors 




significantly lower cost 
estimate post-merger 
Percentage of 
systems made by the 
defense contractors 






(higher or lower) 
Lockheed / Martin 
Marietta  







16.7% 66.7% 83.3% 
Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas  







16.7% 50% 66.7% 
 
Conclusions 
This study examines evidence on the causes and the results of the defense merger 
wave of the late 1990s. Although the analysis is by no means exhaustive, it does suggest 
several key findings. 
First, defense mergers are negatively correlated with DoD procurement outlays. The 
correlation between defense mergers in a given year and DoD procurement outlays in the 
previous year are stronger than correlations of measures in the current year. This suggests 
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that merger activity is more likely to be a delayed response to previous spending levels than 
to current spending levels.   
Second, the correlations between defense merger activity and overall merger activity 
in the economy are strongly positive. On balance, the correlations between defense merger 
activity and overall merger activity are much stronger than the correlations between defense 
merger activity and DoD outlays. This suggests that merger activity was driven less by 
declines in spending following the Cold War, and more by a stronger economy and a vibrant 
financial market.  
Third, the reduction in the number of prime contractors between 1990 and 1998 was 
more substantial in certain sectors than in others and resulted in some of the defense 
contractors becoming dominant across sectors. The tactical missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, and 
expendable launch vehicle sectors experienced a 2/3 reduction in the number of prime 
contractors during the period. The major giants which emerged from the consolidation were 
Boeing (one of the prime contractors in 6 of the 10 sectors), Lockheed Martin (one of the 
prime contractors in 5 of the 10 sectors), and Northrop Grumman (one of the prime 
contractors in 3 of the 10 markets).  
Fourth, in examining the SAR cost data on 28 weapons systems, only 50-65% of 
them exhibited a statistically significant post-merger cost change, which suggests that many 
weapons systems’ estimates were unaffected by the mergers. About 40% of the weapons 
systems examined in this analysis experienced a statistically significant decrease in cost 
estimates, controlling for the time trend, and about 15-20% of the systems experienced a 
statistically significant increase in cost estimates. This suggests that, to the extent that the 
weapons systems were impacted by mergers, a greater proportion of them experienced a 
reduction in costs rather than an increase in costs.  
Fifth, when the weapons systems are classified into the 10 categories discussed in 
the 1998 GAO Report (with two additional categories), the fixed-wing aircraft, strategic 
electronics, and tactical missile categories had the highest percentage of systems which 
experienced a statistically significant post-merger change. Within the strategic electronics 
sector and the fixed-wing aircraft sector, about 60% of the systems experienced a 
statistically significantly lower cost estimate during the post-merger period. In the tactical 
missile category, 28.6% of the systems surveyed experienced a statistically significantly 
higher post-merger cost estimate and 28.6% of the systems experienced a statistically 
significantly lower post-merger cost estimate. This suggests that in the fixed-wing aircraft 
sector especially, which manifested a 2/3 decline in prime contractors between 1990 and 
1998, the increase in market concentration did not result in higher costs for DoD. The 
findings were evenly split in the tactical missile category, which also experienced a 2/3 
decline in contractors.  
Sixth, when the weapons systems were identified with their primary contractor, 
between 70% and 80% of the weapons systems examined in this analysis which were 
produced by Boeing, Raytheon, and Lockheed experienced a statistically significant change 
in their cost estimates. For Boeing and Lockheed, 50-57% of the systems experienced a 
statistically significant reduction in cost estimates. Raytheon was the only contractor for 
whom 60% of the systems experienced a statistically significant increase in their cost 
estimates. This suggests that the increases in market power may not have translated into 
higher costs for DoD, especially for systems made by Lockheed and Boeing. Indeed, 2/3 of 
the systems made by Lockheed and Martin Marietta experienced a statistically significant 
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decline in cost estimates following the merger. Half of the systems made by Boeing and 
McDonnell Douglas experienced a statistically significant decline in cost estimates following 
their merger.    
In conclusion, the analysis suggests that, although market concentration levels in 
certain sectors increased due to the wave of defense mergers, DoD’s costs across weapons 
systems tended to be lower in the post-merger period. Although further research on a larger 
sample of weapons systems distributed across various sectors is necessary to more fully 
inform the public policy discourse, this study indicates that increases in market power do not 
necessarily lead to an anticompetitive outcome in pricing. Additional research on innovation 
cycles within the weapons systems is necessary, as well as a greater assessment of the 
degree to which international competition or the possibility of entry of smaller competitors in 
some of these sub-sectors constrained cost increases. Many of the questions and concerns 
in the earlier rounds of consolidation may emerge if a second round begins, possibly at a 
more global level, so an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the most recent 
round during the late 1990’s is crucial.   
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Introduction 
Strategic Sourcing has become the focus of buying organizations both in government 
and the private sector.  In the federal government, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
(OFPP) began an initiative in 2004 through its Chief Acquisition Officer Council (CAOC) to 
provide for Strategic Sourcing on a government-wide basis.  Similarly, State and Local 
governments have initiated strategic sourcing initiatives to varying degrees across the 
United States.  In support of this initiative, the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing 
(NIGP) adopted a resolution in 2006 supporting the use of Strategic Sourcing at levels of 
government.  In the private sector Strategic Sourcing has been a way of life now for over a 
decade. 
For the uninitiated, Strategic Sourcing has become synonymous with the process of 
identifying certain commodities, or commoditizable [sic] services, aggregating those 
commodities, and then driving a price point that reflects the leveraged buying power of a 
particular buying organization.  While this certainly reflects an aspect of Strategic Sourcing, 
Strategic Sourcing is much broader and encompasses not only the actual sourcing 
decisions, in terms of aggregation of requirements and supplier/supply-chain management, 
but also the analysis of all requirements, the capabilities of the supplier base to meet those 
requirements, and the appropriate method to satisfy requirements through the supplier base, 
among other considerations.  In some cases, managing the supplier base/supply chain 
requires the identification of the optimum size of the supplier base/chain and the mix of 
companies (read capabilities) necessary to meet the demands of the buyer.  On occasion, 
the management of the supplier base/chain includes, or should include, efforts to expand or 
contract the base, or the mixture within the base, in order to control value and the total cost 
of ownership to the buyer.  The ability of a buyer to shape the base is dependent on the 
buyer’s buying power and, in the case of governmental buyers, other policy considerations 
associated with the functions of a sovereign.  It is from this latter perspective that we 
                                                
6 The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.  They do not reflect the opinion of the 
US General Services Administration or the US government. 
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approach the question of this paper of whether there is a role for midsize companies in the 
base/market that supports government acquisition at the federal, state and local levels. 
Market Shares of Smalls, Midsize and Large Companies 
At the moment, the absence of an accepted definition for midsize companies makes 
it impossible, with any precision or general acceptance, to define the market share for 
midsize companies.  In fact, the current statutory and regulatory schema divides markets 
into two groups, small companies and other than small companies.  Small companies are 
defined by statute and regulation in the federal market and in most state and local markets.  
Even where small companies are defined by statute and regulation, there is room for 
inaccuracy precisely because of the way in which the definitions are drafted and as result of 
evolution in the markets themselves.  For example, the size status of a company in the US 
federal market is determined by the North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS), which establishes size status based on the code selected.  The various codes use 
one of two, or a combination thereof, measurements to determine the size of a company: 
sales or the number of employees.  Because the federal contracting officer determines the 
NAICS code to employ in a particular acquisition, in some acquisitions a company may be 
small and in others, other than small.  In addition, in the federal market, there are process 
rules that allow a company to remain small for reporting requirements for the duration of a 
contract, even though after submission of their original offer an event occurred that caused 
the company to become other than small. 
It has often been argued that there is a strong strategic and economic benefit in 
encouraging small business in America.  The Small Business Administration (SBA) 
anticipates that small businesses will be responsible for the nation’s economic growth during 
the coming decades, however, at great risk to the companies themselves.  The key role of 
small enterprises in the federal market space has further been codified through the Small 
Business Act established by Congress.  The purpose of the Act is to provide assistance to 
these ventures through set-aside programs, sole-source contracting opportunities, interest-
free loans and a variety of government funding and support activities. 
In the information technology (IT) arena, the welfare of small and midsized 
companies is critical to the US economy in that the birthplace of innovation generally is 
found in small to midsized businesses, and the new technologies will open avenues for 
future investment, growth and employment opportunities for the future.  While it may be true 
that large companies have an innovative advantage in sectors that are capital-intensive, 
highly unionized and specialized, small businesses have the innovation advantage when 
skilled labor comes into play  (Acs & Audretsch, 1987).  Secondly, in order to remain 
competitive in the global marketplace, the US needs to constantly feed and foster new 
product development. 
By most reports, the federal government’s SBA is serving its constituents well.  
Marked growth in some industries, especially those whose market sector has expanded into 
global commerce via the Internet, has catapulted the previously categorized small business 
into the midsize sector.  The IT market has especially fallen prey to this phenomenon since 
the late 1990s.  What would appear to be a boon for these corporations often becomes 
detrimental to their existence.  The intended protectionism provided by the Small Business 
Act, one that allowed for a gradual, steady growth of a business, one under which 
experience can be gained and expansion revenue generated, is then lost by the sudden 
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influx of economic success without the insight and wisdom of years of business-
management knowledge.   
Once the threshold of success has been crossed for a company that has morphed 
from small to midsize, a series of events occur.  This maturation of the enterprise ends the 
exemption provided to small business in such areas as cost accounting reporting and 
governmental contracting compliance standards.  These emerging enterprises have a 
greater need for capital for expansion, and most often the small business has been reliant 
on the credit of an individual such as the owner for ready cash.  As the small business 
market grows into midsize success stories, the risks associated with achievement are 
exponentially multiplied though regulatory requirements, technology exposures and 
environmental threats.  A great deal of companies report that they are having difficulties 
getting financial software systems that will meet the growing needs of their enterprise at a 
price that is affordable to the midsize market.  This exemplifies the challenge of finding 
something stronger than Quicken but smaller than SAP (large-corporation ERP system) for 
their finances.  Unfortunately the dummied-down versions are not available in the mid-
market size.  This begs the question of just who are small, midsize and large businesses. 
Defining Small, Midsize and Large Businesses 
In the market generally, small businesses are viewed by the public as those 
companies that have less than 100 employees and no more than $500K in annual sales 
(Peterson, Albaum, & Kozmetsky, 1986).  This general interpretation by the average citizen 
differs from that of the Small Business Administration’s standards of a maximum of 500-
1,500 employees based on industry type, and average annual sales as high as $17 million 
(Small Business Administration, 2006). 
In the management accounting software realm, the middle market segment is 
defined as companies who have $1 million to $250 million in annual sales—the number of 
employees is not mentioned as the regulations and accountability of such revenue dictates 
the level of sophistication needed in product development and application. 
What is a Midsize Company? 
As noted earlier, while there are definitions for small businesses in the federal market 
and in most state and local markets, there is no generally accepted schema for identifying 
midsize companies.  There clearly is no agreement on how a company’s size should be 
measured, e.g., number of employees or sales (gross or net).  Further, there is an even 
greater divergence of opinion at what point a company other than small becomes a large 
business in terms of number of employees or sales (gross or net).  For the purposes of this 
discussion, we would like to posit that the definition should be tied to the gross sales of the 
company as opposed to the number of employees.   
We suggest the use of gross sales as a measure for midsize companies.  We do so 
in no small part as a reaction to how the markets have evolved over the past several 
decades.  At one point in time, companies integrated their functions horizontally—
performing most of the work they sold within their own employees.  Over the past decades, 
companies in both the manufacturing and service sectors have, to a great extent, 
outsourced non-core functions of their business, keeping as members of their in-house 
workforce only those employees key to the core functions, and relying on outside sources to 
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“ramp” up to meet business engagements.  Using the number of employees a company has 
in this environment grossly under appreciates the share of the market a company may 
actually control, whereas gross sales really tell the story of a company’s dominance in a 
particular market sector. 
In terms of what threshold should be used to determine the size of a company other 
than small, the suggested numbers are all over the map.  The US General Services 
Administration (GSA), in preparing a Request for Proposal (RFP) for its next generation 
Government-wide Acquisition Contract (GWAC) (named Alliant), issued a Request for 
Information (RFI) from the IT industry (hardware, software and services) asking for feedback 
from the industry on what the cutoff should be in terms of sales for a midsize company in 
that market.  GSA received a significant amount of feedback from companies with 
recommendations ranging from $500 million dollars in sales and up; Yet, the majority of 
those responding proposed $500 million in sales as the threshold. 
For purposes of this paper, we recommend that the definition be set at $500 million 
in gross sales.  Over time, in keeping with sound Strategic Sourcing practices, this threshold 
should be reviewed and adjusted as the nature of the market changes.  It may also prove 
necessary, as the SBA found for small businesses, to adjust this threshold market by market 
based on specific market conditions. Clearly, this would prove a significant effort to 
undertake; yet, its continual maintenance is essential to achieve sound market management 
to meet government buyer requirements. 
The Importance of Midsize Companies to a Healthy 
Government Market—Size Really Does Matter 
What happens when a business outgrows its competitors and is forced to compete 
with the “big dogs” for the first time—when they are too big to be small and too small to be 
big?  A company in this transitional phase of moving from small to large is considered to be 
in “no-man’s land.”  It is here that they have maximized the ability of their founders to further 
add capacity to the business, while at the same time burning cash in order to keep up with 
the market.  Additionally, when a new midsize business loses a major client it had been 
serving during its evolution, the impact of such a loss can devastate or perhaps destroy the 
company entirely (Lafayette, 1992). 
Most small business owners sacrifice themselves for the betterment of the business, 
putting in long hours and taking little pay for their efforts.  Often, they rely on the skills of the 
founder, and when capacity dictates additional support, they find that they must pay a 
prevailing wage for the work, thus taking in lower profits.   
Along with the additional resources needed to keep up with demand comes the 
burden of growing customer expectations.  What a small business did to cater to its 
customers (from personalized service, friendly conversations and lunch meetings) will not 
only be expected to continue as the firm grows, but increasing levels of service will be 
anticipated: “Now that the business has all that money from expansion, well surely they 
could have house-calls, and free replacements, etc.” 
At the crux of this explosion of opportunity will be the requirement for the owner to 
give up his control of the company.  A CEO, CFO or COO will be needed, and this is not a 
small investment to be had.  You can’t manage a larger company without a high-level 
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manager; but as a midsize business, you may not be able to afford their services.  Thus the 
term “no-man’s land.”  
Cold Hard Cash 
As the personal net worth of the founder becomes tied to the company’s balance 
sheet, the credit of the company becomes risky.  There appears to be a reluctance to 
borrow money, as repayment causes lower profit margins—already very tight due to the 
competitiveness of the marketplace (Journal of Commerce, 1999, January).   When money 
is needed and funds are hard to come by, this is when the decision to seek venture capital 
comes into play.  Control of the corporation by these investors often leads to the separation 
of the founder from the business he/she founded.  Further, it may be that the successful 
midsize business is just the perfect complement to the large corporation seeking to acquire 
a greater market share and lock-in or -out its competition.  In the end, most midsize 
companies vanish into either a subdivision of a larger entity or disappear completely through 
dissolution.   
Better, not Bigger 
Some companies, when faced with the challenge of expansion, have discovered that 
perhaps the growth opportunity is not worth the investment, thus choosing to be better and 
not bigger.  These companies look at the market sector in which they operate and choose to 
perfect their niche—moving from good to great and staying in control of their own destiny.  
In situations such as these, the most important motivators for the company are found not in 
profit generation, but in relationships that have been built, ties that have been created in a 
community and the personal rewards that have generated from the worthwhile work they 
perform (Burlingham, 2006). 
Challenges for the Midsize 
In order to be successful, midsized companies must be able to foresee the 
requirements of their clients and find innovative methods with which to meet these needs.  A 
constant stream of investment must always be made in which cutting-edge thoughts and 
actions are encouraged (Violino, 2006).  Companies that fail to take action in these areas 
tend to fail, and the failure to keep up with the impact of IT innovations can really play a 
critical role in the downfall of a successful company.  The Internet has had a profound 
impact on companies that found a manner in which to incorporate the opportunity of 
increased exposure, high demand and customer service.  Those businesses that chose to 
ignore the digital revolution are now awakening to a business model that fails to meet the 
new consumer set of expectations.  
Risk Tolerance 
The amount of risk tolerated by companies is often dictated by their size and market 
position.  Large companies tend to be as bureaucratic and risk averse as governmental 
organizations.  Even where they are inclined to take risk, their internal processes to identify 
the risk, quantify the risk and get approval to assume it are lengthy and expensive.  Clearly, 
when a large company decides to assume risk, they price for it in an attempt to shift as large 
a portion as possible to the buyer.  Conversely, small companies generally lack the 
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bureaucracy associated with making risk-assumption in large businesses; but when they 
face the “bet the company” type of risk issues, their inability to shift the risk through pricing 
or to bet the company’s fate on a single acquisition may cause them to pass on acquisition.  
Midsize companies are particularly situated in this risk-tolerance arena to take on the risk 
without having to bet the company or the ability to fully shift the risk to the buyer through 
pricing.  The buyer clearly benefits in this environment. 
Integration 
Another arena where midsize companies provide an advantage is integration.  More 
and more today government buyers find themselves in situations in which they lack the 
expertise to serve as integrator for solutions they require, but feel uncomfortable buying the 
products and services and integration function from a single provider.  Small companies will 
frequently lack expertise in integrating these complex requirements, although they are more 
than capable of providing the products or services or both.  Large companies are capable of 
providing a fully integrated solution, but experience has shown that it may be to the buyer’s 
advantage to separate the integration function from the parts to be integrated to create a 
tension in the supply chain that ensures that decisions are made that ultimately benefit the 
buyer while focusing on performance and cost-benefit trade-offs. 
Overhead Costs 
Clearly, an advantage that midsize companies offer (whether in fixed-priced or cost-
type acquisitions) is lower overhead rates.  Small businesses offer similar advantages in this 
area as well.  Lower overhead costs benefit the buyer in both fixed-price and cost-type 
contracts. 
Flexibility/Responsiveness 
The advantages in flexibilities and responsiveness, at least from an organizational 
perspective, are clear to any observer when dealing with midsize companies.  With large 
companies, try calling the President or CEO of the company as a government buyer and 
getting them on the phone; our personal experience has been that even when calling to 
discuss potential suspension or debarment (the equivalent of the death penalty in 
government contracting), getting through to a Large company’s senior executives to talk is 
difficult at best.  However, at the midsize level, the very nature of the organization 
allows/promotes effective communication with the company’s senior executives.   
Similarly, when problems arise, even the best contracts with the best companies of 
all sizes have problems; midsize companies seem to demonstrate greater flexibility.  
Whether this flexibility stems from the lack of a significant internal bureaucracy, greater risk 
tolerance, relative position in the market or some other reasons, is irrelevant.  For the 
government, it means access to senior management and more timely, effective dispute 
resolution. 
Boom and Bust Cycle 
Finally, there is a boom and bust cycle in government marketplaces.  Government at 
all levels promotes the development of small businesses and supports their growth through 
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programs designed to help them grow in size and gain experience in performing work.  
However, once they graduate to “other than small” in the US market, the government 
support network disappears completely, leaving most of these companies in the situation 
where they lack the government support programs to sustain their continued growth and, as 
noted above, the capital to compete with large companies.  Thus, many either find 
themselves selling their company or going out of business.  This is an incredibly wasteful 
process in which the company that the government invested in when it was small because it 
was the strongest part of the engine of our economy both in terms of producing jobs and in 
terms of technology development, patent submissions, etc., simply goes away—and along 
with it, often the jobs it created, the innovation it promoted and the experience acquired 
during the time it enjoyed the protections of the various small business programs.  By 
identifying a mid-tier in the market and managing that tier so companies do not have to sell 
or go out of business, waste is eliminated and an overall stronger economy results—one 
better capable of surviving market shifts. 
Conclusion 
There is unquestionably a dearth of empirical data to support the suggestions in this 
paper.  The dearth exists not because the data isn’t available but because government 
markets have not focused on it to date.  Intuition informs many that there is an important role 
for midsize companies in meeting the requirements of the government market, particularly in 
the challenging times facing government buyers today both domestically and internationally. 
Midsize companies offer lower cost solutions, greater risk tolerance and more 
responsiveness than large companies; combine that with greater experience than small 
companies have had the opportunity to garner, and it is clear that there is a value to the 
government buyer in having midsize companies in the government market place…  
Government buyers, however, lack the empirical data they need to utilize existing 
procurement flexibilities to manage government markets to ensure that a sufficient number 
of midsize companies remain available to meet government requirements. 
What is needed at this point is greater study of the markets, empirical demonstration 
of the value of midsize companies to those markets and then the development of an 
effective program designed to ensure that a sufficient mix of companies exist to meet the 
government’s requirements in a timely manner and at best value. 
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This study investigated the relationships between self-leadership and creativity in the 
context of a defense acquisition organization.  More specifically, this study examined 
differences in self-leadership, creativity and perceived organizational support for creativity 
between line and supervisory defense acquisition employees. Our analyses suggested that 
self-leadership was significantly related to creative potential and practiced creativity for both 
line and supervisory employees, although there were no significant differences in overall 
levels of self-leadership between the two groups.  In addition, we found significant 
differences in creative potential, practiced creativity, gap scores and perceptions of 
organizational support for creativity.  Specifically, line employees reported significantly lower 
levels of creative potential, practiced creativity and perceptions of organizational support for 
creativity along with higher gap scores in comparison to supervisors.  
Our findings imply that self-leadership is a primary tool for facilitating creativity at all 
organizational levels and that active organizational support for creativity may be the key for 
reducing the gap between creative potential and practiced creativity that represents 
untapped creative resources.  Our results suggest that this gap is much more pronounced 
among line employees and that line employees generally perceive less organizational 
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support for utilizing their creative resources than supervisors.  In response, we make some 
specific suggestions for organizational interventions designed to increase self-leadership 
capabilities at all levels and to increase perceptions of organization support for creative 
practices among line employees in defense acquisitions. A workforce with creative self-
leaders could synergistically assist organizations in maximizing the utility of all 
organizational resources. 
Introduction 
Innovation and creativity are critical for organizations to thrive in the 21st century 
(Kanter, 1983; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997; Utterback, 1994). Indeed, the Office of Force 
Transformation (OFT) under the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) has placed the 
leveraging of innovation and creativity among the most effective approaches for creating the 
transformational changes needed to maintain the Department of Defense’s strategic 
position. Creativity is more likely to occur if an individual has certain characteristics or innate 
skills and abilities (Tierney & Farmer, 2002; Hinton, 1970; Simonton, 1992; Woodman & 
Schoenfeldt, 1989) and when the individual perceives that the work environment supports 
creativity (Amabile, 1996; Cummings, Hinton & Gobdel, 1975; Woodman, Sawyer & Griffen, 
1993).  Furthermore, the ability to leverage creativity depends largely on effective leadership 
(Kouzes & Posner, 1995; Manz & Sims, 2001). A common theme in improving leadership 
effectiveness concerns knowing and leading oneself (Bennis, 1994; Drucker, 1999; 
Goleman, Boyatzis & McKee, 2002; Senge, 1990; Yukl, 2002). Self-leadership is a concept 
that focuses on self-reflection and evaluation aimed at improving personal and professional 
performance. 
Although theorists have often suggested relationships between self-leadership and 
creativity (e.g., Kouzes & Posner, 1995; Manz & Sims, 2001), very little attention has been 
given to how these relationships may differ across organizational levels.  The purpose of the 
current study is to examine the self-leadership and creativity differences in line and 
supervisory defense acquisition employees.  The differences identified in this research may 
have important implications for maximizing employee self-direction and for fully utilizing 
creative resources at all organizational levels.  
Creativity and Self-leadership  
Although creativity is a complex concept that is somewhat difficult to define, 
consistent themes tend to emerge across the various definitions in the creativity literature 
(e.g., Barron & Harrington, 1981; Guilford, 1950; Martindale, 1989; Sternberg & Lubart, 
1999).  Based on the common ideas in these definitions, we define creativity as an ability to 
harvest novel but appropriate ideas in order to maximize efficiencies, solve problems, and 
increase effectiveness.  We further divide the creativity concept into creative potential and 
practiced creativity (e.g., Hinton, 1968; DiLiello & Houghton, 2006, 2007).  In short, if an 
individual’s creativity is attenuated by the environment, then the individual will not utilize his 
or her full creative potential (Hinton, 1968; George & Zhou, 2001; Scott, 1965). 
Creative potential is the creative capacity, skills and abilities that a person possesses 
(Hinton, 1968, 1970).  Creative potential includes the concept of creative self-efficacy, an 
individual’s subjective assessment of their personal ability to be creative (Tierney & Farmer, 
2002). Creative self-efficacy involves seeing oneself as being good at creative problem-
solving and generating novel ideas.  Creative potential also includes having the talent or 
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expertise to do well in one’s work and possessing the ability to take risks by trying out new 
ideas (Amabile, Burnside& Gryskiewicz, 1999).  
 Practiced creativity, on the other hand, is the perceived opportunity to utilize 
creativity skills and abilities. Practiced creativity should not be confused with creative 
performance, which is an external assessment of products or achievements (Amabile, 1996; 
Hinton, 1968).  Practiced creativity is also different from the concept of organizational 
support for creativity, which is the extent to which, “an organizational culture […] encourages 
creativity through the fair, constructive judgment of ideas, reward and recognition for 
creative work, mechanisms for developing new ideas, and active flow of ideas, and a shared 
vision of what the organization is trying to do” (Amabile et al., 1999, p. 15).  Employees with 
strong creative potential are more likely to actually practice creativity when they perceive 
strong support from the organization (DiLiello & Houghton, 2006); several key conditions 
must be present within an organization for its work environment to support individual 
creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1988; Ford, 1996; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988). 
The distinction between creative potential and practiced creativity is important 
because when people perceive themselves as having creative potential but do not perceive 
the ability to use or practice this potential, they will be less likely to engage in creative 
behavior. The gap between creative potential and creative practice represents untapped 
organizational resources.  Identifying such untapped resources may be especially important 
in defense acquisition organizations that are continually being told to “do more with less.”  
Self-leadership (e.g., Manz, 1986; Neck & Houghton, 2006; Neck & Manz, 2007) is a 
self-evaluation and self-influence process through which individuals identify and replace 
ineffective behaviors and negative thought processes with more effective behaviors and 
positive thought processes, thereby enhancing personal accountability and improving 
professional performance.  Theorists have long suggested that leaders in organizations 
should encourage their followers to lead themselves in the workplace (e.g., Manz & Sims, 
1980, 2001).  Supervisors and work environments only have a limited control over the 
workers; additional control or work motivation must come from within the individual 
(Herzberg, Mausner & Snyderman, 2003; Manz & Sims, 1980; Sergiovanni, 1992). When 
employees are trained and empowered to lead themselves, supervisors can shift their focus 
from detailed oversight and control to longer-term, big-picture issues. 
Founded upon several classic theories of self-influence—including self-regulation 
(Kanfer, 1970; Carver & Scheier, 1981), self-control (Cautela, 1969; Mahoney & Arnkoff, 
1978, 1979; Thoresen & Mahoney, 1974), intrinsic motivation theory (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 
1985), and social cognitive theory (e.g., Bandura, 1986)—self-leadership is a normative 
model that prescribes specific sets of behavioral and cognitive strategies aimed at 
increasing  individual performance.  Self-leadership strategies are often divided into three 
primary categories: Behavior Focused Strategies, Natural Reward Strategies and 
Constructive Thought Strategies (e.g., Neck & Houghton, 2006).  
Behavior Focused Strategies involve identifying and replacing ineffective behaviors 
with more effective ones through a process of self-observation, self-goal setting, self-reward 
and self-correcting feedback (Neck & Houghton, 2006).  Self-observation entails a close 
examination of one’s own behaviors in order to identify behaviors that should be changed, 
enhanced or eliminated (Mahoney & Arnkoff, 1978, 1979; Manz & Sims, 1980; Neck & 
Manz, 2007).  Once target behaviors have been identified, individuals can establish goals 
and associated reward contingencies to energize and direct necessary behaviors (Mahoney 
& Arnkoff, 1978, 1979; Manz & Sims, 1980; Neck & Manz, 2007).  Additionally, self-
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correcting feedback, consisting of a positively framed reflection on failures and undesirable 
behaviors, may be quite effective in helping to recast these behaviors in more positive 
directions (Manz & Sims, 2001).  
Natural Reward Strategies include the ability of the individual to find pleasure in the 
work that has to be performed and to focus on the inherently enjoyable aspects of task or 
activity, leading to increased feelings of competence, self-control and a sense of purpose 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Herzberg, Mausner & Snydermanl, 2003).  
Natural reward strategies include building more pleasant and enjoyable features into a task 
or activity so that the task itself becomes more intrinsically rewarding, and shifting mental 
focus to inherently rewarding aspects of the task (Neck & Houghton, 2006; Neck & Manz, 
2007).   
Constructive Thought Strategies focus on directing and reshaping various mental 
processes—including beliefs and assumptions, self-verbalizations (self-talk), and mental 
imagery—in order to create constructive thought patterns and habitual ways of thinking that 
may have a positive impact on individual performance (Neck & Houghton, 2006; Neck & 
Manz, 1992, 1996).  For example, individuals can assess their thought patterns in an effort 
to identify and eliminate dysfunctional beliefs and assumptions with more rational and 
constructive ones (Burns, 1980; Ellis, 1977; Neck & Manz, 1992).  Similarly, self-talk, 
defined as what we covertly tell ourselves, can be closely examined in order to eliminate 
undue negativity and pessimism.  Research in various fields (sports psychology, clinical 
psychology, education and communication) supports the use of positive self-talk as an 
effective way to improve individual performance (e.g., Neck & Manz, 1992).  Mental imagery 
involves symbolically experiencing behavioral outcomes prior to actual performance without 
overt physical muscular movement (Driskell, Copper, & Moran, 1994; Finke, 1989; Neck & 
Manz, 1992, 1996).  Research suggests that people who visualize successful performance 
before actually engaging in performance are much more likely to perform successfully when 
faced with the actual task (Neck & Houghton, 2006).  In a meta-analysis of 35 empirical 
studies, Driskell et al. (1994) reported an overall positive and significant effect for mental 
imagery on individual performance. 
Theorists have often suggested a relationship exists between self-leadership and 
creativity (e.g., DiLiello & Houghton, 2006; Houghton & Yoho, 2005; Manz & Sims, 2001).  
The relationship between creativity and self-leadership may be partially founded on the 
concepts of autonomy and self-determination.  Autonomy, a key aspect of creativity (e.g., 
Amabile, 1996; Barron & Harrington, 1981; Woodman et al., 1993), has been linked to self-
determination and intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Self-determination is a primary 
component of self-leadership’s natural reward strategies (Neck & Manz, 2007).  Indeed, 
empirical research suggests that an individual’s need for autonomy can subsequently 
influence the extent to which the individual engages in self-leadership (Yun, Cox, & Sims, 
2006).   
Other relationships between creativity and self-leadership have also been suggested. 
For example, Houghton and Yoho (2005) have suggested a relationship between individual 
self-leadership and subsequent levels of individual independence and creativity.  In addition, 
internal locus of control, a theorized component of creativity, has been empirically related to 
individual self-leadership (Kazan & Earnest, 2000).  Finally, an empowering leadership style 
(leading others to be self-leaders) tends to promote creativity rather than conformity (Manz & 
Sims, 2001). Indeed, creativity may be one of the most essential aspects of effective 
organizational leadership (Mumford & Connelly, 1999).  Creative thinking and a different 
style of leadership are necessary to provide flexibility, facilitate change and redesign 
traditional bureaucratic processes (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Encouraging self-leadership is a 
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relatively new leadership style that may help to promote an organizational climate that 
supports creativity.  Empowering leadership is rapidly becoming a key success strategy in 
the rapidly changing work environments of the 21st century.   
The purpose of the current study is to examine the relationships between self-
leadership and creativity in the context of a defense acquisition organization.  More 
specifically, we will examine possible differences in self-leadership, creativity and perceived 
organizational support for creativity between line and supervisory defense acquisition 
employees.  The present study will contribute to the self-leadership and creativity literature 
in a number of important ways.  First, this study will take an empirical step toward 
understanding the nature of the relationship between self-leadership and creativity.  This 
study will also examine the role of organizational support in facilitating practiced creativity 
among organizational members.  Most importantly, this study is among the first to examine 
differences in self-leadership, creativity and perceptions of support between line and 
supervisory employees.  Understanding these differences may be a critical for reducing the 
gap between creative potential and practiced creativity in organizations.  Finally, this study 
makes a unique contribution to our knowledge of creativity and self-leadership in the context 
of defense acquisitions.  The differences examined here may have important implications for 
creating a defense acquisitions workforce with strong self-leaders working in environments 
that support creativity. Creative self-leaders could synergistically assist the DoD in 
maintaining an all-important competitive advantage in the face of a wide range of 21st-
century challenges. 
Method 
 Sample and Procedure 
Primary data were collected from the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) as part of a 
larger study that examined a number of performance-related issues.  Approximately 37% of 
the total ACA workforce of approximately 1900 people chose to complete the online survey, 
a fairly high response rate when compared to the response rates for other federal employee 
surveys and to response rates for e-mail surveys in general (Sheehan, 2001).  Listwise 
deletion for missing data resulted in a final overall sample of 654.  This sample was 
subsequently divided into two subsamples (i.e., supervisory employees, N=215; and line 
employees, N=439) for further analysis.  The average age of the respondents was 
approximately 46, and the average job tenure was approximately 12 years.  Sixty percent of 
the respondents were female.  The online survey was activated in accordance with the 
tailored design method (Dillman, 2000).  An initial e-mail was sent to ACA workforce 
members that included an Informed Consent Notification, the purpose of the study, the 
approval and sponsorship of the study, a confidentiality statement and a link to the online 
survey.  A subsequent follow-up e-mail summarized the first message, added a personal 
note and provided a four-day extension, along with a link to the online survey.   
Measures 
Thirteen items from the Revised Self-leadership Questionnaire (Houghton & Neck, 
2002) were used to measure self-leadership.  Twelve items were utilized to measure 
creativity: six items assessing creative potential and six items representing practiced 
creativity.  These items have demonstrated fairly good reliability and validity for measuring 
creative potential and practiced creativity (DiLiello & Houghton, 2007).  Perceived 
organizational support was measured with six items from “Keys: Assessing the Climate for 
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Creativity,” used with the permission of the Center for Creative Leadership (Amabile et al., 
1999).  All items were measured utilizing a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from Strongly 
Agree to Strongly Disagree. 
Analyses 
Mean differences between supervisory and line employees for self-leadership, 
creative potential, practiced creativity, a gap score (i.e., the difference between creative 
potential and practiced creativity that represents untapped creative potential), and 
perceptions of organizational support for creativity were examined using a series of  
t-tests. In addition, a series of regression analyses were conducted to examine the effects of 
self-leadership, perceived organizational support for creativity and organizational level (line 
vs. supervisory) on creative potential, practiced creativity and gap scores, respectively, 
along with the effects of organizational level (line vs. supervisory) on perceived 
organizational support for creativity.   
Results 
Means and standard deviations for both supervisory and line employees for self-
leadership, creative potential, practiced creativity, gap scores and perceived organizational 
support for creativity are shown in Table 1.  The analysis indicated no mean difference 
between groups for self-leadership, t(507) = 1.16, p = .247.  In contrast, analyses showed 
significant mean differences between the two groups for creative potential, t(652) = 3.30, p = 
.001; practiced creativity, t(469) = 7.48, p = .000; gap scores, t(471) = -5.03, p = .000; and 
perceived organizational support for creativity, t(652) = 3.21, p = .001.   
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) 
 
 SL CP PC GS OS 
Supervisors 























Note:  SL=Self-Leadership, CP=Creative Potential, PC=Practiced Creativity, GS=Gap Score, 
OS=Perceived Organizational Support. 
 
Four separate regression analyses were conducted.  Model 1 examined the effects 
of the independent variables self-leadership and organizational level (1=supervisor - 0=line, 
using dummy variable coding) on the dependent variable creative potential.  Model 2 
examined the effects of self-leadership, perceived organizational support for creativity, and 
organizational level on the dependent variable practiced creativity.  Model 3 examined the 
relationships between the three independent variables and gap scores.  Finally, Model 4 
explored the effects of organizational level on perceptions of organizational support for 
creativity.  A summary of the results of these analyses is presented in Table 2.  
The regression equation for Model 1 suggested that both self-leadership and 
organizational level were significantly related to creative potential, with self-leadership as the 
stronger predictor of the two (Standardized β = .356, p = .000).  The equation for Model 2 
indicated that self-leadership, perceived organizational support for creativity and 
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organizational level were all significant predictors of practiced creativity, accounting for 
approximately 42.6% of its variance.  Of the three variables, perceived organizational 
support was the stronger predictor of practiced creativity (Standardized β = .563, p = .000).  
The Model 3 analysis found that perceived organizational support and organizational level 
were significantly and negatively related to gap scores, explaining approximately 33.1% of 
the observed variance.  The regression equation suggested a strong negative effect for 
perceived organizational support (Standardized β = -.551, p = .000), indicating that lower 
perceptions of organizational support for creativity will result in larger gaps between 
individuals’ creative potential and their practiced creativity.  In addition, the equation 
suggests that gap scores will be significantly greater for line employees than for supervisors 
(Organizational Level: Standardized β = -.117, p = .000).  Finally, the regression analysis for 
Model 4 implied that supervisors tend to have more positive perceptions of organizational 
support for creativity than line employees  
 (Organizational Level: Standardized β = .125, p = .001  

































This study revealed a number of significant differences between line and supervisory 
acquisition employees.  Our analyses suggested that self-leadership was significantly 
related to creative potential and practiced creativity for both line and supervisory employees, 
with no significant differences in overall levels of self-leadership between the two groups.  In 
contrast, we found significant differences between line and supervisory employees in 
creative potential, practiced creativity, gap scores and perceptions of organizational support 
for creativity.  Specifically, line employees reported significantly lower levels of creative 
potential, practiced creativity and perceptions of organizational support for creativity, along 
with higher gap scores in comparison to supervisors.   
Our analyses further suggested that although supervisors tend to have more creative 
potential than line employees, self-leadership appears to be the more important concept in 
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determining an individual’s creative potential.  Likewise, although self-leadership and 
organizational level are both important determinants of practiced creativity, employee 
perceptions of organizational support for creativity seem to be far more crucial.  Similarly, 
perceived organizational support for creativity appears to be more important than 
organizational level in predicting creativity gaps in acquisition employees.  In other words, 
employees who feel that the organization supports their creative efforts will be much more 
likely to practice creative behaviors, thus, lowering the gap between their potential and 
practiced creativity.  Finally, organizational level was a significant determinant of perceptions 
of organizational support for creativity—with supervisory employees holding significantly 
more positive perceptions of support than line employees.  In summation, our analyses 
suggest that self-leadership may be a key determinant of creative potential and practice 
among defense acquisition employees and that perceptions of organizational support for 
creativity, which tend to be weaker in non-supervisory employees, are critical in determining 
whether creative potential will be realized or whether a gap between potential and practice 
will result.  
The results of this study have important theoretical, empirical and practical 
applications. This study adds to our understanding of the nature of the relationship between 
self-leadership, creativity and organizational support for creative practices at both the 
supervisory and non-supervisory levels.  Our findings imply that self-leadership is a primary 
tool for facilitating creativity at all organizational levels and that active organizational support 
for creativity may be the key for reducing the gap between creative potential and practiced 
creativity that represents untapped creative resources.  Our results also suggest that this 
gap is much more pronounced among line employees and that line employees generally 
perceive less organizational support for utilizing their creative resources than supervisors.  
In order to address this situation, an organizational intervention designed to increase self-
leadership capabilities at all levels and to increase perceptions of organization support for 
creative practices among line employees in defense acquisitions would be well advised.  
More specifically, a structured self-leadership training program similar to those reported 
elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Neck & Manz, 1996; Stewart, Carson, & Cardy, 1996) could 
be conducted for acquisition employees.  Such a training program could have the dual effect 
of increasing self-leading behaviors and, thus, creative potential while also strongly signaling 
organizational support for creative behaviors. 
Although our findings suggest exciting avenues toward increasing self-leadership 
and unleashing creative resources at all organizational levels, our study is bound by certain 
limitations.  First, the present sample was relatively homogeneous, consisting entirely of 
members of the Army Contracting Agency.  As we have suggested, such a sample is 
especially appropriate for creativity research because the Department of Defense has taken 
a keen interest in tapping all creative resources available in order to sustain a competitive 
advantage.  However, it is uncertain as to whether the results reported here would 
generalize to other samples of interest.  Second, all items were self-reported and collected 
utilizing a single survey at a single point in time, thus raising concerns regarding 
measurement issues such as response set and social desirability biases.  Given these 
potential problems, our findings should be viewed with some degree of caution.  On the 
other hand, despite such inherent limitations, the use of self-reported items collected in a 
single administration is common practice in many aspects of social science research.       
Future research should continue to examine the relationships between self-
leadership, creative potential, practiced creativity, organizational level and organizational 
support for creativity. Specifically, future research should more closely examine the role of 
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organizational support as a moderator of the relationship between creative potential and 
practiced creativity and as a key mechanism for reducing the gap between these concepts 
in organizations.  In addition, perceptions of support for creativity might be further 
subdivided from the organizational level to the work group and supervisory levels in order to 
provide additional insights (DiLiello & Houghton, 2006).  Similarly, future research could 
continue to examine the differences between line and supervisory employees in terms of 
creativity and perceptions of support for creative practices, with an eye toward identifying 
ways to increase creativity at all organizational levels.  In closing, our findings and 
suggestions have significant practical application in the context of the transformational 
efforts in the Department of Defense in support of warfighter readiness. An acquisition 
workforce of creative self-leaders could synergistically assist the organization in maximizing 
the utility of all organizational resources. 
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The Tuckman (1965) four-stage sequential model of team development (Forming, 
Storming, Norming, and Performing, or FSNP) represents today's most widely used model. 
However, the Tuckman model is a conceptual statement that was suggested by the data 
and has not been empirically validated (Tuckman, 1965). Hadyn, Teare, Scheuing  and 
Armistead (1997, p. 118) state that, "despite increasing interest in teamwork, much of the 
literature on the subject is inconclusive and often derived from anecdote rather than primary 
research."  
The goal of this research was to develop empirical evidence to determine whether or 
not the Tuckman model or some variant thereof provides an appropriate model to explain 
the development of small, short-duration technical teams within the Acquisition Community.  
The results showed, to a 95% confidence level, that only about 2% of 321 teams 
studies followed the Tuckman model (FSNP). However a modified model, called the DAU 
Model (FNP—Tuckman model sans Storming), was experienced by 229 of the 321 teams 
(77%). This discrete three-stage model, along with a redefined Storming function that takes 
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place throughout the teams' duration, constitutes a strong model of team dynamics for the 
studied Acquisition population.  
This research demonstrates that not only do technical teams generally follow the 
DAU model, but also that there is a strong correlation between teams producing above-
average products and teams following this model. The results of this research strongly 
suggest the possibility that the productivity of a technical team may be significantly improved 
by guiding its development through a well-defined process.  
Background 
How to build effective teams is one of the most important management issues of the 
day.  Significant effort is being expended to gain a better understanding of how highly 
successful teams develop in hopes that methodologies to enhance team productivity can be 
produced that will accelerate the movement of high-quality products to the marketplace 
(Osterman, 1994).  In Quality Circles, Concurrent Engineering, and many other 
management innovations, the team is the organizational unit to which creative control is 
being delegated.  As a result, there is a great need to better understand the development of 
technical teams. 
The culture of many of today’s businesses places as much emphasis on a person’s 
ability to work together effectively in a team environment as on technical skills (Tarricone, 
2002).  Osterman (1994) found that teams are being used extensively by organizations that 
need to get products to market faster.  Some industries have reported that teaming brings 
advantages such as increased productivity and decreased absenteeism (Beyerlein, 2001).  
According to Beyerlein, the use of task-oriented teams within organizations has spread 
across many industries, nonprofits, and national boundaries in the last decade.  Kinlaw 
(1991) found that teamwork is the main driver for continuous improvement and increased 
competitiveness.  According to Marks (2001), the advantage of teamwork is that people 
working together can often achieve something beyond the capabilities of individuals working 
alone.  Furthermore, Marks points out that success is not only a function of team members' 
talents and the available resources but also of the processes team members use to interact 
with each other.  Research on the development and functioning of teams is needed to 
enable organizations to retool human resource systems so that managers can better select, 
train, develop, and reward personnel for effective teamwork (Marks, 2001).  To remain 
competitive, it is important for organizations to understand how to create and maintain 
teams that are highly effective in today’s globally competitive environment (Yancey, 1998).   
Introduction—the Importance of Teams to Defense Acquisition 
and the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Connection 
Short-duration, small technical teams represent a significant proportion of the team 
activities within the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition community and corporate 
organizations.  These teams come together, focus on the task at hand, produce whatever 
products are required, communicate their results, and then disband as easily and quickly as 
they were formed (Canadian Business, 2001).  Wherever highly specialized knowledge 
spanning multiple disciplines is required, the technical team enjoys widespread use.  Some 
examples are as follows: 
 Multi-disciplinary Product Integration Teams 
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 Tiger Teams (narrow focus, single issue) 
 Proposal Teams 
 Design Teams 
 Educational/Training Teams 
 Problem Resolution Teams 
 Product Development Teams 
 Marketing/Sales Teams 
In today’s environment, short-duration, small technical teams drive an enormous 
quantity of critically important decisions within a broad range of organizations in all sectors 
of the US economy.  The DoD acquisition community is one such sector that makes 
extensive use of technical teams.  Thus, understanding how these teams develop is of 
critical importance to the DoD Acquisition Community.   
DoD acquisition professionals are those in the government who are responsible for 
acquiring weapon systems for the Department of Defense.  Their collective decisions, made 
primarily by technical teams, move hundreds of billions of dollars per year, influence the 
outcome of international conflicts, and determine the effectiveness of the US military.  To 
perform its mission, the acquisition community employs thousands of technical teams to 
develop the information necessary to make critical decisions and to integrate the 
development and production of very large, costly, and complex weapon systems.  The 
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), which has been organic to both industry and DoD 
acquisition for many years, is a good example of a technical team.  The IPT, along with all of 
the short-duration, small sub-teams it spawns is increasingly being hailed as the preferred 
way to manage large-scale acquisitions (Weinstock, 2002, p. 1).   DoD Directive 5000.1 
requires that the, “Acquisition Community implement the concept of Integrated Product and 
Process Development (IPPD) utilizing IPTs as extensively as possible” (DAU, 2004, October 
17, p. 113). 
DoD technical teams are often multi-disciplinary and could include scientists and 
engineers as well as management, contracts, budget, security, quality, survivability, and 
logistics personnel from both the developer and the user organizations (DAU, 2004, October 
17).  DoD teams often include contractor personnel as well as government employees.  DoD 
acquisition activity centers on extremely large and complex systems that often push the 
state-of-the-art in many fields simultaneously.  The acquisition workforce numbers 
approximately 133,000 people, including both military and civilians.  It is vital to the success 
of integrated military systems that all the stakeholders work together as efficiently and 
productively as possible (Weinstock, 2002, August 15).   
Because countless lives, billions of dollars and the national interest are at stake, the 
US Congress required the Department of Defense to take action to promote high levels of 
professionalism and competency within its acquisition workforce.  One action taken by the 
DoD was to establish a process of training and certification for individuals in the acquisition 
workforce. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) was established to implement this 
training.  This process, called the Acquisition Certification Program, was designed to ensure 
that an employee meets the professional standards (education, training and experience) 
established for acquisition career positions at three separate levels of decision-making 
responsibility; in addition, promotion opportunities are tied to these certification levels.   
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The DAU charter is to provide training to the DoD workforce that sets the direction for 
all DoD acquisitions.  Due to the emphasis the DoD places on teamwork, many of the DAU 
classes are conducted utilizing student teams to generate typical DoD acquisition products.  
Examples of classes that make use of teams are: Systems Engineering, Program 
Management, Software Acquisition Management, and Information Technology Acquisition 
Management.  The DAU’s use of student teams is consistent with many conventional 
universities who are also requiring teaming activities in their courses.  These student teams 
are used to enable the generation of more complex products and to prepare the students for 
the inevitable teaming requirement in the workforce.  It was these DAU teams that were 
studied by this research. 
The Tuckman Model  
In 1965, Tuckman examined 50 empirical research efforts to arrive at his own group 
dynamics model.  Tuckman (1965) concluded that groups develop through a sequence of 
four discrete stages:  the first stage, Forming, is the initial group coming together; the 
second stage, Storming, involves conflict among the group members; the third 
stage, Norming, is when the group actually begins to find value in working together 
and establishes processes that enable the group to function; and the fourth stage, 
Performing, represents the time when the group is working together smoothly and is 
able to share ideas and accomplish goals.  However, Tuckman (1965) warned researchers 
that the application of this model to generic team settings may be inappropriate since the 
majority of his data came from the population of therapy groups and human relations 
training groups.  Note that the types of groups from which the Tuckman model was derived 
have almost nothing in common with the technical groups supporting DoD acquisition. 
Many government organizations, contractors, and management consultants appear 
to be working under the assumption that a team’s productivity can be significantly improved 
by optimally guiding the interaction of the team’s members through the Tuckman model’s 
sequence of stages (Glacel & Robert, 1995).  Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) found the 
Tuckman model to be the preferred model of team development for all types of teams.  It is 
widely believed in both industry and government that a leadership knowledgeable in how to 
apply Tuckman’s theory of team dynamics can markedly enhance teaming performance.  
Top-tier consulting firms are teaching or offering training services based at least partially 
upon the assumption that the Tuckman model applies generically to most teaming 
arrangements (Glacel & Robert, 1995; Smith, 2005).  Many DoD organizations have 
received such training.  Glacel and Robert (1995) state that the Tuckman model can be 
used to facilitate any team-development process.  They present the efficacy of the Tuckman 
model as a general model that applies to all teams.  They state with certainty:  “In the 
development of any team, certain stages of behavior [Tuckman stages model] take place 
which impact how well the individuals and the team accomplish their task” (Glacel & Robert, 
1995, p. 97).   
Notwithstanding its widespread use, Tuckman did not empirically validate his model 
(Tuckman, 1977).  The government and industry managers are, thus, teaching and 
implementing a team-development model that has never be validated for any type of team, 
including the technical teams that are predominant within the DoD acquisition process.  
Large sums of money and critical outcomes may be influenced by the wide use of the 
Tuckman Theory, which was primarily developed through an analysis of data describing the 
development of therapy groups and human relations training groups during the mid-1960’s.   
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Tuckman himself warned the group development community that his stage model 
had never been empirically validated and recommended caution in applying it to other 
settings (Tuckman, 1965).  Subsequent to the original work, Tuckman and Jensen (1977) 
reviewed another 22 studies in an effort to determine if anyone had validated the Tuckman 
model.  In 1977, the only new research that had attempted to validate the model was Runkel 
(1971).  Runkel partially supported the Tuckman model; however, Tuckman and Jensen 
(1977) felt that the results were not necessarily reliable due to the researcher’s 
methodology. 
Even if the Tuckman model of group development was valid for therapy groups and 
human relations training groups, there is no reason to assume that it would be applicable to 
groups in other settings.  Do the members of a missile design team interact in the same way 
as the members of a psychiatric therapy group?  Perhaps, but independent empirical 
validation is needed before giving credibility to such an assumption.   
Data Collection 
The objective of this research was to establish and execute a methodology that 
would enable an objective, rigorous analysis of a large number of teams in order to 
determine whether these teams were following the four-stage Tuckman model, or some 
variant thereof.  For this research, the team members were drawn from the population of 
students attending the DoD Defense Acquisition University (DAU) courses.  The DAU 
employs technical acquisition teams in most of its classroom courses to emulate the 
activities that acquisition professionals face in their everyday work experiences.  The 
classroom courses are used to provide hands-on experiential learning.  Experiential learning 
at DAU requires that students work in teams in which they gain professional experience 
solving real-world problems that closely mirror both the teams and the tasks that they 
encounter in their workplace environment.   
These DAU teams could technically be classified as academic teams because they 
take place in a classroom where an instructor assigns the team project.  However, 
functionally it could be argued that they are more like work teams because the assigned 
tasks emulate real-world problems that the team members are typically asked to solve in a 
work-team environment within their own organizations.  The DAU teams are brought 
together to learn and to practice working real-world problems.  If the DAU team members 
are role playing, then the role they are playing is themselves at work.   
As is the case with work teams, the researcher had no control over the team tasks.  
Individual team projects, which take from one to twenty hours of team interaction to 
complete, are relevant to the tasks team members accomplish within their own 
organizations.  The team projects are selected by the course instructor.  DAU teams 
normally contain 4 to 8 team members. 
All team exercises within the DAU require products to be developed and delivered by 
the end of the exercise.  The products delivered in the class are similar to products delivered 
in the DoD acquisition environment.  For example, a Systems Engineering class is required 
to perform a Requirements Analysis Task within the class team.  These are the people who 
perform Requirements Analysis Tasks within the Acquisition Workforce.   
The instructor graded each team’s product quality.  It can be assumed that students 
are generally motivated to develop the best products they are capable of producing within 
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their teams because the quality of their work is openly graded.  Furthermore, passing DAU 
courses is dependent upon the quality of their teamwork as well as the quality of their team 
products (in addition to their final exam grades).  Since passing a DAU course earns a 
certain level of certification within the Acquisition Corps, and since certification levels are 
tied to career advancement opportunities (DoD, 2005, January 12), DAU students generally 
take their teaming activities seriously and are motivated to work well together.   
For this research, the Diane Miller (1997) Group Process Questionnaire (GPQ) was 
utilized to collect data to determine if events defining the Tuckman stages took place within 
the DAU technical acquisition teams being observed. If the instrument determines that a 
team member observed “Tuckman events” taking place within the team, then data is 
gathered to define when these events occurred and how long they lasted. Dr. Miller involved 
team dynamics subject-matter experts to generate her GPQ and then performed a validation 
study to eliminate questions that did not reflect the team dynamics models of interest. The 
DAU Research Report entitled “Small, Short Duration Technical Team Dynamics” provides 
more details about how this instrument was selected (Knight, 2006).  Miller’s questionnaire 
contains 15 questions that are reflective of the Tuckman model (Miller, 1997).  Figure 1 
provides a list of the 15 Tuckman questions included in the GPQ. 
 
The GPQ required 10-20 minutes to complete. Each of the 15 Tuckman questions 
asks the individual to determine if an event (correlated with one of Tuckman’s four stages) 
happened during a specific teaming exercise and if so, when it happened and how long it 
lasted. The point at which the event occurred and its duration were recorded on a timeline 
scaled from 1-50. If the event was a singular event that occurred at one instant of time only, 
then the person would click a single unit (box) on the timeline. If it occurred various times 
with various durations, the person would indicate each occurrence and its duration by 
clicking a series of contiguous boxes. A sample timeline is shown in Figure 2. 
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Stage Question GPQ Question 
F1 14 The team attempted to discover what was to be accomplished   
F2 24 Individuals tried to determine what was to be accomplished   
F3 31 The team tried to determine the parameters of the task   
S1 1 There was conflict between group members   
S2 5 Individuals demonstrated resistance towards the demands of the task 
S3 16 The group was experiencing some friction   
S4 20 Group members became hostile towards one another   
N1 11 Individuals identified with the group   
N2 23 Group norms were developed   
N3 26 The team felt like it had become a functioning unit   
N4 30 Group cohesion had developed   
P1 3 Solutions were found which solved the problem    
P2 6 A unified group approach was applied to the task   
P3 21 Constructive attempts were made to resolve project issues   
P4 22 Problem solving was a key concern   
F=Forming S=Storming N=Norming P=Performing 








Figure 2.  Sample Question Timeline 
Originally, 368 teams were surveyed with a response rate of 90%. The research 
population consisted of 321 teams and 1448 individuals.  The average team size was 4 to 5 
members but ranged from 2 to 8 members.  The durations of these team projects ranged 
from one hour to two-and–a-half days.  This population contained 68% males, 30% females 
and 2% who did not indicate their gender.  Because the more technical professions 
(particularly engineering) are predominately male, this lopsided gender breakdown is normal 
and expected within the DAU.  The DAU students studied in this research project represent 
a typical set of DAU students.  They are generally well-educated career professionals 
working in a predominately technical environment.  Figure 3 shows the percent of team 
members versus highest degree attained.  Note that 88% have at least a college degree 
(BS/BA) and almost 40% have completed graduate degrees.  These team members are 
generally aware and bright and should have no trouble understanding the questions asked 





Figure 3.  DAU Survey Population Education Levels 
The courses offered at DAU are typically not taken by inexperienced acquisition 
employees.  These are not entry-level courses, but rather are aimed at midlevel and senior 
professionals who are actively trying to advance their careers.  This group of career-ladder 
climbers tends to have more drive and energy and is a little more intellectually aggressive 
than the typical acquisition employee.  The DAU teams in the research population are, on 
High School BS/BA MS/MBA PhD Doctorate 
12% 50% 36% 2% 
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the average, composed of midlevel (11-years experience) professionals on the way up in 
their organizations.  They have been working in product-oriented technical teams in a 
professional capacity for over 7 years and have previously worked in teams with one or two 
of their current teammates.  Incredibly enough, over 71% of them have had some training in 
the techniques of productive teaming.  Bottom line: These teams are highly experienced, 
motivated, and well prepared to work efficiently together to produce whatever products are 
demanded by their various class exercises.    
The DAU instructor evaluated the quality of each team’s products.  Figure 4 shows 
how those evaluations were distributed over the 321 teams.  The instructors judged there to 
be 145 above-average, 151 average and 25 below-average products.   
 Above Average Average 
Below 
Average 
Number 145 151 25 
Percent 45% 47% 8% 
Figure 4.  Instructor Evaluations of Team Products for 321 Teams 
 
Analysis Methodology 
This research defines a statistically valid teaming experience as one that can be 
proven to a 95% level of confidence to be derived from information measured by the GPQ 
that has been certified to be both accurate and statistically meaningful.  That is, each team’s 
qualitative and quantitative experience of a given sequence of Tuckman events (as 
measured by the GPQ) must be shown to be very unlikely (P≤ 0.05) to have occurred as a 
result of random fluctuations in the data (noise).   
An assessment of the ability of the data collection methodology to fully support the 
goals of this research project was undertaken.  A statistical analysis of the time-of-
occurrence data generated independently by each DAU team member clearly demonstrated 
that the data is able to support statistically rigorous results and conclusions about whether 
or not DAU teams followed the Tuckman linear sequential model.  Data-quality standards 
were enforced to ensure that the research database contained a minimum of noise and 
disinformation.   Also, it was statistically shown that team members were able to clearly 
assess the behavior within their teams relative to the Tuckman model event descriptions 
described by the GPQ.  Finally, it was shown that the time-of-occurrence data upon which 
the results of this research are based contain a high enough signal-to-noise ratio to ensure 
that derived results can be scientifically credible.  Appendices N and M in the DAU research 
report derive the details supporting these conclusions (Knight, 2006). 
To show that each team’s experience of a given sequence of Tuckman events was 
very unlikely (P≤ 0.05) to have occurred as a result of random fluctuations in the data, an 
analysis of the sequences defined by the answers to the questionnaire was undertaken.   
This methodology is called Sequence Analysis.  The GPQ contains 3 Forming questions, 4 
Storming questions, 4 Norming questions, and 4 Performing questions.  A sample showing 
one quarter of the sequence analysis algorithm is shown in Figure 5 below. Here we see the 
3 Forming questions (F1, F2, and F3) being analyzed relative to the first Storming question 
(S1) and all of the Norming and Performing questions.  The point is to determine the order in 
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which the four Tuckman stages (F, S, N, and P) occur as given by the timeline data 
associated with each question.  The timing sequence defining the Tuckman model is 
F<S<N<P (the time when Forming occurs is earlier than the time when Storming occurs is 
earlier than the time when Norming occurs is earlier than the time when Performing occurs).  
Similarly, another three of these tables are used for Storming questions 2, 3 and 4.  Possible 
responses are 1 if the sequence indicated by each cell is followed and a 0 if it is not.  For 
example, in the data upon which this sample is based, the sequence F1<S1<N1<P1 did 
occur.  Thus, a 1 is placed in the appropriate cell (second column, fourth row). Likewise, 
since our data did not support the sequence F2<S1<N1<P2, a zero is placed in the third 
column, fifth row.  Each of these 4 tables could produce as many as 63 ones for a total of 
252 total points if the Tuckman model is followed 100% of the time by that individual or 
team.  These scores were then scaled to be between 0 if the Tuckman model is not followed 
at all and 100 if the Tuckman model is followed for all questions. 
 F1 < F2 < F3 < 
S1< 1 1 1 
N1< 1 1 1 
P1 1 1 1 
P2 0 0 1 
P3 1 1 1 
P4 1 1 1 
N2< 1 1 1 
P1 1 1 1 
P2 1 1 1 
P3 1 1 1 
P4 1 1 0 
N3< 1 1 1 
P1 1 1 1 
P2 0 1 1 
P3 1 1 1 
P4 1 1 1 
N4< 1 1 0 
P1 1 0 1 
P2 1 1 1 
P3 1 1 1 
P4 1 1 0 
 19 19 18 
Figure 5.  One Quarter of Sequence Analysis Logical Algorithm (Tuckman Filter) 
Another factor that must be considered to determine if the team is following the 
Tuckman model is how to combine individual data into team data.  One approach would be 
to determine a team position on each Tuckman question and then run this team data 
through the Tuckman sequence-analysis model.  The other approach is to run each 
individual’s data through the Tuckman precedence model and then combine the Tuckman 
scores for individuals to come up with a team score.  The latter method was chosen for 
this research.  The reason for this choice is that the alternative requires good data to be 
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disregarded without good reason for doing so other than to simplify the calculations.  If the 
first approach is selected, the minority opinion of the existence of an interpretative and 
subjective event is thrown out.   
Once a Tuckman score is determined between 0-100, the significance of the score 
must be determined. A Monte Carlo simulation was used to generate a reference distribution 
of Tuckman scores.  A large number (102,000) of questionnaires were filled out randomly—
i.e., randomly answering “YES,” “NO” or “UNCERTAIN” to each of the 15 Tuckman 
questions and then producing random times-of-occurrence for each “YES” answer.  A 
Tuckman score was calculated for each of the 102,000 random teams.  A reference 
distribution was generated for these FSNP scores by sorting the 102,000 random FSNP 
scores into 100 bins.  For example, all the FSNP scores between 15.5 and 16.499 were 
counted, and that number was put into bin 16.   Because accuracy improves with the 
number of samples generated, the number of samples used (102,000) simply reflects the 
practical limits of the available computing resources. 
Next, integrating over the distribution produced a cumulative probability curve.  This 
probability curve was then used to generate a numerical level of confidence that a given 
score was not produced by random data.  Obviously, very low FSNP scores requiring little 
specific organization of the input values are more easily produced by random inputs; yet, 
very high FSNP scores (requiring all F times to be less than all S times, etc.,) are nearly 
impossible to produce from 15 random inputs created by a random-number generator.  Each 
FSNP score produced by the DAU data was required to be larger than the random FSNP 
score associated with a SA = 0.05 probability (of being produced by random processes) in 
order to be declared “significant.”  In other words, for an FSNP score generated by a DAU 
team to be considered statistically significant, it must be large enough such that the 
probability of that score being produced by random input data is less than 0.05.  
Additionally, a sequence of consecutive stages must be composed of discrete, 
clearly discernable, separate stages or it becomes a mixture of multiple stages—not a 
sequence of stages as required by the Tuckman model.  If stage time-of-occurrences are so 
overlapped and intermingled in time such that one cannot clearly differentiate consecutive 
stages, then no bonafide sequence exists.  To ensure this requirement for stage 
discreteness was met, I developed a stage-separation test that, when applied to the data 
representing the experience of a given team, would tell us (to some statistical level of 
confidence) whether or not that team’s experience, as measured by the GPQ, constitutes a 
valid sequence of Tuckman events.  In other words, the conditions were precisely defined 
for sequence validation that determine when two broadly overlapping events belonging to 
consecutive stages can be said to be separated in time such that they represent two 
discrete and separate stages to some specified level of statistical confidence. 
A parametric analysis was used to assess the sensitivity of research results to the 
analytical assumptions driving the analysis by varying the thresholds and criteria that 
numerically represented each assumption.  User input parameters specifying constraints 
imposed upon the analysis were established as user inputs to the analysis engine to allow a 
parametric analysis of how each input affected both intermediate and final results.   
To summarize: An individual’s or team’s FSNP score was counted as being 
supportive of the Tuckman model only if its value was equal to or greater than the calculated 
“significance threshold” and if the FSNP sequence was shown (to a 95% probability) to have 
discrete stages.    The significance threshold is an FSNP score calculated within the 
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Sequence Analysis algorithm associated with a probability of 0.05 that a given FSNP score 
could have been generated by random inputs.  From the random-reference distribution and 
its associated cumulative probability curve, it was determined that an FSNP score of  0.0976 
had a probability of 0.05 of being random.  Thus, any score equal to, or greater than, 0.0976 
represented a significant score.  More detail on random Tuckman score distributions and 
probability curves can be found in the DAU Research Report entitled “Small, Short Duration 
Technical Team Dynamics” (Knight, 2006). 
In addition to determining if an individual and the team are following the Tuckman 
model at the 95% level of confidence, this research looked at what other possible forms of 
the Tuckman model were being followed (i.e., Forming, Norming, Performing OR Forming, 
Norming, Storming, Performing, etc.).  There are 64 possible combinations of alternative 
sequences of the Tuckman stages.  For each individual and for each team, a calculation 
was performed to determine which of these sequences was being followed.  This was then 
plotted to determine which sequences showed up the most often.  The two variants of the 
Tuckman sequential stages model that were most prevalent were F<N<P and F<N/P 
(Forming before Norming and Performing).  These models were assessed using the same 
analytical methodology.  In the exact same manner described above for creating a 
Sequence Analysis algorithm SAF<S<N<P that calculates FSNP scores in order to assess the 
degree to which a statistically valid Tuckman model (F<S<N<P) was experienced by DAU 
teams, an SAF<N<P algorithm was developed that calculates FNP scores in order to assess 
the degree to which a statistically valid F<N<P model was experienced by DAU teams.  
Similarly, an SAF< N/P algorithm was developed that calculates FN/P scores in order to 
assess the degree to which a statistically valid F<N/P model was experienced by DAU 
teams.  The significance threshold for F<N<P sequences was 4.251, and the significance 
threshold for F<N/P sequences was 6.511.  
Results 
The final results are shown in Figure 6.  Only 6 teams (2%) out of 321 experienced a 
statistically valid Tuckman sequence; it is clear that the technical acquisition teams of DAU 
did not follow the Tuckman model.  This outcome was primarily driven by a lack of Storming 
within the teams.  Secondly, Norming and Performing appear to be interspersed in time to 
such an extent that it is difficult to separate the two.    
Tuckman Model - FSNP 
Test Teams Individuals 
Raw Time-of-Occurrence 1% 3% 
Sequence Analysis 2% 6% 
Tuckman Variant - FNP 
Test Teams Individuals 
Raw Time-of-Occurrence 49% 26% 
Sequence Analysis 71% 44% 
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Tuckman Variant – F N/P 
Test Teams Individuals 
Raw Time-of-Occurrence 71% 46% 
Sequence Analysis 90% 70% 
 
Figure 6.  Results Summary 
There were several attributes of the DAU teams that might possibly be related to the 
lack of Storming behavior.  The first attribute is team size.  Typical DAU team sizes were 4 
to 8 team members.  One might wonder if small teams Storm less than larger teams.  
Further research would have to be performed to provide a conclusive answer to this 
question; however, Benfield (2005) also found very little Storming in his data, yet his team 
sizes were not restricted to such small sizes.  In fact, 43% of his teams had more than 11 
team members. The second attribute is the short duration of teaming activity.  The median 
DAU team duration was 4 hours, while no team duration was greater than 20 hours.  The 
question here is:  Do short-duration teams Storm less than longer-duration teams?  To 
conclusively determine the effect of team duration upon the incidence of Storming, further 
research is required.  However, according to Benfield’s (2005) research, 53% of the teams 
he studied lasted longer than 12 months and also produced very little Storming behavior 
relative to the other stages. 
The third attribute that may have influenced the lack of Storming within DAU teams is 
team setting.  The DAU teams were in an academic setting which, because of the nature of 
DAU and DAU teams, could be considered somewhere between Tuckman’s (1965) natural 
and laboratory settings; however, DAU teams are most similar to Tuckman’s natural teams.  
Benfield (2005) studied natural teams working in a DoD technical environment and similarly 
found a low level of Storming relative to the other stages.  There is yet another attribute of 
the DAU academic setting that may have influenced the amount of Storming behavior 
exhibited.   DAU teaming exercises take place in the presence of an instructor and are 
subsequently graded by this instructor.  This is analogous to a natural team when 
“management” is a part of the team or closely monitors the team.  Cooperative 
professionalism is encouraged while conflict, resistance, and hostility are often discouraged 
whenever a neutral authority with significant power over the team members is observing the 
process.  In other words, team members may have been exhibiting their best professional 
behavior rather than the less politically correct behavior they might have exhibited within a 
group of peers.  Certainly, “resistance to the task” would be muted in the presence of the 
instructor who assigned the task and who was going to grade the task products. 
In addition to the lack of Storming found, the distribution of Storming data was more 
or less uniform across the entire timeline (team duration), as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.  Average Time-of-occurrences for Each Stage for 321 Teams 
This characteristic of a constant low level of Storming spread evenly across the 
entire duration of a team’s activity was also observed in Benfield’s (2005) data analyzing 
technical teams.  The other three stages generally occurred at a specific location on the 
timeline, i.e., their distribution exhibited a well-formed peak on the timeline much like that 
predicted by LaCoursiere (1980).  Thus, if the Storming questions were changed to be more 
sensitive to the vigorous (but cooperative, positive, and professional) competition of ideas 
that often takes place within a technical team, there may be more of this newly defined 
Storming (e.g., cooperative brainstorming) but perhaps still no well-defined Storming stage.  
To achieve their goals, it is often necessary for technical team members to challenge 
each other.  Although disagreements and divergent points of view were common among 
DAU teams, they usually were resolved quickly within a cooperative and non-confrontational 
(minimal friction, resistance, or hostility) atmosphere according to their technical merits.  
This type of professional challenging may have occurred at any time throughout the teaming 
process but did not cause many DAU teams to exhibit the Storming stage as defined by the 
Tuckman model and as represented by the Miller GPQ (i.e., conflict, resistance, hostility and 
friction).   The two Storming questions that described conflict and friction (as in conflicting 
ideas, and the friction between competing viewpoints) were responsible for Storming 
behavior being lightly (14%) scattered throughout the DAU data.  The Storming questions 
that focused on resistance to the task and especially the one focused on hostility between 
team members were not relevant to the observations of the teams being studied. 
In summary, a comparison to Benfield’s (2005) data suggests that the lack of 
Storming within the DAU data is not an attribute of team size, duration, or team setting.  
Thus, it is suspected that the lack of Storming is a natural attribute of technical professionals 
working under time constraints to produce good-quality products for which they are held 
collectively responsible.  The technical team setting of this research and Benfield’s (2005) 
research is dramatically different in form, purpose and content than the dominant setting 
(therapy groups) used by Tuckman (1965).  It seems reasonable that Storming, as Tuckman 
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(1965) defined it and Miller (1997) implemented, would occur more often in a therapy group 
setting emphasizing personal interaction than in a technical team setting emphasizing 
professional interaction where each team member’s personal success is dependent upon 
the collective success of the team. 
Performing Sequences Analysis for the F<N<P three-stage (=0.05) model revealed 
that 229 (71%) of the 321 teams generated statistically valid sequences that followed the 
F<N<P three-stage model.  Of these, 161 (50 %) teams also produced an F<N<P average 
time-of-occurrence sequence of stages. Also, 637 (44%) of the 1,448 individuals 
experienced a statistically valid F<N<P sequence.  This variant does clearly constitute a 
majority model of team behavior.  Because almost 3/4 of the DAU teams experienced a 
statistically valid F<N<P sequence, the F<N<P model is a reasonably strong contender for a 
general model of technical acquisition team dynamics.  I refer to the F<N<P model as the 
DAU model. 
Certainly, more research is required to evaluate the causal connection between a 
team’s productivity and its experience of the F<N<P development process.  More work will 
be needed to assess the efficacy and general applicability of guiding a team through the 
F<N<P development process in order to enhance its performance.  If the definition and 
description of Storming is generalized in the survey instrument to include brain storming, 
perhaps it too would play a part in developing a strategy to optimize team performance.    
Because the Norming and Performing behaviors seemed to be intermingled on the 
timeline (on the average, their means are separated by about 2.5 timeline units), 
differentiating between the first (F<N<P) and second (F<P<N) most commonly experienced 
sequence is problematical.  Consequently, a two-stage model F<N/P (Forming occurs 
before Norming, and Forming occurs before Performing) that combines both should 
represent the single most widely experienced sequence.   The Sequence Analysis (=0.05) 
was applied to the two-stage model F<N/P.  The results indicate that 290 (90.34 %) of the 
321 teams had a statistically valid experience of the F<N/P sequence.  This variant clearly 
constitutes a strong model of DAU team behavior. In addition, 895 (62%) of the 1448 
individuals also experienced a valid F<N/P sequence.   Unfortunately, a simple two-stage 
model (first a team experiences Forming, and then it experiences everything else) does not 
provide much information about how one might possibly optimize team productivity other 
than make sure that every team thoroughly accomplishes Forming at its beginning.    
Figure 8 shows that for all three sequence models, above-average teams produced 
the most statistically significant results followed by average teams, while below-average 
teams produced the fewest statistically significant results.  The data shows consistent 
descending stair-stepped results in quantity of sequences generated for each team 
dynamics model as the teams’ rating moves from above average to below average.    
 Sequence Rating  Number Percent 
Above Average (145)  6 4.14% 
Average (151) 0 0 F<S<N<P 
Below Average (25) 0 0 
Above Average (145)  114 78.62% F<N<P 
Average (151) 102 67.55% 
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Below Average (25) 13 52% 
Above Average (145)  138 95.17% 
Average (151) 131 86.75% F<N/P 
Below Average (25) 21 84% 
F<S<N<P F<N<P F<N/P Sequence  
Correlation 0.95 0.99 0.95 
 
Figure 8.  Instructor Evaluation vs. Teams Producing Statistically Significant 
Sequences 
A chi square r x c contingency test was performed to determine the correlation 
between instructor assessment and a team’s probability of producing one of the three 
sequences of Tuckman stages (F<S<N<P, F<N<P or F<N/P).  The correlation numbers 
given in Figure 8 are the probabilities that the populations are not independent—i.e., the 
probability that there is a relationship between a team’s performance and the model of team 
dynamics followed by that team.  Correlations of 0.95 or greater are considered to represent 
a relationship between populations that is statistically significant.  The more productive and 
successful a team was, the more likely they were to observe one of the three sequences of 
Tuckman stages assessed by this research.  
After generating a distribution of stage time-of-occurrence data, it was noticed that 
the stage times-of-occurrence for all 321 teams tended to group together.  In other words, all 
the DAU teams, regardless of their task or duration, experienced the Forming, Norming, and 
Performing stages at about the same place on the 50-unit timeline.   To verify this 
phenomenon, the Kruskal-Wallis test, as described by Conover (1999) was used to 
determine if an ensemble of the DAU time-of-occurrence data generated by each of the 
1448 individuals for each Tuckman question could be separated into discrete stages.  The 
data indicate that an ensemble of all DAU team members from all teams do collectively 
experience a discrete sequence of at least three Tuckman stages.  This result corroborates 
the possibility of a universal experience of the Forming, Norming, and Performing stages of 
the Tuckman model (Tuckman variant 1, F<N<P, DAU Model) at a somewhat predictable 
fraction of a team’s duration.  However, the Storming data was spread across the entire 
timeline, producing no distinct peak.  Forming appears to occur at about 25% of the timeline, 
Norming at about 40% of the timeline, and Performing at about 45% of the timeline. 
Primary Conclusions 
The development of technical acquisition teams appear to follow a variant of the 
Tuckman model (F<S<N<P).  This model, which I will call the DAU Team Dynamics model, 
has three discrete stages (F<N<P) and one continuous brainstorming stage that takes place 
over the entire duration of the team effort.  The brainstorming activity can be described as 
group members challenging each others’ ideas and approaches in a cooperative way with 
the intention of producing a better product or improving the team’s process (efficiency and 
productivity).   
This research demonstrates that not only do technical teams follow the DAU model, 
but that teams following the DAU model produce better products than teams that do not 
follow this model.  It may, therefore, be possible to significantly improve productivity in 
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technical teams by facilitating the DAU model—that is, to encourage teams to first coalesce 
as a team and form their intent and structure, then develop their approach, ground rules, 
and processes, to be followed by assigning tasks and getting the work done—all the while 
cooperatively challenging, re-evaluating, and improving the overall team process as they 
work together to accomplish the task they were given.  Additionally, one should expect the 
Forming stage of the DAU model to occur at about 25% of the timeline, the Norming stage 
to occur at about 40% of the timeline, and the Performing stage to occur at about 45% of the 
timeline.  Establishing a firm causality between following the development structure of the 




The tools and methods developed in this research project are widely applicable to a 
broad assortment of team-dynamics research projects.  Furthermore, developing a custom 
set of tools to fit each individual research application is not difficult.  These two facts should 
encourage much additional research.  
Though learning how to make teaming more efficient and productive has always 
been considered of vital importance to large numbers of users, the research process has 
been so cumbersome, difficult,  inconsistent, and lengthy, that the field has languished 
(relative to its importance) for decades.  Now that this research project has developed a 
statistically and scientifically rigorous process that enables the assessment of a large 
number of teams relatively easily and quickly, it is hoped that the pace of progress will 
accelerate.  The analysis engine and methodology developed for this project provides a 
general model for facilitating low-budget, quick turn-around, high-yield, and statistically 
rigorous research focusing on various team types, settings, sizes, durations, compositions, 
and configurations.  Fortunately, an instrument and its associated analysis engine once 
developed can easily be used by others to perform similar research in different settings, with 
different populations, with different types of tasks, and with teams of different sizes and 
durations. 
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Teams can be a significant resource to business leaders and can help lead to 
greater program successes.  Little empirical data exist on what strategic characteristics 
make teams more effective.  This study was conducted on 57 student project teams in 12 
classes (327 respondents) in a Defense Acquisition University (DAU) executive level, six-
week program management class in six different locations.  The study not only underscores 
the significance of team focus on performance but also highlights how team characteristics 
affect team focus and performance.  The results of this study have applications to the 
successful use of project teams throughout the DoD and in the commercial industrial 
workplace.   
Results   
Significant direct relationships were found in the 15 tested hypotheses between work 
team strategic intent and team performance as measured by team self-assessments and 
instructor assessments.  There was also found to be a relationship between the team self-
assessment of performance and the instructors’ assessment of the team performance.   
This study provided empirical evidence on the significant relationships between work 
team strategic intent and work team performance.  The research accomplished the 
following: 
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1. Provided empirical data on the positive correlation relationships between work team 
strategic intent and work team performance. 
2. Defined characteristics that were used to determine the strategic intent of a work 
team or any work unit. 
3. Created a survey to measure strategic intent of team members and teams in general. 
4. Introduced the study of strategic thinking or use of strategic intent as a method for 
evaluating team performance. 
Introduction 
Organizations operating in today’s complex, changing and sometimes chaotic work 
environments, both in the government and commercial industries, appear to be more and 
more dependent on using work teams to leverage themselves to be more creative, efficient, 
and focused.  Warren Bennis (1985), in his book Leaders, The Strategies for Taking 
Charge, describes the need for cooperation, communication, and collaboration between 
individuals in order to achieve greatness—and emphasizes the successful deployment of 
teams in the last two decades to achieve these same results.   
In today’s society, as complex and technologically sophisticated as it is, the most 
pressing projects require the committed, coordinated, and connected contributions of many 
talented people.  Gone is the myth of the Lone Ranger who can work alone and is larger-
than-life.  Tomorrow’s competitive organizations will be managed and inspired by teams of 
experts, skilled technicians, and team-appointed leaders.  Projects, work efforts, and entire 
programs will be accomplished by a network of linked, disciplined workers skilled in their 
own right but connected by their commitment to their team’s greater cause, goals, and/or 
objectives (Bennis & Biederman, 1997). 
In the classic written about teams, The Wisdom of Teams, authors Jon R. 
Katzenbach and Nicholas K. Smith identify numerous teams in various industries (Citibank, 
General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, etc.) that have been continually successful in employing 
high-performing, self-managed work teams (2003).  They state that a real team that is 
appropriately focused and rigorously disciplined is the most versatile unit an organization 
has for meeting both performance and change challenges in today’s complex global 
markets.   
The use of teams has been increasing for the last 20 years.  In recent data collected 
from Fortune 1000 companies, it was highlighted that the use of self-managed teams has 
increased from 28% in 1987 to 68% in 2003 (Lawler, Mohrman & Ledford, 1995).  A study of 
related research on “self-managed team” underscored the fact that nearly every major 
American corporation is considering adopting self-managed team as an organizational 
design somewhere in their organization (Manz & Sims, 1993; Wellins, Byham & Wilson, 
1991). 
In addition, a GAO study in April 2001 highlighted the specific advantages of using 
Integrated Product Teams (IPT) as a “best practice” to improve how the Department of 
Defense develops and acquires weapon systems (2001, April 10).  The report identifies 
specifically the successful use of IPTs by the military in the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle Program (AAAV) to reduce the time needed to reduce a system design decision 
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from 6 months to about a week.  It also highlighted three commercial companies that 
effectively used high-performing, self-managed teams to improve their product development 
capabilities.  Those were: Daimler Chrysler, Hewlett-Packard, and 3M. 
Organizational changes are occurring with ever-increasing frequency, and the scope 
of change is often revolutionary.  Effective strategic management can help deal with this 
turbulence and, in many cases, has become a key factor for organizational success.  
Organizations must be flexible and able to respond to these environmental challenges with 
their strategic processes, implementation procedures, and organizational structure.   
An important aspect of strategic management implementation is how this critical 
information and way of doing business is being infused into the operational end of the 
business.  Strategic management implementation is extremely challenging; lasting 
implementation is usually the exception, not the rule, due to the resistance to this change of 
doing business and the many layers of the organization that must be touched with this 
enhanced way of doing business.   
An effective method to implement strategic management is through work teams that 
are focused or intent with the same strategic goals and missions of the corporate leadership.  
Teams with a significant level of the same strategic focus on the purpose, objectives, and 
execution strategies that are aligned with the corporate goals and missions can be an 
extremely effective implementation tool for the organization.  This applies in a similar nature 
to a student work team in the classroom, attempting to learn new skills and knowledge.   
It was hypothesized in this study that if student team members are aligned in their 
purpose and objectives to the course goals and learning objectives, then higher levels of 
student team performance or learning will result that is aligned more directly with the 
course’s and the instructors’ learning objectives.  The team’s understanding of and 
commitment to the course’s purpose, objectives, and strategies may help ensure that the 
team is effectively achieving the reason for being in the course, learning and performing the 
course’s goals and objectives.  An objective may be to ensure that the students are aligned 
to the same strategic focus or intent as the instructors’ and course managers’ goals of 
achieving the overall course objectives.   
Business and education leaders have been faced with an increasingly changing 
environment, which increases the need for effective and focused strategic planning and 
implementation practices.  The speed and volume of transformation have increased 
dramatically in the last century, and this trend is expected to continue at an even greater 
speed and impact in the 21st century.  Speed and change are expected to continue, and with 
this challenge, more innovative and effective strategic/future-oriented measures must be 
achieved by business and education leaders to ensure they are able to sustain their 
operations and maintain the proper strategic focus and intentions.  The increased level of 
change and the need to apply effective structural change initiatives, such as teams, to this 
environment of change prompted the interest in this study.  
This research study obtained empirical data from classroom surveys administered to 
student work team members attending a 6-week Program Managers’ PMT 352B course at 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and to DAU PMT 352B faculty members during a 
year’s period of time (July 2005 to July 2006).  The data from the surveys determined each 
respective student team’s Strategic Intent and each team’s Self-assessed Team 
Performance and Instructor-assessed Team Performance.  Pearson’s r correlation 
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coefficient and Spearman’s rho ranked-order correlation tests were used to determine the 
relationship between team Strategic Intent variables and Team Performance—both team 
self-assessed and instructor-assessed. This paper presents a summary of the reasons for 
the study and the results of the study which established empirical data to support the 
general hypothesis that increases in work team strategic intent or focus will cause increases 
in the work team’s performance.     
Past research has provided some general discussions and initial studies on the 
relationship between team characteristics such as Strategic Intent and Team Performance.  
Previous research has also identified the need for further research, and empirical data were 
needed in this area of research to determine and measure the relationships between the 
variables of team strategic thinking (Strategic Intent) and Team Performance (Athanassiou, 
Crittenden & Kelly, 2000; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Hamel & Prahaland, 1994; Thompson & 
Strickland, 1996; Tregoe & Zimmerman, 1989).   
Katzenbach and Smith (2003) have accomplished extensive work in the study of 
teams and their effectiveness.  They admitted that no empirical data exist to prove their 
theories on team effectiveness.  This research study provides data to support Katzenbach 
and Smith’s study (2003) and theories on teams:  teams can more effective or perform 
better if they maintain a Strategic Intent or focus that was understood and committed to by 
all the team members.  This paper highlights the purpose of the study, the key concepts 
studied, the research questions and hypotheses, the results and, finally, some conclusions 
reached from the study. 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study was to use survey data from student work teams and 
instructors’ surveys to examine the relationship between work team Strategic Intent 
(strategic purpose, objectives, and strategies) and work team Performance.  The studied 
work teams were chosen from student work teams attending Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) PMT 352B course.  PMT 352B is a 6-week-long course which teaches the concepts 
and skills of being successful program managers.  It simulates the conditions and stresses 
that senior DoD managers are normally presented with in making daily and long-term 
strategic program management decisions.  Team Performance was assessed by surveys 
administered to the work teams (self-assessment performance) and to the PMT 352B 
instructors who were teaching the student work teams (external, instructor assessment).   
The specific strategic elements studied included the teams’ strategic purpose, 
objectives, and strategies that had been determined in previous academic and business 
research (Ackoff, 1974; Ansoff & McDonnell, 1990; Anthanassiou et al., 2000a, 2000b; 
Elrod, 1999; Hackman & Wageman, 2005; Kraft, 1996; Schein, 1980; Thompson, 1993), 
related to the decision-making success of an organization and having an effect on 
organizational performance and long-term successes.   
Strategic thinking and alignment of this thinking have been used in past research to 
measure a team’s ability to agree among the members on strategic goals, objectives, and 
strategies that focus on or align the team’s efforts on shared performance objectives 
(Anthanassiou et al., 2000a).  This alignment or cohesiveness in strategic thinking in the 
Anthanassiou et al. studies (2000a, 2000b) was measured to determine the difference or 
variance between the leader’s and the team’s perceptions and commitments to the same 
strategic elements (team goals, objectives, and strategy).  They were studied to determine 
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the effects on performance.  In most cases, the higher the alignment or congruence in 
strategic thinking, the better the performance of the team and its associated business 
outcomes (financial and social).    
This research study acquired empirical data from student work team members 
attending classes in PMT 352B.  The strategic characteristics of specific PMT 352B student 
work teams were calculated from information gathered from team surveys.  These students 
were mature (generally 35 to 60 years of age) Department of Defense (DoD) students 
attending this technical training course on program management with Defense Acquisition 
University.  The teams’ understanding of and commitment to their respective team’s 
strategic management characteristics was measured by surveys administered to the teams 
in their location of work (the classroom) by the researcher and trained faculty members.  The 
surveys obtained each team member’s perceptions of his understanding of and commitment 
to the specific team strategic elements studied in this research—team purpose, objectives, 
and strategies.  These strategic elements helped define the teams’ strategic characteristics 
and were defined in the team survey, so there was an understanding of these variables by 
the survey respondents.  This helped define what were the strategic elements being studied 
and what were the data the researcher was seeking.   
Data were collected from each team member on his perception of how similar or 
linked was his understanding of and commitment to the team compared to the other 
members of the team’s understanding of and commitment to the team’s purpose, objectives, 
and strategies.    Team similarity was measured both in terms of understanding and 
commitment to these strategic elements.  
The research calculated team data on team similarity of team strategic 
characteristics as measured by understanding and commitment to team purpose, objectives, 
and strategies.  The research analyzed the relationship of these strategic characteristics 
(similar understanding of and commitment to team purpose, objectives, and strategies) to 
Team Performance—measured by the team’s self-assessment of its performance and by an 
external assessment by the team’s instructor(s).  The study then analyzed the relationship or 
similarity between a team’s self-assessment of its performance and the instructors’ external 
assessment of the same team’s performance.  The researcher theorized that the similarity or 
alignment of a team’s purpose, objectives, and strategies was a strong predictor (a direct 
correlation) of how well the team members worked together and effectively communicated in 
making critical choices vital to the successful performance of the team.  Team effectiveness 
in making decisions and accomplishing the course objectives was theorized to be related to 
the congruence or alignment of each team member’s individual similarity perceptions of his 
strategic characteristics to the other members on the team.   
This congruence was measured in terms of the member’s understanding of and 
commitment to the other team members’ strategic elements of purpose, objectives, and 
strategies.  How congruent or similar the members’ strategic characteristics were, the more 
effective the team should be in accomplishing its purpose, objectives, and strategies.  
Accomplishing these team strategic elements would make the team perform better, both as 
determined by the team’s own standards and by the instructors’ criteria of learning the 
course objectives.  The following research model in Figure 1 helped to identify the variables 
(independent and dependent), research questions, hypotheses, and relationships involved 
in this research study.  The next two sections highlight the two key variables studied: 
Strategic Intent and Team Performance.   
 =




The research model in Figure 1 highlights the key variables and relationships studied 
in this research.  The Strategic Intent of the team is defined and highlighted in the figure as 
consisting of three team strategic elements: purpose, objectives, and strategies.  Strategic 
Intent is further defined as to how each team member was focused or had similarly aligned 
understanding of and commitment to the team’s strategic elements (purpose, objectives, 
and strategies), as measured by surveying each team member.  The actual measurement of 
Strategic Intent was then computed by measuring the overall average team scores for 
Strategic Intent from the individual members’ scores on the team survey.   
One of the basic reasons for using the term “Strategic Intent” to highlight the 
strategic thinking or focus of the teams in this study was to use the previous work of Hamel 
and Prahaland (1989) in this conceptual or research area.  Strategic Intent captures the 
meaning and nature of the characteristics most representative of what exists in teams or 
other groups that highlight what they think and perceive about their future goals, vision, or 
purpose.  As discussed by Hamel and Prahaland, an organization’s Strategic Intent or focus 
is part of the “dream that energizes a company and is more sophisticated and more positive 
than a simple war cry” (p. 64).  These two authors highlighted that Strategic Intent implies a 
sense of organizational direction, discovery, and destiny.  They explained that Strategic 
Intent is more than the implied particular point of view about the long-term market or 
competitive position that an organization hopes to build over the coming decade or so.  It is 
the stated and vital focus that makes an organization competitive and driven toward a vision, 
a future direction, or a destiny that consumes its nature and reason for being (Hamel & 
Prahaland, 1989).  These are the characteristics most representative of what this research 
desired to study and why the research was originally conducted. 
This research study embraced a similar meaning and value to team Strategic Intent 
developed by Hamel and Prahaland—the committed and understood strategic elements of 
the team that united or focused team actions and decisions as measured by the team’s 
commitment to and understanding of the team’s purpose, objectives, and strategies. 
In this research, teams were considered important to facilitating strategy 
implementation and integration when properly focused on the organization’s strategic 
purpose, objectives, and strategies.  The strategic focus or intent of teams was studied to 
determine what relationship strategic intent has on overall Team Performance.  Studying 
this relationship in teams could have a direct bearing on how these same variables 
(Strategic Intent and Performance) are related in larger organizations, such as divisions, 
business units, plants, and firms. 
Adequate controls of the decision-making processes are in place within the focused 
team, which facilitate it to be more effective and successful as a decision-maker in focusing 
on the team purpose and objectives.  Additionally, it can also make the team more 
integrated and focused within the overall organizational structure, enabling or leveraging the 
organization itself to be higher performing in the long term.  Properly disciplined, focused, 
and integrated teams are the ones that become high-performing teams, and they have been 
considered “the most versatile unit organizations have for meeting both performance and 
challenges in today’s complex world” (Katzenbach & Smith, 2003, p. xiii).   
In their book, Built to Last:  Successful Habits of Visionary Companies, Jim Collins 
and Jerry Porras (1994) described the strategic elements or intent needed to ensure that 
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effective strategic decisions can be made.  In their study of 18 highly successful visionary 
companies, Collins and Porras highlighted that core ideologies are relevant to making 
effective strategic choices.  It’s what “drives” these companies to conform to be successful in 
developing new products and services.  This same emphasis on Strategic Intent was 
previously highlighted by Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) and Mintzberg (1994). 
The premise of Collins and Porras’ 1994 book is that core ideology or Strategic Intent 
provides the foundation for the continual successes of the 18 visionary companies, the 
performance of which the researchers tracked over a 6-year period.  These companies were 
standouts in their industry, and Collins and Porras theorized that the reasons for their 
continual successes were directly related to the existence of a core ideology upon which the 
firms and their upper-echelon management teams based their existence and strategic 
behavior.  Their book concludes that if the core ideology of a firm and its strategic thinking 
are properly aligned with the environment, the firm and its thinking will have a greater 
opportunity to be successful in the long term, and it will bring in above-average performance 
returns and profits.  
The work conducted by Collins and Porras is noteworthy and highlighted the 
usefulness of Strategic Intent or core ideologies in determining successful performance.  
Their premise is that based on their study and thinking of core ideologies, firms are able to 
sustain their outstanding performance in the competitive market by staying focused on their 
core ideologies.  Their study, although popular with business leaders, is limited in the 
empirical sense since no hard data exist in their studies that prove or empirically support 
their theories.  They have significant anecdotal information and cases but not empirical data.  
As discussed, the purpose of this study was to help identify and collect empirical data on the 
effects of Strategic Intent on performance. 
Team Performance 
The concept of Team Performance and how to measure it is critically important to the 
successful deployment of teams in any environment (Kraft, 1996).  There is the general 
belief that teams make organizations more effective.  However, few research efforts have 
measured team effectiveness with empirical data.  The research cited in this study focused 
primarily on the manufacturing teams that can be assessed using operational measures 
such as productivity, efficiency, delivery time, defects, and scrap (Beyerlein, 1995).  Some of 
the challenges presented in this research study on measuring Team Performance were 
similar to many studies that relied upon self-reported assessments, especially when 
measuring Team Performance.  Team Performance has been studied extensively, and 
many techniques exist to measure it.  How to measure Team Performance in the classroom 
or even in a program office environment is a challenge without using self-reported or self-
assessed performance measures or data.   
Podsakoff and Organ’s (1986) work highlighted that the most critical concern was 
that the use of self-reports was identifying the potential causes of “artifactual covariance” 
between self-report measures of what were presumed to be two distinctly different variables.  
They stressed that when the same persons provided the researcher with self-report 
measures of two or more different constructs, what could account for any correlations that 
were found in the research could be a result of the “artifactual covariance” and bias in the 
respondents’ self-reported data and not the natural correlation between the variables.  In 
other words, false correlations would be assumed in the research, based on the nature 
(“artifactual covariance”) of the self-reported data and not on the actual relationship 
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occurring in the cases analyzed.  The authors highlighted several techniques to reduce the 
effects of this overlapping influence of the respondents’ self-reported data.  All of these 
methods were highlighted as a means to reduce the effects of obtaining data from self-
reports.   
The Podsakoff and Organ (1986) article highlighted, though, that under specific 
conditions it seems that self-report data in organizational studies are “here to stay.”  They 
also reported on another study by Howard, Maxwell, Weiner, Boynton and Rooney . (1980), 
which noted that under many circumstances, self-reports might represent more accurate 
estimates of population parameters than behavioral measures.  Podsakoff and Organ also 
stressed in their study that it is unlikely that such techniques of using self-reports will be 
abandoned.  They do recommend that caution be taken to ensure that the right conditions 
exist to minimize the effects of self-reported data on the correlations and conclusions made 
concerning the data relationships.  Gupta and Behr (1982) emphasized that despite the 
problems in the use of self-report measures in organizational research, the practical utility of 
self-reported data makes them a necessity to organizational behavior studies.  Self-report 
data are extremely useful and make them “virtually indispensable in many research 
contexts” (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986, p. 540). 
In the context of this research, the application and usefulness of self-reported data 
from team members attending PMT 352B courses are justified, based on the fact that the 
self-reported data are collected at different locations/settings, at different times, and using 
consistent but varying instructors in gathering the data and that the data are aggregated at 
the team level (one level above the team-member level, where the data were originally 
gathered).  These are all methods, as explained by Podsakoff and Organ (1986), which 
reduce the negative effects of self-reported data.   
The nature of the data used in this research also necessitated that to obtain team 
characteristics on Strategic Intent, the natural source of the information would be from the 
team members.  The team members were the most reliable source of information on how 
they thought about the Team Performance and how similar they perceived their beliefs to be 
regarding team purpose, objectives, and strategies (Strategic Intent).  It would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain “true” unbiased, objective data on teams’ perceptions of their 
strategic thinking and their performance without using self-reported data. 
The effects of self-reported data have been assessed in this research.  It was 
determined that given the nature of the self-reported team member data (aggregated at 
team level, collected from different sources, locations, and times), the effects of “artifactual 
covariance,” as highlighted by Podsakoff and Organ (1986), were minimized in this 
research. 
It is evident that the problems of measuring Team Performance are very complex 
and difficult to pinpoint.  The existing performance measurement systems in place in an 
organization are usually not aligned with new initiatives or changes, such as team 
development, occurring in today’s workplace.  In most of these cases, the measurement 
systems do not adequately reflect the impact on efficiency and effectiveness of the latest 
initiatives (Beyerlein, 1995).  Because of these many difficulties with the lack of integrated 
performance-measurement systems and the complexities of how teams affect organizations, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to effectively measure the value of teams with existing 
databases or performance-management systems.  Therefore, it is believed that the only 
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effective way to measure Team Performance is through self-assessment of Team 
Performance.  Lets know understand the study’s research questions and hypotheses.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses   
This study was concerned with a general broad research question that focused on 
determining the relationship between work team Strategic Intent and Team Performance.  
The purpose of the study was to complete a thorough, descriptive, correlational relationship 
study on the six team Strategic Intent variables dealing with the teams’ strategic thinking 
and on the performance of the teams as assessed by the team members themselves and by 
the teams’ instructors in PMT 352B program management courses.   
The research study gathered empirical evidence to answer these research questions 
and provided data to support these hypotheses:  
RQ1.  What was the relationship between the overall Team’s Strategic Intent and the 
overall Team’s Performance (team member self-assessment)? 
Ha1.  There was a statistically significant relationship between the overall Team’s 
Strategic Intent (Independent variable/interval data) and the overall Team’s 
Performance (team member self-assessment) (Dependent variable/interval 
data).  The statistical test used was the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient.  
RQ2.  What was the relationship between the Team’s Strategic Intent as measured 
by the two variables a-b below and Team Performance (team member self-
assessment)? 
a.  Understanding of Team Purpose 
b.  Commitment to Team Purpose  
Ha2.  There was a statistically significant relationship between the Team’s Strategic 
Intent as measured by the two variables (Independent variable/interval data) 
a-b below and Team Performance (team member self-assessment) 
(Dependent variable/interval data).  The statistical test used was the 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficient. 
a.  Understanding of Team Purpose 
b.  Commitment to Team Purpose 
RQ3.  What was the relationship between the Team’s Strategic Intent as measured 
by the two variables a-b below and Team Performance (team member self-
assessment)? 
a.  Understanding of Team Objectives 
b.  Commitment to Team Objectives 
Ha3.  There was a statistically significant relationship between the Team’s Strategic 
Intent as measured by the two variables (Independent variable/interval data) 
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a-b below and Team Performance (team member self-assessment) 
(Dependent variable/ interval data).  The statistical test used was the 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficient. 
a.  Understanding of Team Objectives 
b.  Commitment to Team Objectives 
RQ4.  What was the relationship between the Team’s Strategic Intent as measured 
by the two variables a-b below and Team Performance (team member self-
assessment)? 
a.  Understanding of Team Strategies 
b.  Commitment to Team Strategies 
Ha4.  There was a statistically significant relationship between the Team’s Strategic 
Intent as measured by the two variables (Independent variable/ interval data) 
a-b below and Team Performance (team member self-assessment) 
(Dependent variable/interval data).  The statistical test used was the 
Pearson’s r. 
a.  Understanding of Team Strategies 
b.  Commitment to Team Strategies  
RQ5.  What was the relationship between the overall Team’s Strategic Intent and the 
overall Team’s Performance (external instructor assessment)? 
Ha5.  There was a statistically significant relationship between the overall Team’s 
Strategic Intent (Independent variable/interval data) and the overall Team’s 
Performance (external instructor assessment) (Dependent variable/interval 
data).  The statistical test used was the Pearson’s r.  
RQ6.  What was the relationship between the Team’s Strategic Intent as measured 
by the six variables a-f below and Team Performance (external instructor 
assessment)? 
a.  Understanding of Team Purpose 
b.  Commitment to Team Purpose 
c.  Understanding of Team Objectives 
d.  Commitment to Team Objectives 
e.  Understanding of Team Strategies 
f.  Commitment to Team Strategies 
Ha6.  There was a statistically significant relationship between the Team’s Strategic 
Intent as measured by the six variables (Independent variable/interval data) a-
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f below and Team Performance (external instructor assessment) (Dependent 
variable/ interval data).  The statistical test used was the Pearson’s r 
Correlation Coefficient. 
a.  Understanding of Team Purpose 
b.  Commitment to Team Purpose 
c.  Understanding of Team Objectives 
d.  Commitment to Team Objectives 
e.  Understanding of Team Strategies  
f.  Commitment to Team Strategies 
RQ7.  What was the relationship between the overall Team’s Performance (self-
assessment from team survey) and the overall Team’s Performance 
(Instructor assessment from instructor survey)?  
Ha7.  There was a statistically significant relationship between the overall Team’s 
Performance (self-assessment from team survey) and the overall Team’s 
Performance (instructor assessment from instructor survey).  The statistical 
test used was the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient.  
The following figure highlights the relationships, research questions and hypotheses 











Figure 1. Research Model with Hypotheses 
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There were two surveys involved in the data accumulation.  The first survey was the 
team survey.  The second survey was the instructor survey.  A team-member survey 
questionnaire consisted of scaled questions.  The scaled questions included 4-point Likert 
scales and continuous rating scales (1, low/not similar, to 4, high/extremely similar) on the 
items related to evaluating the similarity of the strategic elements of purpose, objectives, 
and strategies.  Five-point Likert-scale questions were used to evaluate Team Performance, 
both on the team-member survey and the separate instructor survey (1, low/poor, to 5, 
high/excellent).  The team-member questionnaire was divided into categories related to the 
variables in the study:  purpose, objectives, and strategies.  Headings and numbering of 
questions were used to segregate the categories.  In both surveys, definitions were provided 
for the key variables to aid in the understanding of the key concepts and variables in this 
research and to aid in the accuracy of the responses.  Demographic information on the 
survey participants was collected on the team-members’ survey.       
The Team Survey instrument (see Appendix A) was divided into four parts and 
contained 14 questions.  Part 1 and 4 were questions that collected team and student 
information respectively and required short, circled answers.  Part 2 was composed of six 
questions related to Strategic Intent on 4-point Likert scales.  Part 3 was composed of three 
questions related to Team Performance on 5-point Likert scales.    
The Team Performance was also measured by the assigned DAU PMT 352B 
instructors.  The Instructor Survey provided data for measuring the Instructor-assessed 
Team Performance.  The first four questions on the Instructor Survey asked the instructors 
for data on the team’s name, location of the class, and dates of the class.  Question 4 asked 
the instructor to evaluate or assess the individual team’s performance in accomplishing the 
course objectives.  The instructors rated the teams on a 5-point Likert scale of poor (1) to 
excellent (5).  Comments were also requested.  The next section discusses the sample that 
was studied.  
Research Sample Population 
 
Fifty-seven data points or teams were collected from the population of teams 
enrolled in PMT 352B courses.  The acquired empirical data from 12 PMT 352B classes 
were obtained from surveys conducted in the classroom from 57 student teams, their 
respective student members (327), and 32 team instructors.  The students were Department 
of Defense (DoD) career acquisition professionals attending the technical training course 
(PMT 352B) at one of the five Defense Acquisition University campuses.  This research was 
a co-sponsored DAU/Alliant International University research project.  The instructors were 
certified DAU instructors, aged 35-60 years of age.  
Demographic information was analyzed from the surveys also.  Pearson’s r 
correlation coefficient tests were used to test the correlation between team average age and 
team average years of experience to Strategic Intent, Team-assessed Team Performance, 
and Instructor-assessed Performance.  Spearman’s rho rank-order and Pearson’s r 
correlation coefficient tests were used to determine the relationships between team 
educational levels to Strategic Intent, Team-assessed Team Performance, and Instructor-




==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 104 - 
=
=
Overall Research Summary and Findings 
Table 20 highlights the relative strength of each of the Pearson’s r tests that were 
conducted in the study, including those identified in additional findings.  Appendix B contains 
the actual SPSS test results.  The italicized entries below identify the original 15 Research 
Question hypotheses, which were all supported at the .05 significance level with their p-
values.  All but the last entry (Question 9 to Instructor Performance) were supported at a .01 
significance level.  All the tests were supported at the .05 significance level.   
For this paper, the following strength of the relationship or support was used:  
Pearson’s r greater than .7 is considered a strong relationship; from .5 to .699 it is 
considered a moderate relationship; and from .3 to .499 it is considered a modest 
relationship/support.   
 
Table 1. Relative Strength of Tested Variables in This Study 
Variables Rank Pearson’s r p-value Results 
Question 8 (CO) TO 
Overall Strategic Intent 
1 .921 .000** Strongly Supported 
Question 10 (CS) TO 
Overall Strategic Intent 
2 .884 .000** Strongly Supported 
Question 7 (UO) TO 
Overall Strategic Intent 
3 .880 .000** Strongly Supported 
Question 6 (CP) TO 
Overall Strategic Intent 
4 .871 .000** Strongly Supported 
Question 9 (US) TO 
Overall Strategic Intent 
5 .817 .000** Strongly Supported 
Question 5 (UP) TO 
Overall Strategic Intent 
6 .793 .000** Strongly Supported 
Overall Strategic Intent TO 
Overall Team 
Performance 
7 .731 .000** Strongly Supported 
Hypothesis 1 
Overall Strategic Intent TO 
Question 11 
8 .724 .000** Strongly Supported 
Overall Strategic Intent TO 
Question 12 
9 .706 .000** Strongly Supported 
Overall Strategic Intent TO 
Question 13 
10 .680 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
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Variables Rank Pearson’s r p-value Results 
Question 10 (CS) TO 
Overall Team 
Performance 
11 .673 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Question 9 (US) TO 
Overall Team 
Performance 
12 .671 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Question 8 (CO) TO 
Overall Team 
Performance 
13 .664 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Question 7 (UO) TO 
Overall Team 
Performance 
14 .662 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Question 8 (CO) TO 
Question 12 
15 .658 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3b 
Question 7 (UO) TO 
Question 12 
16 .643 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3a 
Question 10 (CS) TO 
Question 13 
17 .640 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Hypothesis 4b 
Instructor Performance TO 
Overall Team 
Performance 
18 .630 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Hypothesis 7 
Question 9 (US) TO 
Question 13 
19 .625 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Hypothesis 4a 
Question 6 (CP) TO 
Overall Team 
Performance 
20 .604 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Question 6 (CP) TO 
Question 11 
 









Variables Rank Pearson’s r p-value Results 
Question 5 (UP) TO 
Question 11 
22 .513 .000** Moderately 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2a 
Question 5 (UP) TO 
Overall Team 
Performance 
23 .495 .000** Modestly Supported 
 
Question 10 (CS) TO 
Instructor Performance 
24 .486 .000** Modestly Supported 
Hypothesis 6f 
Question 7 (UO) TO 
Instructor Performance 
25 .466 .000** Modestly Supported 
Hypothesis 6c 
Overall Strategic Intent TO 
Instructor Performance 
26 .463 .000** Modestly Supported 
Hypothesis 5 
Question 8 (CO) TO 
Instructor Performance 
27 .405 .002** Modestly Supported 
Hypothesis 6d 
Question 6 (CP) TO 
Instructor Performance 
28 .352 .007** Modestly Supported 
Hypothesis 6b 
Question 5 (UP) TO 
Instructor Performance 
29 .349 .008** Modestly Supported 
Hypothesis 6a 
Question 9 (US) TO 
Instructor Performance 
30 .330 .012* Modestly Supported  
Hypothesis 6e 
Note:  * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test); ** Correlation is 
significant at the .01 level (two-tailed test). 
The first six entries/cases in the table above highlight the strongly supported 
relationship between the six individual questions in the team survey (Questions 6-10) and 
overall team Strategic Intent.  These relationships are high in magnitude or strength 
because Team Strategic Intent is defined by the average of all the team members’ 
responses to the six questions related to the team’s understanding and commitment to the 
team’s purpose (Questions 5 and 6 respectively), understanding and commitment to the 
team’s objectives (Questions 7 and 8 respectively), and understanding and commitment to 
the team’s strategies (Questions 9 and 10 respectively).  These results make sense and 
provide no real insight into the research except that Question 8 (Team Understanding of 
Objectives) has the greatest strength of .921.  This indicates that this question has the 
greatest effect on overall Team Strategic Intent.  Managers should be aware that developing 
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a strong sense of understanding of team objectives among team members will have the 
most significant (largest) effect on the team’s overall Strategic Intent perception.  This can 
also have an effect on Team-assessed and Instructor-assessed Team Performance.  This is 
consistent with the fact that Question 8 has the strongest relationship to Question 12 in 
terms of comparing Strategic Intent questions to their related Team Performance question.  
“Understanding the team objectives” as a variable plays a major role in both these 
relationships. 
The strength of the relationship between overall Team Strategic Intent and Team 
Performance (Hypothesis 1) at .731 underscores the influence that strategic thinking or 
developing clear and understandable strategic elements in a team affects how the team will 
assess its performance.  This is a vital source of information to educators, team and 
business leaders, and team sponsors/stakeholders.  This highlights that a team with a clear 
set of strategic characteristics of a team purpose, objectives, and strategies will more 
probably develop a strong sense of being a high-performing team.  Believing this will 
empower the team to greater team results and even more focused performance.  This 
should also produce better results for the organizations that sponsor them.  The leader of 
this team also needs to know that a focused, intent team will believe it will perform well.  
Overall Team Strategic Intent is a key variable in this study and is analyzed/tested in 
11 of the cases identified in Table 1 above.  The strength of the relationship between 
Strategic Intent (SI) and Team Performance at .731 is compared to the same relationship 
between Strategic Intent and Instructor-assessed Performance at .463.  This indicates that 
team strategic thinking has a greater relationship to or effect upon Team-assessed Team 
Performance than its effect on Instructor-assessed Performance.  The strength of team 
Strategic Intent on the instructors’ assessment is significant, nonetheless, and indicates that 
team strategic thinking not only affects Team Performance but also how the team’s 
instructors assessed the team’s performance.  
Strategic Intent is a strong force in or predictor of team dynamics and development.  
Additional future studies should be made to understand how Team Strategic Intent is related 
to other indicators of team success or performance, such as quality of work, timeliness, 
problem-solving effectiveness, and overall team productivity.  Overall Strategic Intent (SI) 
has a strong relationship not only to overall Team Performance at .731 but also when tested 
against the three questions that create Team Performance.  The results are the following:  
724 (Question 11 to SI), .706 (Question 12 to SI), and .680 (Question 13 to SI).  This is to be 
expected and again underscores the strength and value of understanding the effects and 
strength of Team Strategic Intent on Team Performance. Additional Pearson’s r correlation 
coefficient tests highlight that when the individual Strategic Intent questions (5-10) are 
compared to the overall Team-assessed Team Performance, significant (.01) relationships 
occur.  In fact, the results of these tests are similar in strength to the results obtained on the 
tests between the Strategic Intent questions to their related individual Team-assessed 
Performance questions (11-13).  
Here are the comparisons:  Question 5, Understanding Team Purpose (Team 
Performance:  .495; Question 11:  .513); Question 6, Commitment to Team Purpose (Team 
Performance:  .604; Question 11:  .594); Question 7, Understanding Team Objectives 
(Team Performance:  .662; Question 11:  .643); Question 8, Commitment to Team 
Objectives (Team Performance:  .664; Question 11:  .658); Question 9, Understanding 
Team Strategies (Team Performance:  .671; Question 11:  .625); and Question 10, 
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Commitment to Team Strategies (Team Performance:  .673; Question 11:  .640).  All of 
these results have p-values of .000**.  
In summary, it is concluded that these additional tests on various Strategic Intent 
questions and overall Team-assessed Performance provided additional support to the 
previously conducted hypotheses tests.  A more robust test was comparing the Strategic 
Intent questions (5-10) to the related Team-assessed Performance questions (11-13).  The 
results moderately supported the direct relationship between these sets of variables.  There 
was a moderately supported relationship between Team Strategic Intent and Team-
assessed Performance with all three methods:  (a) overall Team Strategic Intent to Overall 
Team Performance (Research Question 1 and Hypothesis 1), (b) results of individual 
Strategic Intent questions 5-10 to individual related Team Performance questions 11-13 
(Research Questions 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b), and (c) individual Strategic Intent 
questions 5-10 to overall Team Performance (see Table 20 results). 
Additional Findings on Demographics Data 
 
Additional tests were conducted on the measured demographic information and its 
relationship to overall team Strategic Intent, Team-assessed Team Performance, and 
Instructor-assessed Team Performance.  Twelve tests were conducted, and only 3 tests 
were supported at least the .05 significance level.  Two supported tests related Team 
Educational Level to Team-assessed Performance and to Instructor-assessed Team 
Performance.  Pearson’s r and Spearman’s rho correlation tests both indicated a positive 
relationship between Team Educational Level and overall Team-assessed Team 
Performance and Instructor-assessed Team Performance at a .05 significance level.      
Educational level can make a difference in Team Performance, both as assessed by 
the team itself and by the instructors.  Although not significant at .05, there is also a positive 
effect on overall Team Strategic Intent by team Educational Level.  Although not statistically 
significant, there does appear to be some indication that using teams is an effective learning 
technique in education, and business leaders employing teams in their organizations who 
want to enhance strategic implementation of corporate strategic goals and initiatives should 
be aware that teams with higher educational levels tend to have higher Team Strategic 
Intent (r = .239, not significant at .05), higher overall Team-assessed Team Performance (r = 
.296, p-value = .025*), and higher Instructor-assessed Team Performance (r = .441. p-value 
= .001**).  Educational Level has a positive effect on these three research variables.  
Education has a rather significant effect on Instructor-assessed Team Performance (r = 
.441). 
Team age and years of experience have a negative effect on Team Strategic Intent, 
on overall Team-assessed Team Performance, and on Instructor-assessed Team 
Performance.  The strength of the relationships is low, and the significant levels are high.  
No relationship was supported at the .05 significance level.  Although not supported 
statistically at an alpha of .05, this was of interest to the researcher.  Age and experience 
have negative relationships to all the research variables:  Strategic Intent, Team-assessed 
Team Performance, and Instructor-assessed Team Performance.   
There is a moderately strong relationship between Team Experience and Team Age 
(r = .643, p-value = .001**).  This is logical, and passed the common-sense test.  The results 
do not affect this research but highlight the strength of the survey data to develop 
conclusions regarding the survey sample.   
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The main conclusions in this research are the following: 
1. There is a statistically significant relationship between the overall team Strategic 
Intent and overall Team-assessed Team Performance.  Teams that have high overall 
team Strategic Intent (team purpose, objectives, and strategies) also have high 
overall Team-assessed Team Performance. 
2. There is a statistically significant relationship between the individual team Strategic 
Intent questions (5-10) and overall Team-assessed Team Performance.  Teams that 
have high results on individual team Strategic Intent questions (5-10) also have high 
results on overall Team-assessed Team Performance. 
3. There is a statistically significant relationship between the individual team Strategic 
Intent questions (5-10) and individual Team-assessed Team Performance questions 
(11-13).  Teams that have high results on individual team Strategic Intent questions 
(5-10) also have high results on individual Team-assessed Team Performance 
questions (11-13). 
4. There is a statistically significant relationship between the overall team Strategic 
Intent and overall Instructor-assessed Team Performance (Question 4).  Teams that 
have high overall team Strategic Intent (team purpose, objectives, and strategies) 
also have high Instructor-assessed Team Performance (Question 4).  
5. There is a statistically significant relationship between the individual team Strategic 
Intent questions (5-10) and individual Instructor-assessed Team Performance 
(Question 4).  Teams that possessed high scores on each individual Question 5-10 
dealing with team Strategic Intent also had high Instructor-assessed Team 
Performance. 
6. There is a statistically significant relationship between the overall Team-assessed 
Team Performance (Questions 11-13) and overall Instructor-assessed Team 
Performance (Question 4).  Teams that have high overall Team-assessed Team 
Performance (Questions 11-13) also have high Instructor-assessed Team 
Performance (Question 4). 
7. There is a statistically significant relationship between the overall Team Educational 
Level and overall Instructor-assessed Team Performance (Question 4).  Teams that 
have high overall Team Educational Level also have high Instructor-assessed Team 
Performance (Question 4).  There is some indication (supported at .05 significance 
level) that there is also a relationship between the overall Team Educational Level 
and both overall Team-assessed Team Performance (Questions 11-13) (supported 
at .05 significance level) and overall Strategic Intent (Questions 5-10) (not supported 
at .05 significance level).  
8. There is some indication (not supported at .05 significance level) that there is also an 
indirect or negative relationship between the overall Team Average Age and all of 
the following:  (a) overall team Strategic Intent (Questions 5-10), (b) overall Team-
assessed Team Performance (Questions 11-13), and (c) overall Instructor-assessed 
Team Performance (Question 4). 
There is some indication (not supported at .05 significance level) that there is also an 
indirect or negative between the overall Team Average Years Experience and all the 
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following:  (a) overall team Strategic Intent (Questions 5-10), (b) overall Team-assessed 
Team Performance (Questions 11-13), and (c) overall Instructor-assessed Team 
Performance (Question 4).  The strengths of these relationships and significance levels do 
not allow for statistical significance of these relationships.  The interesting aspect of these 
studies highlight that with more data and research, age and experience may have 
statistically significant negative effects on the research variables of overall team Strategic 
Intent, Team-assessed Team Performance, and Instructor-assessed Team Performance. 
Concluding Statement 
Teams can be a significant resource to business leaders and lead to greater program 
successes.  Little empirical data exist on what strategic characteristics make teams more 
effective.  Does a work team’s success depend on how strategically focused or intent the 
team is?  Do team-developed purpose, objectives, and strategies (strategic intent) have an 
effect on how well teams perform?  This research study hypothesized and proved that work 
team strategic intent characteristics (team-developed purpose, objectives, and strategies) 
were directly or positively related to the performance of student work teams. 
Significant positive correlation relationships were found in all 15 studied hypotheses 
between work team strategic intent and team performance as measured by team self-
assessments and instructor assessments.  Additionally, a positive correlation was found 
between the team self-assessment of performance and the instructors’ assessment of the 
team performance.   
The research provided significant empirical data on the positive correlation 
relationships between work team strategic intent and work team performance.  It also 
defined the characteristics that were used to determine the strategic intent of a work team or 
any work unit.  It created empirical support for Katzenbach and Smith’s theories from their 
studies in The Wisdom of Teams: Creating the High-performance Organization (2003) on 
the success of real teams, based on being committed to a common purpose and 
performance goals.  Additionally, it created a survey to measure the strategic intent of team 
members and teams in general.  Finally, it introduced the study of strategic thinking or use 
of strategic intent as a method or process for evaluating team performance. 
The complexity of team performance and the large number of future potential 
influences and additional areas of research needed on teams were highlighted in the 
research.  This may help explain why so many organizations using teams in both the public 
and private sector today are having difficulty as they try to reposition themselves in an ever 
more turbulent environment and why teams are often not as effective or successful as 
possible.   
Properly disciplined, focused, and integrated teams are the ones that become high-
performing teams, and are considered “the most versatile unit organizations have for 
meeting both performance and challenges in today’s complex world” (Katzenbach & Smith, 
2003, p. xiii).  This study has identified that Strategic Intent or clearly focused team purpose, 
objectives, and strategies can make teams more high-performing and even more versatile 
and effective in an organization—both in the short and long term.   
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Appendix A. Team Survey 
WORK TEAM 
INTENT AND WORK TEAM 
PERFORMANCE 
This is a university doctorate-level and Defense Acquisition University 
co-sponsored survey.  It will contribute to advancing the body of knowledge to 
help identify if and how much the alignment of work team strategic intent (which 
relates to work team purpose, objectives, and strategies) contribute to work 
team performance.  This information will help enhance work team performance 
effectiveness in DAU classrooms and in DoD organizations.   
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The information gathered in this questionnaire is confidential.  No specific response will 
be shared with any respondent.  Only aggregate information will be discussed in this study.  
No specific information about you personally or your team will be released. 
The survey is optional.  If you do not want to complete the survey inform the researcher or 
instructor that is administering the survey.   
Consent:  Your completion of this survey and submittal to the researchers provide your 
consent to the researcher to use the data in the survey to conduct analyses and determine 
the results and conclusions related to their research.     
Additional Information, Completed Surveys, and Requests 
for Results of this Research Should be Sent to: 
Tom Edison 
Alliant International University 
536 H Ave 
Coronado, Calif. 92118 




Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
 
Work Team Information 
Please fill in the blanks below:   
1. Name and/or number assigned to your work team:  
_______________________________. 
2. Date (month/day/yr) your work team began its work (date class began) and ended:                                 
class began from ________________ and lasted to ________________. 
3. Specific stated purpose/charter of your work team:  
__________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4.  Location of your class/team: 
_________________________________________________.  
Questions 5 to 10 that follow ask for your judgment or perception on how 
similar or aligned your understanding of and/or commitment to specific work team 
elements (purpose, objectives, and strategies) are to those of other members on 




5.  How similar is your understanding of your work team’s purpose to that of the 
other members on your work team? (Circle correct rating.) 
Questions 5 to 6:  Team’s purpose refers to your work team’s overall goal for the future of the work 
team during next six weeks.  Consider this as your intent or focus that collectively provided the work 
team a future goal for the team’s activities and affected the team’s decision making and performance. 
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 1 2 3 4 
6.  How similar is your commitment to your work team’s purpose to that of the other 
members on your work team? (Circle correct rating.) 
Your Commitment 














7. How similar is your understanding of your work team’s objectives to that of the 












 1 2 3 4 
8.  How similar is your commitment to your work team’s objectives to that of the 












 1 2 3 4 
Strategies 
Questions 9 to 10: Team’s strategies are work team procedures, plans, approach, 
and methods used to achieve the overall work team’s purpose and objectives. 
9.  How similar is your understanding of your work team’s strategies to that of the 













 1 2 3 4 
10.   How similar is your commitment to your work team’s strategies to that of the 
other members on your work team? (Circle correct rating.) 
Questions 7 to 8:  Team’s objectives are the specific work team performance targets or 
shorter-term targets your work team was formed for and is working to accomplish. 
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11.  Please indicate how you rate your work team's overall performance in terms of 
accomplishing your work team’s purpose. (Circle one rating number that represents the 
success of team accomplishments in relation to your team purpose.)  
    Poor                Below Ave                 Average                      Good                Excellent      
        1                    2                               3                               4                         5 
 
12.  Please indicate how you rate your work team's overall performance in terms of 
accomplishing your work team’s objectives. (Circle one rating number that represents the 
success of team accomplishments in relation to your team objectives.)  
    Poor                Below Ave                 Average                      Good                Excellent      
        1                    2                               3                               4                         5 
 
13.  Please indicate how you rate your work team's overall performance in terms of 
using your work team’s strategies. (Circle one rating number that represents the success of 
team accomplishments in relation to using your team strategies.)  
     Poor                Below Ave                 Average                      Good                Excellent      




(This information will be held in strictest confidence. Please fill in the blanks below.) 
 
14. In the following questions please provide some personal information about yourself: 
a. Total years work experience: _______years (Fill in the blank)   
 
b. Gender:       Male            Female  (Circle correct answer) 
 
Questions 11-13:  Team performance relates directly to your team’s 
accomplishment of the team’s purpose (evaluated in questions 5-6) and objectives 
(evaluated in questions 7-8) using the team strategies (evaluated in questions 9-
10). 
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c. Your age:_____________(Fill in the blank) 
 
d.   Current work status: 
 1.  If active duty military answer below: (Circle answer or check in box) 
  In what Service were you on active duty on January 2, 2006? 
  Army 
  Navy 
  Marine Corps 
  Air Force 
  
 2.  If government civilian answer below: (Circle answer or check in box) 
For which Department of Defense (DoD) component did you work on January 2, 2006? 
  Army 
  Navy 
  Marine Corps 
  Air Force 
  DoD Agency or Activity 
 
3.  If civilian contractor answer below: (Fill in blank) 
What company do you work for? ________________________ 
f.   Work/functional background that you’ve worked more than 50% of your total career 
















_____Other (Write in Work 
Background greater than 50%) 
__________________________ 
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g.   Highest educational level completed:  (Circle most correct choice) 
1 Some High School  6 Some Post-Graduate 
Courses 
 2 High School Graduate  7 Masters Degree 
3 Some College (1-2 yrs)  8 Some Post-Masters Courses 
4 Some College (3-4 yrs)  9 PhD/Doctorate Degree 
5 Bachelors, College Graduate  10 Other___________________ 
 
 
Thank you very much for your help with this research project! 
 
Comments or Recommendations: 
Appendix B. Overall Test Results 
 
1. Correlation Results of Overall Strategic Intent and Overall Team-assessed 

















Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
2. Correlation Results of Strategic Intent Elements (Q 5-10) to  
Work Team-assessed Performance (Q 11-13)—(RQ 2a-b, 3a-b & 4a-b): 
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Mean Std. Deviation N
 
Correlations
1 .652** .704** .675** .564** .525** .513** .452** .464**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.652** 1 .649** .860** .587** .756** .594** .562** .589**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.704** .649** 1 .786** .699** .718** .663** .643** .608**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.675** .860** .786** 1 .622** .803** .677** .658** .585**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.564** .587** .699** .622** 1 .747** .635** .677** .625**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.525** .756** .718** .803** .747** 1 .655** .648** .640**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.513** .594** .663** .677** .635** .655** 1 .928** .877**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.452** .562** .643** .658** .677** .648** .928** 1 .864**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.464** .589** .608** .585** .625** .640** .877** .864** 1
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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3. Correlation Results of Overall Strategic Intent and Overall Instructor-

















Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
4. Correlation Results of Strategic Intent Elements (Q5-10) to  
Instructor Assessed Performance—(RQ 6a-f): 
Correlations
1 .652** .704** .675** .564** .525** .349**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .008
57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.652** 1 .649** .860** .587** .756** .352**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007
57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.704** .649** 1 .786** .699** .718** .466**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.675** .860** .786** 1 .622** .803** .405**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002
57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.564** .587** .699** .622** 1 .747** .330*
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .012
57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.525** .756** .718** .803** .747** 1 .486**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
57 57 57 57 57 57 57
.349** .352** .466** .405** .330* .486** 1
.008 .007 .000 .002 .012 .000





























Q5TUP Q6TCP Q7TUO Q8TCO Q9TUS Q10TCS Q14InstrPerf
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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5. Correlation Results of Overall Team-assessed Performance and Overall Instructor 
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Panel 5 - Open Architecture, Open Business Models and 
Collaboration for Acquisition 
 
Wednesday, 
May 16, 2007 
Panel 5 - Open Architecture, Open Business Models and Collaboration for 
Acquisition 




William Bray, Program Manager Integrated Combat Systems, PEO IWS 
Discussant:  
Nickolas H. Guertin, Deputy Director Naval Open Architecture 
Papers: 
AEGIS and Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) Platforms: Using KVA 
Analysis, Risk Simulation and Strategic Real Options to Assess 
Operational Effectiveness 
Thomas Housel, Johnathan Mun, Eric Tarantino, and Maj Scott Uchytil, 
USMC,  Naval Postgraduate School 
Measuring the Value Added of Management: A Knowledge Value Added 
Approach 
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AEGIS and Ship Self-defense System (SSDS) Platforms: 
Using KVA Analysis, Risk Simulation and Strategic Real 
Options to Assess Operational Effectiveness 
 
Presenter: Dr. Thomas Housel, PhD, specializes in valuing intellectual capital, telecommunications, 
information technology, value-based business process reengineering, and knowledge value 
measurement in profit and non-profit organizations. He is currently a tenured Full Professor for the 
Information Sciences (Systems) Department. His current research focuses on the use of “Real 
Options” models in identifying, valuing, maintaining, and exercising options in military decision-
making. Prior to joining NPS, he also was a Research Fellow for the Center for Telecommunications 
Management and Associate Professor at the Marshall School of Business at the University of 
Southern California. Housel has been the Chief Business Process Engineer for Pacific Bell, where he 
completed numerous reengineering projects and developed a new objective method for objectively 
measuring the value-added by reengineering.  His last assignment in the corporate world was as the 
Chief of Consumer Market Research for Telecom Italia in Venice, Italy, where he developed new 
methods for predicting the adoption rates for new interactive multimedia broadband applications. He 
is Managing Partner for Business Process Auditors, a firm that specializes in training Big Six 
consultants, large manufacturing and service companies in the Knowledge Value-Added methodology 
for objectively measuring the return generated by corporate knowledge assets/intellectual capital.  
He received his PhD from the University of Utah in 1980. He won the prestigious Society for 
Information Management award for best paper in the field in 1986. His work on measuring the value 
of intellectual capital has been featured in a Fortune cover story (October 3, 1994) and Investor’s 
Business Daily, numerous books, professional periodicals, and academic journals (most recently in 
the Journal of Intellectual Capital, vol 2., 2005). His latest books include: Measuring and Managing 
Knowledge and Global Telecommunications Revolution: The Business Perspective with McGraw-Hill 
(both in 2001). 
Presenter: Dr. Johnathan Mun, PhD, MBA, MS, CFC, CRA, FRM, MIFC. Dr. Johnathan C. Mun is a 
Research Professor at the Naval Post Graduate School and is the CEO of Real Options Valuation 
LLC, a consulting, training, and software development firm specializing in real options, employee 
stock options, financial valuation, and risk analysis located in Northern California. He is the creator of 
the Real Option Super Lattice Solver software, Monte Carlo Risk Simulator software, and Employee 
Stock Options Valuation software at the firm. The Employee Stock Options Valuation software was 
used by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to develop their example valuation (A87) 
in the 2004 FAS 123 requirements (he has also advised the Board of Directors at FASB on several 
occasions on binomial and options valuation). He has authored numerous books including Real 
Options Analysis: Tools and Techniques (Wiley 2002, with a second edition forthcoming September 
2005), Real Options Analysis Course (Wiley 2003), Applied Risk Analysis (Wiley 2003), and Valuing 
Employee Stock Options (Wiley 2004). His books and software are being used around the world at 
top universities (including the Bern Institute in Germany, Chung-Ang University in South Korea, 
Georgetown University, ITESM in Mexico, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York 
University, Stockholm University in Sweden, University of the Andes in Chile, University of Chile, 
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School, University of York in the United Kingdom, and Edinburgh 
University in Scotland, among others.  
He has been a finance and economics professor and has taught courses in financial management, 
investments, real options, economics, and statistics at the undergraduate and the graduate MBA 
levels. He has taught at universities all over the world, from the University of Applied Sciences 
(Switzerland and Germany) and St. Mary’s College (California), and has chaired many graduate 
research thesis committees. He was formerly the Vice President of Analytics at Decisioneering, Inc., 
where he headed up the development of real options and financial analytics software products, 
analytical consulting, training, and technical support, and where he was the creator of the Real 
Options Analysis Toolkit software, the predecessor of the Super Lattice Software discussed in this 
book. Prior to joining Decisioneering, he was a Consulting Manager and Financial Economist in the 
Valuation Services and Global Financial Services practice of KPMG Consulting and a Manager with 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 123 - 
=
=
the Economic Consulting Services practice at KPMG LLP. He has extensive experience in 
econometric modeling, financial analysis, real options, economic analysis, and statistics.  
He has most recently been working on Department of Defense (DoD) projects that apply real 
options—integrated risk management to support analysis of alternatives, strategic courses of action, 
and acquisitions programs. He has, with Dr. Tom Housel of the Naval Post Graduate School, 
developed a 5-day intensive training course to teach DoD analysts and managers how to apply the 
real options analysis technique to various decision making problems. He has also developed a 
module for the Homeland Defense technology class for the masters program at the Naval Post 
Graduate School.  
Dr. Mun received his PhD in Finance and Economics from Lehigh University, where his research and 
academic interests were in the areas of Investment Finance, Econometric Modeling, Financial 
Options, Corporate Finance, and Microeconomic Theory. He also has a MBA in business 
administration, a MS in management science, and a BS in Biology and Physics. He is Certified in 
Financial Risk Management (FRM), Certified in Financial Consulting (CFC), and is Certified in Risk 
Analysis (CRA). He is a member of the American Mensa, Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society, and Golden 
Key Honor Society as well as several other professional organizations, including the Eastern and 
Southern Finance Associations, American Economic Association, and Global Association of Risk 
Professionals. Finally, he has written many academic articles published in the Journal of the 
Advances in Quantitative Accounting and Finance, the Global Finance Journal, the International 
Financial Review, the Journal of Financial Analysis, the Journal of Applied Financial Economics, the 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, the Financial Engineering News, 
and the Journal of the Society of Petroleum Engineers.  
Presenter: Eric Tarantino, is a recent graduate of the University of Virginia.  He graduated as a 
Bachelor of Arts with High Distinction, receiving majors in both Anthropology and Economics.  
Currently he works as a research associate at the Naval Postgraduate School where he focuses on 
valuation studies for the Department of Defense (DoD).  After receiving his certification in Risk 
Management (CRM) from the International Institute of Professional Education and Research (IIPER), 
Eric has aided in many studies including: assessing the return on investment of various options for 
upgrading the AEGIS weapons system; analyzing the SHIPMAIN program and projecting its potential 
value added when three dimensional visualization and product lifecycle management collaborative 
tools are used; an efficiency study of the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, rapid acquisition process; 
and will soon be a coauthor of a book chapter discussing the SHIPYARD Planning Process.  His work 
focuses on the use of the Knowledge Value Added methodology coupled with Real Options analysis.  
Eric is also training to become a professional Scuba Diver. 
Thomas J. Housel    
Naval Postgraduate School 
Information Sciences Department 
Root Hall 239 




Johnathan Mun, PhD  




Modern, analytical tools are critical to understand the impact of open architecture 
technology and open business models on naval warfighting processes and procedures.  
These tools must measure the operational value of a system from an end-user, warfighter 
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perspective, identify areas of deficiencies in capabilities, and flag areas for potential 
acquisitions.  One advantage of examining open architected system upgrade options from a 
warfighter perspective is that the new systems can be integrated with reengineered 
processes more easily leading to improved process performance. This perspective, using 
OA to upgrade existing IWS systems, ensures that upgrades will lead to improved 
warfighting capabilities. Traditional measurement tools used for cost analysis cannot 
calculate the total value of upgrading a system to support an improved warfighting 
capability, particularly the improved operational value resulting from reengineering of 
warfighting processes.   
The Knowledge Value Added/Real Options (KVA+RO) Valuation Framework is a tool 
designed to assist decision-makers in making technology acquisitions.  This paper describes 
research using the KVA+RO framework for estimating return on investment, in an open 
architecture approach, to upgrading and/or replacing aging IWS AEGIS and SSDS systems. 
The results of the research indicated that using the open architecture (OA)model, in 
combination with  the “leave and layer” approach, was approximately five times more 
valuable than the current proprietary approach to system replacement and was 
approximately twice as valuable as a complete retrofit and replace strategy. “Leave and 
layer” provided the highest return on investment for replacing the AEGIS system with the 
lowest risk. The ultimate success of the OA approach is dependent on the ability of the 
multiple parties to system development and deployment to collaborate.  Collaboration, along 
with the tools that facilitate collaboration, is critical to the success of any of the OA 
approaches. 
Keywords: Return on Investment, Real Options, AEGIS, SSDS, Integrated Risk 
Management 
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The US Navy (Navy) is transforming traditional business practices through Naval 
Open Architecture (Naval OA).  Naval OA, a multi-faceted, enterprise-wide business model 
and product-line strategy leverages “open” computer design principles and architectures.  It 
expands the technological open architecture (OA) model and taps into a multiple-developer 
network to deliver cost-effective, innovative, and rapid/spiral acquisition capabilities. In the 
migration to an OA business model, billions of dollars in software and hardware 
development expenditures, along with subsequent maintenance costs, are at stake. 
PEO IWS tasked a research team from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to 
develop a methodology for estimating return on investment (ROI) using an OA approach to 
upgrading and/or replacing the aging Integrated Weapons Systems (IWS)  AEGIS and 
SSDS systems.  The methodology also had to be capable of estimating total value of 
strategic alternative options for replacing existing AEGIS functionality.    
Approaching the project from a customer-based, warfighter perspective, the NPS 
team applied the Knowledge Value Added/Real Options (KVA+RO) valuation/risk portfolio 
management framework to reengineering situational awareness (SA) procedures used in 
the AEGIS and SSDS platforms.7   Track management sub-processes used in SA 
procedures were analyzed through the KVA process reengineering methodology under “As 
Is,” “To Be,” “Radical 1,” and Radical 2” scenarios.  ROI metrics on individual sub-processes 
and watch stations for AEGIS and SSDS were generated through KVA, with a particular 
focus on systems interoperability.  ROI estimates reached as high as 404% for AEGIS and 
399% for SSDS. 
Real options analysis was then performed to determine the prospective value of 
upgrading the AEGIS IWS over a nine-year period from KVA data inputs. Three options of 
“Strategy A: As Is” (i.e., maintain the existing proprietary approach), “Strategy B: DDX OA—
Develop and Retrofit” (i.e., develop a complete system using an OA approach and replace 
the existing AEGIS system), and “Strategy C: Aegis OA—Leave and Layer” (i.e., use an OA 
approach and replace AEGIS modules over time)  represent potential system development 
and deplolyment strategies; each a unique path with risks and benefits.  Real Options 
values ranged from $12 billion to $58.8 billion for the strategic choices. 
 The KVA+RO Framework 
KVA+RO is a comprehensive measurement process and an integrated tool set that 
defines, measures and evaluates the total value of given IWS acquisitions.  It captures data 
across a spectrum of organizations to compare returns on investments, outputs, processes, 
capabilities, risks, strategic alternatives, costs, and value (i.e., comparable revenue).  
KVA+RO analytically quantifies uncertainty and risks elements inherent in predicting the 
future, includes ways to mitigate these risks through strategic options with analysis of 
alternatives, and by analytically developing and allocating budgets to optimize project 
portfolios.  
                                                
7   Although the total functionalities of AEGIS and SSDS IWS systems are so broad, we focused on situational awareness 
because it is the most promising area for upgrading and reengineering.   
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 Knowledge-based Metrics: Knowledge Value Added (KVA) 
KVA measures the value provided by human capital assets and IT assets by an 
organization, process or function at the sub-process level.  Using a “market comparables” 
valuation technique, it monetizes the outputs of all assets, including intangible knowledge 
assets. Using market comparables provides a means for valuing the outputs of warfighting 
processes in the common units of money. This, in turn, makes it possible to use powerful 
financial metrics in forecasting the value of various strategic options for replacing aging IWS 
systems.  
Capturing the value embedded in an organization’s core processes, employees and 
IT enables the actual cost and revenue of a product or service to be calculated.  Analyses 
like ROI on individual projects, programs, processes and sub-processes within a portfolio of 
IT acquisitions can be derived through the KVA methodology.   
 Risk Analysis: Real Options (RO)  
Potential strategic investments can then be evaluated with real options analysis 
based on KVA data. The analysis applied is a robust and analytical process incorporating 
the risk identification (applying various sensitivity techniques), risk quantification (applying 
Monte Carlo simulation), risk valuation (applying real options analysis), risk mitigation 
(utilizing real options framing), and risk diversification (employing analytical portfolio 
optimization).  
 Study Results and Recommendations Summary 
The results of our analysis include: 
• The KVA+RO valuation framework, a viable methodology for estimating 
ROIs and projecting valuation of acquisition options, should be used 
across the board. Several Department of Defense projects are implementing 
the framework. The methodology also supports the CNO’s recent directive of 
accelerating adoption of open-business models and providing a methodology 
to assess the business risks and benefits of various OA-based acquisition 
strategies.  
• Upgrading existing IWS functionality to support reengineering elements of 
existing track-management process appears beneficial.  ROIs ranged from 
212% to 404% for the AEGIS platform and ROIs for the SSDS platform were 
also significant.  ROI results are shown in Figures 1 and 2.8  In addition, 
Tables 1 and 2 provide a detailed analysis of the ROIs for reengineering the 
track management process. Table 3 summarizes the reengineered 
processes and subsequent benefits. The results are based on the 
assumption that the IWS systems could be developed within an OA 
framework to support the reengineered process designs.  
                                                
8  Radical 1 scenario assumes the improvements of the “To Be” scenario while the Radical 2 scenario assumes cumulative 
improvements from all three scenarios.   
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Figure 2.  KVA Results: SSDS ROI Estimates 
 
Tables 1 and 2 are more detailed results for ROI analysis for “As Is” and the other three 
increasingly automated scenarios. 
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AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3421% 3307% 3063% 2633%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" -91% -91% 2061% 1756%
Verify Other Track Sources -95% -95% -95% -96%
Correlate sub-total 1184% 1141% 1506% 1296%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -97% -97% 361% 310%
Update GCCS-M -97% 91% 84% 69%
Track sub-total -98% -94% -58% -64%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 802% 769% 706% 607%
Verify EW emissions -91% -91% -92% 509%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 4121% 3821% 3332%
Match Against ATO -98% 4206% 3890% 3382%
Match Against CommAir Profile 863% 835% 763% 643%
Match Against Intel Information -97% -97% -97% 3814%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -97% -97%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify sub-total 8% 60% 50% 326%
RELAY
Send Over Links -87% -88% -89% -90%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -98% -99% -99% -99%
Relay sub-total -97% -98% -98% -99%
Totals 212% 240% 273% 404%
 
Table 1.  Detailed ROI Estimates for AEGIS
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AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3393% 3280% 3026% 2598%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" -91% -91% 2530% 2158%
Verify Other Track Sources -95% -95% -96% -96%
Correlate sub-total 1174% 1131% 1512% 1301%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -96% -97% 546% 475%
Update GCCS-M -98% 14% 10% 1%
Track sub-total -98% -96% -53% -60%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 790% 757% 692% 595%
Verify EW emissions -90% -91% -91% 474%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 3689% 3405% 2967%
Match Against ATO -98% 3813% 3510% 3049%
Match Against CommAir Profile 926% 896% 816% 688%
Match Against Intel Information -97% -97% -97% 3688%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -96% -96%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify sub-total 12% 59% 48% 316%
RELAY
Send Over Links -82% -83% -84% -86%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -99% -99% -99% -99%
Relay sub-total -97% -98% -98% -98%
Totals 212% 237% 271% 399%  
Table 2.  Detailed ROI Estimates for SSDS 
 
 
Table 3 discusses the potential impact of an OA approach on AEGIS and SSDS. 
 
 “As Is” “To Be” “Radical 1” “Radical 2” 










• Info provided in ATO could be 
upgraded into AEGIS, 
reducing manpower 
requirements. 
• Enables greater sensor and 
data integration, providing 
enhanced correlation in 
pinpointing origin of aircraft or 
ship. 
• Streamlined system automatically 
updates tracks. 
• Increased information-sharing and 
collaborative technology allows for 
automatic correction of multiple tracks 
per target. 
• Continuously updates tracks, allowing 
for pinpoint accuracy. 
• Collaborative technology minimizes 
possibility of multiple tracking of 
targets. 
• Includes changes from “To Be” 
 
• Collaborative technology automatically 
updates ship’s systems with Intel 
information. 
• Electronic communication of data from EW 
to CIC personnel facilitates COTS-based 
environment that easily upgrades to 
accommodate greater processor speeds.  
• Greatly enhances CIC efficiency through 
more timely SA.   







• Reduces maintenance costs.  
 
• Frees watch-standers to 
perform other tasks while 
providing faster data flow.   
• Increases accuracy of tracking targets. 
 
 
• Substantial re-engineering leads to drastic 
reduction in watch-stander work time, 
greatly reducing human error and further 
decreasing maintenance costs.  
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• Strategy C: Leave and Layer is the most promising strategy with lowest 
total costs.  It has the highest potential rate of return with a valuation of 
$58.8 billion and 4.9 times the potential return than Strategy A.   Strategy B 
has a valuation of $23.2 billion, while Strategy A has the lowest valuation at 
$12 billion.   
Table 4.  Real Options Valuation Results: Strategies A-C 
 
 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C 
STRATEGIC OPTION 
“As Is” DDX OA “Develop and Retrofit” 
AEGIS OA 
“Leave & Layer” 
Net Present Value $12.00B $6.38B $27.52B 
Real Options Value $12.00B $23.16B $58.84B 
Total Cost $10.00B $24.00B $9.09B 
Strategic Real Options-
based Relative Return Ratio 1.00 1.9 4.9 
   
• Collaboration is critical.  OA as an acquisition, development and 
deployment framework will not succeed without the support of a collaborative 
infrastructure to facilitate the introduction of multiple large, medium and 
smaller players and their necessary interactions with users of the systems 
(e.g., warfighters), the acquisition community, and Navy leadership.  
Significant investments will be required for the infrastructure necessary to 
enable all parties (acquirers, users, developers) to collaborate easily and 
effectively in an OA model. 
• Performance monitoring is required.  If the performance of acquisition 
strategies is not monitored over time, the probability of success will be greatly 
reduced.  Performance measurement systems  (i.e. performance accounting 
software), in conjunction with predictive forecasting software programs, 
provide additional analytic support to IWS systems-acquisition strategies. 
These research results, along with components of the KVA+RO framework and key 
findings from the analysis, are summarized in this report. 9 
 Summary 
IWS systems developed in a closed, proprietary model have performed well and 
provide substantial returns.  However, a new paradigm is required to maintain military 
superiority and wage information-age warfare.  Through open architected system 
development and open-business models, benefits such as reusable code, lower 
maintenance-upgrade costs, and greater vendor flexibility in supporting system module 
upgrades could be derived.  Moreover, the Navy can leverage new technology by quickly 
adopting it to warfighter needs.  
This study found that the “leave and layer” option for IWS replacement provided the 
lowest costs, highest ROIs, and highest strategic options value with the lowest risk. The 
                                                
9   The accuracy of our analysis is dependent on data and information provided by subject-matter experts. KVA analysis 
includes tests of the reliability of their estimates. 
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results recommend use of the OA—leave and layer IWS replacement approach to support 
reengineered warfighting processes. 
Introduction 
Naval Open Architecture (Naval OA) is a multi-faceted, enterprise-wide business 
model and product-line strategy designed to fully capitalize on “open” computer design 
principles and architectures. Expanding on the technological open architecture (OA) model, 
Naval OA leverages, “open business models for the acquisition and spiral development of 
new systems that enable multiple developers to collectively and competitively participate in 
cost-effective and innovative capability delivery to the Naval Enterprise” (Mullen, 2006, 
August 28).  The new OA business model requires a greater degree of collaboration among 
customers (e.g., warfighter), builders (e.g., small, medium, and large technology 
companies), and buyers (e.g., the acquisition community) than the existing closed, 
proprietary IWS business model.   In the migration to an OA business model, billions of 
dollars in hardware and software development expenditures, along with subsequent 
maintenance costs, are at stake. 
To understand the potential impact of OA technology and business models on naval 
warfighting processes and procedures, analytical tools are critical for decision-makers as 
they manage their portfolio of options. Portfolio management requires that these tools 
quantify the risks, costs, and net value of potential IWS acquisitions. The tools must be able 
to help identify where gaps exist in current processes and to project anticipated returns on 
investments to fill those gaps. 
This study describes research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
using the Knowledge Value Added/Real Options (KVA+RO) valuation/risk portfolio 
management framework.  KVA+RO is a comprehensive measurement tool set that defines, 
measures and evaluates total value of given IWS acquisitions.  It captures data across a 
spectrum of organizations to compare outputs, processes, capabilities, risks, costs, and 
value (i.e. comparable revenue).  KVA+RO analytically quantifies uncertainty and risk 
elements inherent in predicting the future, includes ways to mitigate these risks through 
strategic options and by analytically developing and allocating budgets to optimize project 
portfolios. Understanding uncertainties and mitigating the potential impact of risks 
significantly improves the likelihood of successful acquisition decisions.   
In this study, KVA+RO is used to assess the implications of OA on SA procedures 
onboard the AEGIS and SSDS platforms.  Focusing on systems interoperability, KVA 
methodology is first applied to generate knowledge-based, ROI metrics on individual sub-
processes and watch stations involved in track-management processes.   The potential 
impact of OA on track management processes and sub-processes is analyzed under 
several scenarios: “To Be,” “Radical 1,” and “Radical 2” for AEGIS and SSDS.  Potential 
investments are then evaluated for AEGIS through real options analysis, resulting in net 
present value (NPV) of three strategic alternatives ranging from $6.4 billion to $27.5 billion 
over a nine-year period and options valuations of from $23.2 to $58.8 billion. 
Lessons from the “Open” Solutions Movement 
Disruptive forces and accelerating shifts in technology have enabled organizations to 
leverage open technology platforms to achieve greater productivity and efficiency levels.  
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These “open” solutions offer new possibilities for solving business problems, provide 
business interoperability by standardization and technology transparency, and decrease 
time to market for key products and services.  Organizations are adopting open technology 
platforms and open-source software for critical business needs, moving into mainstream 
business practices in corporations such as IBM, Google, Intel, JPMorgan Chase, Merrill 
Lynch and Pfizer.   
One manifestation of the movement toward “openness,” yet to be embraced by the 
Department of Defense (DoD), is the open-source software movement.  Germany, Australia, 
the United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Canada, China, Japan and Brazil are among the 
increasing number of governments embracing open-source software.  Open-source 
software is growing at such a rate that it represents the most significant all-encompassing 
and long-term trend that the software industry has seen since the early 1980s, according to 
a recent study by International Data Corporation (IDC).  IDC’s survey of over 5,000 
developers in 116 countries found that open source software is being used by 71% of 
developers in the world and is in production at 54% of their organizations.  
Open-source software development site SourceForge.net reported more than 
129,000 projects in 2006, up from 1,362 projects in 2000.  Google’s 2006 “Summer of Code” 
open-source initiative has 630 collaborative projects pumping more than $3 million back into 
the open-source community.  There are now more than 55 Open-Source Initiative (OSI) 
certified open-source licenses available given the popularity of open-source software.10   
The success of this movement has been predicated on the ability of the multiple parties 
involved to easily collaborate across organizational, field-specific, and national boundaries.  
While this approach to software development may not directly apply to security-sensitive 
systems such as IWS, lessons can be learned by examining the results of this movement in 
the commercial world. 
 Collaboration is Key  
As with the use of the OA technology and business model, open-source is built on 
the tenants of open access and collaboration.  The lessons learned when “openness” is 
applied to system development and business models from the open-source movement is 
that such approaches allow access to a wider development community that can adapt, 
improve and fix software at a faster and more agile pace than can a proprietary vendor.  
Organizations are also not locked-into one vendor or product.   
Google, for example, has acknowledged that the open architecture of Google Maps, 
allowing external developers to build applications on top of it, greatly contributed to the 
mapping service’s functionality and diversity at a greater level than the company could have 
done internally (Perez, 2006, March 6).   In 2005, IBM opened access to 500 corporate 
software patents, forfeiting $10 million dollars in annual royalties.  According to IBM, 
technological advances are often dependent on shared knowledge, standards and 
collaborative innovation (IBM, 2005, January 11).   IBM believes that by being allowed 
access to those patents, open-source developers will help foster continued innovation.   
                                                
10  According to OSI, the most commonly used licenses are: Apache License,  GNU General Public License (GPL), GNU 
Lesser General Public License (LGPL), Modified BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) License (new BSD) and Mozilla 
Public License (MPL). MPL is the most widely used since 1998.  A NASA license is also available (OSI, 2006). 
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It’s critical to note that the full potential of OA and open-business model approaches 
cannot be achieved without a basic collaborative technology infrastructure. The ease with 
which all parties share ideas, compare requirements, develop solutions, test system 
capabilities, and finally participate jointly in deploying systems is dependent on their 
commitment to collaborate openly and fully with each other. This can only be facilitated, 
realistically and practically, through collaborative technology.  Benefits from this type of 
approach have been previously demonstrated in shipyard planning where the use of product 
lifecycle management (PLM) collaborative software added tremendous potential value to the 
process (Komoroski, C., Housel, T., Hom, S., & Mun, J., 2006, October). 
 Open Architecture and the Department of Defense 
Computer software plays a critical component in maintaining the nation’s defenses.  
For example, less than 10% of its functionality was provided by software when the F-4 
fighter was developed in the 1960’s; at least 80% of the F/A-22’s functionality is software 
related (GAO, 2004, March).  Although the DoD spends billions of dollars to develop and 
maintain rights to millions of lines of code, such software cannot be accessed or modified by 
anyone but the original vendor because of its proprietary nature (Payton, 2006, August 14).   
Moreover, the DoD will spend as much as $12 billion on reworking software for major 
weapons acquisitions programs—30% of its estimated budget of $40 billion for research, 
development, testing and evaluation in Fiscal Year 2006 (Wait, 2006, July 3).   
Consequences resulting from the lack of OA and open business models include: 
 increased development and maintenance costs for information technology;  
 lock-in to obsolete proprietary technologies;  
 inability to extend existing capabilities in months versus years; and  
 lack of interoperability due to opacity and stove-piping of information systems. (Herz, 
J.C., Lucas, M., & Scott, J., 2006)    
The DoD has at least 115 open-source software applications used in more than 250 
applications.  However,  IWS software acquisitions are still made with the same industrial-
age business models used to acquire ships, tanks and other physical machinery (Payton, 
2006, August 14).   The traditional business model of purchasing physical goods and 
services falls short when applied to acquiring digital assets like IWS technology.  New 
business models are required to acquire IWS technology to wage information-age warfare 
requiring responsiveness and agility, according the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Advanced Systems and Concepts, Dr. Sue Payton (Payton, 2006, August 14).   Moving to 
an open architecture model maximizes IT acquisitions by saving development dollars, 
reducing development cycles, and fostering new and innovative solutions and capabilities. 
Modern, analytical tools are also necessary to deploy an open solutions business 
strategy.  These tools must measure the operational value of a system from the warfighter’s 
perspective, identify areas of deficiencies in capabilities, and flag areas for process 
improvement. Traditional measurement tools used for cost analysis cannot calculate the 
total value of a system, particularly operational value provided by specific process 
improvements.  At the tactical level, an operator does not define capabilities merely in cost 
terms but also in time, efficiency and effectiveness gains like processing more targets within 
a given time period.  Given new potential threats, such as “swarm” attacks where there may 
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be thousands of targets at any one time, the warfighter’s perspective in developing open 
and agile systems is critical. Focusing on the potential cost reductions from the OA and 
open business models approach may lead developers and acquirers away from the real 
needs of the warfighter. Maintaining a focus on the potential value produced, in addition to 
potential cost savings, is critical to the success of OA and open business models. 
KVA+RO Framework 
The KVA+RO methodology provides an equal focus on the potential value and cost of new 
IWS systems. KVA+RO measures operating performance, cost-effectiveness, return on 
investments, risk, real options (capturing strategic flexibility), and analytical portfolio 
optimization. In this study, it was applied to the problem of finding the most promising 
solution for replacing aging IWS systems such as AEGIS and SSDS to support 
reengineered warfighting capabilities.  KVA+RO analysis empowers decision-makers and 
supports IWS acquisition strategies by providing performance-based data and scenario 
analysis.  Analyses like ROI on individual IWS projects and programs, as well as processes 
and sub-processes (e.g., track management processes in the present study) supported by 
IWS systems can be examined within a portfolio of acquisitions framed through the 
KVA+RO methodology.    An overview of the framework is shown in Figure 1. 
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• Risk Identification: List projects and strategies to evaluate.
• Risk Prediction: Base case projections for each project.
• Risk Modeling:  Develop static financial models.
• Risk Analysis:  Dynamic Monte Carlo simulation.
• Risk Mitigation: Frame real options.
• Risk Hedging:  Options analytics, simulation & optimization.
• Risk Diversification: Portfolio optimization and asset allocation.
• Risk Management:   Iterative analysis.
Analyzes/Forecasts 






• Calculate learning time for each sub-process.
• Derive costs and revenues for each sub-process.
• Calculate metrics:
Return on Investment (ROI)
Return on Knowledge (ROK)
DATA COLLECTION
• Collect baseline data.
• Conduct interviews with subject matter experts.
• Identify sub-processes.
• Research market comparable data.




Figure 1.  NPS Valuation Framework 
The framework has been used in a variety of NPS analyses, including evaluating the 
potential impact of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology on naval 
maintenance/modernization processes.  In the study involving one specific area of shipyard 
planning for maintenance alterations, cost savings were projected to exceed $40 million per 
year and manpower requirements drastically reduced with commercial-off–the-shelf, three-
dimensional scanning/visualization technology and collaborative PLM technology 
(Komoroski, C., Housel, T., Hom, S., & Mun, J., 2006, October).  Key components of the 
NPS Valuation framework are further discussed in this section. 
 Knowledge-based Metrics:  Knowledge Value Added  (KVA) 
KVA measures the value provided by human capital assets and IT assets (e.g., IWS 
systems + human operators) by an organization, process or function at the sub-process 
level.  It monetizes the outputs of all assets, including intangible knowledge assets.  
Capturing the value embedded in an organization’s core processes, employees and IT 
enables the actual cost and revenue of a product or service to be calculated. Figure 2 
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identifies the types of assets used to produce output; outputs can be products or services 
produced by that organization. 
P R O C E S S   1
Human Capital Assets
+
• Labor, Training, Skills, Knowledge
Information Technology Assets








• Plan for Shipcheck
P R O C E S S   2
Human Capital Assets
+
• Labor, Training, Skills, Knowledge
Information Technology Assets
P R O C E S S   3Human Capital Assets
+
• Labor, Training, Skills, Knowledge
Information Technology Assets
 
Figure 2.  Measuring Output 
 















Compensation                   $5,000
Benefits/OT                         1,000
Supplies/Materials              2,000
Rent/Leases                       1,000
Depreciation                       1,500
Admin. And Other                 900
Total                              $11,400
Review Task                        $1,000
Determine Op                        1,000
Input Search Function           2,500
Search/Collection                  1,000
Target Data Acq 1,000
Target Data Processing         2,000
Format Report                           600
Quality Control Report               700
Transmit Report                      1,600
Total                                      $11,400
Traditional Accounting KVA Process Costing










t Explains how it was spent
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of Traditional Accounting versus Process-based Costing 
 
As seen in Table 1, total value is captured in two key metrics: ROI and ROK.   While 
ROI is the traditional financial ratio, ROK identifies how a specific process converts existing 
knowledge into process outputs so decision-makers can quantify costs and measure value 
derived from investments in productive assets.   A higher ROK signifies better utilization of 
knowledge assets.  If IT investments, such as existing IWS systems, do not improve the 
ROK value of a given process, steps must be taken to improve that process’s function and 
performance.   
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Metric Description Type Calculation 






Outputs-Benefits in Common Units 
Cost to Produce Output 
Return on Investment 
(ROI) 
Same as ROI at the sub-






Table 1.  KVA Metrics 
 Risk Analysis:  Real Options (RO)  
Potential strategic investments can then be evaluated with real options analysis 
based on KVA data. This analysis is a robust and analytical process incorporating the risk 
identification (applying various sensitivity techniques), risk quantification (applying risk-
based Monte Carlo simulation), risk valuation (applying real options analysis), risk mitigation 
(utilizing real options framing), and risk diversification (employing analytical portfolio 
optimization)  using the Real Options SLS and Risk Simulator software programs.   Figure 4 
reflects the complex calculations for integrated risk analysis in KVA+RO. 
4. Dynamic Monte Carlo 
simulation
A            B             
C              
D                 
E
1. List of projects and 
strategies to evaluate
Start with a list of projects or 
strategies to be evaluated… these 
projects have already been 
through qualitative screening
Time Series Forecasting
2. Base case projections for each 
project
…will the assistance of time-
series forecasting and 
historical data…
3. Develop static financial 
models with KVA data
…the user generates a traditional 
series of static base case financial 
(discounted cash flow) models for 
each project…
…sensitivity and scenario analysis 
coupled with Monte Carlo simulation is 
added to the analysis and the financial 




5. Framing Real Options 6. Options analytics, simulation and optimization
…real options analytics are calculated 
through binomial lattices and closed-form 
partial-differential models with 
simulation…
8. Reports presentation and 
update analysis
…create reports, make decisions, 
and do it all again iteratively over 
time…
…the relevant projects are 
chosen for real options 
analysis and the project or 
portfolio real options are 
framed…







Loss cost reduction  
Loss of market leadership  
Revenue enhancement 
Cost reduction  
Strategic  options value 
Strategic  competi tiveness 
High cost outlay  
Decision
Optimizat ion
…stochastic optimization is the next 
optional step if multiple projects exist that 
requires efficient asset allocation given 
some budgetary constraints… useful for 
strategic portfolio management…
Project Value




































































































































Per i od 
St art ing ( t)
Fi r st Cash Fl ow   
( t + 3)
Di scount ed Val ue of  
Fut ure Cash Fl ows
Di scount ed Val ue of  t he    
Cos t s t o Inves t
DCF Val ue
I nt er est  Rat e 
(m ont hl y basi s )
Oppor t unit y Cos t
Phase I I Opt i ons
Ret ir em ent 13 296, 916 9, 851, 788 6, 086, 684 3, 765, 104 0. 949% 0. 87%
Personal Fi nanci al s 13 158, 350 4, 741, 612 4, 869, 348 - 127,735 0. 949% 0. 87%
Pr i vat e Loans 19 132, 757 3, 246, 855 5, 921, 771 - 2, 674, 916 0. 949% 0. 87%
Academi c Loans 19 146, 850 3, 715, 300 4, 288, 179 - 572,878 0. 949% 0. 87%
St andar d 
Devi ati on of 
Act uali zed 
Cash Fl ows
Opt im al  Exer cise 
Val ue of  t he 
"Di scount ed Val ue 
of  t he Cost s t o 
I nvest "
Opt i on Value at t O pti on Val ue at  t  = 0
Act uali zed 
CF
Fl exi bil t y 
Par am et er
Deci si on To Invest
4, 130,101
9, 851, 788 1. 263
Execut e Inves tm ent
2, 324, 992 4, 741, 612 1. 263 Wai t to Invest
23, 69 3, 246, 855 1. 263 Wai t to Invest
1, 154, 349 3, 715, 300 1. 263




S  ) ( δσεδμδ +=
Historical Data Gathering
 
Figure 4.  Integrated Risk Analysis 
 
 Beyond Concept: KVA+RO Implementations 
Moving beyond a concept stage, the KVA+RO framework is being implemented in 
SPAWAR and in the Army Rapid Equipping Force project.  KVA+RO is being used in both 
projects to improve processes, reduce cycle-times and costs, and increase value by  
allowing Navy executives to acquire intelligence systems via a portfolio approach and by 
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getting the Army troops in the field (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan) what they need very quickly 
through new rapid acquisition processes. 
 Proof-of-Concept Case Study: Situational Awareness Onboard 
 AEGIS and SSDS Platforms11  
This proof of concept case study is designed to assist PEO IWS, Open Architecture 
Division, with its mandate of implementing OA in the Navy.  The case is prepared from a 
warfighter perspective because the value of OA must be proven to the ultimate end-user. 
This perspective also permits a review of how OA can lead to flexible system acquisition and 
development to enable reengineered processes that will provide better performance in core 
warfighting processes such as SA. 
In a multi-phased approach, KVA+RO was applied to SA-track management 
procedures used in the AEGIS and SSDS platforms.  As illustrated in Figure 5, the total 
functionalities of AEGIS and SSDS systems are very broad so we focused our research on 
SA because it appeared to be the most promising area for upgrading and reengineering 
according to subject matter experts.  The goals of this research were to: 
 Demonstrate the efficacy of the KVA-RO framework to evaluate reengineering 
designs for warfighting core processes (i.e., SA-track management) in terms of the 
ROI and strategic option value of various OA approaches to replacing aging IWS 
systems. 
 Determine which elements of the track management process could be reengineered 
using an OA approach  
 Identify areas of improvement for current surface ship track-management 
processes using the existing two IWS systems: AEGIS and SSDS.   
                                                
11  Information collected from subject-matter experts (SMEs) from Surface Warfare Fleet and training commands at Dahlgren 
(AEGIS) and Wallops Island (SSDS).  Information gathered from SMEs then aggregated to provide an average for each 
process to ensure accuracy.  Additional information collected, including process flow diagrams, use-case diagrams and 
literature review, to develop baseline data.  
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Figure 5.  Planned Reuse of Aegis and SSDS in DD(X)  
(MacRitchie, 2005, June 29, p. 12) 
 Background 
In the late 1990s, the DoD articulated a vision for network-centric (or “net-centric”) 
warfare in which networking military forces would facilitate information sharing and 
collaboration, leading to enhanced SA.  Information superiority is vital to enhanced SA, rapid 
decision-making, improved efficiency, speedy execution and mission effectiveness.   A high 
degree of interoperability is required to achieve information superiority.12  Lack of 
interoperability between the services makes it difficult for the warfighter to distinguish “friend” 
from “foe” and to make critical decisions—potentially delaying military response times or 
contributing to lethal mistakes.  Figure 6 shows a scenario in which a sea-based system and 
a land-based system are tracking aircraft and are unable to integrate their views of a 
battlefield.   
                                                
12  The DoD defines interoperability as the ability of systems, units, or forces to exchange data, information, materiel, and 
services to enable them to operate effectively together. 
 =




Figure 6.  Scenario for Tracking Threats without Benefit of Interoperable 
Systems  
(GAO, 2006, January, p. 6) 
 
To achieve information superiority and enable net-centric warfare, the DoD has been 
developing the Global Information Grid (GIG).  Interoperable systems are critical to the GIG 
for joint military operations and to allow users access to data on demand, to share 
information in real-time and to collaborate in decision-making from almost any location.  
Development of this capability is ultimately dependent on support from reengineered SA 
systems within IWS suites. 
 Naval Challenges 
The Navy must develop architectures that meet the integration requirements for the 
GIG.  This is a critical requirement in designing and implementing new IWS systems built 
within the OA framework. In addition, the Navy must resolve the following issues that are a 
result of legacy technology systems, such as the aging IWS systems. 
 Limited computational and operational capability.  Systems operating at 99% 
capacity in non-stressed environments. 
 Difficulty or inability to add new warfighting missions.  “Stove-piped” systems 
diminish interoperability and ability to meet national security threats. 
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 Prohibitive software maintenance costs.  Some $3+ billion spent across Future 
Years Defense Plan in PEO IWS to develop and maintain computer programs. 
Additional testing and certification required when new capabilities added.   
The Navy has historically acquired IWS systems that are proprietary in design and 
engineering, require unique parts, equipment, and services to support them, are supported 
by a limited number of suppliers, and become very expensive to maintain (Strei, 2003, April 
1).  Moreover, systems and/or platforms were entirely eliminated rather than upgraded or 
modernized because of prohibitive costs.  Rapid technological obsolescence, compounded 
by exorbitantly escalating costs for proprietary systems are daunting challenges because 
design, development, and acquisition timelines can span as much as 15 years before a 
military platform reaches operating forces (Strei, 2003, April 1).    
 Naval Open Architecture and Open Business Models 
OA and open-business models propel the Navy into the next era of joint 
interoperability while resolving legacy issues that provide new benefits, including: 
 Lower lifecycle costs for IWS systems.  Total cost of ownership decreases due to 
increased maintainability, interoperability, upgradeability and use of a wider variety of 
vendors. 
 Better performing systems.  Ability to rapidly upgrade hardware and software with 
the latest technology enables greater capabilities, efficiencies and interoperability to 
enable reengineered warfighting processes. 
 Improved interoperability for joint warfighting.  Software reuse and modularity 
facilitates interoperability between systems that use an open architecture framework. 
 Facilitating competition and increasing cooperation between commercial and 
military electronics industries.  Moving away from proprietary systems enables a 
broader range of ideas and technological solutions.   
Guiding principles behind Naval OA are modularity, reusability, interoperability, 
lifecycle affordability and collaboration and competition.  In adopting an open, OA strategy 
based on commercially available, non-proprietary information technology (IT) standards, 
interfaces and formats, the Navy will need to increase collaboration (e.g., supported by 
readily available collaborative product lifecycle management technology) to spur competition 
and fuel innovation in the acquisition lifecycle. 
Ease of collaboration is critical to Naval OA to ensure that multiple vendors compete, 
including the smaller, more nimble companies.  Collaboration also provides the 
infrastructure necessary to facilitate all parties sharing critical requirements and performance 
information to reduce system modification, re-fresh or replacement cycle-times.  As such, 
collaborative capabilities will facilitate moving OA beyond a purely technical focus to a more 
encompassing open-business model, one advocated by CNO Admiral Mullen.  As noted 
earlier, Admiral Mullen’s vision for open architecture isn’t limited to systems built to a set of 
open standards, but focuses on open-business models tapping into a multiple-developer 
network to deliver innovative, cost-effective and rapid, spiral acquisition capabilities to the 
Navy.   
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Migrating to an OA environment has been slow, however, despite the Navy’s early 
adoption of open source strategies.   Encouraged by the cost-effective advantages gained 
through the Acoustic Rapid commercial off –the-shelf Insertion/Advanced Processor Build 
(ARCI/APB) program, Admiral Mullen noted in a recent memo his disappointment with the 
slow pace of adoption and advocated rapid transition to the open-business model (Fein, 
2006, September 11).   
 SA: Track-management Processes 
Track management, a fundamental capability inherent to all IWS SA capabilities for 
surface ships, is the process by which friendly and enemy forces are detected, identified, 
monitored, updated and communicated throughout the area of operations (AOR).  The track 
management process within a Combat Information Center (CIC) is very complex, 
sophisticated and involves multiple watch stations and technological systems.  AEGIS and 
SSDS have different SA procedures and policies, and track-management functions within 
the CIC.   Although variations exist in track-management processes, watch stations are fairly 
consistent on both AEGIS and SSDS ships.  Figure 7 is a generalized organizational chart 











Figure 7.  CIC Organizational Chart 
 
Track-management processes entail various sub-processes, as seen in Figure 8.14  
This graphic is an aggregated view for both AEGIS and SSDS platforms consisting of four 
principal processes and 17 sub-processes.
                                                
13  Although watch stations talk to specific tasks and responsibilities, in an actual CIC, all personnel listed can be actively 
involved in any, or all, aspects of track management (correlation, identification, tracking, and relaying).   
14   Figure derived from numerous SMEs from AEGIS and SSDS communities.  While sub-processes may differ from ship to 
ship, SMEs concluded that the four primary processes reflect track management procedures conducted within a CIC.  
SMEs agreed that the 17 sub-processes shown reflected individual tasks appropriate for this limited research. SMEs also 




















Figure 8. Track Management Sub-processes 
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Case Study Results: Potential Impact of OA 
The potential impact of OA on AEGIS and SSDS platforms was calculated through 
KVA+RO in a multi-phased approach.  In addition, KVA data estimates and real options 
models were based on the assumption that functional upgrades would primarily be in the SA 
area with the remaining modules providing at least the same capabilities as the current 
AEGIS IWS system.   
KVA methodology was first applied to derive potential benefits in SA processes 
within AEGIS and SSDS-class ships (i.e., 84 Destroyers and Cruisers).   Track-management 
sub-processes by process category (and by watch station in Appendix B) were evaluated 
under four improvement scenarios (“As Is,” “To Be,” “Radical 1,” and “Radical 2”).  The 
following assumptions were used to calculate the data: 
 Integration with middleware until Category 3 Open Architecture Computing 
Environment (OACE) level has been reached for systems being evaluated  
 Use of OA approach to developing the IWS systems and use of Commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) equipment 
Steps in calculating KVA data were:  
1. Identify core processes and sub-processes. 
2. Establish common units and level of complexity to measure learning time. 
3. Calculate learning time (i.e., knowledge surrogate) to execute each sub-process. 
4. Designate sampling time period long enough to capture representative sample of the 
core processes’ final product or services output. 
5. Multiply learning time for each sub-process by number of times sub-process 
executes during sample period. 
6. Calculate cost to execute knowledge (learning time and process instructions) to 
determine process costs. 
7. Calculate ROK (ROK= Revenue/Cost) and ROI (ROK= Revenue-Cost/Cost). 
During Phase 2, real options analysis focused on the options for improving (Leave 
and Layer option) or replacing (Retrofitting option) the AEGIS IWS system.  The option to 
continue with the current proprietary systems approach was provided as a baseline for 
comparison purposes. Future research would allow us to examine all AEGIS modules for 
potential upgrading and would likely result in even higher ROI estimates as well as real 
options valuations. 
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KVA Results: ROK and ROI  
ROK and ROI values provide insights into sub-processes that could be reengineered 
to achieve maximum operational efficiency.  Aggregated results for AEGIS and SSDS are 
shown Figures 9 and 10.   The “As Is” provides a baseline ROI/ROK performance measure 
for comparison of the three process reengineering designs. The three redesigns essentially 
represent the effects of increasing levels of automation in the track management process.  





































































Figure 9.  KVA Results: ROK and ROI Estimates 
 





































































Figure 10.  KVA Results: ROK and ROI Estimates 
OA has the potential to provide these operational performance improvement 
benefits: decreased training time for operators of systems, decreased “touch time” on 
processes by replacing manual processes with new automated capabilities, and increased 
efficiency through seamless integration of multiple system components.   As shown in Table 
2 below, the cumulative impact of OA on the track-management processes results in 
significant improvement in three of four areas.  
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 “To Be” “Radical 1” “Radical 2” Cumulative 
Impact 
CORRELATE  X x x 
TRACK X X x x 
IDENTIFY X x X x 
RELAY     
 
Table 2.  Process Reengineering Impacts:  Process Level and Cumulative 
Tables 3 through 6 are ROK and ROI results by core processes and sub-processes 
for AEGIS and SSDS. The ROI estimates demonstrate that as various system functionalities 
of the existing track-management process are upgraded, a corresponding performance 
improvement is derived in those areas.  This more detailed analysis suggests where OA 
based system upgrades should be applied to achieve the best results. For example, the 
core process of correlate and identify have the greatest potential to benefit from an OA 
approach to system development. These estimates also provide the basis for the real 
options analysis projections staged over a 9-year period. 
AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3521% 3407% 3163% 2733%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" 9% 9% 2161% 1856%
Verify Other Track Sources 5% 5% 5% 4%
Correlate sub-total 1284% 1241% 1606% 1396%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks 2% 1% 1% 1%
Update Tracks 3% 3% 461% 410%
Update GCCS-M 3% 191% 184% 169%
Track sub-total 2% 6% 42% 36%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 902% 869% 806% 707%
Verify EW emissions 9% 9% 8% 609%
Verify Point of Origin 2% 4221% 3921% 3432%
Match Against ATO 2% 4306% 3990% 3482%
Match Against CommAir Profile 963% 935% 863% 743%
Match Against Intel Information 3% 3% 3% 3914%
Examine Kinematic Data 4% 4% 3% 3%
Obtain Visual ID 0% 0% 0% 0%
Conduct Verbal Query 1% 1% 1% 1%
Identify sub-total 108% 160% 150% 426%
RELAY
Send Over Links 13% 12% 11% 10%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units 2% 1% 1% 1%
Relay sub-total 3% 2% 2% 1%
TOTALS 312% 340% 373% 504%
 
Table 3.  Detailed ROK Estimates for AEGIS 
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AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3493% 3380% 3126% 2698%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" 9% 9% 2630% 2258%
Verify Other Track Sources 5% 5% 4% 4%
Correlate sub-total 1274% 1231% 1612% 1401%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks 2% 1% 1% 1%
Update Tracks 4% 3% 646% 575%
Update GCCS-M 2% 114% 110% 101%
Track sub-total 2% 4% 47% 40%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 890% 857% 792% 695%
Verify EW emissions 10% 9% 9% 574%
Verify Point of Origin 2% 3789% 3505% 3067%
Match Against ATO 2% 3913% 3610% 3149%
Match Against CommAir Profile 1026% 996% 916% 788%
Match Against Intel Information 3% 3% 3% 3788%
Examine Kinematic Data 4% 4% 4% 4%
Obtain Visual ID 0% 0% 0% 0%
Conduct Verbal Query 1% 1% 1% 1%
Identify sub-total 112% 159% 148% 416%
RELAY
Send Over Links 18% 17% 16% 14%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units 1% 1% 1% 1%
Relay sub-total 3% 2% 2% 2%
Totals 312% 337% 371% 499%
 
Table 4.  Detailed ROK Estimates for  SSDS 
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AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3421% 3307% 3063% 2633%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" -91% -91% 2061% 1756%
Verify Other Track Sources -95% -95% -95% -96%
Correlate sub-total 1184% 1141% 1506% 1296%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -97% -97% 361% 310%
Update GCCS-M -97% 91% 84% 69%
Track sub-total -98% -94% -58% -64%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 802% 769% 706% 607%
Verify EW emissions -91% -91% -92% 509%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 4121% 3821% 3332%
Match Against ATO -98% 4206% 3890% 3382%
Match Against CommAir Profile 863% 835% 763% 643%
Match Against Intel Information -97% -97% -97% 3814%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -97% -97%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify sub-total 8% 60% 50% 326%
RELAY
Send Over Links -87% -88% -89% -90%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -98% -99% -99% -99%
Relay sub-total -97% -98% -98% -99%
Totals 212% 240% 273% 404%
 
Table 5.  Detailed ROI Estimates for AEGIS 
 
AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3393% 3280% 3026% 2598%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" -91% -91% 2530% 2158%
Verify Other Track Sources -95% -95% -96% -96%
Correlate sub-total 1174% 1131% 1512% 1301%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -96% -97% 546% 475%
Update GCCS-M -98% 14% 10% 1%
Track sub-total -98% -96% -53% -60%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 790% 757% 692% 595%
Verify EW emissions -90% -91% -91% 474%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 3689% 3405% 2967%
Match Against ATO -98% 3813% 3510% 3049%
Match Against CommAir Profile 926% 896% 816% 688%
Match Against Intel Information -97% -97% -97% 3688%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -96% -96%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify sub-total 12% 59% 48% 316%
RELAY
Send Over Links -82% -83% -84% -86%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -99% -99% -99% -99%
Relay sub-total -97% -98% -98% -98%
Totals 212% 237% 271% 399%  
Table 6.  Detailed ROI Estimates for SSDS 
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Table 7 summarizes how OA could specifically impact the sub-processes deriving 
most significant improvements:  “Identify ‘Same Contact, Multiple Track',”  “Update GCCS-
M,”  “Update Track,”  “Verify Point of Origin,” “Match against ATO,”  “Verify EW Emissions” 
and “Match Against Intel Information.”   Each watch station at the CIC was affected (see 
Appendix B). 
 






• Reduces reliance on manual identification of multiple tracks and updating current tracks. 
• Automatically corrects anomaly of multiple tracks per target and update tracks. Only brief 
confirmation by the watch station operator necessary. 
TRACK “Update GCCS-M” • Enhances operational value of systems through reduced time, manpower and training required to conduct process. 
TRACK “Update Track” 
• Reduces reliance on manual identification of multiple tracks and updating current tracks. 
• Automatically corrects multiple tracks per target anomaly and update tracks, resulting in 
brief confirmation by watch station operator. 
IDENTIFY “Verify Point of Origin” 
• Enables greater sensor and data integration, providing enhanced correlation in 
pinpointing origin of aircraft or ship. 
• Queries point of origin for friendly force contacts from an open GCCS-M system, and 
interrogates ATO neutral-force contacts from host nation airports (assuming data format 
standardized and provided by host nations.). 
• Facilitates interfaces to other systems to provide automated query for point of origin. 
• Frees watch standers to perform other tasks while providing faster data flow. 
IDENTIFY “Match Against ATO” 








• Facilitates COTS-based environment for easier  upgrades to accommodate greater 
processor speeds. 
• Enhances CIC efficiency through more timely SA. 
• Frees operators to perform other tasks. 
IDENTIFY “Match Against Intel Information” • Streamlines sub-process with automatic updates requiring merely manual confirmation. 
 
Table 7.  Potential Impact of OA at Sub-process Levels 
Value-risk Analysis:  Strategic Real Options Analysis 
Real options analysis was performed to determine the prospective value of 
alternative COAs for upgrading the AEGIS IWS in track management over a nine-year 
period with KVA data inputs.  In all new options for IWS deployment, it was assumed that a 
collaborative technology infrastructure was present to facilitate the use of the OA system 
and open-business model approaches.15 
Figure 11 illustrates the three main strategies laid out as a real options map.  
Strategy A is do nothing, leaving everything “As Is” with the ability to retire ships and their 
AEGIS systems within 10 years. Strategy B is the “DDX Open Architecture” (retrofit) option 
with new development within the first three years at a cost of $8 billion.  Under this strategic 
path, follow-up is required—with retrofitting costing an additional $16 billion within 6 years 
                                                
15  Estimates are based on historical data and additional information provided by SMEs.  We have attempted to be as 
conservative as possible and have assumed very high potential volatility in both of the new IWS development options. 
Access to more precise performance data will help resolve uncertainties and risks over time.  
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after first-phased new development has been completed.  Strategy C looks at the “Leave 
and Layer” option with a three-phased sequential compound option of  “To Be,”  “ Radical 













AS-IS strategy where the older 
ships are retired within 10 
years and no further 
development action is taken.
DDX Open Architecture 
approach of new development 
within 3 years followed by 
retrofitting within 6 years, with 
an option to exit and abandon 
before the retrofitting phase.
AEGIS Open Architecture with 
a Leave & Layer approach, 
followed by a 9-year sequential 
option of stage-gate investment 
of To-Be, Radical, and Radical 
II, with the options to exit and 
abandon at any phase.
Do nothing for now
Stop after new development 
without retrofitting
Do nothing

















Do not continue 
development




Anytime within 3 years
Anytime within 6 years 
(after To-Be)
Anytime within 9 years 
(after Radical)
Do not continue 
development
Option Value = $12B
Total Cost = $10B
Option Value = $23.2B
Total Cost = $24B  
Option Value = $58.8B  
Total Cost = $9.09B   
 
Figure 11.  Strategic Real Options Map 
Strategy C is the option with the greatest potential value.  As seen in Table 8 below, 
Strategy C provides 4.9 times the risk adjusted return of the “As Is” strategy versus Strategy 
B at 1.9 times the return.  Strategy C’s incremental approach offers the lowest risk and 
numerous benefits, including less disruption to the rest of system and deriving benefits 
faster.  It is the lowest total cost alternative with costs spread over a nine-year period, yet 
the program reaps incremental benefits from various functionality improvements throughout 
that time.  This strategy provides the highest NPV. 
 
 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C 
STRATEGIC OPTION 
“As Is” DDX OA “Develop and Retrofit” 
AEGIS OA 
“Leave & Layer” 
Net Present Value $12B $6.38B $27.52B 
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Volatility 0% 80.5% 86.3% 
Real Options Value $12B $23.155B $58.84B 
Strategic Real Options-
based Return on Investment N/A 72.36% 224.75% 
Total Cost $10B $24B $9.09B 
Strategic Real Options-
based Relative Return Ratio 1.0 1.9 4.9 
Notes:  
(1) The volatility measure quantifies uncertainty and risk levels in the strategy and calibrates them to account 
for the time required to complete the entire strategy. 
(2) Strategic real options values are also computed, accounting for value of open architecture as laid out in 
the phased-gate development process.  
(3) Strategic real options-based return on investment looks at real options valuation results and computes ROI 
based on the option values and implementation of costs each phase. The higher this ROI value, the more 
strategic and valuable or profitable a project.  
 
Table 8.  Real Options Valuation Results: Strategies A-C 
 
“Leave and Layer” allows organizations to benefit from incremental adoption.  Rather 
that executing a plan that requires everything to be accomplished at once, “leave and layer” 
enables existing systems to be reused successfully.  NAVFAC successfully adopted the 
approach to provide a more efficient, lower cost contract management solution.   NAVFAC 
architected a technology platform to allow it to build a layer of Web-based collaborative 
project management tools, while leveraging existing financial, HR, and scheduling systems.  
A number of applications were developed, including the collaborative eProjects application 
with a budget of $350,000 and completion in 10 months (Oracle, 2004). eProjects provides 
one-click schedule and cost status.  Another application, eContracts, automates nearly 200 
redundant screens per contract action. 
In our analysis, Strategy B has the highest cost due to high up-front costs required to 
build the system within the first five years without deriving any benefits from the new system 
during that time.  Both strategies B and C require the use of collaborative infrastructure to 
enable the open business model that would be most likely to produce these real options 
values.  Strategy C, in fact, relies most heavily on collaboration to enable the kinds of 
benefits in rapid, spiral acquisition with greater competition and innovation from smaller 
players. 
Summary 
IWS systems that were developed in a closed, proprietary model have performed 
well and provide substantial returns.  However, a new paradigm is required to maintain 
military superiority and wage information-age warfare.  Through open-system development 
and open-business models, benefits such as reusable code, lower maintenance-upgrade 
costs, and greater vendor flexibility in supporting system modules could be derived.  
Moreover, the Navy can leverage new technology by quickly adopting it to military needs.  
Significant investments are required for the infrastructure necessary to enable all 
parties (acquirers, users, developers) to collaborate easily and effectively in the new open-
business model.  Analytical tools are also required to track performance of the multiple 
parties involved in the development, acquisition and use of new system capabilities, in 
conjunction with the ability to adjust options models as uncertainties and risks are resolved 
over time.  Performance measurement systems (i.e. KVA performance accounting software) 
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and predictive, forecasting software programs plus risk certification training provide 
additional analytic support to achieve IWS systems acquisition strategies. 
Appendix A.  Case Study Notes 
 Methodology 
 Case Study Approach 
The learning-time approach to KVA is used to conduct sub-process scenario 
analyses of “As Is,”  “Radical 1,” and “Radical 2.”    Core elements of KVA (such as “time-to-
learn,” “number of personnel involved,” and “times fired”) produce a ratio of knowledge 
capital (ROK) resident in each process.  ROK derives a common unit of measurement for 
each sub-process within the track-management process. 
 Data Collection 
Collecting data to conduct KVA analysis was difficult due to the complex nature of 
track-management procedures in the CIC.  Outputs, learning time and touch time of the 
many sub-processes that comprise the entire procedure are not generally collected or 
retained.  Also, training times and required OJT are targeted at specific watch stations rather 
than at specific processes within the Navy.  Consequently, data was derived through 
numerous interviews with SMEs and review of Personal Qualification Standards (PQS).  
Multiple SMEs were contacted to collect an aggregated sample.   
 “To Be” Data    
Analysis based of situations that SMEs identified as optimal  areas where open 
architecture could provide value to the operator.  In addition,  technical and legal issues of 
the “To Be” scenario were not assessed. 
Discussion of Basic Assumptions Used in Calculations 
Cost and Revenue Data 
 Calculations based on a ship performing SA and track management processes 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week operating an average of 35 weeks per year.   
 Net present value in total revenue estimates is based on a 30-year system-life 
expectancy of ship. 
 A contractor-margin approach was used to generate surrogate comparable revenue 
estimates.  Contractor margin is defined as the amount market place would pay a 
group of contractors, with levels of knowledge comparable to the existing team, to 
perform the activities of the track management team (e.g the margin over current 
Navy costs for the track management team).  This market-comps approach was 
used because there were no commercial processes directly comparable to track 
management activities in the military. Future studies would allow a wider range of 
potential commercially comparable processes to be assessed for comparability/fit 
revenue estimates. 
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 Surrogate comparable revenue estimates are conservative given that revenue 
calculations were based on six people in the SA, track-management process.  In 
reality, more people may be involved in this process.   
New Development/Retrofitting DD(x) 
 PV Asset New Development: Calculated by translating hourly revenue of the 
combined SSDS/AEGIS “AS-IS” estimates to yearly revenue, calculating the present 
value of the yearly revenue based on a 30-year lifecycle, and assuming retrofitting on 
all current 84 Aegis destroyers/cruisers. 
 PV Asses Retrofitting: Calculated by translating hourly revenue of the combined 
SSDS/AEGIS RADICAL estimates to yearly revenue, calculating the present value of 
the yearly revenue based on a 30-year lifecycle, and assuming retrofitting on all 
current 84 AEGIS destroyers/cruisers.   
 Cost to Execute: Based on estimation from SMEs and refining based on historical 
costs of AEGIS.* 
 Operations/Maintenance Costs: Based on historical costs of AEGIS and scaled down 
to account for open architecture. 
 Timing: Based on estimates by SMEs. 
Leave and Layer/AEGIS 
 PV Asset: Calculated by translating hourly revenue of the combined SSDS/AEGIS 
estimates to yearly revenue, calculating the present value of the yearly revenue 
based on a 30-year lifecycle, and taking into account current placement on 84 
destroyers/cruisers.   
 Cost to Execute: Based on $5 billion development costs and scaled according to 
increases in knowledge units. 
 Operations/Maintenance Costs: Based on historical costs of AEGIS and scaled down 
to account for open architecture. 
 Timing: Based on estimates by SMEs. 
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Use of Data in Case Study Calculation 
Item Definition Comments 
No. of 
Personnel 
Sailors and officers involved 




Times each sub-process 
acted upon by watch- 
stander. 
• Actions predicated on amount of contacts (air and surface) encountered during a 
typical hour within the CIC.  Each contact must be acted upon. 
• Estimates based on a typical, six-month deployment. 




Specific amount of time 
required to accomplish action 
every time sub-process acted 
upon. 
• Data captured in hourly units. 
• Although actions require only seconds, category captures data in hours to 
maintain continuity of units of time throughout analysis. 
Total Work 
Time 
Total amount of time each 
sub-process acted upon 
within an hour. 
• Formula=  “AWT”  x  “Actions per Hour”  
• Analysis in hourly units:  when “Total Work Time” for each of sub-processes 
added together for each of the watch stations, total aggregate should remain 




Total amount of time required 
to learn given sub-process.   
• Learning time can be an aggregate of formal schools, distance learning, on-the-
job training (OTJ) or any other training experience that falls under definition of 
“learning.”   
• For this case, comprised of formal school training and OJT provided aboard ship.  
• Basic assumptions to ensure consistent estimates from SMEs:  
a. Officer-SSDS 
Individual completing initial officer training with no prior SSDS platform experience.  It 
was also necessary to determine formal schools represented by this category.  While 
each school’s duration is considerably longer than hours represented in the “ALT” 
category, estimates based on the aggregated amount of time devoted to teaching 
given sub-process from each school: SSDS Basic Operator Course of Instruction, 
SSDS Advanced Operator Course of Instruction, and SSDS Warfare Operator 
Course of Instruction. 
b. Officer-AEGIS 
Individual completing officer training with no prior AEGIS platform experience. It was 
also necessary to determine formal schools represented by this category.  While 
each school’s duration is considerably longer than the hours represented in the 
“ALT” category, estimates based on aggregated amount of time devoted to teaching 
the given sub-process from each school: AEGIS Training Course, SWOS TAO 
School, and TAO Simulator Training. 
c. Enlisted-SSDS 
Individual completed boot camp with no prior SSDS platform experience. It was also 
necessary to determine formal schools represented by this category.   While each 
school’s duration considerably longer than hours represented in the “ALT” category, 
estimates determined based on aggregated amount of time devoted to teaching the 
given sub-process from each school:  OS “A” School,  SSDS Basic Operator Course 
of Instruction, SSDS Advanced Operator Course of Instruction, and SSDS Warfare 
Operator Course of Instruction (E5 and above). 
d. Enlisted-AEGIS 
Individual completed boot camp with no prior AEGIS platform experience. It was also 
necessary to determine formal schools represented by this category.  While each 
school’s duration is considerably longer than hours represented in the “ALT” 
category, estimates based on aggregated amount of time that devoted to teaching 
given sub-process from each school: OS “A” School and AEGIS Console Operator 
Course. 
Rank Order An ordinal ranking of sub- 
processes provides a means 
to ensure the “ALT” estimates 
are reliable and as accurate 
as possible.   
• Allowing SMEs to rank/order each of the sub-processes (1 being the least 
complex), outside the context of units of time, facilitates a mathematical 
correlation achieved between “Rank Order” and “ALT” categories.   
• If correlation is .80 or higher, “ALT” numbers can be considered an accurate 
reflection of the sub–process’s complexity.   
• If correlation is below .80, “ALT” estimates should be closely scrutinized and 
possibly reevaluated after providing a better explanation of the “ALT” components 
to the SMEs. 
Percent Percent of automation for • Captures knowledge embedded within the IT so that it can be accounted for in 
later calculations.  Automation is defined as the amount of the sub-process that is 
 =






each sub-process.   performed by information technology systems and does not require the actions of 
an operator.  
• Each sub-process is represented by a percentage between 0 and 100.  A number 
of 100% indicates sub-process is completely automated and does not require a 
watch stander to accomplish any portion of the task.   
• If number is 0%, no automation exists, and the watch-stander completes the entire 
sub-process manually.  Numbers falling between extremes are estimates based 
on SME observations and experience. 
Total Learning 
Time (TLT) 
Provides total time required 
to learn sub-process, 
including that learning time 
which is resident within the 
IT system.   
• Determined by “Actual Learning Time” by the “Percent Information Technology” 
category.   
• Formula  =  ALT/(1-%IT).   
• For instance:  If it takes 2 hours to learn a system that is 50% automated, then the 
total learning time for that system (to include the learning time that is embedded in 
the system itself) would be 4 hours. 
Numerator 
 
Revenue generated by 
knowledge required to 
perform sub-process.    
• Revenue allocated to the amount of knowledge; amount of knowledge resident in 
sub-process.   
• Formula=  “Number of Personnel”  x  “Actions per Hour”  x “Total Learning 
Time”  
Denominator Cost associated with 
producing sub-process 
output.    






Represents how well 
knowledge assets in 
organization are distributed 
based upon cost and value 
each provides.   
 
• With every sub-process, there is a cost and revenue (or value) associated with 
generating an output.  While these costs and values are captured in the 
“Numerator” and “Denominator” categories, there needs to be a way to quantify 
the knowledge embedded within an IT system.   
• ROK’s can be compared within a process to help determine if knowledge assets 
are being used in an efficient manner; if automation could be inserted to improve 
outputs; and if processes should be changed to promote efficiencies.   
• A low ROK does not automatically assume a process is inefficient or in need of 
automation, but rather is an indicator that a  sub-process may need further 




Average Work Time:  5% Variability—The time it takes to complete each action is 
relatively stable with little or no variability. 
Average Learning Time:  5% Variability—Estimates regarding average learning time are 
based on the time it takes an average person to learn each 
task, hence, low variability. 
Price:  Assume 60% of the time the position is priced at the average 
of the low and high estimates.  The remaining time is split 20-
20 between the low and high values.  A custom distribution is 
utilized to fulfill these requirements.    
Watch Station Cost Range (per hour)                         
Tactical Action Officer (TAO)     $85 to $105, $80.00 to $110.00  
Anti-air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC)   $75 to $90, $72.00 to $92.00  
Surface Warfare Coordinator (SUWC)  $75 to $90, $72.00 to $92.00  
Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC)   $78 to $95, $69.00 to $89.00  
Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC)   $70 to $80, $65.00 to $85.00  
Identification Supervisor (IDS)   $70 to $80, $63.00 to $83.00  
Note: Prices provided by commercial vendors.   
Cost:  Assumes 60% of the time the position is filled by a person with 
the assumed pay grade.  The remaining time is split 20-20% 
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between a person with one rank higher and one rank lower.16 
A custom distribution is utilized to fulfill these requirements.   
 
Watch Station Years of Service Cost 
Tactical Action Officer (TAO): (0-5)  between 10-18 $38 
Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC): (0-4)  between 8-16   $34 
Surface Warfare Coordinator (SUWC): (0-3)  between 6-14   $30 
Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC): (E-8)  between 10-18   $27 
Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC): (E-6)  between 4-14   $17  
Identification Supervisor (IDS): (E-5)  between 3-8   $14 
Note:   Costs calculated by averaging monthly salary plus sea pay for the assumed 
ranks at low/high estimates of years in service. 
 
Actions per Hour:   A triangular distribution with min/max/most-likely values based 
on calculations from the following numbers. 
 Costal Open Water  High Density  
Number of Contacts per Hour 24-42 12-30  28-66 
Time in Location 15% 25% 60% 
Note: Data provided by SMEs
                                                
16 In the case of a TAO, assume 80% of the time the position is filled by an 0-5; in the case of an IDS, 
assume 80% or the time the position is filled by an E-5.  
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 157 - 
=
=
Appendix B.  KVA Results by Watch Station 
 
Tactical Action Officer Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator Surface Warfare Coordinator
Obtain Link Information 3625% 3450% 3206% 2717%
Identify “Same Contact,Multiple Track” -91% -91% 2104% 1778%
Verify Other Track Sources -94% -94% -95% -96%
Correlate Sub-Total 1358% 1290% 1791% 1512%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -97% -97% 294% 235%
Update GCCS-M -95% 173% 154% 117%
Track Sub-Total -98% -97% -85% -87%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 645% 610% 561% 463%
Verify EW emissions -89% -89% -90% 540%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 3450% 3206% 2717%
Match Against ATO -98% 3450% 3206% 2717%
Match Against CommAir Profile 831% 788% 727% 604%
Match Against Intel  Information -97% -97% -97% 3813%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -97% -97%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify Sub-Total 55% 152% 134% 596%
RELAY
Send Over Links -91% -91% -92% -93%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -99% -99% -99% -99%
Relay Sub-Total -98% -100% -100% -100%
TOTAL 306% 347% 389% 558%
5091% 4907% 4525% 3979%
-87% -87% 2983% 2619%
-92% -92% -93% -94%
1932% 1860% 2546% 2233%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
-96% -96% 451% 386%
- - - -
-97% -97% -50% -56%
938% 901% 825% 716%
-89% -91% -92% 827%
-97% 4907% 4525% 3979%
-97% 4907% 4525% 3979%
1198% 1152% 1056% 920%
-96% -96% -96% 5565%
-95% -95% -95% -96%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
84% 197% 174% 689%
-87% -87% -88% -90%
-98% -98% -98% -99%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
354% 400% 451% 640%
2441% 2304% 2230% 2044%
-94% -94% 1453% 1329%
-96% -96% -96% -97%
497% 465% 476% 431%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-98% -98% 177% 155%
-97% 85% 79% 65%
-97% -55% 47% 36%
408% 381% 366% 329%
-92% -93% -93% 387%
-99% 2304% 2230% 2044%
- - - -
- - - -
-98% -98% -98% 2878%
-97% -98% -98% -98%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-95% -93% -93% -26%
-94% -94% -94% -95%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
9% 13% 17% 64%
“AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2”
CORRELATE
“AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2”
 
Figure B-1. AEGIS ROI Estimates 
1040% 1034% 937% 743%
-97% -97% 591% 462%
-98% -98% -98% -99%
346% 344% 493% 383%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% 65% 34%
- - - -
-99% -99% -94% -96%
128% 127% 107% 69%
-96% -96% -97% 113%
-99% 1411% 1282% 1025%
-99% 1411% 1282% 1025%
280% 278% 246% 181%
-99% -99% -99% 1462%
-98% -98% -99% -99%
- - - -
- - - -
-54% -50% -54% 148%
-96% -96% -97% -97%
- - - -
-96% -100% -100% -100%
54% 56% 73% 162%
Combat Systems Coordinator Tactical Information Coordinator Identification Supervisor
5012% 4889% 4510% 4146%
-87% -88% 2973% 2731%
-92% -92% -93% -93%
1901% 1853% 2537% 2329%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
-96% -96% 449% 405%
- - - -
-97% -97% -5% -13%
922% 898% 822% 749%
-85% -85% -86% 865%
-97% 4889% 4510% 4146%
-97% 4889% 4510% 4146%
1178% 1147% 1053% 962%
-96% -96% -96% 5797%
-95% -95% -95% -96%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
21% 69% 56% 242%
-87% -88% -88% -89%
-98% -98% -98% -99%
-98% -100% -100% -100%
228% 258% 297% 423%
5921% 5772% 5312% 4870%
-85% -85% 3508% 3213%
-91% -91% -92% -92%
2257% 2199% 2996% 2743%
-97% -98% -98% -98%
-96% -96% 544% 492%
- - - -
-97% -97% 11% 2%
1104% 1074% 982% 894%
-82% -82% -84% 1030%
-97% 5772% 5312% 4870%
-97% 5772% 5312% 4870%
1405% 1368% 1253% 1142%
-95% -95% -95% 6803%
-94% -94% -95% -95%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
-98% -99% -99% -99%
99% 182% 160% 503%
-85% -85% -86% -88%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
-95% -95% -95% -96%
298% 335% 382% 535%
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track"










Verify Point of Origin
Match Against ATO
Match Against CommAir Profile







Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units
Relay Sub-Total
TOTAL 
“AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2”
 
 
Figure B-2. AEGIS ROI Estimates (cont.) 
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Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track"










Verify Point of Origin
Match Against ATO
Match Against CommAir Profile







Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units
Relay Sub-Total
TOTAL
Tactical Action Officer Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator Surface Warfare Coordinator
2129% 2025% 1871% 1578%
-94% -95% 1477% 1243%
-97% -97% -97% -97%
773% 732% 1045% 876%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-98% -98% 182% 140%
-97% 63% 52% 29%
-99% -98% -91% -92%
346% 325% 294% 236%
-93% -94% -94% 281%
-99% 2025% 1871% 1578%
-99% 2025% 1871% 1578%
457% 431% 393% 320%
-98% -98% -98% 2231%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -100% -100%
-7% 51% 40% 314%
-94% -95% -95% -96%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
143% 168% 193% 294%
3006% 2896% 2655% 2329%
-92% -93% 2104% 1843%
-95% -95% -96% -96%
1116% 1073% 1502% 1312%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-98% -98% 294% 247%
- - - -
-98% -98% -70% -73%
521% 499% 451% 386%
-91% -91% -92% 452%
-98% 2896% 2655% 2329%
-98% 2896% 2655% 2329%
677% 649% 589% 507%
-97% -98% -98% 3273%
-97% -97% -97% -98%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
10% 78% 64% 370%
-92% -93% -93% -94%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
172% 199% 230% 343%
1420% 1339% 1292% 1181%
-96% -96% 1013% 925%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
257% 238% 245% 217%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-99% -99% 99% 83%
-98% 11% 7% -1%
-98% -73% -8% -15%
204% 188% 178% 156%
-95% -96% -96% 191%
-99% 1339% 1292% 1181%
- - - -
- - - -
-99% -99% -99% 1679%
-98% -99% -99% -99%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-97% -96% -96% -56%
-96% -96% -97% -97%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
-35% -33% -30% -2%
“AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2”
 




Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track"










Verify Point of Origin
Match Against ATO
Match Against CommAir Profile







Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units
Relay Sub-Total
TOTAL   
Combat Systems Coordinator Tactical Information Coordinator Identification Supervisor
2628% 2613% 2370% 1907%
-93% -93% 1876% 1505%
-96% -96% -96% -97%
968% 962% 1336% 1066%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-98% -98% 253% 187%
- - - -
-99% -99% -90% -92%
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Figure B-4. SSDS ROI Estimates (cont.) 
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Table C-2. KVA Analysis with Monte Carlo Risk-based Simulations
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Table C-3. Strategy B: Real Options Analysis Results 
 
 
Table C-4. Strategy C: Real Options Analysis Results 
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That management adds value to organizations is one of the unquestioned truisms of 
business, government, military, and any other multi-member organization. The question left 
largely unanswered is, “How much value does management add to an organization?”  The 
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central research focus of this study is to establish a method for objectively measuring the 
value management adds to an organization.   
Determining the value added by management becomes particularly important as 
Navy acquisition managers deal with increasingly complex, open business models that 
engage many more participants in the development and implementation of products and 
services to support warfighters. There is a recognition that emerging, increasingly complex 
acquisition environments require more direction, collaboration, and control to achieve the 
reductions in costs as well as the increases in warfighting effectiveness that initiatives, such 
as the Open Architecture (OA) system acquisition and development framework, promise. 
The increasing burden on management in such environments largely derives from the 
amount of complexity managers must deal with by attempting to mitigate risks, improve 
predictions, and exercise the control and oversight necessary to be successful. 
Determining the value added by management is important because: 
 Managers need to know how well they are performing in more complex and 
demanding environments such as OA and open business models. 
 Those who evaluate management performance need a common metric to gauge the 
degree to which managers are succeeding or failing. 
 Poor performance by management threatens delivery time, acquisition costs, and 
capability of acquired products and services. 
 A consistent and objective way to evaluate management provides historical 
performance data that leads to more precise risk estimates (instead of uncertainty-
based guesses).  
 Including management performance in the overall assessment of organizational 
performance provides a more complete picture of how well an organization is 
performing. 
Objectivity Needed 
Solving this problem requires a new and more objective approach to measuring the 
value added by management than previous efforts. Subjective approaches and approaches 
based on corporate-level residuals—which presumably are a result of management 
activity—will not provide the kinds of precision necessary to allocate value (e.g., revenue, 
outputs) to individual managers in proportion to the amount they contribute to the 
organization’s value stream.  
Management literature is replete with the characteristics, motivations, and general 
mantras regarding what it takes to develop and sustain great managers. There are even 
more articles, books, motivational tapes and videos on what it takes to become a great 
leader. Undoubtedly, these suggestions can lead to great management. However, without a 
way to partition the actual, countable contributions that management makes to the corporate 
bottom line or general organizational success, there will be no way to tell which suggestions 
really work and which add little or no marginal value.   
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 Research Focus 
This research will focus on making the case for a method to objectively measure the 
value added by management activities. We will review the general issues involved in 
developing a theoretically sound, rigorous, and pragmatic approach to estimating the value 
added by management.  The paper will conclude with an example of how this approach 
would work in an open acquisitions environment. 
Management “Dark Matter” 
Dark matter, in the physics sense, is largely unobservable—albeit critical to 
understanding the physics of the universe. The dark matter of management has also been 
largely unobservable in the outputs of the core processes of an organization, although it is 
also critical to understanding the functioning of an organization.17 These mysterious 
elements are the managing activities that guide the organization toward its future and are 
assumed to be associated with the market outcomes (e.g., increases or decreases in 
revenue, military capability) managers attempt to influence.  
Management activities contribute directly to the outputs of the processes that are 
being managed, but they also involve the use of managers’ creative insights when they 
attempt to predict the future, create potential pathways to accomplish the predictions, and 
control for future risks and uncertainties. Those activities that are uniquely associated with 
management involve the creative use of decision heuristics based on managers implicit 
knowledge accumulated over years of experience, training and education.  We label this 
creative aspect as management “dark matter.” This management “dark matter” has largely 
been assumed to be critical to the duties of a manager but has not been objectively 
measured as researchers attempted to account for the value added by management.  
These heuristics from management’s dark matter are not algorithmically definable 
and previously have been subsumed within the standard knowledge value added (KVA) 
methodology in gross estimates of the overall output of an organization at a given point in 
time.  Basic KVA theory is designed specifically for all processes, activities that are 
algorithmically definable a priori, i.e., for processes with predetermined outputs (Housel & 
Kanevsky, 1995).  KVA posits an analytic tautology that assumes that historical outputs of 
an organization at a given point in time can be described in common units and, therefore, 
can be counted in absolute terms. Further, the total revenue of a commercial organization is 
equivalent to the total number of common units of output at a given point in time.  The theory 
must now be expanded to account for those managing activities that involve creative 
attempts to resolve risk, uncertainty and take advantage of upside potential.  
To maintain the historical and analytic context of KVA, we will provide a way to count 
the management dark matter activities within estimates of the overall output of the 
organization at a given point in time. This is reasonable given the fact that previous dark 
matter activities can be found in current process outputs; they usually take the form of 
changes to those process descriptions that lead to new or changed outputs.  
                                                
17 Notionally, the grey (dark) matter of the brain also is where original thinking occurs. 
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For instance, in an open-business-model environment, if an acquisition manager 
suggests that a vendor change some aspect of his/her core processes to ensure that a 
project stay on schedule, and the vendor responds by changing his/her process to mitigate 
the perceived risk, then the acquisition manager’s dark matter will eventually be manifested 
in the changed process. This example assumes that the acquisition manager and vendor 
are part of a virtual organization working collaboratively toward a final outcome, e.g., an 
integrated weapons system.  
In the ARCI (Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion) program, an open architecture (OA), 
open-acquisition business model was used to rapidly transition new technologies from the 
Advanced Submarine Technology Office (ASTO) housed within the Program Executive 
Office-Integrated Weapons Systems (PEO-IWS)  and the ARCI program (housed within a 
different program office, i.e., PEO Subs). This created an increase in the complexity of the 
acquisition cycle. However, it also allowed the ARCI program to leverage the resources and 
outputs of the ASTO program when it created an inter-program partnership. The OA, open-
business model provided the environment that created this opportunity as well as 
contributed to the increased complexity. In this environment, the ARCI acquisition 
management had to use more of its dark matter to ensure closer collaboration among the 
various parties as well as to predict and mitigate possible uncertainties and risks while 
leveraging the multiple resources of the “virtual” organization. 
Accounting for the value added by acquisition managers, in this case, is more than 
just accounting for their routine process contributions; it also requires accounting for their 
use of dark matter capabilities to influence the future behavior of the virtual organization. If 
the acquisition manager is really “doing his/her job” in this open business environment, s/he 
will constantly be using this dark matter to attempt to control risks and uncertainties by 
predicting the future actions necessary to mitigate same.  
This manager can no longer be content to simply ensure that the vendor meets the 
stipulated contract obligations. In the new open environment, the acquisitions manager must 
now coordinate with numerous potential contractors throughout the life cycle of the system 
acquisition. These must become a part of a virtual management team that collaborates 
regularly to ensure that the developing (or developed) system meets the needs of the 
warfighter. This new, more complex environment introduces greater opportunities for the 
manager to use his/her dark matter to creatively anticipate and solve problems while also 
seeking better ways to satisfy the constantly changing warfighter requirements. 
Difficult-to-track Dark Matter Outputs 
This dark matter aspect of his/her job has been more difficult to track in objective 
terms and largely has been relegated to anecdotal descriptions of the occasional successes 
and failures in the use of dark matter capabilities.  These managers’ job descriptions include 
directions to use their dark matter capabilities to control for risks, such as potentially slipping 
development and implementation schedules.  However, it is often more easy for them to 
simply focus on the daily routines of “putting out fires” than to stretch their dark matter 
capacities to innovate when necessary to mitigate future risks and capitalize on future 
opportunities—in other words, to increase warfighting capabilities.  
We can use standard KVA methodology to track the outputs of this dark matter 
activity over time since it has been assumed to be a part of the organization’s overall output 
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at a given point in time.  As such, it is assumed to be a required part of the manager’s 
standard outputs and, thus, can be counted within the standard KVA methodology.  
However, we also assume that this dark matter output will have some influence on the 
marketplace. Therefore this output should correlate with changes in the market, such as 
increased sales. 
Computing Metaphor 
Another way to describe management dark matter conceptually is by using a 
computing metaphor as has been used previously to describe the KVA methodology 
(Kanevsky & Housel, 1998). Using a computing analogy, managers use their dark matter 
capabilities to write the program for the processes they manage.  “Writing” the program 
includes: 
 decisions they must make during the course of a given time period, including: 
o Deciding which “program” to use 
o Deciding how to allocate resources to produce given outputs 
o Sustaining activities that maintain his/her network 
o Forecasting the amount of outputs desired from the processes he/she 
manages 
o Creating, sending, and receiving messages 
o Selecting and using technology to support management activities 
Writing the program is how managers create value in the processes they manage. 
The time it takes to write the program to produce a given output is the cost of managing. 
The actual, non-redundant length of the program is proportionate to the value of the 
program (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995).  More complex dark matter decisions require longer 
programs, and simpler decisions require shorter programs.  Writing a relatively long program 
that includes significant amounts of redundancy and does not execute or executes poorly is 
how managers increase costs—relative to managers who write shorter, i.e., more elegant, 
programs that produce the same outputs.  This can be likened to the “art of good 
management.” 
Technology can support managers in producing their dark matter outputs. For 
example, in an open acquisitions environment, collaborative technology can support a 
manager in recording, distributing, and receiving messages. However, while “managing 
technology” may execute some routine management activities, there is no program, at this 
point, that can write its own unique program.  This makes the position of the managers 
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unique because, at this point in time,18 it is their ability to create elegant programs that 
largely determines their success in managing. 
The ability of a manager to write elegant programs that produce the desired amount 
and kinds of process outputs, largely determines his/her value added to the enterprise.  If 
they write programs that predict poorly, managers will fail to allocate resources properly and, 
thus, fail to produce the desired outputs. This will be evidenced by overall lower returns on 
investment (ROIs) on given processes due to relatively poor utilization of process assets 
such as technology and employees. 
Elegant, parsimonious, and precise management “programmers” will produce the 
best outcomes over time. This may be due to a variety of reasons, including: employees that 
are happier because they are more productive, the ability of management to respond quickly 
to changes in markets-environments, and higher utilization of technology assets based on 
more optimized process designs. There may be a variety of outcomes due to more elegant 
programs; however, regardless of outcome, elegant programs will result in higher ROIs in 
managing.  
Dark Matter Correlates with Market Performance 
We recognize that these dark matter activities are meant to influence the future 
behavior of the core processes of organizations to achieve the management goals 
established for the organization. As such, they should be correlated with the market 
performance of the organization in terms of the impact on outcomes obtained by 
organizations (e.g., increased capabilities, winning the battle, more revenue, or other forms 
of value).  
The seeming conundrum is that while these dark matter activities are designed to 
influence future behavior and outcomes, historically, they can be accounted for at a given 
point in time.  That they are part of the output of an organization at a given point in time is 
clear; however, they cannot be tied directly to the current outputs of the organization that 
produce the value or capabilities that markets are willing to purchase.  
For example, in our new open business environment in which all parties are part of a 
collaborative virtual organization,  an acquisition manager would feel free to suggest a 
potential risk mitigation strategy to a contractor because he/she assumes that the 
development schedule will slip due to the loss of a key programmer. With the required 
increase in collaboration among the contractor and the other parties involved in the 
development and deployment of a new integrated weapons system (IWS), precipitated by 
the use of an OA and open-business-model approach, managers of every group must 
engage in greater cooperation across organizational boundaries. To be successful, they all 
must use their collective dark matter capabilities to recognize and address potential risks 
and opportunities.  
In this new cooperative environment, whether the acquisition manager’s or the 
contractor’s dark matter activity is directly responsible for changes to IWS development 
                                                
18 Ray Kurzweil (In the Age of Spiritual Machines) argues that computers will have the intelligence to 
write their own unique programs within the next 50 years. 
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processes cannot be known unambiguously—e.g., “Was it the acquisition manager or the 
contractor manager that was responsible for the changed process that avoided the possible 
schedule slippage?” The only thing that is unambiguous is that both have produced the 
outputs from their collective dark matter capabilities, and these should be treated as coming 
from a single management entity. They should, therefore, be less inclined to point fingers 
when things go wrong due to poor use of management dark matter and more inclined to 
ensure that the IWS is delivered on time, with the capabilities required by the warfighter.  
In addition, the cooperative use of dark matter to achieve common goals will ensure 
that managers make the adjustments necessary to seize opportunities to create greater 
capabilities in the IWS when deemed necessary by the warfighter. Tracking their collective 
use of dark matter makes it possible to assess the contributions of the new collaborative 
cross-organizational management team. There is nothing quite like being measured on 
overall performance to drive home the need for cooperation to achieve common goals. 
Outputs of Dark Matter 
If we assume that these dark matter outputs are a necessary part of the output of an 
organization—and this would appear to be the case in terms of our expectations for as least 
part of what managers should be doing: i.e., predicting the future and controlling for risk—
then it follows that these dark matter activities of management are, a priori, designed to be 
part of the output of the organization.  Indeed, a review of management job descriptions 
would include imperatives to “lead, motivate, plan for the future, control risks,” all of which 
we are labeling dark matter activities.  
For example, if a manager uses his/her creative insight to suggest that the product 
should be painted green as well as red, the painting process eventually must be changed to 
reflect the prediction that the new color for the product will sell better to a given segment of 
the market.  
Or, for example, when an acquisition manager senses that the schedule is about to 
slip because a subcontractor has gone bankrupt, he/she must predict the effect of this risk 
and develop strategies to mitigate the problem, such as maintaining an option to purchase 
the service from another developer.  Another example might be when the “manager” (officer) 
of a warfighting process that tracks ships in a congested area, such as the Persian Gulf, 
recognizes that something is amiss even though the track information appears to be correct. 
His intuition, based on the dark matter acquired over years of experience, comes into play in 
seeking further clarification of the track information because something (his intuition, or dark 
matter) tells him all is not well, and this ship may not be “friendly”. 
Operationalizing: The Measurement of Dark Matter 
We assume that managers constantly acquire knowledge both formally and 
informally, learn from that knowledge, and incorporate that knowledge in their decision-
making in predicting the future and in planning to control for risk and uncertainty from a 
constantly changing environment. This form of management “dark matter” output is 
manifested largely in the messages that managers generate, distribute and interpret to 
predict and control core processes to accomplish the goals of the organization.  Most of a 
manager’s time is spent in creating, sending, receiving and interpreting messages. These 
messages are basic descriptions of actions the manager is influencing his organization to 
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take. Some of these actions are unambiguously tied to actual production of the process they 
are managing and, thus, are captured in the standard KVA methodology within the 
description of process outputs.  
The central idea is that we can “see” the manifestation of that acquired knowledge 
and the subsequent managing activities via the networks that managers and information 
technology (e.g., collaborative technology) use to create, send, and receive messages. 
These messages are sent to and received from the employees and the technology.19  The 
actual contents of the messages take many forms and fill many purposes—all of which can 
be described in the common descriptive language provided by the KVA approach in terms of 
their relative complexity.  
The challenge is to develop an operationalization of management dark matter 
outputs that permits an objective bifurcation of relevant and irrelevant activities without 
resorting to overly subjective interpretations and the potential biases such subjective 
judgments introduce. At the very least, the goal should be to establish an unambiguous 
principle for categorizing relevant and irrelevant activities that is defensible without resorting 
to subjective judgment. This bifurcation will be worked out as we attempt to operationalize 
this approach over time with actual case studies and empirical research.20 
Those messages that are unambiguously tied to current process outputs represent 
routine management outputs that are measurable in the standard KVA methodology. Those 
management messages that are not found directly in current outputs of the process are 
evidence of management dark matter activity. Regardless of their semantic content, 
because we can observe all the messages and estimate their complexity, they represent a 
convenient way to observe and measure management dark matter outputs.   
Management Dark Matter Outputs and Job Descriptions 
Top executives often state goals in broad sweeping terms such as “We will move 
from product leadership to cost leadership within the next three years; We will move from a 
proprietary, closed business model to an open business model in acquisitions.”  Such 
                                                
19 Future research may establish a more refined measure of dark matter activity and outputs by 
examining the networks managers create, modify and use to receive and distribute their messages. 
These networks vary in terms of their complexity; the messages sent and received also vary in 
complexity.  These two forms of complexity can be described in terms of the knowledge required to 
reproduce them, and the knowledge can be described in common units using the KVA approach. 
With this information, we can measure the amount of knowledge transferred through each link in the 
network—including the knowledge used to maintain and modify the network. 
20 The basic problem is to determine what aspects of this management dark matter are relevant to 
organizational value and which are not directly relevant.  It is possible to semantically interpret 
management activities as relevant or irrelevant to the organization. For example, when a manager 
arranges a dinner date with his/her spouse, it is very likely this activity was irrelevant to achieving 
organizational goals. However, when we examine less obvious examples, such as a manager musing 
about whether to invest in a new technology that may or may not ever be purchased, it is less obvious 
how this activity led to some organizational outcome.   
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broadly stated goals must be translated into action at the process level through changes in 
the process descriptions (e.g., make more widgets or make different kinds of widgets).   
Management job descriptions should reflect the dark matter capabilities necessary to 
translate such broad, sweeping goals into operational realities.  One way to measure dark 
matter output would be to examine the job descriptions of managers and ask them to 
estimate how many messages and/or activities they generate to fulfill each aspect of the job, 
as well as how often they do this within a given time period. To check the accuracy of 
manager’s self reports, we can check actual message logs, e-mails, other text-based 
historical records to ensure there is a high enough level of reliability among the estimates to 
proceed. 
 It would also be possible to ask them to generate a more precise job description if 
the original is not sufficiently reflective of what they really do.  The next step would be to 
separate the duties that involve routine daily operations and those that are more reflective of 
management dark matter activities. 
 Case Example: Ship Tracking Process 
There are approximately 250K ships at sea world-wide at any given point in time. 
The US military needs to know which are friendly and which are potential foes. The 
responsibility for tracking these ships currently rests with the Coast Guard. The tracking 
process must be managed by experienced Watch Commanders who can intuitively sense 
when a given track is incorrect  (Figure 1). This ability cannot be automated at this point in 
time and is, therefore, indicative of dark matter.  Watch Commanders must be able to 
anticipate when risks of false identification of tracks may be present. 
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Ship Tracking Management’s Dark Matter Activities 
The track manager and his watch commander must supervise the process to ensure 
that timely and accurate information is provided to various DoD entities to help them achieve 
situational awareness (SA). The primary job of management is to ensure its subordinates 
are correctly tracking the ship activity. One method by which members of management 
check tracking is the quality control step, in which managers must sign off on track reports 
as accurate. 
In this environment, there are times when the managers intuitively recognize that the 
track information may not be correct—even though they may not be completely aware of 
why they have made such judgments. Their intuitions lead them to ask their subordinates to 
re-run the track information gathering to ensure its accuracy.  Their use of dark matter 
results in communications/messages, to subordinates to rerun the tracking process on given 
suspect targets. As such, the communications are observable applications of their dark 
matter and can be described via the standard KVA methodology.  
The times when intuitions are correct or incorrect also can be counted. If we take a 
conservative attribution strategy, we will only count the correct ones, those ships that turned 
out to be incorrectly tracked and categorized, as part of management’s dark matter output. 
However, it can also be argued that to achieve a given yield rate for suspected tracks, 
management must have some level of false positives; therefore, all should be counted as 
management dark matter outputs. In either case, this simple case example enabled us to 
identify and count those dark matter outputs of management which in turn allowed us to 
allocate value to those activities.  
In this case example, we have also demonstrated that when a simple dark matter 
capability can be explicitly described (i.e., we may uncover the heuristic decision-making 
process that managers used to identify the potential incorrect tracks), it becomes possible to 
capture this dark matter capability in intelligent computer programs such as expert systems. 
This is the basis for many expert systems that embed management dark matter decision 
capabilities within their code.  The new tracking system developed by the Office of  Naval 
Research not only automated most of the tracking process but also largely replaced the 
need for the managers to use their dark matter to identify potential incorrect tracks.  The 
new system greatly improved the capabilities to track the enormous number of ships that 
previously were tracked primarily by human operators.  It also is capable of gathering 
additional information that makes use of managers’ intuition about possible inaccurate 
tracking largely unnecessary.   
However, the track process designers continue to require the presence of 
management to sign off on the accuracy of tracks while ensuring that the routine tracking 
process is carried out as expected. If management becomes complacent about its dark 
matter duties, it may assume that the new system is so accurate that management members 
need not waste their time trying to find the potentially inaccurate tracks.   
Because dark matter activities involve prediction, the possible removal of this 
management dark matter capability must be considered seriously because one correct 
prediction—i.e., identification of an inaccurate track by management that was not caught by 
the new system—might lead to identification of a suspect ship that is carrying weapons of 
mass destruction. Dismissing management prerogatives embedded in its dark matter 
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capabilities by “automating” them must be carefully considered before leadership eliminates 
this capability. 
Standard KVA and Delta Correlation Approaches 
The cascading of management goals to lower levels of management, and eventually 
to the process level, represents the relative influence of managers on their organizations. 
This kind of influence takes time to become a reality at the process level.  Because the 
response of the market to these kinds of goal-setting messages is uncertain, it is necessary 
to measure the change or delta in value (e.g., capabilities, revenue) of the organization over 
time as the goals eventually become, or fail to become, reality in process changes.   
We must acknowledge the likelihood that these kinds of unique management 
activities do indeed influence organizational outcomes—as has been argued in prior 
research as well as in general business publications about the role and value of leadership 
and management.  This assumption leads us to propose that changes in these activities 
should be roughly correlated with changes in market outcomes.   
Because making a causal, one-to-one connection between dark matter messages 
and changes in core processes is problematic due to the semantic-interpretation problems 
mentioned earlier, we will not attempt to causally connect the two. Because a pure historical 
causal relationship cannot be established between the dark matter-market outcome-process 
change deltas, we will need to track the correlation among the three over time to better 
understand the relationship between deltas in management dark matter activity and the 
presumed corresponding deltas in market responses.   
This logic leads to two measures of management dark matter activity. First, we can 
track the deltas in management’s dark matter activity, process changes, and market 
outcomes over time. Second, using standard KVA methodology, we can account for the 
amount of dark matter outputs as a percentage of the total outputs of a process and, 
consequently, of the organization at a given historical point in time.21  
As a first cut, we can aggregate the delta of all managers’ dark matter activity and 
correlate it with market outcome deltas.  Individual manager dark matter output deltas can 
be compared within the organization and correlated with the market outcome deltas to infer 
which managers have had the most influence on market outcomes.  This approach extends 
standard KVA theory to the largely uncharted realm of how management influences 
organizational outcomes.  
Basic Hypothesis  
This formulation of the problem enables us to test some basic hypotheses about the 
correlation among dark matter outputs and organizational outcomes. One hypothesis would 
                                                
21 In the first case, we can use standard KVA methodology to allocate outputs and associated value 
(e.g., revenue, capability) to individual managers at a given point in time. In the second case, we can 
measure the relative changes in deltas among the managers’ dark matter activity and the 
corresponding changes in market deltas.   
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be that there should be a much higher percentage of dark matter outputs in an open 
business environment (in which the OA approach is used to develop IWS systems) 
compared to a closed business model approach (in which proprietary IWS systems are 
developed).  
Similarly, in the corporate sector, the amount of management dark matter produced 
over a given period of time should correlate with the amount of revenue generated over a 
period of time. It should follow that mature industries (e.g., petroleum extraction) that have 
largely mitigated risks and operate within a relatively stable environment in which demand is 
largely predictable should have less of this kind of dark matter than those operating within 
largely unstable environments (e.g., biotechnology).   
The same would pertain to military environments in which there have been periods of 
stable competition (e.g., Cold War) among nations compared to periods when competition 
among entities is ill-defined and highly volatile (e.g., Global War on Terror). In the current, 
military environment in which there is greater instability, there is a larger need for the 
production of management dark matter to predict and deal with uncertainties and risks.  
Hypothesis Test: ARCI versus Proprietary Acquisition 
The ARCI case example provides a simplistic test of this hypothesis. We can 
compare the rough orders of magnitude estimates of dark matter outputs in both proprietary 
and open environments and then correlate these with the outcomes for development of IWS 
systems in both environments.22  The hypothesis is that the OA, open-business-model 
environment of ARCI generated significantly more dark matter output than the proprietary 
model of system acquisition in IWS. 
The hypothesis rests on the basic assumption that when managers are successful in 
setting and implementing goals to affect the markets within which they operate, markets 
respond positively and the converse is also true.   
Through changes that they induce in their organization’s core processes, the 
commercial market responds by purchasing more of their products, the same number of 
higher priced products, or both outcomes. In the military “markets,” managers/officers use 
their dark matter to anticipate future actions by adversaries by adding capabilities and 
improving system acquisition cycle-times to respond to new events and competitor’s 
strategies.  
However, when managers increase these kinds of creative activities and the result is 
lower revenue or reduced capabilities, it can be said that management reduced or failed to 
increase value. The delta in dark matter management activities from one period to the next, 
in response to anticipated changes in the market, should correlate to organizational 
performance over time. 
                                                
22 It does not permit, however, the translation of deltas in dark matter activity over time into absolute 
numbers against which value can be allocated. 
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It does not follow, however, that merely increasing the number of dark matter 
activities (e.g., setting goals, trying to implement an increased number of goals) will result in 
increases in value. These goals and other creative management activities must eventually 
be translated into operational changes in core processes to affect any changes in company 
outputs and, therefore, responses to changes in the market. Such inevitability provides a 
rationale for counting management dark matter activities within counts of the total output of 
an organization at any given point in time.23  Clearly, these activities are present and can be 
described with the standard KVA approach currently used to describe the outputs of all 
processes in common units. It follows that the standard KVA approach may be extended to 
triangulate with the correlational approach in estimating the effect of dark matter outputs on 
organizational outcomes.  
ROI on Management Dark Matter 
Using the KVA knowledge metaphor to describe outputs, the absolute total 
contribution of managing a process is equivalent to the total amount of knowledge required 
to produce and interpret all management messages during a given time period.  The amount 
of time a manager (and supporting management technology) spends using this knowledge 
is the cost of management.  It follows that a manager who must use a large amount of 
knowledge to process messages but can process those messages quickly, provides a 
relatively good return on investment in managing.  Those who take longer to produce a 
similarly complex output cost more and provide a lower relative return on investment. 
We would need to make a further separation of messages that involve use of dark 
matter from those that do not. Following this separation, we would estimate the amount of 
complexity in each message set using the learning time or other KVA approach, and 
estimate the total amount of output from the dark matter activity (i.e., the prediction-based 
messages). This resulting value would be included in the total output for a given period, and 
value would be allocated proportionately as is done currently in the KVA method for normal 
process outputs. 
We can use standard KVA methodology to allocate outputs and associated value 
(e.g., revenue, capability) to individual managers at a given point in time.  
 Resolving uncertainty requires that managers make a prediction about what 
demands the future will make on current processes in terms of the amount and kinds of 
outputs required from those processes. These messages, interpretations of messages, and 
decisions about resolving risk and uncertainty can be observed over time such that it is 
                                                
23 A very crude and simple test of this hypothesis would be to compare the dark matter job activities of 
the acquiring manager in a proprietary environment with the dark matter job activities of managers in 
an OA, open-management environment. The number of messages and complexity of messages used 
to coordinate acquisition in an OA, open-business-models environment would be much greater than 
for managers in the proprietary, single-vendor context.  This would assume that the processes 
managed have about the same level of complexity. Relative complexity of the process becomes the 
index against which the amount of dark matter per unit of complexity is produced.  
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possible to gather historical data on the number and amount of complexity of these dark 
matter managing activities.24   
So, in addition to the routine KVA data that estimates the number of common units of 
output from algorithmically definable processes, it also is possible to count the number of 
dark matter outputs and their respective complexity. The total amount of output, then, is a 
function of the number of times a given asset produces algorithmically defined outputs 
multiplied times the amount of complexity required to produce the outputs plus the dark 
matter outputs that occur in that given time period.25 
Past research on the value of management and leadership provides a useful review 
of alternative approaches to this daunting problem. There are a number of lines of research 
that have attempted to address this problem indirectly and may offer some insights about its 
many varied aspects. Thus, it would be useful to review the strengths and weaknesses of 
these prior attempts to resolve this difficult problem. 
Prior Approaches to Assessing the Value of Management  
The literature on the value added by managing includes the effect of corporate 
governance on firm value, the drivers of value (including managing activities), the 
characteristics of great leaders, failures of management, and fund management.  
This review of previous attempts to assess the value that management adds includes 
research on: 
 How corporate governance affects a firm’s valuation, 
 What management characteristics can lead to improved company value, 
 Fund-management approaches to solving the problem, and 
 Attempts to solve the management value added quantification problem using a 
knowledge framework. 
Corporate Management/Governance Value  
The current literature discussing the effect of corporate governance on management 
valuation does not focus on direct valuation of individual managers or those in positions to 
                                                
24 This formulation assumes that we do not count redundancy in the dark matter activities—such as 
exhorting the vendor to “work harder” every day during the observational time period. We would count 
the non-redundant or unique dark matter outputs. In this case, we might only count the exhortation to 
work harder as one output instead of one output repeated many times.  We would also separate out 
the non-relevant activities—for example, when the manager calls his wife to arrange a dinner date. 
25 Given that there are many, if not infinite, alternative paths for the organization’s future, it is 
impossible to enumerate all the potential opportunities foregone by selecting a specific path. It is, 
therefore, not useful (in accounting for dark matter outputs) to attempt to look backward to determine 
whether managers might have better utilized their dark matter to make “better” predictions. This type 
of interpretation must be left to the subjective judgment of the leadership of the organization. 
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perform management governance activities. Instead, the current literature revolves around 
two major themes: an analysis of corporate governance and its relation to firm value as well 
as an analysis of corporate management techniques and suggestions on qualitatively 
increasing management’s value. 
Literature focused on corporate governance/management focuses on two major 
themes: addressing whether corporate governance affects firm value and providing 
suggestions on how to qualitatively increase the value of corporate 
governance/management—thus, increasing firm value.  Literature focused on the second 
theme generally does not relate techniques directly to quantitatively measured increases in 
firm value, but instead implies that the techniques will increase value in some way. 
Corporate Governance and its Effect on Firm Value 
Black, Jang, and Kim set out to answer the question: “How do a country’s corporate 
governance rules, or the corporate governance practices of individual firms within a country, 
affect overall firm value and performance?” (Black, Jang, & Kim, 2003, p. 1).   This study 
answers the question by developing a corporate governance index for 526 Korean public 
companies.  The index is based on information obtained on shareholder rights, board of 
directors in general, outside directors, audit committee and internal auditor disclosure to 
investors, and ownership parity.  It then uses multiple regression equations to explain the 
variance in the corporate governance index compared to firm value.  The analysis finds 
evidence that corporate governance is an important factor in explaining the market value of 
Korean public companies.  Following a similar model Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and 
Zimmerman (2006) establish a relationship between corporate governance quality and firm 
value.   
Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmerman, in their work “An Integrated Framework of 
Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation,” state that:  
Recent empirical research shows evidence of a positive relationship between 
the quality of firm-specific corporate governance and firm valuation. Instead 
of looking at one single corporate governance mechanism in isolation, [this 
report] constructs a broad corporate governance index and [applies] five 
additional variables related to ownership structure, board characteristics, and 
leverage to provide a comprehensive description of firm-level corporate 
governance for a representative sample of Swiss firms. To control for 
potential endogeneity of these six governance mechanisms, [the report 
develops] a system of simultaneous equations and [applies] three-stage least 
squares (3SLS). [The] results support the widespread hypothesis of a positive 
relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation. (2006, 
publication abstract) 
This work shows a relationship between the quality of specific corporate governance 
practices and the value of a firm, but does not allow for direct valuation of individual 
managers.  It primarily supplements the intuitive hypothesis that quality affects value.     
Klein, Shapiro, and Young (2005) prove a similar relationship between quality and 
value in Canadian firms, but add the additional element of the ownership category.  In their 
report, the researchers analyze the relationship between firm value and indices of effective 
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corporate governance in Canadian firms.  “The results indicate that corporate governance 
does matter in Canada. However, not all elements of measured governance are important, 
and the effects of governance do differ by ownership category” (Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 
2005, publication abstract). The results of this study establish the link between quality of 
governance and value. 
An additional work with similar results is Hsiu-I Ting’s (2006).  In this work, Ting 
investigates the 207 IPO companies encompassing the Taiwan Security Exchange between 
the years 1992-2002.  His analysis examines situations in which corporate governance 
could increase firm value. 
[Ting] finds positive effects of corporate governance on firm performance, 
which proves the existence of a corporate governance effect. Different from 
the previous studies, this paper addresses the fact that the corporate 
governance effect exists under poor economic conditions. As expected, firms 
with poor corporate governance mechanisms tend to perform badly when 
business cycles go downward. In other words, the report indicates the 
importance of corporate governance increases during poor economic 
conditions. Firms with higher agency costs also show a significant corporate 
governance effect.  [Also, when investing more in other companies causes a 
firm structure to become more complicated while simultaneously diminishing 
information disclosure, the corporate governance mechanism could work 
effectively.] Finally, the recognition of a supervisor is an important factor for 
corporate governance effect as well. Firms with executive recognition appear 
to have a corporate governance effect. (2006, p. 8) 
To summarize, this line of research demonstrated that there is a relationship 
between corporate governance firm values, but there is a profound gap in quantifying the 
precise value of the management that governs companies.  Furthermore, once the 
management/government structure is broken down and one wishes to determine the value 
of specific managers, the lack of quantifiable value studies becomes even more 
accentuated.  There is a lack of studies that attempt to measure the value of management in 
dollar terms.  
Another theme of corporate management valuation studies involves discussing the 
methods of increasing the value of corporate management.  Unfortunately for our purposes, 
this literature fails to produce objective measures of how much value managers add. 
Increasing the Value of Corporate Management 
There are many works discussing techniques to improve management techniques, 
and most offer useful insights to do so.  However, these techniques are limited because 
there is no quantifiable measure to discover how they increase firm value.   
All agree that more effective management is ideal, but seem to question how one 
can discover what management characteristics and techniques are the most effective 
without discovering the relative value they add.  How can managers discover what they 
should place emphasis on without knowing the payoff?  The following works all discuss 
valuable techniques crucial to manager success, but none supplement their advice with 
techniques to discover their actual value added. 
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In their book, Value Driven Management: How to Create and Maximize Value over 
Time for Organizational Success, Pohlman and Gardiner discuss how to increase 
management’s value by focusing on eight “value drivers”: external cultural values, internal 
cultural values, employee values, supplier values, customer values, third-party values, 
competitor values, and owner values.  This guideline is structured to help managers keep 
pace with fluctuating business structures in order to achieve long-term success.  Pohlman 
and Gardiner’s book is about leading, managing and working in organizations as managers 
enter the twenty-first century.  Its techniques are rooted in traditional theories and styles, but 
focus on value creation over time—because traditional theories must constantly make 
adjustments as paradigms shift.  
Following in the same spirit is Michael Armstrong’s A Handbook of Management 
Techniques Revised, 3rd edition.  Armstrong’s work acts as a guide for professional 
managers or as an essential guide for students.  His work attempts to encompass value-
adding skills/techniques for numerous management responsibilities.  It distinguishes 
between tasks that fall into the following categories: marketing management, operational 
management, financial management, human resource management, management science, 
planning and resource allocation, efficiency and effectiveness.  Within these topics, 
Armstrong’s work includes 100 qualitative, systematic, and analytical methods used to assist 
in decision-making and to improve efficiency and effectiveness.  As is evident, Pohlman and 
Gardiner as well as Armstrong focus on techniques that increase management’s value.   
Gardner’s work described below takes a slight shift in topic from suggesting useful 
techniques to highlighting character traits that are inherent in a successful leader.  
John Gardner’s On Leadership (1990) focuses on the characteristics a leader should 
possess, centering on managers and how such qualities increase their value to their 
business.  Gardner lists six respects with which leader/managers distinguish themselves 
from the general run of managers: 
 They think longer-term—beyond the day’s crises, beyond the quarterly report, 
beyond the horizon. 
 In thinking about the unit they are heading, they grasp its relationship to larger 
realities—the larger organization of which they are a part, conditions external to the 
organization, global trends. 
 They reach and influence constituents beyond their jurisdictions, beyond boundaries. 
 They put heavy emphasis on the intangibles of vision, values, and motivation and 
understand intuitively the nonrational and unconscious elements in leader-
constituent interaction. 
 They have the political skill to cope with the conflicting requirements of multiple 
constituencies. 
 They think in terms of renewal.  The routine manager tends to accept organizational 
structure and process as it exists.  The leader or leader/manager seeks the revisions 
of process and structure required by ever-changing reality.   
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 180 - 
=
=
Management characteristics are obviously important to company success.  
Therefore, it clearly follows that company failure can result from choosing a manager that 
lacks the characteristics necessary for success.  Gerard Egan, in Adding Value: A 
Systematic Guide to Business-driven Management and Leadership, cites this as one of the 
main reasons for organizational failure.  He provides information on choosing the correct 
manager.    
When companies fail, Egan proposes that true failure lies not with managers 
themselves, but with the system by which they are chosen and developed. Egan states that 
it is not wise to promote professionals to management without any guidance on how to 
actually manage; they may excel in a specific skills area, such as engineering or accounting, 
but may lack the specific management training necessary to be good managers. Egan 
describes the basic skills managers need to look beyond their own area of expertise in ways 
that add value to the business. He presents a comprehensive, integrated system of 
management that can be adapted to meet any company's real business needs—including 
strategy, leadership, structure, human resources, innovation, and organizational culture. 
Egan offers theoretical constructs as well as three practical, hands-on models. Most 
importantly, he shows how to integrate the models into a system that managers can use to 
identify, organize, and implement the best ideas emerging from today's "business and 
organizational potential" movement.  
All the techniques on management characteristics discussed in countless books may 
be useful, but they do not address the issue of how much value such techniques and 
characteristics can add in specific instances with specific managers.   
The Alpha measure in fund management attempts to grasp some idea of the value of 
management in general, but also has several limitations that make it problematic for use in 
determining the value added of individual managers.   
Lessons from Fund Management Research 
“Alpha” measures the difference between a fund's actual returns and its expected 
performance given its level of risk (as measured by “beta”). A positive alpha figure indicates 
the fund has performed better than its beta (risk) would predict. In contrast, a negative alpha 
indicates a fund has underperformed, given the expectations established by the fund's beta. 
Some investors see alpha as a measurement of the value added or subtracted by a fund's 
manager. There are limitations to alpha's ability to accurately depict a manager's added or 
subtracted value. In some cases, a negative alpha can result from the expenses that are 
present in the fund figures but are not present in the figures of the comparison index. In 
addition, alpha is dependent on the accuracy of beta: If the investor accepts beta as a 
conclusive definition of risk, a positive alpha would be a conclusive indicator of good fund 
performance. Of course, the value of beta is dependent on R-squared.  
For Alpha vs. the Standard Index, Morningstar performs its calculations using the 
S&P 500 as the benchmark index for equity funds and the Lehman Brothers Aggregate as 
the benchmark index for bond funds. Morningstar deducts the current return of the 90-day T-
bill from the total return of both the fund and the benchmark index. The difference is called 
the fund's excess return. The exact mathematical definition of alpha that Morningstar uses is 
listed below.  
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Alpha = Excess Return - ((Beta x (Benchmark - Treasury))  
Benchmark = Total Return of Benchmark Index  
Treasury = Return on Three-month Treasury Bill (Morningstar). 
Aside from Alpha, there have been several previous attempts to quantify the 
contributions of management, but they have, as yet, failed to provide a means to quantify 
the actual value added by individual managers. More recent approaches have employed a 
knowledge-based metaphor to frame the problem.  
Knowledge-based Approaches 
Housel and Nelson (2005) attempted to quantify the contributions of management in 
aggregate using a knowledge-based framework. The general idea of their study was that by 
quantifying management’s total accumulated education, experience, and time with a firm, it 
was possible to generate its weighting on the output of a firm.  
The limitations of this approach were that it did not provide a means to quantify 
individual managers’ contributions; it assumed that management’s aggregated contributions 
were purely a result of its members’ combined education, experience, and time with the firm, 
and such weightings were applied as a constant across core areas or processes of a firm. 
While useful as a first attempt to quantify the value added by management in aggregate, the 
general approach assumed away individual differences among managers in terms of the 
value they add to a firm; likewise, the weighting factor could not be directly tied to the 
outputs of a firm in a relatively unambiguous way.  
Further, it would be quite possible for two firms to have nearly the same weighting 
factor for management with radically different profitability and productivity scores.  A more 
precise methodology that can differentiate among individual managers based on their 
observable contributions to process outputs would resolve these problems.  
Pavlou, Housel, Rodgers, and Jansen’s (2005) research had implications for the 
potential value added by managing activities. They assumed that implicit knowledge, which 
is akin to the notion of the type of knowledge managers use in making creative decisions 
(i.e., dark matter outputs), could be accounted for in terms of the experience of employees 
(including line managers).  As such, a simple algorithm to measure their years of experience 
would serve as an indicator of the amount of knowledge used to produce the outputs of 
creative problem solving.  However, this study did not directly address the issue of the value 
added directly by creative managing (i.e., management dark matter) activities. 
There is a substantial collection of literature regarding corporate governance, 
leadership characteristics, and fund management, among other things, which attempts to 
address directly or indirectly the issue of how to measure the value added by managing 
activities. Yet, there remains a lack of research that attempts to objectively quantify the 
value added by individual managers. Further, past approaches do not provide a way of 
structuring the problem such that this kind of objective measure can be derived and revenue 
or value can be allocated to individual manager’s dark matter outputs.    
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This research gap is further accentuated by the current concerns over the 
transparency of corporate activity, which assists investors in making more informed 
decisions. Transparency would aid investors in understanding the rationale for 
compensation packages provided corporate executives. This call for transparency is 
particularly important for businesses in the United States, but likely applies to the rest of the 
business world as well.   
The research reviewed leads to a common conclusion: firm governance, leadership 
characteristics, management knowledge and experience do affect firm valuation. Because 
firm valuation is ultimately a result of a firm’s profitability or productivity over time, there is a 
direct relationship between firm valuation and profitability or productivity over time. The 
question remaining is, “How much do dark matter managing activities affect firm 
profitability?” 
The prior research also provides qualitative recommendations for how individual 
managers can increase their potential value to the firm.  However, there is no relatively 
objective quantifiable evidence available to tie given characteristics of great leaders directly 
to the actual profitability or productivity of a firm.   
While promising, the Alpha measure (the term sometimes used as the measurement 
of value a manager contributes to a fund), is a theoretical measure, is difficult to estimate, 
and is seldom reliable because it is very difficult to operationalize.  Given that there does not 
appear to be a relatively objective way to quantify the value added by individual managers, 
such a measure would be beneficial to both managers and investors alike. 
An approach to estimating how much value managers add to an organization or fund 
would provide the kinds of performance data that might be used to reward value-adding 
managers while not rewarding those that perform poorly. This presumably happens today 
with existing performance-evaluation techniques. But often, these techniques appear very 
subjective. A more objective technique that ties performance directly to the firm’s 
profitability/productivity, indicating how much of a firm’s revenue can be allocated to given 
managers’ activities, would provide a more convincing evaluation.  
The same performance information might lead poorly performing managers to self-
organize in a way that ensures they are in positions where their talents can be used in the 
most profitable, productive ways. Such measurement would also provide investors with the 
kind of performance data that would lead them to reward organizations in which value added 
by management benchmarks well within an industry segment while withdrawing support for 
firms in which management does not perform well.   
The same phenomena should occur in non-profit organizations as well when relative 
productivity among organizations can be compared on an objective basis. The federal 
government with its stop-light (Red=poor performance, Yellow=needs-improvement 
performance, and Green=good performance) scorecard for the large federal agencies is 
attempting to accomplish this goal. However, these rather crude indicators do not allow for 
the objective quantification of agency productivity, let alone the performance of agency 
management.  
What is needed is a method that provides a way to quantify individual managers’ 
contributions using structural, analytic, and relatively objective techniques that would allow 
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comparisons among organizations. The method we proposed above promises to meet these 
criteria and will allow allocation of revenue to managing activities. This extension of the KVA 
framework allows the description of managing activities in common units.  In addition, 
because managers produce, interpret and send messages through their networks, the 
method also accounts for these managing activities in a common descriptive language.   
Options and Dark Matter 
Many management decisions are constrained by legal or regulatory frameworks that 
severely reduce or virtually eliminate management’s ability to examine alternative future 
pathways or options. If there are no options for managers to generate and from which to 
select, there is no purpose for dark matter activities.  
However, where options exist, managers can take full advantage of their dark matter 
capabilities to help move the organization toward desired future states. The introduction of 
open business acquisition models using an OA system development framework promise to 
create more options for managers to achieve their objectives. To succeed in this new 
environment, managers will have to make more use of their dark matter to produce the kinds 
of outputs that truly serve their warfighting customers. Acquisition managers should be more 
free and motivated to use their dark matter capabilities to mitigate potential risks while taking 
advantage of upside opportunities to build better systems that will meet warfighters’ 
changing requirements as they face a more uncertain environment. 
On the other hand, if acquisition managers follow management practices that lead to 
proprietary, non-collaborative solutions, their number of options (and, thus, the requirement 
for the use of their dark matter) are reduced. This, in turn, could lead to a reduction in 
warfighting capability compared to situations in which OA and open business models are 
employed, in which management dark matter can be more easily utilized by acquisitions 
management.   
Framing these options using the real options analysis method is one way to structure 
managers analysis that also takes advantage of KVA data.  This technique has the potential 
to provide managers a way to achieve more consistent results or organizational outcomes 
over time.  Such techniques as real options and KVA can support managers in producing 
more informed dark matter outputs that will lead to better outcomes over time.   
Benefits of Measuring the Value Added of Management 
This method for measuring the performance of managing activities provides a variety 
of new kinds of information for executives, investors, and managers. These include: 
 a method to test the value of different management techniques (including those 
advocated in prior research) 
 information that investors could use to determine the performance of managers  
 new ways to determine a salary or reward system based on managers’ verifiable 
contributions 
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 a basic return on management (ROM) measure at any level of aggregation in an 
organization 
 performance feedback to motivate managers to best utilize their individual 
talents/strengths 
This new information would allow Adam Smith’s invisible hand of the competitive 
market place to manifest itself in determining manager rewards and would allow managers 
to concentrate on techniques that are proven to increase their value.   
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Appendix A. Future Research—The Delta Problem 
The ultimate goal of the approach is to allocate some amount revenue to amount of 
management dark matter of outputs. This will become more likely when we have the 
derivative (coefficient) necessary to convert the dark matter correlational deltas to absolute 
numbers.  The delta will be proportional to revenue with a given coefficient (that is yet to be 
discovered), once the coefficient is established. 
Example of the problem: 
Al Smith, manager of X process, generated 1Gigabyte of (relevant) dark matter 
based messages during January.  In February, he generated 2 Gigabytes of dark matter 
messages. In March, he generated .5 Gigabytes of dark messages. In January, the 
company made $100 in revenue, in February it made $400 in revenue, and in March it made 
$200 in revenue. Correlating Al’s amount of dark matter messages per month with revenue 
per month we establish a relatively negative correlation between the two values. We can 
then check the volatility of the company’s revenue performance and Al’s dark matter 
messages over the same 3 months and correlate these volatilities. Now we have 2 
correlations: between revenue and Al’s amount of dark matter messages and between 
volatility of revenue and volatility of Al’s amount of messages per month.  The correlation 
coefficient between the two would allow us to eliminate the dark messages that are not 
related to the revenue.  We would then be able to predict the manager’s activities based on 
changes in revenue or vice versa.   
We need to establish the percentage of relevant (i.e., dark matter based) to irrelevant 
manager messages for every time period in terms of dark matter outputs. The volume of 
irrelevant messages should be independent of the prior time period. The amount of 
irrelevant messages is independent from revenue; the correlation of relevant messages to 
revenue should be very high when a manager is influencing corporate outcomes. The 
correlation between relevant and irrelevant messages also should be very low.  
These basic conditions can be tested in empirical research. The results of the 
research should help us establish the coefficient that will allow us to translate correlational 
deltas into absolute numbers so that revenue can then be allocated to dark matter outputs. 
Appendix B. Correlating the Delta in Value and Management 
Dark Matter Activity  
Once the problems of establishing a method of bifurcating relevant and irrelevant 
dark matter messages has been resolved, it will be necessary to provide the method for 
relating changes in dark matter activity with changes in value (e.g., revenue, capability).  To 
do this, we would have to establish a baseline dark matter measure for each manager 
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against which to calculate the rolling averages to generate the delta estimates.  The 
corresponding time periods deltas would also be calculated to enable the correlations. Over 
time with a large sample size, it will be possible to estimate the optimal number of dark 
matter messages for a given level of environmental, market uncertainty.  
Assumptions and Algorithms 
In what follows, we lay out the basic algorithmic framework and assumptions for 
estimating the correlation between the management dark matter delta and value (e.g., 
revenue, capability) delta.26  This approach will assume a conservative semantic 
interpretation that would permit estimation of amount of dark matter outputs in common 
units. The following algorithms are a preliminary attempt to describe the delta correlation 
approach. 
The basic equation that accounts for all of the outputs of an organization at a given 
point in time is: 
N (i.e., number of firings of a process, activity) x A (i.e., amount of complexity for one 
firing) +  M (i.e., relevant dark matter management activity). Stated more simply: 
N x A + M = Total Value (T) 
To measure the change in this equation from time period 1 to time 2, it is possible to 
compute the total value produced in T1 and subtract that from the total outputs in T2 in the 
following equation:  
Total value time period (T1) = N¹ x A¹+ M¹ 
Total value time period (T2) = N² x A² + M² 
The delta for value over the two time periods can be stated as: 
(N1 – N2) x  A + (M1 – M2) =  delta in value resulting from dark management activities. 
   N²  - N¹             (M²- M¹)     corresponds to → R²  - R¹ 
 A¹    (N² - N¹)     x   A  +   (N² - N¹)      corresponds to   → N²  - N¹      
             (M4  - M3) →   (R4  - R3) 
 A   +     (N4  - N3)  →   (N4  - N3) 
 M  - M³  ___ M² – M¹ → (R  - R³)  __ R²  - R¹ 
              N  - N³         N²  - N¹→  (N  - N³)       N²  - N¹ 
The degree of change from one period to the next resulting from this dark 
management activity should correspond to the change in value (e.g., revenue, capability) 
from the same two time periods. This equation can be stated as follows (where V = revenue 
or capability): 
                                                
26 The approach is incomplete at this juncture because we do not have the coefficient that would allow 
us to derive an absolute number (i.e., in common units of output) that would lead to allocation of value 
to management dark matter activity. 
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A1 (N2 – N1) / (N1 – N2)  x A + (M2 – M1) / (N2 – N1) →  (V2 – V1) / (N1 – N2 )   
The above formulation assumes that we have separated out irrelevant messages 
from M and that M represents relevant messages. It also assumes that management 
messages that can be found in the outputs of current processes are algorithmically definable 
and, therefore, accounted for using the routine KVA methodology.  This formulation 
assumes that redundant messages have been eliminated to prevent over-estimation of M.  
This formulation also assumes that it is possible to derive all estimates from historical data. 
Appendix C. Observations about Over-estimates of Dark Matter 
Our formulation of the effect of management dark matter activities on organizational 
value can lead to some interesting observations about managers who generate dark matter 
activities that may not contribute to organization value. For example, when the change in 
value is 0, the corresponding change in M should also be 0.  Managers whose generation of 
dark matter messages do not correlate with organizational performance may be creating a 
lot of “churn” but little value. Given a large number of time periods, the manager whose dark 
matter messages do not correlate with organizational performance would be seen as one 
who was not providing unique management contributions that had an impact on 
organization’s value-generating capabilities. 
This formulation does not reward redundancy in management dark matter 
messages. For example, the manager who issues the command, “Work Harder!” everyday 
for a given time period would only get credit for one message because the following “Work 
Harder!” messages would be redundant with the first. Only new and unique messages would 
be counted in the total M for this given manager.  
This formulation also would lead to the conclusion that management dark matter 
would have little influence on organizational value generation when the organization was 
operating in a very stable environment with little risk or uncertainty. There should be a 
corresponding increase in management dark matter activity when an organization 
encounters turbulence, risk, and even higher opportunities for increased value. It follows that 
the complexity of a management environment increases in correspondence with increases 
in environmental uncertainty or risk, and the amount of dark matter messages should also 
increase correspondingly in response.  For example, instructing an employee to “paint the 
door green” in routine operations is much less complex than trying to predict how the market 
will respond to green doors as tastes change. Similarly in the military environment, an 
officer’s instructions to move supplies from point A to point B in peace-time would be less 
complex than in war-time, when there are increasing risks and uncertainties that must be 
dealt with.  
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27 This paper draws from Greenfield, V.A., & Camm, F. (2005). Performance and risk 
management in the Balkans Support Contract (MG-282-A). Santa Monica, CA: RAND, which can 
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experience in Iraq,” held at The George Washington University on January 28, 2005, and a paper 
presented at a conference of the American Bar Association on March 3, 2006.  We thank the 
sponsors of the originating RAND report; however, we bear sole responsibility for all errors or 
omissions and for the views expressed in this paper, which are our own and do not reflect those 
of our employers or the research sponsor. 
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For centuries, the US military has wrestled with decisions about when and how to 
use private contractors, especially “Contractors on the Battlefield.”  Reports of mixed 
performance, inexperienced contracting officers, miscommunication, and profiteering 
date back to the Revolutionary War.  History may be “living history,” in part, because 
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decision-makers have lacked adequate means of systematically anticipating future 
outcomes and harvesting lessons from the past.  The US military’s risk-management 
framework, a familiar tool in other operational settings, may fill that void.  To illustrate, 
this paper applies the framework to the Army’s Balkans Support Contract (BSC); the 
contract covers a variety of life support, transportation, and maintenance services and 
has registered a substantial track record in deployment.  The application demonstrates 
the utility of the risk-management framework and draws general lessons from the BSC 
experience for selecting service providers and for contract development, management, 
and oversight.  Four deceptively simple lessons emerge from the analysis: first, not all 
risks are inherently contractual; most are environmental or activity-based. Second, risk is 
dynamic; appropriate responses change over time. Third, a contract is only as good as 
its customer; design and execution determine outcomes. And fourth, risk management is 
not risk elimination; not all risk can or should be eliminated. 
Introduction 
For centuries, the US military has wrestled with decisions about when and how to 
use private contractors, especially “Contractors on the Battlefield.”  Under what 
circumstance should it hire contractors and, if it does hire them, what can it do to insure 
that it gets what it wants, when it wants it, at a reasonable cost? 
Shrader (1999, p. 3) describes the use of contractors in the Revolutionary War 
and the apparent timelessness of the Army’s experience: 
The Army experience with private contractors in the War for Independence 
contained most of the elements which would characterize the later use of 
contractors on the battlefield: mixed results in terms of performance and 
adequate support for the troops; lack of experience and expertise on the part of 
Army officers in dealing with contractors; lack of clarity in communications 
between the Army and supporting contractors as to requirements, capabilities, 
and costs; and financial manipulation and desire to increase profits at the 
expense of the Army on the part of contractors. 
Much of what Shrader describes rings true today, but why?  History may be 
“living history,” in part, for reasons of resources and culture, e.g., the number of billets 
allocated to contract oversight and the relative status of contracting officers, and, in part, 
for reasons of analytical capability: decision-makers have lacked adequate—both 
tractable and broadly applicable—means of systematically anticipating future outcomes 
and harvesting lessons from the past.  A prospective analysis would enable planning, 
and a retrospective analysis would enable evaluation. 
The US military’s risk-management framework, a familiar tool in other operational 
settings, offers one possible means of filling the analytical void: it is simple and easy to 
use and can be replicated under wide-ranging circumstance.  The framework consists of 
a 5-step continuous risk-management process—(1) identifying hazards, (2) assessing 
hazards, (3) developing controls and making risk decisions, (4) implementing controls, 
and (5) supervising and reviewing—and a complementary risk-assessment matrix.  
Decision-makers can use the framework to recast “when” and “how” in terms more 
amenable to systematic analysis: what risks does contracting present; how do they 
compare to the risks involved in using US military, host nation, or other support; and 
how, if at all, can any or all of those risks be mitigated—and at what cost? 
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To illustrate, this paper applies the risk-management framework to the Army’s 
Balkans Support Contract (BSC).  With particular attention to hazard identification and 
assessment, the application demonstrates the utility of the framework and draws general 
lessons from the BSC experience for selecting service providers—of different types—
and for contract development, management, and oversight. 
We chose the BSC because it covers a variety of life support, transportation, and 
maintenance services, and it has registered a substantial track record in deployment.  
Prior to the war in Iraq, it was also the largest contract of its kind, both in terms of dollars 
and contract staff.  Among its limits as a case study, the BSC does not cover all types of 
services—it does not, for example, provide weapon system support. 
In the sections that follow, we review the origins, principles, and structure of the 
BSC as the basis for analysis, present and apply the US Military’s risk-management 
framework, and summarize our findings. 
BSC Origins, Principles, Structure, and Participants 
The BSC, as described in this paper, began operating in 1999, but can trace its 
roots to the first Logistics Civil Augmentation Plan (LOGCAP) contract, which the Army 
awarded to Brown and Root Services, now Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), in 1992.28  
The Army established LOGCAP as a performance-based, indefinite-delivery-indefinite-
quantity (IDIQ), pre-planned umbrella contract, capable of delivering a wide range of 
services worldwide, in contingencies or crises, on demand.  Flexibility and 
responsiveness are central concepts in LOGCAP and other such contracts. 
 A performance-based contract tells the contractor what the customer wants 
done, but does not tell the contractor how to do it.  The contractor is free to 
leverage its resources, including expertise. 
 An IDIQ contract does not specify the delivery date or exact quantities at the time 
of the award; instead, the customer orders services and work under the contract, 
as needed.  This level of generality can accommodate uncertainty about timing 
and quantities. 
 In a pre-planned contract, the contractor develops an implementation plan for a 
future contingency, ideally in close collaboration with the customer.  The plan 
should cover all activities posited in the statement of work, potentially reducing 
turnaround times on service and work orders. 
                                                
28 The BSC is now in its second iteration; the first, as described in this paper, expired in 2004.  On 
June 21, 2005, the Army awarded a re-specified firm-fixed-price and cost-plus-award-fee contract 
to KBR for a 5-year term; the Army solicited 66 bids on September 29, 2003, and received three.  
The contract’s spending limit is $1.25 billion.  (For more information, see 
www.defenselink.mil/contracts and Halliburton (2005) at www.halliburton.com.)  This paper 
addresses the terms of the BSC as established in 1999 and modified over the primary period of 
research encompassed in Greenfield and Camm (2005), i.e., 2001-2003.  For a much more 
detailed treatment of the contract, see Greenfield and Camm (2005), which draws material from: 
CETAC (1998), CETAC (1999), CETAC (2001), and CETAC (2002); CETAC-OC (1997); Kolar 
(1997); McElroy (1999); USACE (1994); Wynn (2000); and others.  For a particularly readable 
overview of the contract and the roles of its participants, see Wynn (2000). 
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 An umbrella contract covers a broad range of activities, hence the term 
“umbrella,” but the customer can choose to turn to other service providers on a 
task-by-task basis as it sees fit; indeed, under certain circumstances the 
customer must consider using other providers, including other contractors, US 
military personnel, and host-nation support. 
The Army activated the LOGCAP contract in the Balkans in 1995.  In 1997, the 
Army replaced the Balkans element of the LOGCAP contract with a sole-source contract 
and, almost two years later, the Army awarded the BSC in an open competitive process 
based on “best overall value.”  The selection factors for the BSC award consisted of: the 
management execution plan, the contractor’s experience, the contractor’s past 
performance, and cost (CETAC, 1998).  The cost factor spoke to realism, completeness, 
and financial capability, but not directly to level.  The selection process weighed all non-
cost factors equally—together, they were deemed “significantly more important” than 
cost—and considered performance risk for all four factors. 
The principles and structure of the BSC closely mirror those of the original 
LOGCAP contract and impart similar flexibilities to both the customer and the contractor.  
The BSC is also a performance-based, IDIQ, pre-planned umbrella contract.  As such, 
the contract confers an opportunity, but not an obligation to obtain life support, 
transportation, and maintenance services.  The performance-based work scope tells the 
contractor what needs to be done, e.g., that the Army requires laundry, food, waste 
removal, road repair, or other services, but it does not tell the contractor how many 
people or what type of equipment to use. 
And, as was true of the LOGCAP contract, the BSC is also a cost-plus-award-fee 
(CPAF) contract. 
The CPAF payment structure warrants further consideration, especially with 
regard to the incentives it creates for cost control and cost inflation.  The bases for 
award-fee calculations, cost reimbursement, and future contract awards each play a part 
in determining those incentives. 
First, award-fee payments are calculated on the basis of negotiated estimated 
costs, not actual costs, and they depend on the results of regularly scheduled 
performance evaluations.  In the BSC, the contractor may obtain an award-fee payment 
of up to 8% of the negotiated estimated cost, depending on its performance rating.  If, for 
example, the contractor receives a perfect score in a performance evaluation and the 
estimated negotiated cost of the service it provides is $100, then it would receive an $8 
award-fee payment; if the estimated negotiate cost is $50, it would receive a $4 award-
fee payment; and so on.  If it receives a less-than-perfect score, it would receive a pre-
determined fraction of the $8 or $4 award-fee payment. 
If actual costs differ from estimated costs, the award-fee payment will only 
change if the difference affects the contractor’s performance rating, which would 
depend, in turn, on the specification of the performance-evaluation criteria.  If cost is 
among the criteria, the contractor might obtain a higher rating (and payment) for lower 
costs and a lower rating (and payment) for higher costs.  The BSC criteria have to 
varying degrees addressed cost, quality, coordination, flexibility, and responsiveness. 
Second, CPAF means that the Army reimburses only those costs that are 
“reasonable,” “allowable,” and “allocable” under the contract (Wynn, 2000, p. 6).  The 
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Army must approve the expenditure.  If the contractor spends above and beyond the 
cost estimate, the contractor may not get that approval.  Moreover, even if the contactor 
gets the approval, it may, as already noted, obtain a lower rating in its performance 
evaluation, which would, in turn, result in a lower award-fee payment. 
Third, if the contractor develops a reputation for inflating costs; that is, spending 
above and beyond the negotiated estimated costs, the Army might not view it favorably 
in future competitions for other contracts. 
Together, these three considerations suggest that, once the customer and 
contractor have finished negotiating the cost estimate, the CPAF structure provides little 
or no incentive to inflate cost, could provide incentive to control cost, and may even 
provide incentive to reduce costs, if reductions result in higher performance ratings.  
Inflating cost will not generate more award fee; indeed, it may result in less fee and 
fewer future contract awards.  However, tensions may arise when quality is also a 
criterion, particularly if additional spending can improve the quality of service.29  Higher 
costs, all else constant, might result in a lower performance rating, but higher quality, all 
else constant, might result in a higher rating.  The contractor’s response to these 
competing incentives would depend on their relative weights and net effect in the 
evaluation process, which would also depend on the preferences of the customer. 
Ultimately, the CPAF structure places the burden on the customer to clearly 
establish and articulate its needs and preferences in developing the contract, to 
scrutinize the contractor’s plans, to firmly negotiate appropriate cost estimates, to closely 
review actual costs when the contractor presents them for approval and reimbursement, 
and to uphold its preferences in the performance-evaluation process.  The analysis of 
the BSC that follows confirms each of these points in part or whole. 
Finally, the contract’s participants constitute a near “cast of thousands,” spanning 
the globe, contributing a range of talents, skills, and other resources, and representing 
diverse and sometimes conflicting interests.  For example, US Army Europe in Germany 
is the bill-payer; the operational units deployed in the theater are among the end-users; 
the US Army Corp of Engineers in Winchester, VA, provides the Principle Contracting 
Officer (PCO); and the contractor, KBR in Houston, TX, provides service.  The Defense 
Contract Management Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency also provide 
substantial administrative support.  Notwithstanding several foregoing references to “the 
customer” as if it were a single monolithic entity, the interests of the bill-payer, end-
users, PCO, and others are not necessarily the same and at times may be at odds with 
one another.  In particular, end-users may want more or better service from the contract 
and the bill-payer may want lower cost, leaving the PCO to address resulting frictions.  
                                                
29 Economists would also note two other considerations: first, the possibility of low-balling in the 
negotiation to win the award, with the intent to charge actual, higher costs later; and, second, the 
possibility of inflating costs in the current period to increase the value of contracts in later periods.  
In the first instance, issues of reimbursements and award-fee determinations could discourage 
low-balling.  In the second instance, another factor would come into play, i.e., the potential for 
future gain.  The contractor would need to assess the effect of its current behavior on the 
likelihood of winning a future contract and weigh the possible sacrifice of current earnings, e.g., 
through loss of reimbursement or award-fee payment, against the value added to future 
contracts, appropriately discounted. 
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Given the PCO’s “location” between the end-users and the bill-payer, he or she may 
have a strong interest in minimizing those frictions. 
The Risk-management Framework 
Army and joint doctrine (Department of the Army, 1998; Department of the Army, 
Marine Corps, Navy, & Air Force, 2001) provide a risk-management framework that can 
be used to identify hazards, assess their probability and severity, establish risk-
mitigation measures or risk controls, and compare risks and potential responses across 
alternative service providers.30  The framework consists of a 5-step continuous risk-
management process and a complementary risk-assessment matrix.  The doctrine 
focuses on tactical and operational considerations, but refers to other applications, 
including contracting.  Discussions with Army and other military personnel suggest that 
the underlying concepts are ingrained in their thinking about deployment generally, but 
not in their thinking about the use of contractors specifically. 
The Army31 defines risk as the, “chance of hazard or bad consequences; the 
probability of exposure to chance of injury or loss from a hazard; risk level is expressed 
in terms of hazard probability and severity” (Department of the Army, 1998, p. Glossary-
2).  The Army further defines hazard as, “a condition or activity with potential to cause 
damage, loss, or mission degradation” and any actual or potential condition that can 
cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment and 
property; or mission degradation (Department of the Army, 1998, pp. Glossary-1 and 2-
2).32  In loose, non-technical terms, “bad things” can happen in a field operation or 
elsewhere, with varying degrees of likelihood and impact. 
The 5-step risk-management process unfolds as follows: 
First, “Identify hazards” by analyzing the mission, listing possible hazards, and 
listing their causes.  This step is forward-looking: for example, a hypothetical planner 
faces concerns about a service provider’s performance, e.g., will food be cold or roads 
impassable (see the discussion in the following section).  The planner identifies specific 
“bad things” and, perhaps as importantly, their causes.  Failure to identify the causes—
especially the sometimes less obvious root causes—could lead a planner to suggest the 
wrong type of risk control, which could either leave the risk unchecked or create 
additional risk.  An assertion that “bad things can happen” won’t suffice. 
                                                
30 Greenfield and Camm (2005) offer a more detailed treatment of risk, the risk-management 
framework, and the applicability of the framework. 
31 The Army (1998) and joint (2001) doctrine each make use of slightly different vocabulary in 
their discussions of risk; this analysis draws primarily from the Army doctrine. 
32 Department of the Army (1998, p. ii) defines “mission” as including “mission, operation, or task.” 
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Figure 1.  A 5-step Continuous Risk-management Process  
(Department of the Army (1998); Department of the Army et al. (2001)) 
 
Second, how likely is it that the “bad things” will happen and how bad are they?  
This step, assessing hazard probability and severity, can be used to establish priorities 
for allocating resources and, speaking to the issue at hand, determining whether or not a 
contract is an appropriate vehicle.  As shown in Figure 2, Army doctrine provides a 
simple matrix for addressing the issues.  Third, develop controls and make risk 
decisions.  With a reasonable understanding of the hazards and their potential 
consequences, the planner can develop controls, determine residual risk, and make risk 
decisions.  The process instructs the planner to make decisions about how much risk to 
accept, implying that it may not be possible or appropriate to eliminate all risk.  Fourth, 
implement controls in the operating environment and, if possible, before entering the 
operating environment.  Fifth, supervise and review the process and develop new 
controls.  This step enables continuous feedback.  At this stage, it may be helpful to re-
invoke steps one and two to review any realized hazards—what “bad things” have 
actually happened, what caused them, and how bad are they? 
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Figure 2. Risk-assessment Matrix: How Likely and How Bad?  
(Department of the Army (1998); Department of the Army et al. (2001)) 
 
The BSC in Theory and Practice 
This section focuses on applications of Steps One and Two of the 5-step 
process: first, in a prospective assessment of underlying hazards in the BSC; second, in 
a retrospective assessment of the contract’s performance. 
Underlying Hazards 
Two broad categories of hazards emerge from a review of the BSC work scope 
and its operating environment.  One category relates to the performance and cost of 
day-to-day activities, such as food preparation, laundry, road repair, and waste removal; 
the other to higher-order concerns about mission success, force management, and 
safety and security.33  Context matters.  Faulty road repairs may delay a postal delivery 
in one instance and prevent troops from reaching the battlefield in another. 
Framed in terms of the risk-assessment matrix in Figure 2, a planner might rank 
most day-to-day hazards as negligibly or marginally severe and most higher-order 
hazards as critically or catastrophically severe. 
In some instances, hazards across and within categories are interrelated.  For 
example, seemingly minor day-to-day problems can give rise to higher-order concerns 
over time.  If quality-of-life suffers, e.g., if food is cold, laundry is dirty, and latrines 
overflow, the Army may have difficulty recruiting and retaining troops.  Moreover, if the 
                                                
33 Mission success includes readiness. 
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costs of these services are too high,34 the Army may eventually run short of funding for 
other mission-essential activities.  Hazards may also involve trade-offs between 
competing objectives, especially cost and quality.  Typically, the customer must pay 
more to get more, sometimes, as already noted, causing tension and friction among 
contractors, bill-payers, end-users, and PCO’s. 
Categorizing and recognizing relationships among hazards is important to 
understanding the nature of risk; but drilling down to underlying causality yields equally 
important insight for developing risk controls. 
Consider an anecdotal example: a soldier returns from a late shift, cannot get a 
hot meal, and complains.  The immediate hazard is the lack of a hot meal, but what is 
the cause?  The most obvious answer might be, “a closed kitchen,” possibly because the 
contractor is short staffed, but the terms of the BSC point elsewhere.  The BSC directs 
the contractor to “Provide 24-hour food service operations”; however, it also calls for 
“limited food service during non-meal hours” (CETAC, 1998).  As such, the contract does 
not require hot meals after the late shift.  It permits and arguably directs the opposite.  In 
this case, the “cause” is the underlying statement of work.  The customer is getting what 
it asked for, nothing more and nothing less. 
Had the analysis ended with a closed kitchen or short staffing, a planner—or 
reviewer—might have suggested the wrong control, perhaps a staffing mandate, which 
might have increased cost, but would not have solved the problem. 
As this example suggests, one possible source of hazard is the contract itself or, 
more accurately, a poorly framed statement of work.  On this basis, it might be tempting 
to argue for eliminating the contract—if the contract is the source of the hazard, why not 
eliminate the contract?  Merely shifting to another provider, e.g., a US military provider, 
will not resolve the problem if the customer continues to misstate its needs; moreover, 
shifting from contract personnel to troops could reduce the availability of troops for other 
activities that only they can perform. 
Framing can be made better or worse with performance standards.  In a 
performance-based contract, such standards do not specify “how”; rather, they clarify 
“what” and, ideally, provide an objective basis for evaluation.  Without standards, the 
contractor may substitute its own or other commonly accepted standards and may 
provide the wrong service or the wrong amount of service.  However, if standards are 
overly prescriptive they may negate intended flexibility. 
A lack of performance standards may also contribute to so-called gold-plating, in 
which a contractor provides better or more service than is necessary at a higher cost.  
But, gold-plating cannot occur without willing participants on both sides of the contractual 
table.  A CPAF contract might create incentives to over-provide by rewarding higher-
quality service with a higher performance rating, but the customer must approve the 
contractor’s plan, negotiate the cost estimate, and authorize reimbursements for actual 
costs.  Ultimately, it takes two—or more—to gold-plate effectively. 
                                                
34 Separate from concerns about intentional cost inflation, realized costs might be higher than 
expected costs within the confines of “reasonable, allowable, and allocable.” 
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Other possible sources of hazard include ambiguous roles and responsibilities 
and inadequate communication and coordination.  For example, a contract that calls for 
weekly deliveries of fuel oil should specify whether the contractor or the customer is 
providing the fuel, the truck, or the security.  If the customer is providing any of these 
goods or services, it must be aware of and plan for its commitment; moreover, the 
customer must communicate with the contractor and vice versa, e.g., regarding 
timetables and whereabouts, to coordinate activities. 
More recently, attention has turned to two other issues involving “roles and 
responsibilities,” those of chain of command and protections under international law.  
Contractors operate through the contracting chain of command and outside the military 
chain of command, which has raised concerns about responsiveness in the field; in 
some circumstances, their standing under international law is uncertain, which has 
raised concerns about their security.35 
BSC Performance 
Realized hazards under the BSC have involved day-to-day activities, with 
unsatisfactory outcomes arising from poorly stated service or work orders, inadequate 
communication and coordination, and incentives to accept higher costs in exchange for 
higher quality.  Higher-order concerns have not borne fruit. 
A GAO36 report (2000a) on controlling costs in the BSC describes an instance in 
which planned firefighting services would have been too costly and potentially 
unsupportable, but available evidence strongly suggests that a lack of performance 
standards and communication between the customer and contractor contributed to the 
conflict.  Concerns about unnecessary redundancy in power generation also seem to 
have had their roots, at least partly, in standards and communication issues.  The GAO 
report also suggests instances of gold-plating.  It describes spending on base camp 
personalization, e.g., changing street names for each new rotation of troops. 
Another GAO report (2000b) issued at about the same time finds a high level of 
customer satisfaction with services under the BSC.  The concurrent release of the two 
GAO reports—one criticizing spending and the other praising quality-of-life—calls to 
mind the inherent tension between cost and quality.  The two reports address different 
costs and qualities, but the juxtaposition is striking. 
Acknowledging a need to better control costs, the Army responded to the GAO 
by clarifying its service requirements, by publishing a handbook of performance 
standards,37 and by placing greater emphasis on cost, especially in performance criteria.  
It re-oriented the criteria to weigh cost more heavily and to require ongoing reductions. 
                                                
35 For background on these issues, see Department of the Army (2003); for a more general 
discussion of concerns about readiness in this and other contracts, see GAO (2003). 
36 GAO is now known as the “US Government Accountability Office”; at the time of the report cited 
here, it was known as the “US General Accounting Office.” 
37 The Army issued a call to more closely scrutinize services just prior to the publication of the 
GAO report. 
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The Army’s response may reflect a natural shift in priorities.  At the start of an 
operation, the Army may seek to allocate managerial talent and manpower to mission-
essential activities; it may be more willing—and able—to devote these resources to 
controlling costs as the operation proceeds. 
Lessons for Future Operations 
The foregoing analysis applies the US military’s risk-management framework to 
the BSC to consider hazards, both prospectively and retrospectively.  The results 
suggest four general lessons for future operations. 
First, not all risks are inherently contractual.  Few of the hazards uncovered in 
the BSC were “contractual” per se; most were environmental or activity-based, including 
those stemming from trade-offs that the Army—or any customer—routinely faces, 
regardless of the provider.  Were the hazards attributed solely to contracting, any 
subsequent risk controls (including any decisions to replace contract personnel with 
troops) might be ineffectual or worse.  Staffing with troops will not guarantee the “right” 
services if the customer asks for the “wrong” services; alternatively, a staffing mandate 
will not correct a statement of work, but may incur unnecessary costs. 
But, risks are not identical across providers.  The probability and severity of 
hazards and the costs of controls may differ by type of provider, as in the case of 
security requirements.  Moreover, in some instances, the hazards themselves will differ, 
as when concerns arise about the chain of command or about the status of contractor 
employees under international law.  Clearly, the results of the analysis will be 
circumstance-specific and will depending on conditions in the operating environment. 
The real lesson is to compare risks, controls, and costs across potential service 
providers—be they contractors, US military, host nation, or otherwise—considering both 
common and unique hazards and conditions in the operating environment.  For example, 
a contractor’s employees may require more security than US military personnel, 
especially in an unstable operating environment, such as at or near the battlefield, but 
the Army may still use fewer resources on balance if opts for the contactor. 
Second, risk is dynamic, and appropriate responses may change over time.  
Prominent concerns at the start of an operation may differ vastly from those at the end of 
an operation.  Action typically dominates the start.  Initially, the customer must focus on 
getting the job done and might be willing to pay a premium to do so, especially if it 
means increasing mission effectiveness by freeing up managerial talent and manpower 
for other purposes.  The customer, either explicitly or implicitly, may be considering the 
“price” of controlling cost in the face of other resource constraints.  However, as the 
operation proceeds and conditions stabilize, concerns about cost tend to increase.  GAO 
criticisms of the BSC and the Army’s response suggest that cost became a more central 
theme as conditions stabilized in the Balkans. 
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Third, the contract is only as good as its customer.  The success of a contract 
hinges first on its design and then on its execution, including the selection process, 
management, and oversight.38  This means that the customer must be able to: 
 Clearly establish and articulate its needs, including its preferences for cost and 
quality in the face of tradeoffs; 
 Carefully review the contractor’s plans, firmly negotiate appropriate cost 
estimates, and judge the validity of actual costs; 
 Uphold its preferences during the performance-evaluation process; and 
 Communicate effectively, coordinate activities, and respond to changes in the 
operating environment as they arise. 
Here too, the customer faces a potential hazard; that is, if it is overly prescriptive 
in stating its needs, it may lose some of the flexibility it initially sought in the contract, 
especially in a performance-based, IDIQ contract. 
A participatory “cast of thousands” may bring a richness of talents, skills, and 
other resources to the contract, but it also adds complexity and potential conflict to 
design and execution.  By implication, each participant—not just a single monolithic 
customer—must understand the terms of the contract and, as already noted, its roles 
and responsibilities under the contract.39 
For all these reasons, good training, especially with potentially less familiar 
constructs like CPAF contracting, is essential. 
Fourth, risk management is not risk elimination.  Not all risk can or should be 
eliminated, but decisions about how much risk to accept should be made consciously 
and intentionally with adequate information.  The Army—or any other customer—can 
structure a contract to address many forms of risk, but it may want or need to tolerate 
some.  The costs of controls might be too high in view of the probability and severity of 
the consequences.  Moreover, as conditions in the operating environment change, 
decisions about risk controls and acceptance may also change. 
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The reasons for the prevalence of contracted support for military deployments and 
combat operations are well known. In the 1990’s, the military force structure shrank as a 
dividend of the end of the Cold War. Contemporaneously, outsourcing proved its worth in 
both the private and public sectors. The Army pioneered a logistic civilian augmentation 
program (LOGCAP) followed by somewhat similar programs in the Navy and Air Force. 
While the support of civilians (both government and contractor) to the military was not new, 
the potential scope of the support and the existence of on-call world-wide support under 
LOGCAP was. In addition, the sophistication of weapons systems—especially those just 
entering the inventory—made civilian-specialist support essential. Moreover, the decision to 
devote more of the shrinking military to the fighting “tooth” rather to than the supporting “tail” 
tended to reduce KP, latrine details, and similar functions that had once been hallmarks of 
military service. 
Currently, the public debate concerning contractors supporting military operations 
seems to be dominated by “contracting” concerns rather than “military operations” concerns. 
Policy is driven not from the point of view of operations, but the point of view of contracting 
with its myriad rules and cast of players (many far removed from the scene of operations). 
Fortunately, a “one team/one fight” spirit seems to have prevailed so far in combat zones 
despite questionable bureaucratic responses and examples of political rhetoric approaching 
demagogy. 
Iraq dominates the current debate for obvious reasons. It is the scene of the most 
widespread and intense combat operations and the largest contingent of contractors 
supporting deployed military forces. Iraq is also the prime example of the potential mischief 
caused by a policy driven by the contract mentality rather than the operations mentality. No 
one is in charge! No one person, no one commander is in charge of, or even knows how 
many, contractors are in Iraq. This is not only a management problem but a potential legal 
(and perhaps not too much of a stretch to say, moral) problem. 
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While Iraq serves as an example of the frailty of current policy, the real failing is a 
lack of vision or imagination. The lessons of history and examples from other countries 
should be considered in crafting the optimum policy for contracted support for military 
operations. World War II is rich in lessons for various responses to problems we confront 
today; many of those lessons have been ignored. Foreign countries have crafted policies, 
such as Britain’s sponsored reserves, which while not panaceas, could prove beneficial if 
intelligently adapted and implemented in the environment of the American military. 
Our current system fails on a number of scores. Its failure of imagination is also a 
failure to implement some obvious and tried principles. The first principle that is ignored is 
unity of command. This should apply to the contractors who are now so important to the 
success of military operations as well as to the military. Part of the problem is that our so-
called “contracting” system is more a regulatory system than true contracting. A contracting 
regime should have as its prime principle facilitating transactions rather than regulating 
them. Personnel in a combat zone should be subject to certain common standards. A 
common code governing criminal conduct is prime among these. This research concludes 
that while policy development has addressed many important issues, it has lacked vision 
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Dr. Buhrkuhl's civilian awards include: Exceptional Civilian Service Award; Meritorious Civilian 
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Abstract 
One of the foundations of military command and control is that authority must match 
responsibility.  Yet in weapon system acquisition, a program manager is responsible to 
deliver capabilities to the warfighter without full control of the resources he needs to carry 
out this task.  Successful program managers recognize their dependencies upon other 
actors and execute their programs using a network with a common goal of enhancing a 
specific warfighting capability.  A hierarchical chain of command still exists, but the network 
enables the actors to carry out their objectives in an efficient and effective manner.  This 
report describes how the acquisition process purportedly works in hierarchical terms.  It also 
introduces a process model to describe the set of activities actually used and the actors who 
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are required to collaborate to deliver capabilities to the warfighter.  The analysis of those 
activities between actors reveals that weapon system acquisition behaves like a network.  
Describing acquisition in network terms allows those involved in weapon system acquisition 
oversight, policy, and practice to have new insights and measurement tools to understand 




Over one-hundred years ago, the Wright Brothers were the first to accomplish a 
manned, controlled, heavier-than-air-flight, making history at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, on 
December 17, 1903.  How did two bicycle mechanics from Dayton, Ohio, accomplish this 
feat against a host of inventors?  And, why did the Wright's lose their advantage and not 
continue to make aviation history?  The answer to both questions revolves around their 
networks.  Early on, the Wright's were not only inventors, they were networked innovators.  
Shulman concluded that their early success was due to their correspondence and sharing of 
ideas with Samuel Langley and flight historian Octave Chanute, who had built an extensive 
network within the aviation community (2002).  Following their successful flight, however, the 
Wright's network was limited through secrecy that was driven by a desire to patent the 
airplane and secure a monopoly, even Chanute's request for information about their maiden 
flights (Shulman, 2002).  The Wrights cut themselves off from their network, preferring to 
secure the patents rather than build upon their technological feat.  The loss of their network 
also led to stagnation in their innovation efforts.  Glenn Curtiss, on the other hand, was 
anything but secretive.  He and the Aerial Experiment Association built his June Bug aircraft 
and demonstrated flying to the public.  Eventually, Curtiss' collaborative network yielded the 
invention of 500 aviation devices, many of which are still in use today.  His factory invented 
and sold the flying boat to the Navy, along with 6,000 JN-1 Jenny's, making Curtiss Aircraft 
one of the largest aircraft companies in the world (Shulman, 2002).  In essence, the duel 
between the Wrights and Curtiss proved that the success of complex projects is predicated 
upon the structure of the project's network of collaborators. 
Would Curtiss recognize today's billion-dollar weapon system programs with their 
high-stakes decision-making process ensuring that entrepreneurs do not waste precious 
taxpayer resources?  Or, has the world not changed that much… Do successful programs 
still collaborate and network to successfully deliver capabilities to warfighters? 
Acquisition Process Problems 
Department of Defense (DoD) weapon system acquisition programs are plagued with 
performance shortfalls, and even more notably, cost and schedule overruns.  Addressing 
this problem has spawned numerous studies and reforms over many years.  Most recently, 
the push to reinvent government in the 1990s resulted in a series of reforms that led 
acquisition toward a market-based model.  Despite these efforts to improve efficiency, 
success has yet to be realized, with several recent studies noting increasing cost and 
schedule overruns.  Civilian and military officials at the highest levels in the Pentagon have 
expressed frustration at the lack of balance among the competing interests of cost, 
schedule, and performance in weapon system acquisition programs.  Given many 
stakeholders with multiple interests in the acquisition process and the inability of high-
ranking officials to achieve a balance among competing interests, assigning a program 
manager responsibility for balancing cost, schedule, and performance appears to be a 
nearly impossible task. 
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In addition to problems managing costs, schedule, and performance, warfighters are 
asking even more from their weapon systems, requiring capabilities that are joint, 
interoperable, and able to seamlessly share information.  Joint staffs are looking to gain an 
advantage on the battlefield based upon a revolution in military affairs driven by the 
explosion in information technology.  A weapon system program manager must manage not 
only her own baseline but, in addition, rely on capabilities from other systems that are also in 
development. 
Alternative Acquisition Organizations 
Along with many initiatives to solve the fundamental acquisition problem, the 
strategic assumptions underlying acquisition reforms point to three alternative organizations: 
hierarchical control, market solutions, or network collaboration.  Powell (1990) concluded 
that hierarchies, markets, and networks are the three basic forms of organization.  
Congressional and politically appointed civilian control of the weapon system acquisition 
process, along with the chain of command within the DoD, makes one think of acquisition in 
hierarchical terms.  Alternatively, weapon system acquisition relies heavily on contractors 
who possess the know-how and resources to produce major weapon systems.  A market-
based solution to acquisition problems is also rational.  Finally, acquisition programs create 
the need to cross organizational boundaries for decision-making—necessitating the need for 
a network form of governance. 
The policy-makers and practitioners within the weapon system acquisition process 
do not typically think of the process in network terms.  Yet, Powell (1990) concluded that 
networks are the predominant form of organization with a very few pure markets or 
hierarchies in existence.  This project is devoted to describing the acquisition process in 
network terms.  Therefore, the research question for this paper is:  Does the DoD weapon 
system acquisition process behave as a network? 
The focus of this project is to understand how weapon system acquisition programs 
accomplish their objectives, and whether those interactions fit within the description of a 
network.  This analysis will offer a new perspective on the acquisition process. 
Methodology 
Chapter II describes the acquisition process and its interactions with both the 
warfighters who describe weapon system capability needs and the budget staff who balance 
alternative needs against fiscal constraints.  A process model will be introduced to describe 
the full set of activities and interactions a program must go through from concept to delivery 
and operation. 
With the activities of the acquisition process in mind, Chapter III highlights the 
characteristics of networks.  A definition of networks is established, and aspects of networks 
are described from a review of literature.  Several network analysis techniques are coupled 
with a description of operating within networks, allowing an analysis of the acquisition 
process in network terms in Chapter IV. 
Finally, Chapter V offers conclusions to the basic research question of whether 
weapon system acquisition may be described in network terms.  Further, several 
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Weapon System Acquisition Process 
The Department of Defense (DoD) weapon system acquisition process must be 
described before it can be characterized as a hierarchy, network, or market.  This Chapter 
will describe the acquisition process and its interactions with other key processes.  To 
analyze these interactions, a detailed process model will be introduced that describes the 
activities and actors involved in transforming inputs into outputs in the form of knowledge 
and, ultimately, weapon systems. 
Background 
The mission of defense acquisition is to deliver needed capabilities to warfighters.  In 
the hands of warfighters, these capabilities are able to produce constructive effects on the 
battlefield.  The defense acquisition system is, in essence, developing the set of equipment 
that will be used to fight the next war.  The process of collaboration among competing 
agencies to make these decisions is a very complex task that combines optimization of 
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities 
(DOTMLPF) solutions within the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System 
(JCIDS).  Additionally, these decisions are dynamic, changing over time in response to 
environmental variables.  This results in changing desires and continuing debate over what 
is the best solution.   
Further, delivering materiel capability requires a complex set of actors, and even 
more stakeholders, who, from markedly different perspectives, seek to optimize the various 
processes of technology development, integration, test and evaluation, production, fielding, 
and sustainment of weapon systems.  Nevertheless, the governing directive within the DoD, 
Directive 5000.1, gives the Program Manager the purported authority and the clear 
responsibility to deliver required capabilities to the warfighter (Department of Defense, 
2003a).  Therefore, the Program Manager must find ways to shape the capability needs 
from the JCIDS requirements generation system; choose a design architecture, mature 
technologies, and develop an acquisition strategy within the Defense Acquisition System; 
and seek resources from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
System.  Dynamic interaction among these systems is required to deliver a capability to the 
warfighter.  Kadish, et al., described this interaction as the "Big A" acquisition process 
(2006).  This paper will use this cross-cutting definition of the acquisition process.  
This chapter will highlight the key processes and interactions required to deliver a 
capability.  The JCIDS, Defense Acquisition System, and PPBE system will be briefly 
examined.  A process model will be introduced to highlight the depth and complexity of the 
interactions the acquisition process must perform to deliver a capability. 
 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was born out of 
the perception that each service parochially examined alternatives within its own core 
competencies, rather than from the perspective of a joint warfighting environment.  The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created a framework where Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMs) are responsible for joint operations, and service secretaries and commanders 
are responsible to organize, train, and equip the military to conduct army, naval, and air 
operations in support of the combatant commanders (Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986).  The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the COCOMs a significant voice in the funding process.  JCIDS 
essentially took the next step and institutionalized a process in which requirements are 
jointly conceived, validated, and approved prior to each service implementing those needs. 
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The other effect of JCIDS is to define capabilities gaps rather than threat-driven 
needs.  The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01 E defined 
capabilities as: 
The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and 
conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of 
tasks. It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational 
terms in the format of a joint or initial capabilities document or a joint doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendation (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2005).  
 JCIDS Pattern of Relationships 
The drivers of the JCIDS process are the representatives of the warfighting 
community.  The Combatant Commands and Joint Staff run key portions of the process.  
The services’ requirements communities become involved as they sponsor an approach that 
falls inside one of their warfighting core competencies.  One difficulty in the JCIDS process 
is getting the services involved without corrupting the process by making it a forum for the 
each service to argue for its preferred approach.  JCIDS is supposed to avoid this problem 
through Joint Staff analysis of capability gaps identified by the Combatant Commands. 
Several presentations at the PEO/SYSCOM Conference in December 2003 outlined 
what are essentially opposing views on the service's role during a panel on aligning JCIDS 
and the Defense Acquisition System.  Dr Glenn Lamartin, OSD(AT&L) Director of Defense 
Systems noted throughout his briefing that the new JCIDS and Acquisition policies had to be 
followed with collaborative relationships between the OSD, the Functional Capabilities 
Boards, and the Services to support decision-making (2003).  Dr. Nancy Spruill, OSD(AT&L) 
Director of Acquisition Resources and Analysis, supported a view that the OSD ought to be 
the decision-maker in the process, holding cross-cutting Defense Acquisition Boards and 
either cutting or accelerating service programs to meet joint needs (2003).  Essentially, Dr 
Spruill viewed the services as materiel providers who would react to OSD-defined solutions, 
whereas Dr Lamartin valued the services’ inputs to the joint architectures and decisions as a 
critical interdependency.  The right viewpoint is the one that recognizes how information is 
distributed.  If information that is needed for decision-making is distributed within the 
services and the combatant commands, the services ought to be involved.  If the Combatant 
Commands and Joint Staff have the information they need to derive alternatives that 
integrate with current warfighting systems and doctrine, then the services might be viewed 
as implementers of systems. 
 JCIDS Realities 
As structured as the JCIDS process appears, the reality is that requirements change 
over time.  As technological possibilities and threat conditions change, so do needs of the 
warfighter.  Within the acquisition system, "requirements creep" may show up late in the 
process in the form of expectations or actual changes to written requirements.  JCIDS 
institutionalized this concept with the Capabilities Production Document, offering the 
opportunity for requirements changes before entering low-rate initial production (Matthews, 
2004).  Further, the expectations of the warfighter are often not met in a timely manner 
because expectations evolve over time.  Without changing written requirements, the 
operational community may interpret what was previously stated in a requirements 
document differently.  Therefore, both the perception and the reality is that the desired 
outputs of the acquisition system are dynamic. 
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 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
The funding for the program comes through the PPBE process.  Every other year, 
the OSD issues budget guidance, and the services begin a biannual cycle of preparing 
program objective memorandums (POM) to advocate their program's needs among other 
service priorities.  Eventually, the OSD comptroller and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) prepare the defense portion of the President's Budget.  Even though 
Congress normally appropriates money for only each fiscal year, the POM for a program 
portrays the budget reflected in the Future Year Defense Program.  This, in essence, gives 
the budget community a forecast of what the budget will look like to satisfy spending 
priorities for the next several fiscal years. 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system is a centralized, 
structured way of allocating resources to support the National Security Strategy.  McCaffrey 
and Jones described the goal of PPBE as balancing forces, equipment, and support given 
resource constraints (2004).  Given the competitive nature of the services, this process 
allows the Secretary of Defense to balance competing objectives and select the most 
beneficial use of resources.  
The overlap of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution phases, along 
with the multitude of disparate stakeholders, makes the system very complex.  Nonetheless, 
there is structure from the strategies of the planning phase, to the alternatives of the 
programming phase, the constraining of the budgeting phase, and finally, the execution 
phase where funds are appropriated, allocated, re-allocated, and expended.  Lewis, Brown, 
and Roll contend that the Air Force budget process includes centralized planning and 
decentralized execution with the Major Commands (MAJCOMs) playing a key role as the 
interface with the COCOMs.  The JCIDS process generates capability needs that flow 
through Air Staff to OSD to become part of the budget.  Budget and manpower flow through 
Air Staff to the program office for execution (2002). 
 Defense Acquisition System 
The Defense Acquisition System refines concepts; matures technologies; develops 
and integrates system designs; and tests, produces, sustains, and disposes of weapon 
systems in response to warfighter needs.  The Department of Defense Directive (DODD 
5000.1) (Department of Defense, 2003a, sec. 3.2) governing weapon system acquisition 
defines an acquisition program as:  "a directed, funded effort that provides a new, improved, 
or continuing materiel, weapon or information system or service capability in response to an 
approved need." 
The sponsor (i.e., a Major Command in the Air Force) uses the JCIDS process as 
outlined above to define the need.  The interface with the acquisition community is through 
the Initial Capabilities Document.  This input is refined in the concept-refinement phase 
through the Analysis of Alternatives process to select a materiel alternative that is 
operationally and cost-effective.  The sponsor is responsible for the analysis of alternatives 
using a collaborative process with the acquirer, developer, tester, and other enabling 
communities to refine the "art of the possible" (Air Force, 2005, p. 9). 
The acquisition process uses a high-level framework as shown in Figure 1 that 
serves as a common reference and set of expectations for all programs.  The reality is that 
every program is unique.  An infamous retort within the acquisition community when asked a 
general question about acquisition programs is, "It depends."  The expectations for each 
program are established through the milestone decision authority at a milestone decision. 
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Figure 1. Acquisition Phases and Milestones  
(Department of Defense, 2003b) 
 
 
Despite many interdependencies across the acquisition stakeholder community, DoD 
Directive 5000.1 names the milestone decision authority and program manager as key 
participants.  The milestone decision authority is given overall responsibility for the program, 
while the program manager is, "the designated individual with the responsibility for and 
authority to meet program objectives" (2003a). The reality, however, is that the program 
manager must collaborate among many interests to accomplish program objectives.  
Collaboration using integrated product teams (IPT) is the tool designated to resolve 
competing interests.  The collaborative process is not specified in detail, although DoD 
Directive 5000.1 (2003a) lists the communities that ought to participate in collaborative 
decision-making and identifies the IPT as the entry point for organizations that want to 
collaborate.  The program manager and milestone decision authority use the IPTs' advice to 
make better decisions (Department of Defense, 2003a). 
Weapon system acquisition process model 
 Purpose 
Given a plethora of the stakeholders and a complex product-development process, 
the set of interactions required to manage a program need to be well understood.  
Describing the process to manage an acquisition program helps assess who interacts and 
how they interact to accomplish a program.  The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
(Acquisition Integration), SAF/AQX, formed the Acquisition Process Action Team (APAT) in 
Spring 2005 to describe the set of processes Air Force weapon systems were using to 
accomplish their missions.  The goals were to baseline the acquisition processes and form a 
common language and basis of measurement across the stakeholders in the acquisition 
process.  The group focused mainly on the defense acquisition system itself and its 
interactions with JCIDS and PPBE. 
Lt. Col. Michael Paul and Major Ryan Mantz, SAF/AQXA, led the APAT effort.  A 
group of consultants from the Center for Reengineering and Enabling Technologies (CRET) 
provided the methodology and manpower to support the data-gathering effort.  Mr. Mike 
Wilhelm, CRET, was instrumental in managing the effort. 
In order to assess the interactions within weapon system acquisition, the APAT used 
an enterprise process-model approach.  A process model offers a look across the many 
disciplines within weapon system acquisition to understand what behaviors the team is 
using to solve the problem.  The model is put into process terms, where each step is defined 
as a verb-subject relationship.  Instead of describing a contracting/source selection process, 
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the step is simply "Select Source."  This allows the team to focus on the stakeholders' inputs 
to the process instead of driving the description solely in contracting terms. 
Another important aspect of a process model is to describe the relationship between 
the steps and other actors.  In essence, the process model is a look at the 
interdependencies within the acquisition system.  Each step in the process is described in 
terms of inputs, outputs, triggers, and mechanisms.  A source of those characteristics is also 
described.  This allows the model to describe interaction with other steps in the process. 
 Data Gathering 
The APAT team used the DOD 5000 series regulations as a jumping-off point.  The 
major steps in the process were chosen as the high-level steps in the process.  This allowed 
the model to refer back to a reference to which acquisition, logistics, finance, contracting, 
test, and requirements personnel could relate.  Beginning with the high-level process, the 
APAT team held several workshops with a core group to decompose the high-level process 
into a series of lower-level process steps.  To ensure that the process model reflected the 
interactions across the Air Force acquisition process, the team established a series of 
workshops with acquisition personnel to refine the second-level of the model and develop 
the third and lower-levels of the model.  Each workshop lasted approximately two days and 
was focused on a particular phase of the acquisition process.  Participants from all bases 
were invited, but the main, working-level participants were from the host base.  A series of 
workshops were held at the Pentagon, Eglin AFB, Warner-Robins AFB, and Wright-
Patterson AFB, which gathered 120 collective participants from across acquisition functions 
of requirements, engineering, test, program management, finance, sustainment, 
maintenance, and disposal.  Further, telephone conferences were held to refine the results. 
 Results 
The team used the following definitions as part of the process-decomposition 
effort: 
Process Logical set of steps transforming an input into an output 
Inputs Information or resource consumed in the activity to create the output 
Outputs Information produced by an activity 
Suppliers Those who provide the input to the process 
Customers Those who receive the output of the process 
Key Players Those ultimately responsible for the process being accomplished 
Controls Business rules that govern the performance of an activity 
Mechanisms Resource that performs or supports an activity, but is not consumed 
by the activity 
Processes were decomposed into roughly five to seven sub-processes that were the 
key components of the higher-level process.  The workshop participants were instructed to 
keep decomposing processes until they were defined at an "actionable level."  In reality, the 
processes were decomposed until workshop participants could not agree on sub-processes 
that generally fit most programs. 
Appendix A depicts the output from the APAT effort.  The APAT effort identified 27 
process steps supporting the five major DoD 5000 acquisition phases. Beneath the major 
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processes are 107 sub-processes with 172 supporting activities.  The workshop participants 
were more comfortable with the latter three phases of the acquisition process than the first 
two.  Concept Refinement and Technology Development had fewer sub-process and 
supporting activity steps upon which participants were able to agree. 
Even more important than the numbers of steps are the key players, suppliers, and 
customers of each process step.  To make the data more manageable for this paper, key 
sub- processes and supporting activities were chosen in the Concept-refinement, 
Technology-development, and System-design and Development phases of the acquisition 
process.  These phases shape the program and lock-in the design characteristics that affect 
cost schedule and performance during the latter phases.  Therefore, this paper focuses on 
these early phases of acquisition. 
What is a Network? 
 Introduction 
Chapter II defines both how weapon system acquisition purportedly and actually 
behaves.  There is a defined, hierarchical chain of command with a milestone decision 
authority and a program manager who is responsible for delivering a weapon system 
capability.  The APAT process study also revealed that the inputs required to deliver this 
capability require a set of stakeholder interactions that go outside the boundaries of the 
traditional chain of command.  Further, the stakeholders involved have differing and 
dynamic objectives causing both real and perceived instability within the acquisition process.  
First, however, to address the question of whether the defense acquisition system can be 
characterized as a network, one must first define networks and understand their basic 
properties.   
 Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks 
The specialized support required for a project often conjures up images of 
hierarchical organizations that integrate these specialties together for a common purpose.  
Alternatively, a project might be accomplished through the marketplace where products and 
services are efficiently offered to those who have the highest willingness to pay.  Ronald 
Coase’s early work on transaction costs compared firms and markets as alternatives to one 
another.  According to Coase, firms resorted to hierarchy when it was less costly compared 
establishing and monitoring individual contracts in a market.  The growth of the firm was 
balanced with the increasing expenses to organize a larger labor force due to diminishing 
marginal returns.  Eventually, the cost of an additional transaction within the firm was equal 
to the cost of contracting in the marketplace for the same goods or services (Coase, 1937). 
Powell introduced the concept that a network existed between a self-forming 
marketplace and a hierarchical organization.  He rejected the view that networks are neither 
part of a market-to-hierarchy continuum, nor do they represent a hybrid form of hierarchy.  
As evidence, Powell offered two examples that pointed to the existence of networks.  He 
noted the blurring of the boundaries between markets and inter-organizational 
collaborations, such as cooperative joint ventures.  His second example was the creation of 
enduring relationships between hierarchies and their consulting, law, and banking firms—
indicating that a network form of governance existed between these organizations (1990). 
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 Why Network? 
Before delving into the definitions of a network, it is worth noting the inherent 
strengths and weaknesses of each form of organization.  Markets are ideal for simple 
transactions in which inputs and outputs are measurable and are not based on a number of 
contingencies.  Coase (1937, p. 287) described the marketplace as: "under no central 
control […] supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption."   
Hierarchies evolved to control the specialized inputs needed to produce complex 
products or services for which the inputs may not be available in the commercial 
marketplace.  Coase (1937) used the classic example of specialized labor where a firm 
chose to employ an individual with specific skills, thereby internalizing the uncertainties 
associated with inputs.  Additionally, the firm would also observe that person’s work on the 
job and make adjustments (Williamson, 1973).  Therefore, hierarchies excel when inputs 
have uncertainty, since they allow internal observation and adjustment during the course of 
business. 
Networks are adept at handling uncertainty associated with both inputs and outputs.  
O'Toole (1997) described uncertainty as leading to wicked problems that cannot be divided 
into tasks that are isolated from each other.  Powell agreed that networks form as 
organizations choose to pool resources to manage uncertainties, thereby creating 
interdependencies from which a firm cannot easily walk away.  He elaborated that networks 
are particularly adept at exchanging resources that are difficult to measure, such as "know-
how, technological capability, a particular approach or style of production" (1990, p. 304). 
 Network Definition 
While a network is fairly well understood in today’s society, such familiarity with 
networks may lead to a variety of definitions.  The most straight forward definition of a 
network comes from sociology.  Borgatti and Foster (2003, p. 992) described this type of 
governance this way: “A network is a set of actors connected by a set of ties.”  Marsden and 
Lin (1982) and Knoke and Kuklinski (1991) emphasized persistent relationships among 
actors, focusing on their relationships rather than the actors themselves or the groups to 
which they belong.  Whereas an actor continues to exist apart from the network, a network 
does not exist without the relationship between the actors. 
Another example of networks comes from the field of public administration where 
networks are used among government, non-government, and private agencies.  Kickert, 
Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997, p. 6) described networks as “stable patterns of social relations 
between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy 
programmes.”  This definition is broad, spanning coalitions of intergovernmental and non-
governmental actors organized around both issues and delivery of public goods and 
services.   
This report will utilize the Kickert, et al. (1997) definition of networks in which actors 
are dependent upon one another; there are lasting, stable relationships; and the network is 
formed around a policy or project.  In comparing this definition with others, Klijn (1997) 
identified three characteristics of networks: 
 Networks form due to interdependencies between actors. 
 Networks consist of multiple actors who have their own objectives. 
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 Networks consist of the lasting relationships between the various actors. 
The first condition for a network is interdependencies.  Klijn (1997) suggested 
resource dependency is a key driver of lasting relationships since organizations require 
exchange of capital, personnel, and knowledge with other organizations.  Powell (1990) and 
Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997) similarly emphasized actors within networks performing 
complex exchanges and transactions using trust and norms rather than market-driven, 
legally enforceable contracts.  
Again, the condition for more than one actor comes into the definition with the added 
criteria that each has his/her own objectives.  Scharpf (1978) concluded that within  
government, there is no single actor and no unifying goal.  Instead, policy was a result of 
interactions among multiple actors in which coordination is achieved through exchanges of 
material, information, and legitimacy. 
The final characteristic of networks is that they are composed of lasting relationships 
among the actors.  Klijn (1997) and Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) concluded that 
relationship patterns in a network are defined according to their frequency over time.  
Repeated interactions strengthen the relationship.  As a pattern of behavior develops during 
on-going interactions, actors will begin to understand who they can trust and who they 
cannot trust.  Therefore, the basis for the network is the willingness to establish 
interdependency based on that frequent, lasting relationship. 
Network Analysis 
 Network Structure 
In analyzing a network, the individuals within the network are not as important as the 
relationships between them.  Since networks imply interactions in which no one individual 
has all the resources to solve a problem, the dyadic relationship is the basic unit of 
structure.  At the next higher level of analysis, the network as a whole will determine the 
success of outcomes.  How the dyadic relationships are arranged to form a network count in 
achieving a result.  Therefore, structure determines how the group as a whole will perform. 
 
Figure 2. Asymmetric Informational Network  
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Table 1.  Matrix Representation of an Asymmetric Network  
(Knoke, 1990, p. 237) 
 
 A B C D E F G H I J Total 
A  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
B 1  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
C 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
D 1 1 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
E 1 0 0 0  1 1 1 0 0 4 
F 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0 1 
G 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 0 0 1 
H 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  0 0 1 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 
J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Total 4 2 2 2 4 1 2 1 0 0 18 
 
To illustrate the concepts of measuring information flow in a network, a hypothetical 
example of a network in which actors exchange information asymmetrically is shown in 
Figure 2.  The arrows depict the flow of information.  An adjacency matrix is used to 
represent this information flow from actors to one another.  The number one in a row 
represents transmitting information from the actor in the row to the actor in the column, 
whereas a zero indicates that no information is transmitted.  The number one in a column 
represents receipt of information, and a zero represents no information receipt.  Knoke 
(1990) developed the above matrix in Table 1, concluding from the totals for the columns 
and rows that A receives the information from more sources, and E transmits information to 
the most actors. 
 Actors’ Positions within the Network 
Switching from the network back to the individual actor as a unit of analysis, the 
above tools also allow an assessment of how the actor fits into the structure of the network.  
Freeman (1977) introduced measures of a node's centrality based on his definition of 
position centrality:  "the degree they stand between others, and can therefore facilitate, 
impede or bias the transmission of messages."  These nodes control the information flow in 
the network more than others.   
Centrality appears to be directly correlated with the efficiency of the network and the 
power of the individual who is more central.  Freeman (1977) applied centrality measures to 
other studies of communication in small group settings, and concluded that centrality was 
related to solving problems with speed, efficiency and personal satisfaction.  Likewise, 
Krackhardt's (1990) work correlated Freeman's measures of centrality to perceived power in 
a small, entrepreneurial organization. 
 Relating Network Structure to Network Effectiveness 
From the perspective of the network as a whole, a definition of network effectiveness 
must be defined on multiple levels across multiple agencies.  Provan and Milward (2001) 
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offer the community, or area the network serves, the network itself, and the organization and 
participants as the levels among which a network should be evaluated to satisfy multiple 
stakeholder perspectives.  Their empirical study developed the following conclusions: 
 Networks are more effective when they are integrated through centralization, 
although networks that are integrated through a core agency and integrated through 
dense links among members will be less effective than those are integrated through 
a core agency alone. 
 Networks are most effective when external controls are directly applied, rather than 
applied through an agency. 
 Networks are most effective when a degree of stability is achieved, especially when 
the stability and uncertainty impacts clients. 
 When the above conditions are optimal, resource scarcity will limit the effectiveness 
of the network.  Conversely, resource abundance allows the network to range from 
low to high effectiveness, depending on the conditions above. 
Analysis 
Application of the network Perspective to weapon system 
acquisition 
Chapter II described the acquisition system and its formal hierarchical operating 
structure.  Chapter III introduced the network perspective and its basic assumptions and 
methodology.  This chapter draws on the data from the APAT process model and concludes 
that the acquisition system has network-like properties.  The implications of the acquisition 
system’s network characteristics are explored in terms of acquisition governance.  
 Interdependencies between Actors 
One of the key characteristics of a network is the relationships between the actors.  
Interdependencies between actors are the basis for the formation of networks (Klijn, 1997; 
Powell, 1990; Jones, Hesterly & Borgatti, 1997).  The interdependencies are based on the 
exchange of resources, and develop in situations in which the actors need capital, 
personnel, and knowledge to accomplish their objectives (Klijn, 1997). 
To deliver a weapon system, numerous actors are involved, as shown in the 
relationship matrices in Appendix B.  One of the key interdependencies during the 
acquisition process is the exchange of knowledge between actors.  During the first three 
phases of the acquisition process, knowledge about what you need to buy and how the 
system should be designed to meet that need is the focus of the activities.  As shown in 
Appendix A, Process 1.0, the outputs of the Concept Refinement phase include an 
approved Course of Action, identification of resources needed for the next phase, approved 
milestone decision documents, a signed acquisition-decision memorandum, and a 
technology-development strategy.  All of this knowledge is based on the collaborations 
among the stakeholders during each activity.  
The interdependencies between actors for Concept Refinement are modeled in 
Figure 3.  For modeling purposes, the interactions are assumed to be two-way, directed 
collaborations.  The relationships are those that are specified in the Concept Refinement 
processes or may be inferred from the type of documents that are approved during that 
phase.  For example, approval of a Test Evaluation Master Plan for a large program 
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requires an OSD (DOT&E) signature.  Of course, these are not the only relationships that a 
program might need to carry out the objectives of this phase of the acquisition cycle.  This is 
a minimum set that one would expect to see for any major acquisition program.   
The diagram shown in Figure 3 illustrates the interdependencies required to define 
the weapon system concept, select the course of action, and prepare for the Technology 
Development phase.  As one could guess based on the description of responsibilities in 
JCIDS and the DoD 5000 series regulations, the lead acquisition organization program 
manager (node 4), the MAJCOM requirements organization (node 2), and the milestone 
decision authority (node 5) have critical roles during this phase.  Freeman's measure of 
degree centrality (1977) for those nodes is relatively higher indicating the probability that 
they will control resources in the network. 
Graphically, Figure 3 portrays the collaboration required with the other 22 actors to 
accomplish the outputs of this acquisition phase.  Individually, the lead acquisition 
organization, the MAJCOM requirements organization, and the milestone decision authority 
do not interface with all of the other actors.  The spreadsheet in Appendix B for the Concept 
Refinement interactions denotes the lead acquisition organization collaborating with 18 other 
actors.  Of the seven actors with which the lead acquisition organization does not interface, 
the program manager must rely on other organizations to gather information from those 
parts of the network. 
Figure 3. Concept Refinement Interdependencies 
 
Given a weapon system concept, the purpose of the Technology Development 
phase of the acquisition process is to mature key technologies and to plan for weapon 
system development.  These two activities require a diverse set of interdependencies.  
Maturing technology requires an in-depth understanding of the concept and system 
architecture as well as a diverse network of technology providers.  Furthermore, the program 
must define the capability needs in the Capabilities Development Document (CDD).  Along 
with the capability needs, operational, support, maintenance, and interoperability concepts 
must be refined so the weapon system may be designed with these plans in mind.  The 
acquisition systems engineering, test, logistics, contracting, and financial-management 
communities collaborate with the warfighters to translate concepts into an executable 
acquisition program. 
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To understand these interactions, this analysis focuses on process 2.1.2, Identify 
Technologies for Maturation, process 2.1.3, Define Technology Maturation Plan, and 
process 2.5, Develop and Prepare Documents for Milestone B, which the APAT model 
decomposed as noted in Appendix A.  The diagram of the interdependencies for this phase 
is illustrated in Figure 4, while the matrix-view is in Appendix B. 
The diagram in Figure 4 reveals that there are 28 actors involved in the acquisition 
program, an increase from the Concept-refinement phase.  Based on degree centrality, the 
lead acquisition organization/program manager (node 4) remains the most central actor, 
maintaining many of the relationships from the previous phase.  Likewise, the MAJCOM 
requirements organization (node 2) and the milestone decision authority (node 5) also 
maintain their central role.  A number of other actors at the OSD and service-level become 
more prominent, as demonstrated by their degree centrality.  The network relies on 
relationships with these actors to provide guidance and priorities that shape the program 
from an operational, acquisition strategy, and budget perspective.  Therefore, the influence 
of the key actors is still great, but there are many relationships developing during this phase 
that are beyond the control of the key actors. 
Figure 4. Technology Development Planning/Milestone Interdependencies 
 
During System Development and Demonstration, the critical activities include 
allocating requirements and developing a design, testing the design, and preparing for 
production and fielding of the system.  This analysis focuses on process 3.1, Manage the 
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Figure 5. System Development and Demonstration Interdependencies 
 
The diagram in Figure 5 depicts a less dense, decentralized network.  In terms of 
degree centrality, the program manager (node 4) is still the most central actor, although the 
MAJCOM requirements organization (node 2) is now less central than the contractor (node 
10) in influencing the network.  The rise of the contractor's centrality indicates the 
importance of the contractor’s information to the network in a monopolistic environment.  
This measure of centrality for the sole non-governmental actor is of interest to those who 
want to influence the outcome of the network at the community, network, and organizational 
levels of analysis. 
 Multiple, Independent Actors Formed around a Project 
Another characteristic of a network is that there is more than one actor who shares 
some common attribute that forms the context of their relationship.  Using the types of 
network relationships from Knoke and Kuklinski (1991), the actors involved in concept 
refinement would share several types of relationships.  Since information is a key resource, 
many relationships are communication relations.  Relationships with industry might be 
described in transactional terms, where dollars are expended so resources can be utilized to 
help gather information on different acquisition concepts.  Finally, authority/power relations 
exist among the relationships.  Process 1.1 in Appendix A describes the controls on the 
process from the Congressional, OSD, and service level.  These controls may be targeted 
specifically at a program, such as when Congress earmarks an appropriation for a specific 
program. 
One of the key questions is whether the actors remain independent to pursue their 
own objectives for the project.  As noted above, there are authority/power relations exerted 
on the program.  In fact, the lead acquisition organization program manager works for the 
service acquisition executive, typically through the PEO as an intermediate supervisor.  
Many of the actors, however, do not work for one another.  Congress clearly does not work 
for the program manager, and the converse is also true.  In addition, key collaborators such 
as the MAJCOM and the lead acquisition organization do not work for one another even 
though they are in the same service.  If the lead acquisition organization and the MAJCOM 
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requirements organization had a dispute, they would have to resolve it at the Chief of Staff 
of the Air Force/Secretary of the Air Force level.  Issues are not resolved typically at that 
level.  Instead, the actors utilize their relationship with one another to collaborate and work 
through issues. 
 Lasting, Stable Relationships between Actors  
The final characteristic to be analyzed is the pattern of relationships between actors 
over time.  Again, the literature stresses the importance of this characteristic based on the 
need to strengthen relationships (Klijn, 1997).  In long-term acquisition programs with both 
complexity and uncertainty, this characteristic is important to allow actors to establish trust 
with one another.  This trust enables actors to make transaction-specific investments that 
will further the objectives of both the actors and the network. 
To examine this variable, the set of actors in the first three acquisition phases were 
analyzed to determine if the relationship spanned multiple acquisition phases—which could 
last from a couple of years to over a decade.  The analysis is inexact since only select 
processes from the Technology Development phase and System Development and 
Demonstration phase were analyzed.  Nonetheless, a group of 10 actors form 13 enduring 
relationships that span the formation and development of an acquisition program.  This 
group of key players and their relationships are displayed in Appendix B. 
High-degree centrality among this core group denotes the actors who continually 
control resources over time.  Not surprisingly, the program office has the highest degree 
centrality within this persistent group of core actors.  Interestingly, the MAJCOM budget 
organization and modernization budget integrator on Air Staff, SAF/AQX, also have high-
degree centrality—stemming from their control over the fiscal resources needed to execute 
the acquisition program. 
 Network Governance 
A network view of acquisition allows an analyst to examine outcomes and 
management strategies in a new way.  Rather than focusing on accountability, the focus 
shifts to understanding how to enable the network as a whole to create greater value.  As 
Provan and Milward (2001) suggested, the effectiveness of the network ought to be 
analyzed at the community, network, and participant level.  Understanding the outcomes 
desired from acquisition programs across the Congressional and warfighting community, the 
acquisition community, and the individual organizations within the network allows a holistic 
analysis of how the network ought to be structured to accomplish these desires. 
A review of the data in Appendix B supports the conclusion that the Lead Acquisition 
Organization/Program Manager is the most central actor within the acquisition process in 
terms of degree centrality.  Furthermore, this actor has the greatest range of relationships, 
brokering information from the warfighter, budget community, technology community, and 
contractor.  This places the Program Manager in a very important position in the network. 
Not all program managers perform equally.  Some may be unable to stabilize their  
inherently unstable networks.  Other managers may have perfectly adequate networks, but 
the manager is unable to understand how to manage in a network.   Whatever the case, 
understanding the structure of the network should enable program managers to understand 
the environment within which successful programs are executed. 
Further, an understanding of the network allows an analysis of second-order effects 
due to changes in the network.  Provan and Milward (1995) concluded that resource scarcity 
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would limit the effectiveness of any network.  When resources are adequate, however, 
factors such as centralization, direct external controls, and stability may also affect the 
outcomes of networks.  An understanding of the structure of the acquisition program 
network would allow an analysis of the effects of changes using modeling.  The resultant 
outcomes could be analyzed at the participant, network, and community level.  In other 
words, a network view of acquisition would allow individual participants to understand how 
their outcomes and the network's outcomes would be affected by the continuing change in 
policy, resources, and players in the acquisition system. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
 Research Question 
The focus of this paper was to answer the following research question:  does the 
DoD weapon system acquisition process behave as a network? 
The characterization of the "Big A" acquisition system as a complex interaction of the 
JCIDS subsystem, the PPBE subsystem, and the defense acquisition subsystem identified 
multiple stakeholders who value different outcomes.  Each of these players attempts to 
utilize some form of hierarchy to break down tasks and assign responsibility to ensure task 
accomplishment. 
However, the APAT process model revealed a more complex, interactive process 
among the JCIDS, PPBE, and the acquisition subsystems.  Appendix B portrays the key 
players in the first three phases of the acquisition cycle.  An analysis of these players 
reveals that many do not work for one another and may have differing objectives.  
Furthermore, examination of the key activities within the Concept Refinement, Technology 
Development, and System Development and Demonstration phases, and the interactions of 
the key players who were involved in the controls, inputs, activities, and outputs of each 
subsystem, revealed key interdependencies and long, stable relationships among 
independent actors.  This analysis led to the conclusion that weapon system acquisition can 
be conceptualized as a network. 
 Further Refinements 
Analysis of the APAT process model data also led to an understanding that centrality 
is not equally distributed within the network.  The lead acquisition organizations/program 
manager is a central figure who has the greatest number of relationships and is most central 
to the network measured in terms of degree of centrality.  Despite the program manager's 
lack of a high position within a hierarchical model, network analysis reveals that the program 
manager has the greatest number of contacts and interactions within the network. 
Additionally, there is a core group of actors who have a persistent set of relationships 
during the early, critical stages of the acquisition process.  While the program manager is 
well-placed within this core group, there are other important actors who deal with budgets 
and have sustained relationships over time.  Understanding the structure of this group and 
their relationships with the rest of the network will be important in helping the acquisition 
community develop strategies to govern the network and influence changes for improved 
network performance and outcomes.  
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 Validate the Model 
First, the data gathered in the APAT model were intended to serve as a framework to 
understand the current acquisition process as it applies to a majority of programs.  The 
scope of the data-gathering process limited the ability to focus on all interactions.  
Therefore, activities such as milestone decisions were described as an exercise in 
document writing.  Those involved in the APAT effort recognized that the documents 
generated for a milestone decision were actually the culmination of a set of interactions to 
gather data and develop a strategy for a particular portion of the acquisition program.  For 
this effort, the official who approved the document and the program office WIPT were 
assumed to be the only participants.  This is, in fact, probably not true.  Participants might 
include other organizations, depending on the subject matter of the program and local 
procedures. 
Therefore, the model serves as a good first step to begin to explore certain 
interactions within the acquisition system.  If a certain set of interactions or a set of actors 
are of interest, gathering more detailed data would be valuable to further the understanding 
of the network and to validate the model. 
 Network Framework to Study Improved Outcomes 
The data-gathering effort for the APAT model was not prescriptive.  While the 
sponsors of the effort were interested in recognizing areas for improvement, the model was 
meant to describe the current process.  There are reasons for the patterns of relationships 
established in the model, but there also may be improved ways of interacting. 
Indeed, the network model, once validated, could be utilized as a framework to 
assess program success.  Those who control acquisition policy or who participate in 
acquisition programs likely would be interested in studying how the networks of these 
programs of interest differ from the norm.  DoD Directive 5000.1 gives the program manager 
and milestone decision authority flexibility to decide what the correct set of activities and 
relationships should be for a particular acquisition program.  Studying network models of 
similar programs might enable decision-makers to tailor their efforts and focus resources on 
valuable relationships.  Alternatively, acquisition strategies could be modeled to discover if 
information flows efficiently and effectively given several scenarios for organizing a program. 
 Simulate Changes to the Acquisition System 
Of course, there are number of challenges within the acquisition process.  
Consistently delivering cost, schedule, and performance is rare as Augustine and Fabini 
(1983), Jones (1996), and McNutt (1998) agreed.  Improving consistency of the system has 
spawned a number of changes—some of which are initially declared successful, only to be 
later discredited for their "unintended consequences."  An example is the initiative to give 
the contractor Total System Performance Responsibility.  This initiative gave the contractor 
more flexibility and responsibility for the performance of the acquisition program.  
Unfortunately, the effects of this change were probably not studied using a network analysis.  
The decision-makers acted upon the ideology that the marketplace solved all their problems. 
A number of changes to the acquisition system are being considered today.  JCIDS 
mandates that programs have been have a Net-ready Key Performance Parameter 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).  This attempt to build a communication system 
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by mandating interoperability from those who will utilize the system is much like the chicken 
and the egg conundrum.  First, the architecture of the network must have some definition.  
Those who are developing a network and the users of the network must collaborate to solve 
this problem.  Clearly, a network analysis to identify who is involved and how they are 
collaborating would be more beneficial than mandating a change and hoping that those 
actors in the network would comply. 
Summary 
Networks describe both formal and informal ways of getting things done in the 
acquisition system.  The marketplace rarely delivers what the DoD needs at the quantity that 
it is needed.  Some commodities may be purchased in the marketplace, but the 
uncertainties associated with DoD needs do not allow firms to match their supply to 
demand.  Also, many of the DoD's needs are based on interoperability between programs 
that must be defined before the market can react to this need.  The largest transactions, 
which involve the lion's share of the modernization budget, rely on the interactions between 
JCIDS, PPBE, and the acquisition system.  A hierarchy exists to account for the resources 
input into the process.  However, the complexities and dynamic nature of the process can 
best be described as a network of actors who use their relationships to affect outcomes. 
Would Glenn Curtiss recognize this network that delivers today's innovative stealth 
aircraft, advanced combat systems, and ships?  He probably would.  If you brought Mr. 
Curtiss into a meeting with a program manager, MAJCOM requirements officer, and a 
contractor, he would feel right at home.  Mr. Curtiss was no stranger to hierarchies given the 
size of the Curtiss Aircraft Company.  Nonetheless, he knew that innovation occurs when a 
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Appendix A. DOD 5000 process Model 
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Appendix B. Acquisition Networks 
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D.  Persistent Relationships from Concept Refinement Through 





























Requirements 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
(3) Program 




(MDA) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) Contractor 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(6) MAJCOM 
Budget 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
(7) SAF/AQX 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
(8) Service Acq 
Exec 
(SAF/AQ) 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(9) SAF/FM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
(10) AF/XP 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(11) Center 
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Abstract 
Federal Acquisition Reform acknowledges the importance of effective collaboration 
among participating organizations.  However, both research and practical experience have 
shown that inter-organizational collaboration can be difficult to achieve.  This research builds 
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on a model developed by the authors with homeland security organizations that identified 
enablers and barriers to collaborative capacity.  The focus of our current research is to 
develop a diagnostic mechanism that can be used to improve that capability.  The initial 
conceptual model and research from homeland security has been elaborated into an item 
bank of diagnostic interview and survey questions. A diagnostic process based on the 
established practices of organizational development is offered to guide the design and 
application of tailored assessments.  Recommendations are given for the use of the 
diagnostic process to generate organization- or network-specific data that can guide action 
planning to improve collaborative capacity. 
Introduction 
The research presented at this symposium represents the completion of our FY06 
activities as well as the plans and progress on the FY07 efforts in the development of a 
diagnostic method to assess the capacity of organizations to work collaboratively with other 
organizations.  The first phase of the research developed a conceptual model of inter-
organizational collaboration, identified factors that enable or inhibit collaboration and 
established a comprehensive item bank of survey and interview questions that could be 
used to diagnose the collaborative capacity of an organization or system of organizations.  It 
also outlined a process, based on principles of organizational development, by which the 
diagnostic results can be used to design interventions to improve collaborative capacity.  
The second phase, which is in progress, is field testing the items as well as the diagnostic 
process on interagency partnerships in both the homeland security and acquisition context.  
The product of Phase Two will be a revised and validated diagnostic instrument and field-
validated model for collaborative capacity. 
Background 
Federal Acquisition Reform has consistently called for more and better collaboration 
among participating acquisition agencies as well as between the DoD and defense 
contractors.  Specifically, the DOD Directive 5000.1 (The Defense Acquisition System, 
paragraph E1.2, Collaboration, 2003) specifically states that teaming among warfighters, 
users, developers, acquirers, technologists, testers, budgeters, and sustainers shall begin 
during the capability-needs-definition phase of the acquisition lifecycle.  Furthermore, the 
recent Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) report recommends improved 
collaboration among acquisition organizations as well as between the DoD and industry.  
The use of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), Partnering relationships, and Alpha 
Contracting processes are a few examples of innovative arrangements being used in some 
commands.  As DAPA recommendations are implemented, additional collaboration 
requirements and opportunities will emerge.   
Collaboration across organizations in government and industry has been found to 
reduce litigation, decrease costs, and increase innovation (Mankin, Cohen & Fitzgerald, 
2004).  However, experience shows that organizations commonly fail when they attempt to 
build collaborative relationships.  Among the reasons for ineffective collaboration are: 
diverse missions, goals and incentives that conflict with one another; histories of distrust that 
are hard to alter; leaders who do not actively support collaborative efforts; and the lack of 
supportive coordination systems and structures (US Government Accountability Office, 
2002, December).  However, experience shows that inter-organizational collaboration can 
be difficult at best.  Our research focuses on identifying and assessing those factors that 
facilitate or inhibit successful collaboration, with the ultimate aim of guiding actions to 
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enhance the capacity of organizations to collaborate with each other when appropriate. We 
define collaborative capacity as the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and 
sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes.    
Development of the Diagnostic Model and Assessment Tool 
In a series of studies, beginning with research on homeland security organizations 
and then reformulated to also address the acquisition context, we have developed a general 
framework for addressing the problem of how interagency collaborative capacity is 
developed and maintained (Hocevar, Jansen & Thomas, 2004; Hocevar, Thomas, & 
Jansen, 2006).  The model developed in Phase One of our research program identifies 
imperatives of successful collaboration and aims to assist organizations in diagnosing their 
collaborative capacity.  The focus of Phase Two was the development of a database of 
interview and survey questions that can be used to tailor collaborative capacity assessments 
to specific collaborative contexts.  The goal of the diagnostic is to allow organizations to 
assess their capacity to engage in collaborative efforts and then use the assessment results 
to identify specific activities to improve their collaborative capacity.  The survey and 
interview questions were developed in conjunction with the five dimensions in our model of 
interagency collaboration capacity.  The dimensions are presented in more detail in Figure 
1.   
Figure 1.  Factors Related to the Development of Collaborative Capacity 
Organization 
dimensions  
“Success” factors that 
contribute to collaborative 
capacity 




- “Felt need” to collaborate  
- Common goal or 
recognized 
interdependence 
- Adaptable to interests of 
other organizations 
- Divergent goals 
- Focus on local organization over 
cross-agency (e.g., regional) 
concerns 
- Lack of goal clarity 
- Not adaptable to interests of other 
organizations 
Structure 
- Formalized coordination 
committee or liaison roles 
- Sufficient authority of 
participants 
 
- Impeding rules or policies 
- Inadequate authority of participants 
- Inadequate resources 
- Lack of accountability 
- Lack of formal roles or procedures 
for managing collaboration 
Lateral 
mechanisms 
- Social capital (i.e., 
interpersonal networks) 
- Effective communication 
and information exchange 
- Technical interoperability 
- Lack of familiarity with other 
organizations 
- Inadequate communication and 
information sharing (distrust) 
 =




- Collaboration as a 
prerequisite for funding or 
resources 
- Leadership support and 
commitment 
- Absence of competitive 
rivalries 
- Acknowledged benefits of 
collaboration (e.g., shared 
resources) 
- Competition for resources 
- Territoriality 
- Organization-level distrust 
- Lack of mutual respect 
- Apathy 
People 
- Appreciation of others’ 
perspectives  
- Competencies for 
collaboration 
- Trust 
- Commitment and 
motivation 
- Lack of competency 
- Arrogance, hostility, animosity 
 
Specific survey and interview questions have been generated for each of the five 
dimensions of collaborative capacity presented in the figure above.  Illustrative questions for 
each of the dimensions are presented below: 
Purpose and Strategy questions address organizational purpose, goals, and values; 
the degree of perceived “felt need” to collaborate; and strategic planning processes. 
 Interagency collaboration is a high priority for this organization. 
 We have clearly established goals for interagency collaboration. 
 We consistently use an interagency approach to planning. 
Collaborative Structure includes policies, roles and responsibilities that facilitate or 
serve as barriers to collaboration; formal control mechanisms including authority and 
standard operating procedures; and coordinating structures. 
 Our organization is flexible in adapting our procedures to better fit with those of 
partner organizations. 
 My organization has mechanisms in place to monitor and evaluate collaborative 
efforts. 
 Conflicting organizational policies make collaboration very difficult. 
Social Capital through Lateral Mechanisms addresses both formal and informal 
factors, including network ties, information sharing, combined training, and familiarity with 
other organizations.  These factors, working together, can become internalized into a culture 
of collaboration: 
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 Our organization has strong norms that encourage sharing information with other 
agencies. 
 Our organization commits adequate human and financial resources to training with 
other agencies.   
 Our organization invests time and resources to become familiar with the capabilities 
and requirements of our partner organizations. 
Incentives address both the factors that encourage and discourage organizational- 
and individual-level engagement in collaboration.  The structure of incentives can shape 
whether organizations frame their interactions as collaborative or competitive.  
 A history of competition and conflict affects our interagency capability. 
 Our organization rewards members for their interagency collaborative activities. 
 The senior leaders of our organization often discuss the importance of interagency 
collaboration with others in the organization. 
People are the foundation for macro-level collaboration, which ultimately depends on 
their perceptions, motives, attitudes, and skills.    
 Members of our organization respect the expertise of those in other organizations 
with whom we have to work. 
 We have training in place to develop collaborative skills (e.g., conflict management, 
team-process skills). 
 People in our organization tend to be suspicious and distrustful of our partners in 
other organizations. 
We expect that the ability to systematically assess collaborative capacity can 
contribute to something akin to a common doctrine and common operational picture that will 
assist leaders in developing action plans for developing this important capability. The 
diagnostic process encourages a common language and understanding around 
collaboration and assists leaders in determining capabilities that the organization must 
develop to be successful.  The next section shows how our diagnostic tool can leverage 
learning for an organization. 
Process for Diagnosing Collaborative Capacity 
We have shaped the process for using the collaborative capacity diagnostic around 
the well-established principles of organization development (Beckhard, 1969).  The focus in 
this presentation is how to use the Collaborative Capacity survey instrument to inform 
leaders and change agents of the strengths and weaknesses of their organization’s 
collaborative systems.  From these data, specific interventions can be identified and 
implemented.  The survey tool is, thus, designed to contribute to a learning process that 
improves interagency relationships.   
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This approach follows the process of a “gap” analysis (e.g., Harrison, 1994).  In 
consultation with the client organization(s), the diagnostic process identifies the desired 
future state—why collaboration is needed and ways in which improvements in this capability 
can be accomplished.  Through the dialogue that occurs in the design, conduct, and 
analysis of survey results, organizational members become sensitized to the importance of 
the issues being assessed (Downs & Adrian, 2004).  The data from the diagnostic survey 
also provide a mechanism to challenge existing mental models or assumptions of 
organizational members about inter-organizational collaboration.  They provide a common 
basis for understanding the “current state” and can, thus, motivate desired improvements. 
The key question being addressed in interpretation is, “What do the assessment 
results mean?”  In action planning, the question is “What do we do about it?”  The 
organizational members engaged in action planning may be different (or in addition to) those 
who were involved in the interpretation.  It is important to involve members in deciding what 
action to take if their commitment or capabilities are necessary to the implementation of the 
action plan.  Feedback about the diagnostic process should include not only the results and 
interpretation of the assessments, but also the interventions identified as part of action 
planning.  Ongoing communication through the implementation of action planning is also 
important if the diagnostic process is to contribute broadly to organizational learning (Downs 
& Adrian, 2004; Senge, 1992). 
The initial assessment establishes a baseline that can be used to evaluate progress 
toward the desired goals after the implementation of interventions.  The assessment also 
allows the opportunity for comparisons across organizational levels and units.  For example, 
it may be worthwhile to investigate the extent to which top-level managers’ assessment of 
collaborative capacity is similar to those of front-line workers.  Also of interest could be a 
comparison of those whose work involves them with counterparts in other 
organizations/agencies with those who have less frequent contact. 
Next steps—Validating the Assessment Tool with Field Testing 
and Subject-matter Experts (SMEs) 
There is a growing body of literature on the concept of a capacity for collaboration, 
and our results to date coincide with others who are working in this area (e.g., Foster-
Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson, & Allen, 2001; Hansen & Nohria, 2004; Huxham, 
1996; Mankin, Cohen, & Fitzgerald, 2004).  What we add to those pursuing these ideas 
(e.g., Bardach, 1998) is a way to measure the overarching concept of collaborative capacity 
and the contributing variables.  Generating valid and reliable interview questions and survey 
items require a painstaking process of refinement, testing and retesting.  All questions are to 
be subjected to critical review by subject-matter experts from the acquisition community as 
well as from homeland security organizations currently implementing or initiating inter-
organizational collaboration.  The interagency level of analysis is complex and requires 
analysis from a variety of possible contexts, forms, structures and processes.  Our goal is to 
develop an audit that is sufficiently generalizable to be conducted in a wide variety of 
contexts, but it must be specific enough to provide actionable insights to organizational 
leaders. 
In this stage of our research, we are identifying potential partners who are interested 
in assessing collaborative capacity.  These partners will allow us to field test the instrument 
with organizations that are in different developmental stages.  In other words, some 
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organizations may have only recently initiated the process of collaborating; others may have 
been collaborating for some time, but face the problems of institutionalizing and formalizing 
the process; and some may have institutionalized their processes.  Different lessons can be 
learned in each of these contexts.   
We should also note that the process of validating items is also a process of 
validating and elaborating theoretical constructs.  This means that the nuts-and-bolts 
process of revising and interpreting items through field testing itself generates more 
coherent and useful ways of thinking about the capabilities and capacities of interagency 
collaboration.  For example, we anticipate developing some preliminary hypotheses about 
the developmental stages of collaborative capacity as we begin our field testing work with 
organizations that have different amounts of experience with interagency collaboration.  We 
also expect that we will begin to identify somewhat of a hierarchy of predictors of 
collaborative capacity because it is unlikely that all factors included in our current model are 
of equal impact in influencing collaboration.  As we proceed with our research, we will be 
developing a more refined diagnostic process, as well as a more refined understanding of 
how collaborative capacity develops and ways it can be fostered. 
Bibliography 
Bardach, E. (1998). Getting agencies to work together: The practice and theory of 
managerial craftsmanship. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Beckhard, R. (1969). Organization development: Strategies and models.  Reading, MA: 
Addison Wesley.  
Downs, C.W., & Adrian, A.D. (2004). Assessing organizational communication:  Strategic 
communication audits. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Foster-Fishman, P.G., Berkowitz, S.L., Lounsbury, D.W. Jacobson, S. & Allen, N.A. (2001).  
Building collaborative capacity in community coalitions:  A review and integrative 
framework.  American Journal of Community Psychology, 29(2), 241-257. 
Hansen, M.T., & Nohria, N. (2004). How to build collaborative advantage. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, 46(1), 22-30. 
Hocevar, S., Thomas, G.F., & Jansen, E. (2006). Building collaborative capacity: An 
innovative strategy for homeland security preparedness. In M.M. Beyerlein, D.A. 
Johnson, & S.T. Beyerlein (Eds.), Innovation through collaboration (Vol. 12) (pp. 263-
283). New York: Elsevier.  
Hocevar, S., Jansen, E., & Thomas, G.F. (2004). Building collaborative capacity for 
homeland security. Naval Postgraduate School (Technical Report NPS-GSBPP-04-
008). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Huxham, C. (1996). Collaboration and collaborative advantage. In C. Huxham (Ed.), 
Creating collaborative advantage (pp. 1-18). London: Sage Publications. 
Mankin, D., Cohen, S., & Fitzgerald, S.P. (2004). Developing complex collaboration: Basic 
principles to guide, design, and implementation. In M.M. Beyerlein, D.A. Johnson, & 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 259 - 
=
= =
S.T. Beyerlein (Eds.), Complex collaborative: Building the capabilities for working 
across boundaries (pp. 1-26). New York: Elsevier.  
Senge, P.M. (1992).  Catalyzing systems thinking within organizations.  In F. Massarik (Ed.) 
Advances in organization development (Vol. 1) (pp. 197-246).  Norwood, NJ:  Ablex 
Publishing. 
United States Government Accountability Office. (2002, December).  Homeland security: 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 261 - 
=
= =
Panel 8 - Implementing Open Architecture 
 
Wednesday, 
May 16, 2007 
Panel 8 - Implementing Open Architecture 




CAPT James Shannon – Program Manager, Naval Open Architecture, 
PEO IWS 7.0 
Discussant:  
Thomas (Tom) Huynh, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School 
Papers:  
Analysis of Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) Implementation in 
Navy Acquisition Programs 
Rene Rendon, Naval Postgraduate School 
Software Architecture: Managing Design for Achieving Warfighter 
Capability 
Brad Naegle and Diana Petross, Naval Postgraduate School 
Putting Teeth into Open Architectures: Infrastructure for Reducing the 
Need for Retesting 
Valdis Berzins and Manuel Rodriguez, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Chair: CAPT James Shannon – Program Manager, Naval Open Architecture, PEO IWS 7.0, is a 
native of San Francisco, California and a 1981 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, 
MD where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree. He also received a Master of Science in 
Telecommunication Systems Management from Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA and a 
Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the College of Naval Warfare, NWC 
Newport, RI. He attended the Defense Acquisition University in Ft. Belvoir, VA, and is certified Level 
III in Program Management. Captain Shannon is also a National Security Management Fellow of the 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. 
CAPT Shannon's operational experience includes service in the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 7th Fleets. He 
initially served in the Deck and Engineering departments onboard the USS SHASTA (AE-33) 
homeported in Concord, CA. He was also the Chief Engineer onboard both the USS PEGASUS 
(PHM-1) in Key West, FL and the USS O'BRIEN (DD-975) in San Diego, CA. CAPT Shannon sailed 
on several different ships while serving as Material Officer (N4) for COMDESRON 31. The Red 
Stallions of DESRON 31 relocated to Pearl Harbor, HI during his assignment where they were then 
known as the Pacific Fleet ASW Squadron as they tested and evaluated various tactics and ASW 
systems for the Navy. He was the Executive Officer onboard the USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CG-
62) in San Diego, Ca. This ship was awarded the Spokane Trophy for combat readiness during his 
tour. CAPT Shannon's command tours include the USS ESTOCIN (FFG-15) and USS SAMUEL 
ELIOT MORISON (FFG-13) in Norfolk, VA. While in command of the ESTOCIN, he deployed to 
South America in support of Operation UNITAS. The ESTOCIN was recognized for Fleet Retention 
with the Golden Anchor Award. As the final Commanding Officer of SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, 
CAPT Shannon coordinated the transfer of that ship to the Turkish Navy. 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 262 - 
=
= =
Significant shore duties include an instructor tour at the Surface Warfare Officer School in Newport, 
RI where he taught tactics to prospective Ship Department Heads. He served on the Joint Staff (C4I 
directorate, J-6) where he was an action officer principally responsible for support of JROC activities. 
CAPT Shannon was selected as an Acquisition Professional (AP) in 2000. As an AP, he was the 
Director of Development, Test, and Acceptance of the Evolved SEASPARROW Missile (ESSM). 
During that assignment, the ESSM successfully passed OPEVAL and received Full Rate Production 
acceptance by the Service Acquisition Executive (ASN RDA). A plankowner in Program Executive 
Office, Integrated Warfare Systems (IWS), CAPT Shannon was the first military member assigned to 
be the Project Manager for NIFC-CA (Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air). He currently serves 
as the Program Manager for Future Combat Systems Open Architecture (PEO IWS 7) and is 
responsible for carrying out the open architecture efforts among all warfare systems across the entire 
Naval Enterprise. 
Captain Shannon is married to the former Lisa Palmieri. They have two sons, Patrick and Casey, and 
one daughter, Caroline. Patrick is a Midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy ('09).  
 
Analysis of Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) 
Implementation in Navy Acquisition Programs 
 
Presenter:  Rene Rendon, PhD, is on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School where he 
teaches graduate acquisition and contract management courses.  Prior to his appointment at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, he served for more than 22 years as an acquisition and contracting 
officer in the United States Air Force.  His Air Force career included assignments as a contracting 
officer for major space and weapon systems.  Rendon has earned Bachelor, Master’s, and Doctorate 
degrees in Business Administration and has taught for the UCLA Government Contracts program.  
Dr. Rendon is the Chair of ISM’s Federal Acquisition and Subcontract Management Group, a member 
of the ISM Certification Committee, as well as on the Editorial Review Board for the ISM Inside 
Supply Management.  He is a member of the NCMA Board of Advisors, as well as associate editor for 
its Journal of Contract Management.  Dr. Rendon has published articles in Contract Management, the 
Journal of Contract Management, Program Manager, Project Management Journal, and PM Network, 
and is co-author of Contract Management Organizational Assessment Tools published in 2005. 
 
Dr. Rene G. Rendon 
Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Street 




This research continues the exploration of the use of the modular open systems 
approach (MOSA) as a method for implementing an evolutionary acquisition strategy in 
Department of Defense (DoD) programs.  The background on the initial DoD and Navy 
policy on using a MOSA approach in defense acquisition is presented, followed by a review 
of the initial research findings.  A discussion is then provided on the Navy’s method for 
assessing its implementation of a MOSA approach in its acquisition programs. This 
discussion will focus on the use of the Naval Enterprise Open Architecture Assessment Tool 
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(OAAT).  The primary purpose of this continuing research is to provide an analysis of the 
results of the OAAT assessment of Navy acquisition programs.  
Background on MOSA Policy 
DoD 5000.1 states that, “a modular open systems approach shall be employed 
where feasible” (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2003, May 12a; 2003, May 12b).  
Furthermore, in April 2004, the USD (AT&L) issued a memorandum stating, “all programs 
subject to milestone review shall brief their program’s MOSA implementation status to the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to determine compliance” (Under Secretary of Defense 
(AT&L), 2004, April 5).   
Later that year, the Office of the USD(AT&L), Director of Defense Systems, issued 
instructions for MOSA implementation and identified the Open System Joint Task Force 
(OSJTF) as the DoD lead for MOSA.  This memo also identified MOSA as, “an integral part 
of the toolset that will help DoD achieve its goal of providing the joint combat capabilities 
required in the 21st century, including supporting and evolving these capabilities over their 
total life-cycle” (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2004, July 7).    
In addition, in August 2004, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 
Development & Acquisition) (ASN (RDA)) issued a policy statement that developed a single 
Navy-wide Open Architecture to account for Surface, Air, Submarine, C41, and Space 
domain unique requirements.  That memo also assigned PEO IWS overall responsibility and 
authority for directing the Navy's OA Enterprise effort. An OA Enterprise Team comprised of 
OA domain leads, ASN, OPNAV, and SYSCOM representatives was chartered and led by 
PEO IWS. The Team collectively oversees the development and implementation of the 
processes, business strategies, and technical solutions which support cross-Enterprise 
requirements in addition to domain-specific needs. The Enterprise Team will also define an 
overarching OA acquisition strategy and develop guidance that addresses incentives, 
intellectual property issues, contracting strategies (i.e., integrator's vs. prime's), and funding 
alternatives (ASN (RD&A), 2004). 
Finally, in a 23 December 2005 letter, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Warfare 
Requirements and Program) established the Navy-wide requirement for OA and laid out the 
priorities on which it wants Naval OA to focus.  The letter, “establishes the requirement to 
implement Open Architecture (OA) principles across the Navy Enterprise.”  It establishes the 
OA Council (OAC) of representatives of N6/N7 Division 
Directors to work with the OAET on the requirements.  The letter directs the OAC, 
PEO IWS 7.0, and the OAET to focus assessment priorities in support of the following 
capabilities: Track management, Combat ID (CID), Data fusion, Time-critical Targeting & 
Strike, and Integrated Fire Control (IFC).   
Initial Research Findings 
The purpose of the initial MOSA research was to explore both the use of the modular 
open systems approach (MOSA) as a method for implementing an evolutionary acquisition 
strategy, as well as the implications of using such an approach on the contracting process.   
Although the phases of the contracting process are the same for MOSA-based 
programs as they are for non-MOSA-based programs, this research found that the specific 
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activities conducted and documents developed during the execution of these contracting 
phases have a direct influence on the success of a MOSA-based program.  For example, 
the various options for allocating roles and responsibilities between the government and the 
contractor for the various steps in the acquisition process will influence the amount of 
“openness” in the program and the contractor’s motivation for meeting the desired level of 
openness.   
This research indicated that the greater degree of jointness in acquisition roles and 
responsibilities, as well as the greater degree of contractor-developed acquisition 
documents, will lead to a higher level of openness.  
This initial research also identified early involvement and participation by industry in 
developing requirements and acquisition strategy as a key factor in successful MOSA-based 
programs.  Program offices managing a MOSA-based program should conduct extensive 
market research and industry conferences to achieve this contractor involvement.  A best-
value contract strategy that is tailored to emphasize technical performance in open-based 
systems and COTS systems is also a critical factor in meeting higher levels of openness in 
MOSA-based programs.  A contract strategy which involves developing source-selection 
evaluation factors specifically weighted to emphasize an open systems approach will be 
critical for MOSA-based programs. 
As important as the acquisition strategy is the structure of the contract of a MOSA-
based program.   
This research identified the use of incentive-fees, award-fees, and award-term 
contract incentives as integral to the success of MOSA-based programs.  These incentives, 
if structured appropriately, are effective tools for motivating and incentivizing contractors to 
achieve higher levels of openness in the design and development of systems.   
Finally, the consistent and aggressive use of the contractor past-performance 
information system, as well as the development and establishment of lessons-learned 
programs and best practices will be essential as more and more MOSA-based programs are 
initiated.  As contractors performing work on MOSA-based programs begin to realize that 
the DoD is insistent on using open systems in developing its major weapon systems, they 
should begin to dedicate the required resources to this method of developing weapon 
systems.   
Internal Assessment of MOSA Implementation 
The focus of this follow-on research is to analyze the effectiveness of the 
implementation of MOSA in Navy acquisition programs by investigating the results of 
MOSA-internal assessments, specifically the results of the Open Architecture Assessment 
Tool (OAAT).  The results of this research will prove beneficial to senior Navy officials by 
providing data points on MOSA implementation by analyzing the consistency of MOSA 
compliance status and internal assessments for specific Navy acquisition programs. 
The OAAT is a tool designed to assist Navy program managers in assessing the 
"openness" of their programs. It aligns to the Open Architecture Assessment Model (OAAM) 
as approved by ASN(RDA) and provides a reproducible and objective method of conducting 
program assessments.   Specifically, the OAAT is an analytic tool that evaluates responses 
to a set of interrelated questions to provide program officers with an objective and evidence-
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based assessment of the degree that a program exhibits openness along two axes:  
business and technical.  The degree that openness is implemented is presented in terms of 
business/programmatic and technical criteria.  The business/programmatic dimension 
criteria include questions that address:  Open Architecture, Modular Open Design, Interface 
Design and Management, Treatment of Proprietary Elements, Open Business Practices, 
Peer Review Rights, and Technology Insertion.  The technical dimension criteria cover 
essential OA design tenets of Interoperability, Composability, Reusability, Maintainability 
and Extensibility. 
The OAAT assessment score summary provides a summary of the ratings for each 
of the evaluated areas (See Figure 1).   
Business Areas
Open Systems Approach 
Open Architecture 
Open Modular Design 
Interface Design and Management 
Treatment of Proprietary Elements 
Open Business Practices 





Design Tenet: Interoperability 
Design Tenet: Maintainability 
Design Tenet: Extensibility 
Design Tenet: Composability
Design Tenet: Reusability 
General Design Tenet
 
Figure 1. Ratings of Evaluated Areas 
In addition, an OA assessment matrix that displays the program current state with 
respect to business and technical openness is also provided in the assessment summary.  
Each of these areas (business and technical) is rated on a scale of 0 to 4. (See Figure 2.)  
The results of the OAAT assessment could then be used by the program manager to help 
improve the program with respect to Naval Open Architecture. 
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Figure 2. Open Architeture Maturity Matrix 
 
This is an executive summary of the complete research report.  The complete research 
report may be accessed from the Naval Postgraduate School website 
www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/acqn/publications. 
References 
Defense Acquisition University. (2004, October). Defense acquisition guidebook (Ver. 1.0). 
Retrieved April 11, 2007, from http://akss.dau.mil/dag/. 
Engelbeck, R.M. (2002). Acquisition management. Vienna, VA: Management Concepts. 
Federal acquisition regulation (FAR). Retrieved April 11, 2007, from 
http://farsite.hill.af.mil/VFFARA.HTM 
Garrett, G.A., & Rendon, R.G. (2005). Contract management: Organizational assessment 
tool. Vienna, VA: National Contract Management Association. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2005, November 15). DoD acquisition outcomes: 
A case for change (Report 06-257T). Washington, DC: author. 
Meyers, B.C., & Oberndorf, P. (2001). Managing software acquisition: Open systems and 
COTS products. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L). (2005). Guide for contracting for systems 
engineering (draft). Washington, DC: author. 
Open Systems Joint Task Force (OSJTF). (2004, September). Program manager’s guide: A 
modular open systems approach (MOSA) to acquisition. Retrieved April 11, 2007, 
from www.acq.osd.mil/osjtf. 
Rendon, R.G. (2006).  Using a modular open systems approach in defense acquisitions: 
Implications for the contracting process.  Acquisition Research Sponsored Report, 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), USD (AT&L). (2004, April 5). Guidance regarding 
modular open systems approach (MOSA) implementation. Memo, amplifying DoDD 
5000.1. Washington, DC: author. 
US Navy. (2005, September 9a). Common enterprise display system (CEDS) contract data 
requirements list (CDRL); draft solicitation; industry day briefing (N00024-05-NR-
46527). Washington, DC: author. 
US Navy. (2005, September 9b). Common enterprise display system (CEDS) Draft 
statement of work (SOW) (N00024-05-NR-46527). Washington, DC: author. 
US Navy. (2005, September 27). Enterprise open architecture baseline assessment of 
contracts (PEO/IWS). Washington, DC: author. 
US Navy. (2003). Littoral combat ship (LCS) flight 0 preliminary design solicitation (N00024-
03-R-2309). Washington, DC: author.  
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 267 - 
=
= =
US Navy. (2005, June). Mission package integrator solicitation (N00024-05-R-6311). 
Washington, DC: author. 
US Navy. (2005, September 29a). Mobile user objective system (MUOS) program briefing. 
In Proceedings. Naval Enterprise Open Architecture Contracts Symposium. 
US Navy. (2005, September 29b). Multi-mission maritime aircraft (MMA) program briefing. In 
Proceedings. Naval Enterprise Open Architecture Contracts Symposium. 
 
Software Architecture: Managing Design for Achieving 
Warfighter Capability 
 
Presenter:  Brad Naegle, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army (Ret), is a Lecturer and Academic Associate 
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.  While on active duty, LTC (ret.) Naegle was 
assigned as the Product Manager for the US Army 2½-Ton Extended Service Program (ESP) and the 
USMC Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) from 1994 to 1996, and the Deputy Project 
Manager for Light Tactical Vehicles from 1996 to 1997.  He was the 7th Infantry Division (Light) 
Division Materiel Officer from 1990 to 1993 and the 34th Support Group Director of Security, Plans 
and Operations from 1987 to 1988.  Prior to that, Naegle held positions in Test and Evaluations and 
Logistics fields.  He earned a Master’s Degree in Systems Acquisition Management (with Distinction) 
from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Bachelor of Science degree from Weber State University 
in Economics.  He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms and 
Services Staff School, and Ordnance Corps Advanced and Basic Courses. 
 
Brad Naegle 




“Software architecture forms the backbone for any successful software-intensive 
system.  An architecture is the primary carrier of a software system’s quality 
attributes such as performance or reliability.  The right architecture—correctly 
designed to meet its quality requirements, clearly documented, and conscientiously 
evaluated—is the linchpin for software project success.  The wrong one is a recipe 
for guaranteed disaster” (Software Engineering Institute/Carnegie Mellon, 2007). 
Introduction 
 
Software engineers will typically spend 50% or more of the total software 
development time designing software architecture, and that architecture may provide up to 
80% of a modern weapon system’s functionality.  Increasingly, these systems will operate 
within a network or other system-of-systems architecture.  Obviously, the requirements 
driving that architectural design effort and the process for tracing requirement to functions, 
insight into the process, and control of the effort are critical for the successful development 
of the capability needed by the warfighter. 
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The DoD typically monitors and controls system technical development through 
implementation of the Baselines, Audits and Technical Reviews within an overarching 
Systems Engineering Process (SEP) (Defense Acquisition University, 2004, December, 
chap. 4).  Because of the relatively immature software engineering environment, significantly 
more analysis and development of the requirements is required.  In addition, the software 
architectural design effort is dependent on in-depth requirements analysis, is resource 
intensive, and must occur very early in the process.  Effective management and 
implementation of design metrics is essential in developing software that meets the 
warfighters’ needs.  This management and metrics effort supplements and supports the 
system technical development through the Baselines, Audits and Technical Reviews. 
There are numerous variations and models of the Systems Engineering Process 
(SEP).  This research uses the model depicted in Figure 1 (below), which illustrates the 
systems engineering functions described throughout this paper.  The concepts are 
transferable to the SEP “V” model currently used by the DoD. 
 
Figure 1.  Systems Engineering Process 
Software Requirements Impact 
The importance of system software requirements development to the potential 
success of software-intensive systems development cannot be overstated.  
Underdeveloped, vaguely articulated, ill-defined software requirements elicitation has been 
















Systems Engineering Process 
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overruns.  In addition, the resulting products have been lacking important functionality, are 
unreliable, and have been costly and difficult to effectively sustain (Naegle, 2006, 
September). 
Using the SEP approach, the explicit user capabilities requirements specified in the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) provides the Input for 
system Requirements Analyses.  These analyses are intended to illuminate all system-
stated, derived and implied requirements and quality attributes necessary to achieve the 
capabilities needed by the warfighter.  The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) is a 
methodology for defining ever-increasing levels of performance specificity—using the SEP 
to guide the development of each successive layer (Department of Defense, 2005, July, pp. 
1-5). 
Software Engineering Environment 
The software engineering environment is not mature, especially when compared to 
hardware-centric engineering environments.  Dr. Philippe Kruchten of the University of 
British Columbia remarks, “we haven’t found the fundamental laws of software that would 
play the role that the fundamental laws of physics play for other engineering disciplines” 
(Kruchten, 2005, p. 17).  Software engineering is significantly unbounded as there are no 
physical laws that help define environments; and to date, no industry-wide dominant 
language, set of engineering tools, techniques, reusable assets, or processes have 
emerged.  
This lack of engineering maturity impacts both requirements development and the 
subject for this research, design of the architecture, which will be discussed later.  To 
compensate for the relative immaturity of the software engineering environment, the DoD 
must conduct significantly more in-depth requirements analysis and provide potential 
software developers detailed performance specifications in all areas of software 
performance and sustainability.  
Performance Specifications and the Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) 
Since the implementation of Acquisition Reform in the nineties, detailed 
specifications have been replaced with performance specifications in order to leverage the 
considerable experience and expertise available in the defense contractor base.  In most 
hardware-centric engineering disciplines, the expertise the DoD seeks to leverage includes 
a mature engineering environment in which materials, standards, tools, techniques and 
processes are widely accepted and implemented by industry leaders.  This engineering 
maturity helps to account for derived and implied requirements not explicitly stated in the 
performance specification.  Three levels of the WBS may provide sufficient detail for a 
desired system to be developed in a mature engineering environment, such as the 
automotive field.  For example, an automotive design that provides for easy replacement of 
wear-out items such as tires, filters, belts, and batteries obviously provides sustainability 
performance that is absolutely required.  Most performance specifications do not explicitly 
address this capability as they would be automatically considered by any competent 
provider within the mature automotive engineering environment.  
In stark comparison, the software engineering environment offers little assistance in 
compensating for derived and implied requirements, and developers are limited to respond, 
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almost exclusively, to the explicit requirements provided.  The DoD Handbook 881A, “Work 
Breakdown Structures for Defense Materiel Items,” recommends a minimum of three levels 
be developed before handoff to a contractor.  If a program is expected to be high-cost or 
high-risk, it is critical to define the system at a lower level of the WBS (Department of 
Defense, 2005, July, p. 3).  Complex weapon systems are nearly always high-cost, and the 
complex software development needed almost always means that it is high-risk, as well.  
The WBS and performance specification must, consequently, be significantly more 
developed to provide the software engineer enough information and insight to accurately 
estimate the level of effort needed—cost and schedule—and to actually produce the 
capabilities needed by the warfighter.  Contracts resulting from proposals that are based on 
underdeveloped, vague, or missing requirements typically result in catastrophic cost and 
schedule growth as the true level of software development effort is discovered only after 
contract award.  
The WBS provides the basis for the performance specification and is a powerful 
communications medium with potential contractors as the upper levels provide a functional 
system breakdown structure from the DoD’s perspective.  The same WBS continues to be 
developed by the contractor, eventually providing the detailed breakdown structure, which is 
the basis for the cost and scheduling estimates provided in the proposals and used in the 
Earned Value Management (EVM) metrics during execution. 
Software Quality Attributes 
As the system requirements are developed, software quality attributes are identified 
and become the basis for designing the software architecture.  One methodology for fully 
developing the software attributes is to use the Software Engineering Institute’s Quality 
Attribute Workshop (QAW), which is implemented before the software architecture has been 
created and is intended to provide stakeholder input about their needs and expectations 
from the software (Barbacci, Ellison, Lattanze, Stafford, Weinstock, & Wood, 2003, August, 
p. 1).   
While the QAW would certainly be useful after contract award, conducting the 
workshop between combat developers/users and the program management office before 
issuance of the Request for Proposal (RFP) would provide an improved understanding of 
the requirements, enhance the performance-specification preparation, and improve the 
ability of the prospective contractors to accurately propose the cost and schedule.  This 
approach would support the goals of the System Requirements Review (SRR), which is 
designed to ascertain whether all derived and implied requirements have been defined. 
The QAW process provides a vehicle for keeping the combat developer and user 
community involved in the DoD acquisition process, which is a key goal of that process.  In 
addition, the QAW includes scenario-building processes that are essential for the software 
developer in designing the software system architecture (Barbacci, Ellison, Lattanze, 
Stafford, Weinstock, & Wood, 2003, August, pp. 9-11).  These scenarios will continue to be 
developed and prioritized after contract award to provide context to the quality attribute.  
Specific recommendations for this process will be discussed later.   
Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability/Interfaces, Reliability, 
and Safety/Security (MUIRS) Analytic Technique 
The QAW provides the “how,” and the performance requirements (with 
Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability/Interfaces, Reliability, and Safety/Security 
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(MUIRS) analytic technique) provides the “what”—or at least a significant portion of it.  The 
MUIRS elements also help capture the need for Open Architecture (OA), especially in the 
Maintainability, Upgradability, and Interoperability/Interfaces elements.  Much of the 
software performance that typically lacks consideration and is not routinely addressed in the 
software engineering environment can be captured through development and analysis of the 
MUIRS elements.  Analyzing the warfighter requirements in a QAW framework for 
performance in each MUIRS area will help identify software quality attributes that need to be 
communicated to potential software contractors  (Naegle, 2006, September, pp. 17-24).  
While this technique would be effective within any system, it is especially effective in 
compensating for the lack of software engineering maturity and in conveying a more 
complete understanding of the potential software-development effort, resulting in more 
realistic proposals.   
The MUIRS analytical approach provides a framework to capture, develop, and 
document derived and implied requirements—which may be vaguely alluded to or missing 
from the user/combat developer’s requirements documents.  For example, a user 
requirement might be simply presented in terms like, “The network must be secure in all 
modes within the intended environment.”  Without further development, the software 
engineer may interpret that requirement in many different ways, planning for authentication 
and encryption/decryption routines.  Applying the Safety/Security analytic approach in a 
QAW format, the derived and implied requirements are likely to elucidate the following 
requirements: 
 Ability to constantly monitor the network to detect and counteract active or passive 
intrusion or attacks 
 Ability to provide details of attacks to Intelligence/Counter Intelligence personnel 
 Ability to conduct passive measures to ensure that all node operations are conducted 
with authorized personnel exclusively 
 Ability to quarantine a suspect node without impacting the rest of the network.  Ability 
to lift the quarantine when properly authenticated. 
 Ability to identify information provided to, or requested by the quarantined node for 
Intelligence/Counter Intelligence analysis 
 Passive ability to authenticate information sources 
 Ability to interoperate with other secure devices and networks without the risk of 
compromise 
 Ability to accommodate network system changes and upgrades 
 Ability to accommodate a wide array of users and organizations, formed into the 
secure network task force as missions dictate 
The difference in the level of requirement development is significant, and the more 
complete information provides necessary performance thresholds that must be 
accommodated by the software design and development effort.  The software architecture 
would likely be vastly different the implied and derived security requirements are considered.  
The amount of work required to meet the actual software security-performance attributes is 
revealed to the contractor prior to proposal preparation—which should vastly improve the 
cost and schedule accuracy of the proposal submitted.  In addition, the software engineer 
gains a much more in-depth understanding of the system being developed, thereby 
improving the design effort described later. 
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Similar analyses of all MUIRS elements provide a much more complete 
understanding of requirements and insight into the operational environment envisioned by 
the warfighter.  This level of understanding is absolutely crucial for effective design of the 
software architecture.  If the design effort is started without this level of understanding of the 
requirement attributes, significant architectural design rework or outright scrapping of early 
design attempts is inevitable—resulting in increased costs and lengthened schedules.  
 
Software Architecture Characteristics 
Software Developer Effort 
In past acquisition programs, software development was considered something that 
could be fielded and then “fixed” after the weapon systems were deployed. The complexity 
of software, interface problems and the cost for rework were grossly underestimated; the 
result was costly schedule slips and less-than-desired performance.  
When software development was in its infancy in 1968, Alfred M. Peitrasanta at IBM 
Systems Research Institute wrote:  
Anyone who expects a quick and easy solution to the multi-faced problem of 
resource estimation is going to be disappointed. The reason is clear; computer 
program system development is a complex process; the process itself is poorly 
understood by its practitioners; the phases and functions which comprise the process 
are influenced by dozens of ill-defined variables; most of the activities within the 
process are still primarily human rather than mechanical, and therefore prone to all 
the subjective factors which affect human performance. (Pietrasanta, 1968, pp. 341-
346)   
After numerous, costly software disasters, we have learned that software 
development must be a parallel effort with system development within the acquisition 
framework to ensure that requirements are being met and usable products are being 
delivered to the warfighter. As the system requirements are defined, the requirements for 
the software should also be developed concurrently.  One critical factor in the software 
development effort is applying systems engineering discipline to the process and ensuring 
that discipline is continuous and rigorous throughout the development. Software 
development has the highest degree of program risk and tends to evolve into a state of 
turmoil, which is detrimental to the goal of mission-ready software and has a negative impact 
on cost, schedule and performance.   
Software Functionality and Design Architecture 
 
The design of the architecture begins with the description of the system and 
identifies the functions required for the system to provide the capabilities desired. The 
required functions will drive the design of the system architecture.  System functionality and 
performance requirements are documented in the Government’s Request for Proposal 
(RFP). The potential contractor must break down those functions and performance 
requirements and consider Maintainability, Upgradeability, Interfaces/Interoperability, 
Reliability, Safety, and Security (MUIRSS) in the design-decision process.  The MUIRSS 
analysis will ensure the contractor understands the requirement and will also identify any 
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limiting factors in the system requirements tradeoffs. The desired functionality and the 
analysis will drive the system architecture.  For software-intensive acquisition programs, it is 
even more critical that the performance requirements be communicated and understood by 
the software developer.  
 
 
Work Breakdown Structure  
 
The Government’s requirements and specifications for a new weapon system are 
detailed in the RFP; this includes a Government-produced Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) to at least three levels.  This is known as the Program WBS and is handed off to the 
contractor to develop a WBS that defines the level of detail required for product 
development. This contractor-generated product will ensure the system developer 
understands the program objectives and the products to be delivered in performance of the 
contract. The WBS details the functionality and performance of the system and provides a 
baseline to track performance against cost and schedule. For most hardware-centric 
programs, a WBS for the top three levels of the system under development is usually 
enough detail to manage the program. Because of the volatile nature of software 
development, immature software engineering environment, and the potential impact to cost, 
schedule and risk, the WBS for software intensive programs need to be developed down to 
Level 5 or lower for a software-intensive program—including system-of-systems (SOS) and 
net-centric systems development.  
Level 1 of the WBS describes the entire project. If the program is a Systems of 
Systems (SOS) project, Level I becomes that overarching system.  The Army Future 
Combat System (FCS) has a number of platforms that are segments of the total system. 
Each platform becomes a major segment of that product (Level 2); the software 
development would then be broken down to Level 6, which identifies software-configuration 
items.  
 Using the FCS as an example, Level 1 describes the overall FCS concept and 
environment. Level 2 details the major product segments of the SOS. With our example of 
FCS, the Level 2 would be the manned systems, i.e., infantry-carrier vehicles, command-
and-controlled vehicles, mounted combat systems, etc.  
Level 3 defines the major components or subsets of Level 2. For software 
development, decomposing the software WBS to the lowest component is critical for the 
developer to fully comprehend the detailed level of effort required to design and develop 
effective systems. Under the FCS scenario, Level 3 would be one of the subsystems on 
board the manned systems, e.g., the fire-control systems and environmental-control 
systems.  It is clear that WBS definition to this level provides only a very top-level insight to 
the system being developed; thus, for the software-intensive system, the WBS fails to 
convey enough information for the contractor to propose a realistic cost and schedule 
estimate.  Too much of the software development work is hidden at this level. 
Level 4 becomes a breakout of the component parts of the subsystem. Using a 
manned vehicle in the FCS program, Level 5 of the WBS would identify the component 
functions for the fire-control system: for example, detect the target, aim at the target and fire 
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the munitions. The software build set would support the functionality of that component 
within the subsystem. Again, using FCS as the overarching program, Level 6 is a sum of 
software items (SI’s) which satisfy a required function and are designated for configuration 
management.  If the software requirements or attributes are well defined, the result is a 
product that is properly designed to functionally perform to the users’ requirements.   Further 
development below Level 6 may be necessary to adequately convey the derived and implied 
requirements needed by the software developer. 
Systems Engineering Process 
 
Just as it supports hardware development, the Systems Engineering Process (SEP) 
is essential in the development of software design. In software development, good quality 
and predictable results are paramount goals in creating the specified warfighter capabilities 
within cost and schedule constraints. To accomplish those goals, we examine the methods, 
tools and processes that the software developer uses in building the software with the intent 
of attaining a product that provides all of the necessary functionality and is supportable, 
efficient, reliable and easy to upgrade.   
The SEP also helps identify and manage program risk.  How mature is the processes 
of the software developer? One cause for delays and cost overruns in the C-17 
Globemaster program was the contractor’s lack of software experience, which is an element 
of the developer’s maturity. To address developer maturity, SEI developed an evaluation 
tool in the mid-1980s known as the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) which rates software 
developers on key elements of maturity including experience, processes, management and 
demonstrated predictability. This gives the DoD insight into the maturity of potential 
developers as a means of risk reduction.  
The system requirements, stated in the RFP, detail the software’s functions, what it 
must do and how well, under what conditions, and identifies interfaces and interoperability 
requirements. The performance requirements are also analyzed for required response time, 
maintainability and modularity, open-architecture requirements and transportability.  This 
phase of the SEP also addresses any restricting factors—for example, interface with legacy 
systems, any required operating systems—and also identifies issues such as data and 
software rights constraints.   
The developer then identifies software attributes and decomposes functions to the 
lowest level, ensuring that each performance specification in the RFP has, as a minimum, 
one function. The functional architecture, the block diagrams and software interfaces are 
described during this step.  
These functions are then combined into a system that describes the architecture, 
defines all interfaces, explains operating parameters,   produces the SI’s and develops the 
documentation, technical manuals, and any deliverable media (Kazman, Klein & Clements, 
2000, August, p. vii).     
Attribute-driven Design 
 
“Quality attribute goals, by themselves, are not definitive enough either for design or for 
evaluation” (Barbacci, Ellison, Lattanze, Stafford, Weinstock, & Wood, 2003, August, p. 3)     
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The design of the system architecture will be driven by the quality attributes 
requirements. The performance goals of the system must be defined not only in attributes or 
qualities, but also in how those attributes interact or interface with the system and 
subsystems. If those attributes are poorly communicated, the architectural design will fail to 
meet the performance goals and could potentially impact the overall program cost and 
schedule. Those critical attributes or qualities must be carefully documented and articulated 
to the software designer. To evaluate the architecture, the designer must receive a detailed 
description of the desired attributes with the overall proposed design of the system. 
However, in the evaluation of the design, an analysis of the attributes may not be enough 
detail for the developer. The RFP or performance specification needs to address any 
operational requirements or constraints. Clearly, understanding the attributes in the context 
of how they are used is critical for the software designer.  
Software Architecture Analysis 
If a software architecture is a key business asset for an organization, the 
architectural analysis must also be a key practice for that organization.  Why?  
Because architectures are complex and involve many design tradeoffs.  Without 
undertaking a formal analysis process, the organization cannot ensure that the 
architectural decisions made—particularly those which affect the achievement of 
quality attributes such as performance, availability, security, and modifiability—are 
advisable ones that appropriately mitigate risks. (Kazman, Klein & Clements, 2000, 
August, p. vii)   
This quote from the Software Engineering Institute illustrates the importance of 
performing architectural analysis in developing software-intensive systems. 
After thorough requirements development and elicitation, architectural analysis is the 
next necessary step in managing the software development and serves as the SEP 
functional allocation step.  Defining the requirements and software quality attributes is a 
critical first step to any program development and provides the basis for architectural 
analysis.  One of the main functions of the architectural analyses is to understand how the 
quality attribute is being achieved by the design architecture and, just as importantly, is to 
gain insight into how those attributes interact with each other.  For example, it is crucial to 
understand how security is ensured while the open-system architecture the DoD requires is 
maintained. 
Understanding Quality Attributes in Context 
It is not sufficient to understand a quality attribute without understanding the context 
in which it will be used and sustained by the warfighter.  One method of gaining the needed 
context is to develop operational scenarios that would place all software quality attributes 
into system-use cases spanning key effectiveness and suitability issues.  The development 
and prioritization of the operational scenarios must be accomplished by the user, combat 
developer, warfighter, and other stakeholders—keeping them actively engaged in the 
developmental process. 
The context in which the attributes function provides significant design cues to the 
software engineer.  For example, the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank uses numerous inputs 
for precisely engaging threat targets.  Several such inputs are essential for any acceptable 
probability of hitting the desired target, including target acquisition (finding the target), 
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location (azimuth and range), aiming/tracking, and firing the projectile.  To increase 
accuracy, several other systems are employed that enhance one or more of the essential 
functions, including cross-wind sensor, temperature sensor, muzzle-reference system, and 
others.  The tank main-gun engagement scenario separates the essential functions from the 
enhancing functions, allowing the software engineer to design the software to permit an 
engagement when all of the essential functions are operational—even when an enhancing 
function, like the temperature sensor, is not working.  The warfighter can continue to fight 
effectively using the system, increasing mission reliability.  Without development of these 
scenarios, every requirement and quality attribute appear to be in the “essential” category, 
which may result in a design that precludes critical operations when a non-essential 
enhancing system is not working. 
Operational Scenario Development 
A scenario is a short statement describing an interaction of one of the stakeholders 
with the system (Kazman, Klein & Clements, 2000, August, p. 13).  A warfighter would 
describe using the system to perform a task or mission in a range of environments (dark, 
cold hot, contaminated, etc.).  A leader would describe system employment in concert with 
other joint and allied systems in a system-of-systems approach.  A system maintainer would 
describe preventative or restorative maintenance tasks and procedures.  A trainer would 
describe programs of instruction to task, condition and standard. 
Much of the necessary operational scenario development work has been 
accomplished through implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, May).  JCIDS is the user’s 
capability-based requirements generation process, providing a top-down baseline for 
identifying future capabilities.  It uses a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) analysis 
technique to assess current systems’ and programs’ abilities to provide the warfighter with 
capabilities to accomplish missions envisioned in the applicable CONOPS.  These CONOPS 
provide the basis for operational scenario development. 
Two of the JCIDS key documents, the Capabilities Design Document (CDD) and 
Capabilities Production Document (CPD):  
state the operational and support-related performance attributes of a system that 
provide the desired capability required by the warfighter, attributes so significant that they 
must be verified by testing and evaluation.  The documents shall designate the specific 
attributes considered essential to the development of an effective military capability and 
those attributes that make significant contribution to the key characteristics as defined in the 
[Joint Operations Concepts] JOpsC as [Key Performance Parameters] KPPs. (Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, May, p. A-17)   
Key system attributes within the context of the CONOPS are the genesis of scenario 
building and will help guide the user in developing a prioritized set of operational scenarios 
considered essential in designing the software architecture. 
Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a type of exploratory 
scenario analysis designed to expose potential failure modes and their impact on the system 
functionality and mission accomplishment.  Scenarios are developed that explore system 
operations in likely or critical subsystem failure modes; then, the criticality of those failures is 
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analyzed.  Operations in degraded modes are also analyzed to gain insight into graceful 
degradation capabilities as subsystems fail and the system is reduced to ever-decreasing 
levels of basic functionality.  With up to 80% of weapon-system functionality in the system 
software, it is critical for the design engineer to understand warfighter needs and 
expectations in these failure modes. 
FMECA scenarios with the software systems and subsystems provide architectural 
design cues to software engineers.  These scenarios provide analysis for designing 
redundant systems for mission-critical elements, “safe mode” operations for survivability- 
and safety-related systems, and drive the software engineer to conduct “what if” analyses 
with a superior understanding of failure-mode scenarios.  For example, nearly all military 
aircraft are “fly-by-wire,” with no physical connection between the pilot controls and the 
aircraft-control surfaces, so basic software avionic functions must be provided in the event of 
damage or power-loss situations to give the pilot the ability to perform basic flight and 
navigation functions.  Obviously, this would be a major design driver for the software 
architect.   
Architectural Trade-off Analysis SM   
The Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Trade-off Analysis Methodology SM 
(ATAM) is an architectural analysis tool designed to evaluate design decisions based on the 
quality attribute requirements of the system being developed.  The methodology is a 
process for determining whether the quality attributes are achievable by the architecture as 
it has been conceived before enormous resources have been committed to that design.  
One of the main goals is to gain insight into how the quality attributes trade off against each 
other (Kazman, Klein & Clements, 2000, August, p. 1).   
Within the Systems Engineering Process (SEP), the ATAM provides the critical 
Requirements Loop process, tracing each requirement or quality attribute to corresponding 
functions reflected in the software architectural design.  Whether ATAM or another analysis 
technique is used, this critical SEP process must be performed to ensure that functional- or 
object-oriented designs meet all stated, derived, and implied warfighter requirements.  In 
complex systems development such as weapon systems, half or more than half of the total 
software development effort will be expended in the architectural design process. Therefore, 
the DoD Program Managers must ensure that the design is addressing requirements in 
context and that the resulting architecture has a high probability of producing the 
warfighters’ capabilities described in the JCIDS documents. 
The ATAM focuses on quality attribute requirements, so it is critical to have precise 
characterizations for each.  To characterize a quality attribute, the following questions must 
be answered: 
 What are the stimuli to which the architecture must respond? 
 What is the measurable or observable manifestation of the quality attribute by which 
its achievement is judged? 
 What are the key architectural decisions that impact achieving the attribute 
requirement? (2000, p. 5) 
The scenarios are a key to providing the necessary information to answer the first 
two questions, driving the software engineer to design the architecture to answer the third. 
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The ATAM uses three types of scenarios:  Use-case scenarios involve typical uses 
of the system to help understand quality attributes in the operational context; growth 
scenarios involve anticipated upgrades, added interfaces supporting system-of-systems 
development, and other maturity needs; and exploratory scenarios involve extreme 
conditions and system stressors, including FMECA scenarios (2000, pp. 13-15).  As 
depicted in Figure 2, below, the scenarios build on the basis provided in the JCIDS 
documents and requirements developed through the QAW process.  These processes lend 
themselves to development in an Integrated Product Team (IPT) environment led by the 
user/combat developer and including all of the system’s stakeholders.  The IPT products will 
include a set of scenarios, prioritized by the needs of the warfighter for capability.  The 
prioritization process provides a basis for architecture tradeoff analyses.  When fully 
developed and prioritized, the scenarios provide a more complete understanding of 
requirements and quality attributes in context with the operation and support of the system 
over its lifecycle.  
 
Figure 2.  QAW & ATAM Integration into Software Lifecycle Management 
 
Just as the QAW process provides a methodology supporting RFP and Source-
selection activities, the Software Specification and System Requirements Reviews (SSR and 
SRR), the ATAM provides a methodology supporting design analyses, test program 
activities, the System Functional and Preliminary Design Reviews (SFR and PDR).  The 
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QAW and ATAM methodologies are probably not the only effective methods supporting 
software development efforts, but they fit particularly well with the DoD’s goals, models and 
SEP emphasis.  The user/combat developer (blue arrow block in Figure 2, above) is kept 
actively involved throughout the development process—providing key insights the software 
developer needs to successfully develop warfighter capabilities in a sustainable design for 
long-term effectiveness and suitability.  The system development activities are conducted 
with superior understanding and clarity, reducing scrap and rework, and saving cost and 
schedule.  The technical reviews and audits (part of the DoD overarching SEP) are 
supported with methodologies that enhance the visibility of the development work that is 
needed and the progress toward completing it.   
One of the main goals in analyzing the scenarios is to find key architectural decision 
points that pose risk for meeting quality requirements.  Sensitivity points are determined, 
such as real-time latency performance shortfalls in target tracking.  Tradeoff points are also 
examined, such as level of encryption and message-processing time. The Software 
Engineering Institute explains, “Tradeoff points are the most critical decisions that one can 
make in an architecture, which is why we focus on them so carefully” (Kazman, Klein & 
Clements, 2000, August, p. 23). 
The ATAM provides an analysis methodology that compliments and enhances many 
of the key DoD acquisition processes.  It provides the requirements loop analysis in the 
SEP, extends the user/stakeholder JCIDS involvement through scenario development, 
provides informed architectural tradeoff analyses, and vastly improves the software 
developer’s understanding of the quality requirements in context.  Architectural risk is 
significantly reduced, and the software architecture presented at the Preliminary Design 




A significant product resulting from the ATAM is the development of test cases 
correlating to the use case, growth, and exploratory scenarios developed and prioritized.  
Figure 3, below, depicts the progression from user-stated capability requirements in the 
JCIDS documents to the ATAM scenario development, and finally to the corresponding test 
cases developed.  The linkage to the user requirements is very strong as the user 
documents drive the development of the three types of scenarios, and in turn, the scenarios 
drive the development of the use cases.  The prioritization of the scenarios from user-stated 
Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), Critical Operational Issues (COIs), and FMECA 
analysis flows to the test cases, helping to create a system test program designed to focus 









Figure 3.  Capabilities-based ATAM Scenario Development 
The software developer’s understanding of the eventual performance required to be 
considered successful guides the design of the architecture and every step of the software 
development, coding, and testing through to the Full Operational Capability (FOC) delivery 
and OT&E.  Coding and early testing of software units and configuration items is much more 
purposeful due to this level of understanding. 
The resulting test program is very comprehensive as each prioritized scenario 
requires testing or other verification methodologies to demonstrate how the software 
performs in each related scenario and satisfies the quality attributes borne of the user 
requirements.  The testing supports the SEP design loop by verifying that the software 
performs the functions allocated to it and in aggregate, performs the verification loop 
process by demonstrating that the final product produces the capability identified in the user 
requirements through operational testing. 
Architectural Analysis Products 
 Architecture Documentation and the Preliminary Design Review 
 (PDR) 
One of the main purposes of the PDR is to evaluate the system architectural design 
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in the SEP as it provides traceability from the requirements to the functional allocation of the 
proposed design.   
It is critical to have a complete functional- or object-oriented Software Design 
Document reviewed at the PDR.  Given that, the software developer would likely have spent 
50% or more of the effort at the time of the PDR for a software-intensive system.  
Discovering that the proposed software design is insufficient at this point in the development 
cycle can be disastrous to the budget and schedule for the entire program, especially if the 
proposed design must be scrapped or if there is significant redesign required.   
 Architecture Documentation 
Documenting the process decisions in designing the software architecture provides a 
record of design decisions, tradeoffs made, and priorities implemented throughout the 
design effort and design reviews.  The active involvement of the user and all system 
stakeholders throughout this process is one of the keys to achieving a robust design that 
provides warfighter capabilities and long-term, cost-effective sustainability.  The ATAM 
provides methodologies that formalize the stakeholder participation in the architectural 
design. 
The ATAM would help drive documentation from quality attributes to both the three 
types of prioritized scenarios as well as the test cases needed to demonstrate or verify 
performance.  The quality attributes are understood in the context of the user-prioritized 
scenarios, so design decisions have strong linkage to user priorities.  The test cases help 
guide the design effort as the software engineer has a very clear understanding of what the 
software must do, under what conditions, and to what standard.  Design reviews each have 
a clearly defined focus, with the ATAM products providing a common understanding of what 
is to be accomplished. 
 Scenario Inventory 
One of the main products resulting from the ATAM is the prioritized inventory of use 
case, growth, and exploratory scenarios that drive the architectural design.  As the user 
(along with other stakeholders) is the primary source for scenario development, the resulting 
design is user-oriented, not engineer-oriented.   
The prioritization of the scenarios provides the basis for tradeoff analyses and design 
decisions, placing tradeoff decisions where they should be—with the warfighter.  With the 
user involved throughout the design process, the resulting system is much more likely to 
satisfy warfighter capability requirements. 
 Software and System Test Program 
The development of test cases from the scenarios, as depicted in Figure 3 above, 
provides the Design Loop function of the SEP by ensuring that the software developed 
performs the functions defined by the scenarios, which represent the quality attribute 
requirements in context.  The inventories of test cases are developed from the user-defined 
scenarios so that there is one or more test case for every scenario.  The test cases will tend 
to satisfy both technical issues (as the software developed will be tested against its intended 
function) as well as operational issues, as each function is borne of the users’ scenarios. 
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The aggregated test cases are part of the system’s overall test program and 
contribute to readiness for the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E).  The IOT&E 
is the defining event in the SEP Verification Loop, ensuring that the software developed 
satisfies user effectiveness and suitability requirements and meets warfighter capability 
needs specified in the JCIDS documents. 
 Software Design Metrics 
From the DoD’s point of view, gaining insight and control of the software design 
process is crucial to delivering the warfighter capabilities required. In addition, metrics 
provide a means to monitor and control the process.  The metrics chosen must provide the 
DoD insight into how the software architecture is designed to satisfy quality attributes and 
requirements across a broad spectrum of functionality and long-term sustainability 
performance.  In addition, technically oriented design metrics such as complexity are also 
important, but are not the focus of this research. 
The system architectural design is very much a shared responsibility between the 
DoD and the software developer, so metrics must also reflect developmental measures 
spanning both.  For instance, designating the completed set of prioritized scenarios as a 
design metric involves measuring the build of the scenarios in a collaborative 
user/stakeholder/developer environment.   
Using the completion of the ATAM products as metrics is logical as they are 
measurable, are key processes in the architectural design, and serve as indicators to the 
progress towards successfully completing the design process.  Useful ATAM-based metrics 
would include: 
 Business Drivers Developed 
 Prioritized Scenario Sets Developed 
 Attribute Utility Tree 
 Sensitivity Points & Tradeoff Points 
 Architecture Approach Document 
Summary 
The main goal of the DoD acquisition process is to develop identified warfighter 
capabilities within predicted and controlled timelines and cost targets; yet, many software-
intensive systems developed have experienced significant cost and schedule growth due, at 
least in part, to the software development component.  There are many factors that 
contribute to the problem—including how and when the DoD conveys the needed quality 
attribute requirements. 
The DoD acquisition model uses the Systems Engineering Process (SEP) as the 
central process for controlling the developmental process of its systems.  The SEP is an 
integrated process with the DoD and the contractors selected, thereby urging shared 
responsibility for effective systems development.  The process begins and ends with the 
user or combat developer responsible for providing the capabilities-based requirements, 
which are further developed and decomposed by the Program Manager and contractors 
responsible for building the system.  The system components are constructed, integrated 
and continually tested, culminating in the User’s acceptance testing, usually the Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). 
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A key to the SEP implementation is effective and complete development and 
communication of the system requirements.  This must happen at some point for any system 
to be successfully developed; but when it happens is extremely important to the cost and 
schedule estimate accuracy.  When the contractor has a good understanding of the work to 
be completed from the requirements presented, more accurate estimates are offered in the 
contractor’s proposal before the program schedule is locked in with a contract.  If a 
significant portion of the work is discovered through requirements decomposition after the 
contract is in place (typical of software components), the estimates provided in the proposal 
are severely understated, and the program schedule and budgets are no longer appropriate. 
One reason the software component is more sensitive to the requirements 
development is that the software engineering environment is immature when compared to 
most hardware-centric environments.  Vague or missing requirements for a hardware item 
may be compensated by a mature engineering environment that accommodates implied 
requirements.  For instance, the automotive industry would provide the ability to easily 
replace normal wear-out items like filters and tires, whether or not such provisions were 
specified.  The software engineering environment does not offer that level of maturity.  
The MUIRS analytical technique helps capture software performance requirements 
that are routinely overlooked in the immature software engineering environment.  The 
MUIRS analysis helps capture and convey Open Architecture needs, safety and security 
considerations, and long-term supportability performance needed by the warfighter. 
In addition to simply understanding the breadth of system requirements, the software 
engineer needs to understand them in context of the operations, supportability, and 
environments to design a software architecture that is effective.  It is not enough to 
understand what the software must do; the engineer must understand under what 
circumstances, in what environments, and to what standard the function must be performed. 
What the DoD needs to improve the acquisition of software-intensive systems are 
methodologies that capture and convey quality attribute requirements in an operational 
context, within a Systems Engineering Process environment.  The Software Engineering 
Institute’s Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW) and Architecture Tradeoff Analysis 
Methodology SM (ATAM) provide well-suited techniques for developing requirements in 
context.  The QAW process before contracting helps provide enough requirements 
elicitation for more accurate contractor proposals; likewise, the ATAM helps provide the 
operational context through scenario and test-case development before the software design 
effort.  Both products support the SEP, providing methodologies for performing critical SEP 
functions. 
DoD personnel (user/combat developer and Program Manager/materiel developer) 
are key and integral to the development of effective and suitable warfighter capabilities 
within predictable cost and schedule parameters.  Improving the processes that develop and 
convey system quality attribute requirements in context will improve the cost, schedule and 
performance predictability of software-intensive systems and will reduce the supportability 
costs over the life of the system. 
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The Navy is currently implementing the open-architecture framework for developing 
joint interoperable systems that adapt and exploit open-system design principles and 
architectures. This raises concerns about how to practically achieve dependability in 
software-intensive systems with many possible configurations when: 1) the actual 
configuration of the system is subject to frequent and possibly rapid change, and 2) the 
environment of typical reusable subsystems is variable and unpredictable. Our preliminary 
investigations indicate that current methods for achieving dependability in open 
architectures are insufficient. Conventional methods for testing are suited for stovepipe 
systems and depend strongly on the assumptions that the environment of a typical system is 
fixed and known in detail to the quality-assurance team at test and evaluation time. This 
paper outlines new approaches to quality assurance and testing that are better suited for 
providing affordable reliability in open architectures, and explains some of the additional 
technical features that an Open Architecture must have in order to become a Dependable 
Open Architecture.  
Introduction  
The Navy’s Open Architecture (OA) is defined to be a multi-faceted strategy 
providing a framework for developing joint interoperable systems that adapt and exploit 
open-system design principles and architectures (DAU, 2007b). The objective of supporting 
adaptable systems has significant implications for quality assurance. OA approaches often 
involve: (i) a public, non-proprietary architecture that can accept plug-in components and be 
transparent to changes (e.g., the system should continue to work if selected components or 
connectors are replaced by different components or connectors), and (ii) an architecture 
whose purpose is to make explicit the common interfaces (e.g., POSIX, CORBA, etc.). Main 
goals of Navy’s OA include minimizing total cost of ownership, increasing competition, 
achieving reuse, optimizing systems, and developing systems that support evolution.  
This paper explores some test and evaluation implications, outlines an approach for 
providing affordable quality assurance in the kind of dynamic environment that open 
architectures are intended to accommodate, and evaluates the current state of some 
technologies that support the new approach.  
The Navy's requirements to implement OA are set forth in several Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Department of Navy (DoN, 2004, August 5) policy documents (e.g., “The 
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Defense Acquisition System” (DoD, 2003, May 12), “Guidance Regarding Modular Open 
Systems Approach (MOSA) Implementation” (DoD, 2004, April 5), “Naval Open Architecture 
Scope and Responsibilities” (DoN, 2004, August 5), etc.). In the past the Navy has acquired 
systems that, although they performed their functions and tasks exceedingly well, were 
unique in their designs and engineering. Indeed, they required unique parts, equipment, and 
services to support them, were supported by a limited number of suppliers and became 
unaffordable to maintain. There are numerous instances, moreover, in which a system or 
platform was scrapped rather than upgraded or modernized because the cost to do so had 
become prohibitive. Test and evaluation account for an appreciable part of the cost for 
system upgrades. This paper explores how open architecture principles can be extended 
and applied to reduce these costs and to make Navy systems more agile.  
Business issues are pushing the Navy to shift its development processes towards an 
open-architecture paradigm. In an era of strenuous competition for dollars, the Navy is 
continuously challenged with budget decisions. Inflexible acquisition strategies lock the 
Navy into single systems and vendors that limit the service's options for competition and 
innovation. Limited competition impedes innovation, while OA provides options for greater 
competition and inclusion of innovators. Cost of procured systems is due to maintenance as 
well as development expense. Stovepiped processes lead to acquisition of systems across 
the Navy with duplicated capabilities. For example, every ship (class) had a unique combat 
system. Currently, limited asset reuse takes place across the enterprise without open 
architectures. However, there are few enterprise processes to foster integration in a legacy 
environment. To achieve rapid fielding of new technology and capability for the Fleet, the 
Navy’s business model has to change from the classic acquisition system to a process that 
supports Rapid Capability Insertion. Open architecture meets those needs by shortening 
cycle-times for getting capability to the warfighter when needed. The use of modular 
systems to facilitate technology refreshment and obsolescence mitigation is a key aspect of 
OA. Increased competition and innovation are possible through changed business practices 
enabled by OA.  
Many technical issues are also motivating the Navy’s change towards open 
architectures:  
 Procurement of monolithic systems using legacy processes produces incompatible 
systems that are not interoperable. 
 Software closely coupled (integral) to the computing hardware platforms is not 
reusable.  
 Special-use code and modules that cannot be reused across the Navy are artifacts 
of the legacy approach to systems acquisition. 
 Proliferation (and resulting lifecycle cost growth) of hardware and software baselines 
results from upgrade processes in closed systems.  
Consequently, there has been much attention to cultural issues and acquisition 
policies to facilitate adoption of an open architecture paradigm for Navy systems.  
This paper addresses a complementary effort to identify current weaknesses and 
gaps in the state of the knowledge with respect to assuring reliability of DoD/DoN systems 
developed according to open-systems principles, and to develop or adapt new methods for 
overcoming those weaknesses so they can be used in Navy open architectures. We are 
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studying weaknesses in current best practices with respect to the context identified above, 
and are performing research to extend and develop methods to overcome those 
weaknesses.  
Our preliminary investigations indicate that current methods for achieving 
dependability in open architectures are insufficient. The main problem is how to practically 
achieve dependability in software-intensive systems with many possible configurations when 
the actual configuration of the system is subject to frequent and possibly rapid change, and 
the environment of typical reusable subsystems is variable (used in many platforms) and 
unpredictable (mission-dependent). This is a major problem for practical development 
because real development projects depend heavily on software testing, which is strongly 
context-dependent. Conventional methods for testing depend strongly on the assumptions 
that the environment of a typical system is fixed and known in detail to the quality-assurance 
team at test and evaluation time. These assumptions are quite reasonable for stovepipe 
systems but are not valid for open architectures. A component in an open architecture 
should be reusable not only across current classes of ships but also across future platforms 
that are yet to be designed—those that belong to different services, and perhaps even to 
coalition partners. This set of contexts is very large in practice, is open-ended, and cannot 
even in principle be known in detail to the test and evaluation team.  
This paper outlines new approaches to quality assurance and testing that are better 
suited for providing affordable reliability in open architectures, and explains some of the 
additional technical features that an Open Architecture must have in order to become a 
Dependable Open Architecture, i.e., one that can support reuse and rapid reconfiguration 
via module swapping (without compromising reliability) while remaining economically viable 
at the level of individual systems and reducing total ownership cost for the enterprise. This 
requires linking the architecture with: 1) specific dependability requirements, 2) certifiable 
technical standards for each interaction path, 3) specialized types of testing, as well as 
combining that testing with other kinds of computer-aided quality-assurance methods. The 
paper explains the concepts behind the approach and why it is expected to work as claimed. 
Navy’s Vision of Open Architecture 
The Navy Open Architecture (Navy OA) is a Navy initiative for a multi-faceted 
strategy providing a framework for developing joint interoperable systems that adapt and 
exploit open-system design principles and architectures (DAU, 2007a, DAU, 2007b). This is 
a systems design approach consistent with several governmental concepts and initiatives, 
such as the Open Architecture Computing Environment (OACE) (Naval Sea Systems 
Command, 2007), FORCEnet (FORCEnet, 2007a), and the Modular Open Systems 
Approach (MOSA) (Open Systems Joint Task Force, 2007). OACE seeks to ease the test 
and evaluation burden by limiting hardware choices to certain approved possibilities. 
FORCEnet is an operational concept that can benefit from realization of OA goals for its 
implementation. MOSA is a joint-acquisition approach that shares many of the goals of the 
Navy’s OA effort.  
The OACE (NSWCDD, 2004, August 23a, NSWCDD, 2004, August 23b) aims to 
implement open specifications for interfaces, services and supporting formats. It enables 
software components to work across a range of systems and interoperate with other 
software components on local and remote systems. Thus, the OACE framework includes a 
set of principles, processes, and best practices. The OACE is a surface-Navy approach to 
setting technical standards for shipboard systems. It shares many of the objectives of OA, 
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but does not address business processes that deal with those objectives, and does not 
apply to submarines, aircraft or C4I systems. The OACE consists of a set of documentation 
describing an infrastructure of technologies supported by a reference architecture. This 
infrastructure includes cable plant, cabinets, network components, processors, operating 
systems, adaptation and distribution middleware, frameworks, resource management, 
common services (e.g., system server applications such as web servers), etc. As an 
example, Figure 1 shows the reference OA defined by the OACE.  
 
Figure 1. The OACE’s Open Architecture Computing Environment  
(extracted from NSWCDD, 2004, August 23a) 
 
The OACE also defines guidance and strategies for fault tolerance, scalability, 
portability, real-time performance, system composition, system test & certification, and 
selection of standards (e.g., POSIX, CORBA, etc.). The OACE will allow the Navy to 
introduce and change out commercial technology to maximize affordability and performance 
goals.  
FORCEnet is the operational construct and architectural framework for Naval 
Warfare in the Information Age to integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and 
control, systems, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force, 
scalable across the spectrum of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land (FORCEnet, 
2007a). FORCEnet is, thus, the future implementation of the Network Centric Warfare in the 
Navy, and is the Navy's primary effort to integrate multiple architecture and standards 
efforts. Research efforts demonstrated that across the Navy Enterprise, FORCEnet viability, 
affordability and sustenance necessitates an architecture that is in full compliance with OA 
technology, systems and standards. The development and embedding of OA within 
FORCEnet will enable a superior, adaptive, “plug and fight” capability for the modern 



















Figure 2. FORCEnet’s System Interface Description  
(extracted from FORCEnet, 2007b) 
 
The Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team (OAET) is currently spearheading an 
OA/FORCEnet Risk Reduction Experimentation effort to minimize the risk of delivering 
interoperable products (Shannon, 2006). This effort is in its early stages and has recently 
completed its first cycle. An example of a project enabling the integration of OA into 
FORCEnet is the “Open Architecture as an Enabler for FORCEnet” project (Deering et al., 
2006, September). It concentrates on implementing network-centric military operations with 
specific threat-engagement scenarios (i.e., sensed threats to available weapons). These 
concepts are applied to the FORCEnet OA Domain Model using legacy and future 
warfare/Navy systems based on OA concepts. An analysis exposed potential functional 
boundary limitations in the current OA Domain model, and a revised model has been 
proposed.  
The Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) (Open Systems Joint Task Force, 
2007) is both a business and technical strategy for developing new systems or modernizing 
existing ones (see Figure 3).  
 =




Figure 3. MOSA’s Fundamental Building Blocks  
(extracted from Flowers & Azani, 2004) 
 
As a business strategy, the MOSA enables program teams to build, upgrade and 
support systems more quickly and affordably. This can be achieved through the use of 
commercial products from multiple sources and by leveraging the commercial-sector 
investment in new technology and products. The technical portion of the MOSA addresses a 
system design that is modular, has well-defined interfaces, is designed for change and, to 
the extent possible, makes use of commonly used industry standards for key interfaces. This 
system design is best accomplished using collaborative engineering based on sound 
systems engineering processes. Adherence to MOSA allows for developing DoD systems 
that account for the growing asymmetrical threats, unprecedented rate of technological 
change, and requirements for joint warfighting capabilities. The Navy’s OA is closely related 
to MOSA. OA is a more specific extension of generalized MOSA principles. Naval OA 
applies to computer-intensive National Security Systems as defined in the Clinger Cohen 
Act, while MOSA has broader applicability, e.g., including mechanical systems.  
The successful implementation of OA principles in the Navy may bring multiple 
benefits from both business and technical viewpoints to the Navy and other DoN/DoD 
organizations. Business benefits include: (i) enterprise-wide plans based on a cost/capability 
analysis of programs that address capability, affordability, and stabilization, (ii) flexible 
acquisition strategies and contracts that enable the Navy to reuse software, easily upgrade 
systems, and share data throughout the enterprise, (iii) streamlined investments in similar 
capabilities, (iv) increased competition to foster innovation and leverage technology 
upgrades, and (v) established enterprise processes and governance to foster integration. 
On the other hand, an efficient implementation of OA principles yields many technical 
benefits, including: (i) layered and modular open architectures that address portability, 
maintainability, interoperability, upgradeability and long-term supportability, (ii) modular, 
open designs consisting of components that are self-contained elements with well-defined 
interfaces, (iii) maximum use of commercial standards and commodity “commercial off-the-
shelf” (COTS) products, and (iv) systems that continuously conform with Information 
Assurance (IA) requirements and monitor technology developments for IA improvements.  
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Figure 4 below presents a synthesis of OA benefits.  
 
Figure 4. Open Architecture Benefits 
(extracted from DAU, 2007C) 
The Navy still needs to complete carrying out the necessary business and technical 
changes to achieve the stated OA goals. Well-known technical changes include the need for 
continuing the transition to COTS-based computing plants in modular architectures, the 
development of an OA Enterprise component library capability to facilitate market research 
and reuse of components, the alignment of standards among the domains and the 
alignment of standards to the DoD Information Technology Standards Registry (DISR). This 
paper identifies additional technical changes related to test and evaluation.  
Difficulties in Testing Systems with Open Architectures 
The Navy has emphasized improving its business and organizational processes, 
structure and expertise over technical matters. The Navy is currently able to deliver open 
architecture-based systems. However, known methods for achieving dependability with OA 
are expensive and not clearly understood. The Navy’s current approach to system testing is 
not well matched to the needs of open environments. It is too expensive; it takes too long, 
and it lacks agility to react to changes during and after acquisition.  
Traditional testing techniques, such as scenario-based testing, are commonly used 
for assessing dependability of Navy systems. These techniques are strongly dependent on a 
particular system configuration and environment. The environment is usually modeled using 
flat, uniform distributions of software inputs and a limited number of profiles. Accordingly, the 
environment’s profile and the most relevant estimates of the application inputs are 
considered. For example, in Navy’s control systems, input parameters such as the number 
of weapons or the number of strike elements are included within the testing profiles.  
The drawback of these techniques is that when the system configuration or 
environment changes, the designed test cases also need to be changed. Plugging in a new 
component will lead to a completely different system and will likely invalidate the test 
scenarios and profiles previously used. A similar problem also occurs when the application 
has to be used in an operational environment other than the one for which it was originally 
designed, which is expected to be common for reusable components. This raises an 
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important concern since Navy systems are submitted to frequent changes. Better ways of 
doing testing and evaluation are, thus, highly desirable.  
Acquisition of new system modules and components is also an important concern. 
While an architectural or modular approach should allow for a certain degree of 
predictability, current Navy testing processes do not deal with modularity. As a result, time-
consuming and expensive test procedures are needed each time a new system release 
comes up because available testing methods cannot support the high frequency of releases. 
Methods that limit the number of configurations of an architecture might be required, at least 
in the near term. Such limitations may be able to be relaxed as technologies for testing 
families of systems improve.  
In flexible, open systems, components need to be assembled in a large number of 
configurations; and because the system is open, new components can be added that did not 
even exist at the time the system was originally designed.  
In practice, the number of possible configurations for an open system is very large, 
because each of many slots in an open architecture can be independently filled by several 
different specific subsystems. Because the number of choices for each slot must be 
multiplied together to produce the total number of possible configurations, the number of 
possibilities is astronomical for the kinds of systems designed by the Navy. For example, it 
has been estimated that avionics software systems have thousands of components and tens 
of thousands of connections. In principle, the number of configurations is unbounded 
because an unknown and unlimited number of new subsystems can be created in the future. 
One consequence of this is that it will be impossible to test all configurations, and that a 
majority of the possible configurations will not be tested at all. These ideas are graphically 













Figure 5. Example of Various Sets of Configuration Types: Dependable vs. Non-
dependable, Known vs. Unknown, Tested vs. Untested 
Each node in the figure represents a possible configuration of an open architecture. 
The connections between the nodes represent transitions between possible configurations, 
such as those resulting from the replacement of a subsystem with another plug-compatible 
subsystem that fits in the same slot of the open architecture. The figure is valid at many 
different scales; a module can be as small as a single data item, software procedure, or 
integrated circuit chip, and can include subsystems as large as entire ships. Figure 5 also 
highlights two important concerns (indicated by the interrogation point): the non-dependable 
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configurations that are unknown and the non-dependable configurations that (although 
known) have not been tested. Indeed, the number of configurations in practice is too large to 
be able to either know or test all of them. We seek alternative methods to palliate these 
issues.  
These considerations indicate that quality assurance methods that depend on 
checking the individual possible behaviors of the entire system do not have any hope of 
being effective for the test and evaluation of flexible open architectures, and that 
conceptually new and different methods will have to be employed to achieve dependability 
for such systems in the presence of reuse and reconfiguration. 
Testing of reusable subsystems is also subject to the above considerations and, 
similarly, requires new methods for effectively achieving dependability. This conclusion is 
consistent with past experience with system failures in military, scientific and commercial 
applications. The majority of observed failures are due to requirements and specifications 
errors, many of which manifest after a subsystem has been moved to a different 
environment than the one for which it was originally designed and tested. This is an 
indication that in current practice, the effectiveness of testing is very sensitive to the 
expected operating environment, which is unknown for reusable subsystems. Indeed, 
software reuse may invalidate the operational profiles and test cases and scenarios 
originally developed. The new operational profiles, test cases and scenarios are unknown, 
and no efficient method exists to calculate the required “delta” describing the necessary 
changes from previously used profiles (or test cases or scenarios) so that they can be 
applied to the newly reconfigured system. Open Architecture facilitates software reuse, 
which adds weight to this issue. 
Test cases correspond to the traditional artifact used in testing, which are based on a 
model of the system environment. In stovepipe systems, requirements analysis and testing 
is greatly simplified compared to open systems. Also, there exist numerous methods and 
techniques that allow for linking the testing results to dependability parameters, so as to 
obtain a quantitative measure of the overall dependability of the system (e.g., notion of 
“dependability benchmarking”).  
The traditional concept of system design is not focused on architectural “bits.” An 
architecture is related to a family of systems, while a design is traditionally associated with a 
single instance of a system. Also, an architecture involves more complexity than the 
traditional notion of system “configuration.” This is due to the fact that the “context” is 
included in the architecture, which is usually unknown, not well understood or difficult to 
accurately take into account.  
The type of dependability properties to be tested is also an important concern. 
Making Navy systems dependable will require considering a certain level of system 
performance and availability as part of the dependability concern. Indeed, architectural 
changes can considerably impact Key Performance Parameters (KPP), availability and other 
system requirements. Other concerns relate to how testing can be applied to Navy systems 
that are based on migrating services (e.g., reconfiguration of service-based architectures) 
and how system developers and testers can be involved in the acquisition process. At the 
moment, it is not possible to accurately know how much it may cost to move towards an 
open architecture paradigm. 
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In the short term, the problems outlined in the previous section are being addressed 
by attempting to predict future needs and by limiting the allowed configurations accordingly. 
This has the advantage of minimizing impact on current development processes and 
organizations, and the disadvantages that cost of testing is sill large and proportional to the 
number of reconfigurations, and that in cases in which predictions of future needs turn out to 
be incorrect, reconfigurations will need time for lengthy retesting, or new configurations will 
have to be fielded without assurance of dependability. However, in the Navy’s Open 
Architecture vision, the “plug and fight” process is supposed to be inexpensive and agile.  
The main objective of the OA approach is to get away from monolithic designs and 
architectures, and gain the ability to replace bits of systems. The goal is to facilitate 
DoD/Navy systems acquisition. This requires a shift from scenario-based testing to 
architecture-based testing. The constraints expressing the most important dependability 
properties should be part of the architecture. The architecture should, thus, include not only 
components and connections but also constraints. Note that there are different types of 
constraints—encompassing requirements, capabilities and standards (capabilities are 
similar to requirements). A dependable architecture should have requirements associated 
with it, which means that certain dependability guarantees should be already reflected in the 
architecture itself. Then, testing is not only to be applied to the system implementation, but 
also to the architectural model.  
Thus, fully realizing the open architecture vision requires a new paradigm for test and 
evaluation. We propose such a paradigm here, based on the concepts of dependability 
contracts, interchangeable software parts, and computer-aided enforcement of dependability 
contracts.  
Current approaches to system development and testing are more analogous to 
individual craftsmanship than they are to modern concepts of mass production and 
interchangeable parts. Craftsmen used to build things by individually tuning mating parts 
until they properly fit together. In such a context, designs could be relatively informal and 
relatively rough. In a mass production environment, parts are built to standards with 
precisely specified tolerances, and it is up to the designer to determine and verify the 
tolerances necessary to make the design work for any combination of parts that meet the 
specified tolerances. An example that illustrates this problem is the manufacturing of a rifle 
using a set of interchangeable parts. This is different from having parts that need to be 
crafted individually. It is necessary to evaluate how much variation is allowed to make 
different components and parts fit into the rifle. To do this, it is necessary to measure 
absolute sizes and construct the various parts of the rifle with certain tolerances. These 
modular approaches have been used in manufacturing for many years, but have never been 
successfully integrated into software engineering approaches. Another example consists of 
modern audio systems. There exist specific standards for audio systems specifying how 
things need to fit together in order for components from different vendors to work together 
effectively. Standards for audio system components can be relatively simple and generic 
only because the requirements for stereo systems are very simple. An audio system is not 
concerned about whether it is playing a song or the news. For systems whose behavior is 
sensitive to the meaning of the data, new types of standards will be needed to accomplish a 
similar function. These examples raise questions related to the kinds of standards that need 
be considered to make system components interchangeable and how such changes may 
influence testing. The answers to these questions should take into account the fact that we 
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aim at testing pieces of the architecture versus standards, not versus (other pieces of) the 
system.  
We are seeking analogous quality-assurance techniques for systems involving 
software. The fundamental operation of such an approach can be outlined as follows: 
1. System-wide capabilities are characterized by a set of dependability properties that 
must hold in all acceptable system configurations. These properties comprise the 
dependability contract for the system as a whole. They become part of a dependable 
open architecture for the system and serve as the basis for system quality 
assurance. Dependability contracts are primarily technical rather than legal 
documents, and they are intended to be checkable via software.  
2. The designers of the open architecture determine the common structure of the 
system and develop the component-level dependability contracts for the subsystems 
and connectors. The common structure consists of connection patterns and 
subsystem slots to which all configurations must conform.  
3. The quality-assurance team checks the structure of the architecture and the 
dependability contracts for subsystems and connectors to make sure they are strong 
enough to guarantee the system-wide dependability properties in all possible 
configurations. This is a one-time process that uses symbolic analysis techniques. 
Assuring the feasibility of this step is one of the objectives of ongoing research by the 
authors. 
4. The quality assurance team tests each component (subsystem and connector) 
against its dependability contract. This is envisioned to be an automated process to 
enable sufficient large sets of test cases for statistically significant conclusions about 
desirable dependability levels. The cost for this step is proportional to the number of 
components, and the process must be completed once for each version of each 
atomic component. Technologies for doing this are well known, and many of them 
are used in common practice.  
5. The quality-assurance team checks components for non-interference. This process 
is computer-aided. Many of the technologies for this are well known, and some of 
them are commonly used. Some development may be needed to get a complete set. 
This part of the process ensures that components that work correctly in isolation will 
continue to do so when they are connected.  
6. The assumptions about the operating environment on which the architecture 
depends are checked by runtime monitoring. This can be done using BIT (Built-In-
Test) technology that is currently in use in some DoD systems. This is recommended 
for all reusable components.  
Figure 6 provides an overview of the global approach. The architectural and testing 
visions of the proposed approach are described below:  
 Architectural vision 
♦ Consider an architecture as a support system not only for development but also 
for testing—including interchangeable software parts. 
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♦ Look at an architecture as consisting not only of components, connections and 
constraints, but also of standards, requirements/capabilities and environmental 
assumptions. 
 Testing vision 
♦ Relate testing to standards and constraints as a means to ensure architecture 
meets requirements and provides the needed capabilities. 
♦ Relate standards to architectural structures and associated dependability 
requirements. 
♦ Certify absence of interference between components and the dependability 
properties of interest.  
♦ Check constraints on environment at reconfiguration time. 
♦ The purpose is to prevent problems (such as integration problems). When 
feasible, this is better than detecting those problems. The approach should allow 
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Figure 6. Overview of the Global Approach 
The above process is a long-term goal whose realization depends on refinement and 
integration of new technologies and processes—especially those supporting steps 3 and 5.  
Full success of the approach will eliminate the need for integration testing after each 
reconfiguration. This is the meaning of interchangeable software components. We do not 
propose to eliminate integration testing entirely, even in the long term. The reason is that all 
analysis is relative to a model. While the models we use are good, it is always possible that 
the existing implementation does not realize the intended model completely precisely. For 
example, it is possible that the compiler used does not implement its programming language 
correctly in some rare cases, or that the hardware does not perform its functions as 
specified under some rare conditions. For these reasons, we recommend integration testing 
for at least one system configuration, e.g., the initial configuration to be fielded. Shorter-term 
reductions in the amount of testing needed after a reconfiguration are expected when 
effective non-interference checks eliminate specific kinds of failures due to integration 
issues.  
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Some examples include interference due to data or control interactions that are not 
allowed by the architecture, or due to resource constraints such as limits on memory, 
network bandwidth, or computation time. An example of existing technology that can 
eliminate a specific type of interference is architecture-based schedulability analysis, which 
can guarantee absence of failures due to real-time constraints and computing resource 
limits.  
Another related issue is how to certify a standard. The certification method should be 
able to satisfy the critical requirements of all architectural configurations. Quality assurance 
and analysis techniques (such as model checking or theorem proving) could be used for 
such purposes. These techniques are well-known, well-established and have been used for 
many years. However, these techniques do not scale-up well. The reason is that they have 
traditionally been applied to program code, which is a very large artifact. We believe this 
technology can be applied to the architecture of a system because the architecture is much 
smaller than the code. This is especially the case if each level of the architectural hierarchy 
can be checked separately. To make this possible, the traditional concept of architecture 
should be enhanced, e.g., constraints and standards should also be included.  
Another issue is that to check the absence of interference between components, 
static-analysis techniques (e.g., type checking, static checking, code analysis) will be 
needed, since testing is not enough for this purpose. This means that reachability analysis 
techniques will necessarily be different. The underlying approach might be “large scale.” but 
it does not mean it needs to be sophisticated (just feasible). Moreover, if testing is 
conducted against a standard, it is possible to have an automated testing oracle. In classical 
reliability techniques, it is possible to calculate the number of test cases needed to assure 
(with a certain confidence level) that the system will not experience more than a given 
number of failures during a determined period of time. For example, if the system should not 
fail more than once in N executions, the number of test cases needed for a confidence level 
of 1-1/N is given by Nlog2 N. (e.g., about 20 million test cases are needed to reach 10EXP-6 
assurance).  
Testing with respect to standards can drastically reduce the number of test cases 
needed because each component can be tested separately, and all possible combinations 
do not need to be checked. However, this source of potential savings depends on effective 
methods for carrying out steps 3 and 5 above.  
Some shorter-term savings can be achieved by using testing approaches that obtain 
information about many different configurations based on a single test case run on a single 
configuration. An example is an approach that tests every pair of components that are 
connected in the architecture in at least one system configuration, but not in all possible 
contexts.  
The major contributions and advantages of the proposed approach are: 
 Ability to reduce the testing effort. The approach will enable reducing unnecessary 
testing on every system change and enable identifying what kinds of testing and 
checking do need to be repeated when something changes.  
 Ability to limit the retesting scope. The approach will limit the scope of retesting when 
possible. This will involve a combination of testing with other kind of quality-
assurance techniques. 
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 Ability to assure dependability. The approach will include methods for assuring, with 
a single analysis, that all possible configurations that can be generated in a model-
driven architecture will satisfy given dependability requirements. Prior successful 
experience with developing methods of this kind has been demonstrated by the first 
author of this paper (Berzins, 2000). These results will be extended and applied to fit 
the requirements of the Navy open-architecture initiative.  
Example 
A simple example of part of a dependable architecture is shown in Figure 7. There 
are two component slots, one representing the software driver for a position sensor, and the 
other a control software module for an autopilot. There is one connector that carries 
information about the current position of the host platform. The example shows just a 
fragment of a realistic architecture as indicated by the ellipsis on the connections. In a 
complete architecture, the position information will also feed into other systems, such as 












Figure 7. Example of a Dependable Architecture Fragment 
The figure shows a simplified40 partial description of the dependability contracts. The 
overall purpose of the interconnection is to keep the platform on course. This informal intent 
is expressed as a measurable dependability property that becomes the basis for the quality 
assurance of this architectural fragment. The navigation tolerance is a parameter of the 
overall system requirements as well as of the architecture. It provides a partial 
characterization of mission needs and a family of system configurations that meet that need. 
For example, different types of platforms may have different navigation tolerances. Note that 
this same architecture fragment is relevant to surface, subsurface and air platforms. The 
own-craft-position subsystem slot can be filled by a variety of sensors, such as GPS, inertial, 
VOR/DME, etc., and the autopilot subsystem slot can likewise be filled with components that 
realize different control algorithms. The subsystem dependability contract expresses part of 
the standards that any acceptable realization of the subsystem must meet—by expressing 
tolerances—for the accuracy of the sensor and the allowable time delay between the time 
the platform’s position is measured and the time the position is delivered to the connector. It 
is the responsibility of the designers of the architecture to determine how the values of these 
                                                
40 For example, for air platforms, the vertical navigation tolerance can be different than the horizontal 
tolerance.  
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subsystem dependability parameters are derived from the overall dependability parameter. 
The purpose of Step 3 in the proposed quality assurance process is to check that this 
derivation is valid in the sense that the system will meet its requirements for any choice of 
sensors that meets its dependability contract, as well as for any choice of control algorithm 
that meets its dependability contract (not shown). This process depends on mathematical 
modeling, analysis and proof techniques, some existing and some to be developed.  
The process of reconfiguring the system fragment in the example would amount to 
replacing the sensor and its software driver with another one. The quality-assurance 
activities associated with this would be certifying that the new component meets the 
dependability properties in the own-craft-position dependability contract (Step 4) and non-
interference checks between the new component and the other components in the new 
configuration (Step 5).  
Our objective is to provide static analysis methods to accomplish Step 5. If a 
complete set of such methods can be provided, then integration testing will not be needed 
after such a component replacement. If some but not all of the potential interference modes 
can be ruled out by static checking, then some integration testing will still have to be 
performed as part of Step 5, but the scope of that testing can be focused on the failure 
modes that are not yet covered by static checks. We note that although we have been 
mostly focused on replacement of software components, sometimes, as in this example, a 
meaningful reconfiguration may involve replacement of some hardware as well. In our 
example, some kinds of improvements may be possible by replacing just the driver software 
for a given sensor, but the largest gains may come from combining a new and more 
accurate type of position sensor with the new software driver needed to make the new 
sensor fit the existing subsystem slot in the architecture. The goal is not to change the 
architecture when the system is reconfigured. In such cases, the non-interference tests may 
include electrical, thermal and mechanical considerations in addition to software 
consideration.  
Our recommendation is to identify potential sources of interference in detail, and to 
develop specific quality-assurance techniques for assuring absence of each type. These can 
involve a combination of static analysis checks, such as: data-type consistency, lack of 
unspecified data flow, lack of unspecified control flow, conformance to power and heat load 
limits, etc., with conventional testing processes. We also note that in some specific contexts, 
specialized efficient testing procedures are possible, for example, where dominance 
relations exist. For instance, in continuous domains it is common that a single worst-case 
test case can expose all the faults that any other test case could detect.  
The dependability contracts in the example also have a dominance property: if a 
component has been certified with respect to a component with a larger error tolerance, it 
will also work for one with a smaller error tolerance, because every possible behavior of the 
more accurate component is also a possible behavior of the original, less accurate 
component. In the example, a sensor with a given max.error and max.delay can be replaced 
with any other sensor that has a smaller max.error and smaller max.delay provided that the 
new sensor also passes all non-interference checks.  
We note that a kit of available components can be pre-certified with respect to Steps 
4 and 5. This would enable agile dependable reconfiguration, and perhaps even a capability 
for on-the-fly “plug and fight.” The cost to do Step 4 is proportional to the number of 
components, and can economically be completed in advance. The cost to do Step 5 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 300 - 
=
= =
depends on whether generic non-interference methods can be developed for all needed 
failure modes. In the best case, it is proportional to the number of components and could be 
done in advance. If all-pairs analysis is necessary, cost would be quadratic in the number of 
components—making pre-checking expensive but still perhaps feasible in advance if the 
number of components in the reconfigurable part is not too big. In the worst case, where 
multiple interactions may be significant, some non-interference checking may still be 
required after reconfiguration, when the actual set of components in the new configuration is 
known.  
Comparison with Related Work 
The purpose of this section is to provide a comprehensive survey on existing 
approaches for improving Quality Assurance properties of open and flexible architecture-
based systems. It is also an objective to review existing works on how testing is performed 
in a fluid environment with agile reconfiguration.  
Comparison with Navy’s Approaches 
The Naval OA program interacts with the OACE, FORCEnet and MOSA initiatives in 
different ways. As described above, OACE is based on a set of standards for the computing 
environment of surface ship-centric systems specifications; MOSA is an acquisition and 
design approach, while FORCEnet is a unifying concept for multiple architectures and 
standards efforts in the Navy. The recommended testing practices are described by these 
standards in general terms and are mostly founded on scenario-based techniques. For 
example, OACE recommends functional and performance testing against specified system 
requirements, organized according to test cases and scenarios. It defines the concept of 
“virtual homogeneity” to facilitate testing by identifying groups of sub-systems performing 
similarly. The concepts of “tree of subsystems” and “aggregations of components” are also 
introduced. Each aggregation exists only in a manageable number of configurations. A test 
case can be applied to many configurations when there is no (considerable) interaction 
between choices of configurations. Schedulability analysis is recommended for ensuring that 
any configuration that the resource manager creates is schedulable. These are existing 
attempts to reduce cost of testing by limiting flexibility of systems and to increase confidence 
that a test case provides useful information about more than one configuration by limiting 
possible sources of interference between components.  
Our methodology aims at defining a broader testing approach covering both 
functional and non-functional properties of Open Architecture-based systems, with emphasis 
on ensuring dependability for all possible system configurations. Instead of seeking for 
subsystems performing similarly (concept of “virtual homogeneity”), our approach will use 
architectural artifacts and standards which already define the basis for all the different 
groups of subsystems that can be developed in practice. In our context, “performing 
similarly” means “meeting the dependability contract associated with a subsystem slot in the 
open architecture.” Since our approach will work at the architectural level, and the 
architecture represents a family of systems and subsystems, the concepts of “tree of 
subsystems” and “aggregation of components” will be also covered. The non-interaction 
between choices of configurations is already covered by the concept of non-interference 
defined in our approach. Schedulability analysis is also part of the non-interference notion, 
since it will allow for predicting resource conflicts between tasks and processes.  
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Comparison with Component-based Testing  
Component-based testing can be readily employed for Step 4 of our methodology to 
further test a candidate software component against the specific domain and architectural 
standards of the target system in which it is to be plugged-in and integrated.  
Traditionally, component-based testing is performed by the component’s developer 
itself (e.g., through unit testing). It is aimed at establishing the proper functioning of the 
component and at detecting possible failures early, i.e., ensuring the quality of the 
component before it is released. The tests established by the developer can rely not only on 
a complete documentation and knowledge of the component, but also on the availability of 
the source code, and, thus, in general pursue some kind of coverage testing. Therefore, 
when applied by the component’s developer, this testing approach cannot address the 
verification of the component’s behavior with respect to the specifications of the host 
system(s) in which the component will be later assembled (i.e., integration and system 
testing). Note, however, that component-based testing techniques are also used by system 
testers and integrators.  
Voas (1998, June; 2000, August) proposed a certification strategy for off-the-shelf 
components relying on black-box testing, system-level fault injection and defense protection 
through wrapping. Black-box testing is a well-known testing technique used whenever the 
source code of a component is not available, only its interface specifications. System fault 
injection and defense wrapping are system-level approaches for integration testing and fault 
containment that might not be needed in our approach if the non-interference property is 
fully satisfied.  
Other approaches aim at making component’s data available (e.g., internal 
behavioral and structural data, development data, etc.) so that the data can assist the 
testing process. The work in Orso, Harrold and Rosenblum (2001) defines an approach in 
which metadata of a component (describing both static and dynamic aspects) are available 
throughout the entire component’s lifecycle. The feasibility of the approach is demonstrated 
in the context of component-based testing, consisting of the generation of self-checking 
code and program slicing. The work in Whaley, Martin and Lam (2002) automatically 
extracts a finite-state machine model from the interface of a software component, which can 
be delivered along with the component itself for testing purposes. Off-the-shelf (OTS) 
components are usually acquired as black-box code without access to data that might be 
necessary for testing. Salles, Rodriguez, Fabre and Arlat (1999) developed a framework for 
integration testing of OTS real-time operating systems (RTOS). Information needed for 
testing is obtained through reflective techniques implemented in an additional software 
module added to the OTS component. A fault-injection methodology is used to verify that 
the behavior of the integrated OTS component does not impact the dependability of the 
system.  
Bertolino and Polini (2003) recognized the importance of testing a software 
component in its deployment environment (i.e., the target system). They developed a 
framework that supports functional testing of a software component with respect to 
customer’s specification—which also provides a simple way to enclose the developer’s test 
suites which can be re-executed by the customer. The customer is thus provided with both a 
technique to specify a deployment test suite early and an environment for running and 
reusing the specified tests on any component implementation. There is a complete 
decoupling between the tests’ specification and component implementation. The approach 
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requires the customer to have a complete specification of the component to be incorporated 
into a system.  
In the formal verification domain, there has been a long history of research on 
verification of systems with modular structure. A key idea (Lamport, 1983; Kupferman & 
Vardi, 1997; Henzinger, Qadeer & Rajamani, 1998) in modular verification is the assume-
guarantee paradigm: a module should guarantee to have the desired behavior once the 
environment with which the module is interacting has the assumed behavior. There have 
been a variety of implementations for this idea (see, e.g., Grumberg & Long, 1994; Alur et 
al., 1998; Pasareanu, Dwyer & Huth, 1999; Dingel, 2003; Chaki, Clarke, Groce, Jha & Veith, 
2003; Xie & Browne, 2003). The key issue with the assume-guarantee style reasoning is 
how to obtain assumptions about the environment. Giannakopoulou et al. (Giannakopoulou, 
Pasareanu & Barringer, 2002; Giannakopoulou, Pasareanu & Cobleigh, 2004) introduced a 
novel approach to generate assumptions that characterize exactly the environment in which 
a component satisfies its property. Their idea is based on a purely formal verification 
technique (model-checking). Fisler et al. (Fisler & Krishnamurthi, 2001; Li, Krishnamurthi & 
Fisler, 2002) introduced a similar idea of deducing a model-checking condition for extension 
features from the base feature for model-checking, feature-oriented software designs. This 
approach is not applicable to component-based systems where unspecified components 
exist. This work differs from related work like Xie and Dang (2004), in which an automata-
theoretic approach is used to solve a similar LTL model-checking problem. 
In the past decade, there has also been significant research on combining model-
checking and testing techniques for system verification, which can be grouped into a 
broader class of techniques called specification-based testing. Many of the studies utilize 
model-checkers’ ability of generating counter-examples from a system’s specification to 
produce test cases against an implementation (Callahan, Schneider & Easterbrook, 1996; 
Holzmann, 1997, May; Engels, Feijs & Mauw, 1997; Gargantini & Heitmeyer, 1999; 
Ammann, Black, & Majurski, 1998; Black, Okun, & Yesha, 2000). Peled et. al. (Peled, Vardi 
& Yannakakis 1999: Groce, Peled & Yannakakis, 2002; Peled, 2003) studied the issue of 
checking a black-box against a temporal property (called black-box checking). The research 
focuses on how to efficiently establish abstract models for black-box testing and on how to 
define properties (e.g., LTL formula) about the black-box components. 
Comparison with Runtime Software Reconfiguration  
For an important class of safety- and mission-critical software systems, such as air 
traffic control, telephone switching, and high-availability public information systems, shutting 
down and restarting the system for upgrades incurs unacceptable delays, increased cost, 
and risk. Support for runtime modification is a key aspect of these systems. In our 
methodology, a reconfigured set of components can be seen as a particular configuration of 
a system architecture. Since our approach aims at guaranteeing dependability properties for 
the family of systems and configurations represented by the architecture, the proposed 
testing approach should be able to provide assurance in presence of runtime reconfiguration 
for at least a certain number of properties (e.g., non-interference).  
There are a wide variety of techniques for supporting runtime software change. 
Some of the most popular techniques are based on Dynamic Software Architectures 
(Oreizy, 2007). Several research projects have addressed these issues, such as Self-
Adaptive, Healing Architectures (ArchShell, 2007), or Dynamic Wright (Allen, Douence & 
Garlan, 1998, April).  Gupta, Jalote and Barua (1996, February) describe an approach to 
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modeling changes at the statement and procedure levels for a simple imperative 
programming language. Many dynamic programming languages, such as Lisp, Smalltalk, 
and Haskel (Peterson, Hudak & Ling, 1997, July) have supported runtime software change 
for decades. Dynamic linking mechanisms and libraries have been available in operating 
systems such as UNIX, Microsoft Windows, and the Apple Macintosh for some time. New 
approaches to dynamic linking (Franz, 1997, March) hope to significantly reduce the runtime 
performance overhead associated with using such mechanisms. Dynamic Object 
Technology, such as CORBA (Object Management Group, 1996, July) and COM 
(Brockschmidt, 1994) support the runtime locations, loading, and binding of software objects 
or components.  
Service-oriented architectures (SOAs) typically have a dynamic nature, given by the 
runtime detection of components through registry services and subsequent dynamic binding. 
The work in Baresi, Heckel, Thone, and Varro (2006) defines a refinement relation from a 
generic style of component-based systems to the SOA style based on the use of graph 
transformation systems as models of architectural styles at different levels of platform 
abstraction (which represent reconfiguration and communication scenarios as graph 
transformation sequences). Besides the many proposals for Architecture Description 
Languages (ADLs), like Rapide (Luckham et al., 1995; Oreizy, 1996, August; Oreizy, 
Medvidovic & Taylor, 1998, April), Wright (Allen, 1997; Allen, Douence & Garlan, 1997, 
September; Allen, Douence & Garlan, 1998, April; Allen, Douence & Garlan, 1998), Darwin 
(Magee, Dulay, Eisenbach & Kramer, 1995; Kramer & Magee, 1998) or C2 (Medvidovic, 
1996, October; Oreizy, Medvidovic & Taylor, 1998, April), we must mention those 
approaches that exploit graph transformation (Hirsh, 2003; Hirsh & Montanari, 2001, August; 
Metayer, 1996, October; Taentzer, Goedicke & Meyer, 2000; Wermelinger & Fiadeiro, 2002; 
Baresi, Heckel, Thone, & Varro, 2003; Gonczy, 2006) to reason about the consistency of 
reconfiguration operations and interaction of components with respect to structural 
constraints. Le Metayer (1996, October) describes architectures by graphs and the valid 
graphs of an architectural style by a graph grammar. Reconfiguration is described by 
conditional graph-rewriting rules. He uses static-type checking to prove that the rewriting 
rules are consistent with the respective style. The graphs represent computational entities 
but not connectors, specifications, or other resources. Wermelinger and Fiadeiro (2002) 
provide an algebraic framework based on Category theory in which architectures are 
represented as graphs of CommUnity programs and superpositions. Dynamic 
reconfigurations are specified by graph transformation rules over architecture instances. 
Both styles and rules are used for modeling domain-specific restrictions rather than the 
underlying platform. Consequently, they do not deal with refinement relationships between 
different levels of platform abstraction. Hirsch (2003) uses hypergraphs to represent 
architectures and hyperedge replacement grammars to define the valid architectures of an 
architectural style. Furthermore, he uses graph transformation rules to specify runtime 
interactions among components, reconfigurations, and mobility. In the CHAM approach 
(Inverardi & Wolf, 1995, April), architectural reconfiguration is studied in terms of molecules 
and reactions, and the proposals that represent architectural styles by means of graph 
grammars (Hirsh & Montanari, 2001, August; Metayer, 1996, October; Taentzer, Goedicke & 
Meyer, 2000; Wermelinger & Fiadeiro, 2000, March) and reason on changes and evolution 
with respect to structural constraints. Some of these approaches use a graph grammar to 
specify the class of admissible configurations of the style. Graph transformation rules model 
only dynamic aspects like evolution and reconfiguration. The advantage is that a declarative 
specification is more abstract and easier to understand, even if constructive/operational 
ones are better for analysis and tools. The use of graph-transformation techniques to 
capture dynamic semantics of models has also been inspired by work proposed by Engels, 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 304 - 
=
= =
Hausmann, Heckel and St. Sauer (2000) under the name of dynamic meta-modeling. That 
approach extends metamodels—re-defining the abstract syntax of a modeling language like 
UML by using graph-transformation rules that allow for describing changes to object graphs 
and represent the states of a model.  
Grammar-oriented Programming (GOP) and Grammar-oriented Object Design 
(GOOD) (GOOD, 2002) are based on designing and creating a domain-specific 
programming language (DSL) for a specific business domain. GOOD can be used to drive 
the execution of the application, or it can be used to embed the declarative processing logic 
of a context-aware component (CAC) or context-aware service (CAS) (Arsanjani, Curbera, & 
Mukhi, 2004). GOOD is a method for creating and maintaining dynamically reconfigurable 
software architectures driven by business-process architectures. The business compiler was 
used to capture business processes within real-time workshops for various lines of business 
and create an executable simulation of the processes used. Instead of using one DSL for 
the entire programming activity, GOOD suggests the combination of defining domain-
specific behavioral semantics in conjunction with the use of more traditional, general 
purpose programming languages.  
The use of model-checking techniques for verifying software architectures has been 
thoroughly studied. For example, vUML (Lilius & Paltor, 1999, October), veriUML (Compton, 
Gurevich, Huggins & Shen, 2000), JACK (Gnesi, Latella & Massink, 1999), and HUGO 
(Schafer, Knapp & Merz, 2001) support the validation of distributed systems (where each 
statechart describes a component), but do not support complex communication paradigms. 
These works study static systems whose topology cannot vary at runtime. Similarly, Garlan 
Khersonsky and Kim (2003, May) and the researchers involved in the Cadena project 
(Hatcliff, Deng, Dwyer, Jung & Ranganath, 2003, May) applied model-checking techniques 
to analyze specific architectures with a fixed topology based on the publish/subscribe 
paradigm. A formal approach that considers refinement of dynamic reconfiguration can be 
found in Bolusset and Oquendo (2002). The approach is targeted on the translation from 
one ADL to another rather than on the refinement between architectural styles. Cherchago 
and Heckel (2004) describe the application of graph transformations in the runtime matching 
of behavioral Web service specifications. In Heckel and Mariani (2005), the conformance 
testing of Web services is based on graph transformations, focusing on the automated test-
case generation. The work of Bertolino and Polini (2006) utilizes the benefits of these 
approaches and defines fault-tolerant algorithms incorporated into appropriate 
reconfiguration mechanisms for modeling reliable message delivery by graph-transformation 
rules in SOA. Graph transformation is used as a specification technique for dynamic 
architectural reconfigurations in Wermelinger and Fiadeiro (2002), using the algebraic 
framework CommUnity. Hirsch uses graph transformations over hypergraphs (2003) to 
specify runtime interactions among components, reconfigurations, and mobility in a given 
architectural style. A profile for reliability was designed for J2EE applications in Rodrigues, 
Roberts, Emmerich and Skene (2004). In Zheng, Jun and Yan (2005), a pattern-based 
specification and runtime validation approach is presented for interaction properties of web 
services using a semantic web rule language (SWRL). GROOVE (Graphs for Object-
oriented Verification, 2007) is a project centered around the use of simple graphs for 
modeling the design-time, compile-time, and runtime structure of object-oriented systems; it 
also focuses on graph transformations as a basis for model transformation and operational 
semantics. This entails a formal foundation for model transformation and dynamic 
semantics, and the ability to verify model transformation and dynamic semantics through an 
(automatic) analysis of the resulting graph transformation systems—for instance using 
model checking.  
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The techniques described above such as model checking and graph transformations 
can benefit several steps of our methodology. In Step 2 these techniques can be used to 
derive dependability contracts addressing reconfiguration, topology and connections 
properties and constraints at the system and subsystem levels. In Steps 3 and 4, these 
techniques can be used in combination with other symbolic analysis techniques and testing 
techniques for verifying the structure of the architecture and the dependability contracts. 
These techniques can also provide useful information about the various sources of 
interference between the target components and the host system, and can help determine 
suitable and alternate approaches to avoid those interference sources.  
However, designers have traditionally sought alternatives to runtime change, 
especially for safety-critical applications such as combat systems. Several reasons account 
for this: 
1. It is usually avoidable. Runtime change is not a critical aspect of many software 
systems, and several techniques have been devised to circumvent the need for 
runtime change altogether. Regularly scheduled downtimes, functional redundancy 
or clustering, and manual overrides are all examples of such techniques. 
2. It increases risk. System integrity, reliability, and robustness are more difficult to 
ensure in light of runtime change. 
3. It increases cost. There is typically a marked performance overhead associated with 
supporting runtime change. Additionally, few techniques have limited expertise; and 
a lack of proven techniques for supporting runtime change exasperates engineering 
costs. 
Although “plug and fight” has been articulated as a goal, in the near term 
reconfiguration is likely to be more constrained and less agile due to weapons certification 
and doctrine issues. 
Conclusion  
This paper explores methods for test and evaluation of flexible systems with open 
architectures, and proposes an approach for substantially reducing the amount of testing 
necessary for dependable reconfigurable systems. The approach involves augmenting open 
architectures with measurable dependability properties associated with the system as a 
whole as well as dependability properties associated with slots for replaceable subsystems. 
It also involves augmenting testing with other kinds of quality-assurance methods. These 
additional methods include static checks for non-interference properties. The purpose of 
these checks is to ensure that components that work correctly in isolation will continue to do 
so in the context of a given dependable open architecture. In the long term, this approach 
should eliminate the need for integration testing after each reconfiguration, and in the short 
to medium term, it should substantially reduce the amount of integration testing required 
after reconfiguration.  
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Federal Government agencies convert in-house positions to contractor positions via 
the A-76 process in order to save money.  During an A-76 conversion, stable future labor 
cost growth is assumed.  This assumption is faulty in cases wherein the contractor 
workforce subsequently unionizes.  Unionization may lead to unanticipated increases in 
cost, threatening the savings projected during the A-76 process.  This study seeks to: 1) 
compare the rate of labor-cost growth for military, civilian, and contract employees and 2) 
compare current labor costs for a sample outsourced activity (fuels) to labor costs for the 
military requirement based on manpower standards.  The study finds that overall, annual 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) wages increases were typically 1-2% higher than 
Service Contract Act (SCA) wages increases.  However, we found no evidence that 
contractors performed functions in our sample functional area at a higher cost than in-
house.  The actual cost of contractors averaged ~40% less than the cost derived from the 
military manpower standard.  The actual in-house cost averaged over 20% higher than the 
cost derived from the manpower standard.  Our results indicate that for the fuels functional 
area, A-76 actions remain economically advantageous to the government, despite increases 
in contract labor cost. 
Introduction 
In 1966, the US Government began using the A-76 process to evaluate 
governmental activities as candidates for outsourcing (OMB, 1983, August 4).   The A-76 
process provides a roadmap for government to convert work from internal (military in our 
study) performance to either contractor support or a redefined in-house performance 
organization.  The intent of the A-76 process is to save money while freeing military 
personnel to perform inherently governmental functions.  The A-76 process requires the use 
of estimates of future cost growth when evaluating cost not just in the current year, but in the 
out-years as well.  These estimates are based on assumptions of stable future cost growth.   
Several potential frustrations may develop for commanders in the post-A76 
environment.  These frustrations include a perceived loss of flexibility in mission support 
when moving from military to contractor support.  Further, there may be frustration with 
“must pay” contract cost increases stemming from an increase in union-negotiated collective 
bargaining agreements (CBAs) and the perception that contractors have no incentive to 
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control CBA cost growth because the increase is passed on to the government agency as a 
100% pass-through.   
The impact of increasing labor costs for service contracts is felt Air Force-wide.  
Activities are competitively sourced for various reasons, but cost savings are a primary 
driver.  When the cost of the contracted services expands beyond expectations, then only 
two options exist for the government: reduce the level of service or take funding away from 
other requirements.  Both of these actions have a negative impact on day-to-day operations. 
Loss of flexibility coupled with ever-increasing contract cost has caused some 
commanders to ask whether or not the A-76 evaluation process adequately considers future 
labor cost growth in the decision to outsource. 
 Wage Rate History 
Wage rates in contracted-out functions are controlled by the Service Contract Act 
(SCA).  The SCA’s purpose is to protect the wages and benefits of service contract 
employees.  41USC351 provides required provisions for public contracts in excess of 
$2500.  The Secretary of Labor creates wage determinations to establish minimum wages 
for various categories of workers in a location.  41USC351(a) requires the contractor to 
provide wages and fringe benefits at least equal to the amounts established in the 
Department of Labor wage determination. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act and Service Contract Act, “Price Adjustment (Multiple 
Year and Option Contracts)” clause incorporates this law into government contracts (FAR, 
2007, 52.222-43).  It applies to both contracts covered under the SCA as well as those 
under which the workforce is unionized, and it operates under a CBA.  The contractor’s 
employees are protected by these Acts as their pay and fringe benefits cannot fall below the 
wage determination of the Department of Labor.  The contractor is protected by these acts 
because the increases in pay and fringe benefits are pass-through costs to the government.  
Thus, the contractor is not subject to financial ruin due to increasing labor/fringe benefit 
rates.  The government takes on the financial burden of these increases to, in effect, protect 
the contractor’s employees (Lear Siegler Services).  This creates a financial obligation to the 
contracting entity which that entity has little input or control over.  In SCA actions, the 
increases reflect the rise in wages in the local area per the wage determination, and are, 
therefore, seen as somewhat predictable.  CBA negotiations between the contractor and the 
employees’ union are not bound to such limitations, and are seen as less predictable. 
Two additional Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) citations are very relevant.  
FAR 22.1008-2 (b) mandates that wage determinations and CBAs carry over even if there is 
a change in contractor due to the contract being reawarded.  The intent here is clear: 
because the competing bidders are bound to the same labor rates as the incumbent, they 
cannot develop a bid advantage solely by discounting employees’ wages.  The effect of this, 
however, may be to reduce the incentive of the incumbent to drive a hard bargain in 
negotiations with the union.  For one, they do not actually pay the increases, and secondly, 
their competition gains no advantage from the negotiated increases. 
Finally, FAR 22.1002-3 and FAR 22.1021 do provide avenues for the government to 
ensure that the negotiations between the contractor and union are legitimate.  FAR 22.1021 
allows the contracting officer to request a hearing with the Department of Labor (DoL) to 
determine if the negotiated CBA rates are reasonable.  The CBA will not be applied if: 
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The Secretary of Labor determines—(1) after a hearing, that the wage and 
fringe benefits are substantially at variance with those which prevail for 
services of a similar character in the locality, or (2) that the wages and fringe 
benefits are not the result of arm’s length negotiations. (FAR, 2007, 22.1002-
3 (a) (1) (2)) 
The question of how much the wage and fringe benefit rates of collective bargaining 
agreements vary from the SCA rates raised by this FAR reference is at the heart of this 
research. 
Three previous studies have addressed labor-cost growth issues and were 
referenced in this study.  The first was conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses in 2001, 
entitled, “Long-run Costs and Performance Effects of Competitive Sourcing” (Rosenblum, 
Coast & Smallwood, 2001).  The second study entitled, “Personnel Savings in Competitively 
Sourced DoD Activities: Are they Real?  Will They Last?” was conducted by RAND in 2000 
(Gates & Robbert).  The third study referenced was conducted by Dr. Roger Golden and 
published in his dissertation entitled, “Cost Trends on Defense Commissary Service 
Contracts” (1999). 
When the government converts work to contractor performance through the A-76 
process, stable future labor cost growth is assumed.  This assumption is faulty in cases 
wherein the contractor workforce unionizes.  In addition, the assumption may lead to 
unanticipated increases in cost, which could invalidate savings projected during the A-76 
process.  Establishing a better method to compare future labor cost will ensure the more 
cost-effective organization, over the long term, performs the service. 
The ultimate aim of this research stream is to develop an additional cost growth 
factor to consider in the A-76 process.  This study focuses on answering two fundamental 
questions necessary to develop such a factor: Do CBAs lead to faster wage growth?  Do 
CBAs end up costing the government more than military performance of the function? 
Objectives 
1. Compare cost growth in labor rates of military, civilian, Service Contract Act, and 
collective bargaining agreement employees. 
2. Compare current labor costs for an A-76-affected activity to labor costs for the 
military requirement based on manpower standards. 
 The Sample: Air Education and Training Command (AETC)  
The Air Force Air Education and Training Command (AETC) administers many 
contracts with industry for commercial functions.  AETC has conducted A-76 competitive 
sourcing studies over a long period of time, with many being completed in the 1980’s and 
1990’s.   
The current challenge to AETC is that the government is required to pay the 
contractor for wage increases, whether they originate from a revised wage determination 
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under the Service Contract Act (SCA) or a renegotiation of a collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA).  While the SCA is considered a fairly stable and predictable cost growth, 
the CBA growth is viewed as less predictable.  For an organization with a defined budget, 
being required to fund unpredictable labor cost requirements can have negative impacts. 
AETC’s mission has led to frequent use of the A-76 process to competitively source 
commercial activities.  Based on these factors, the study team selected AETC bases as the 
sample for this study. 
Methodology 
 Assumptions 
1. Direct comparison of base pay rates between military, civilian, SCA, and CBA 
employees is acceptable as a method of comparing labor cost growth.  Because the 
composite factors for military pay contain costs not obtainable for civilian, SCA and 
CBA rates, the base pay rate is the most accurate measure for comparison between 
the contracted and in-house pay growth. 
2. Time is not a factor in calculating labor cost growth rates as the comparison between 
rates covers the same time periods and, therefore, the time/inflation costs are the 
same. 
3. SCA base pay rates plus health and welfare (H&W) costs are directly comparable to 
CBA base pay rates plus H&W costs.  This assumption is necessary to allow for 
direct comparison of the two rates, although they may not always mean exactly the 
same thing for each CBA. 
4. Overhead costs for Civilian, SCA and CBA positions are assumed to be relatively 
consistent, allowing comparison of wage increases without incorporating applicable 
overhead costs.  This assumption is needed to conduct timely analysis. 
5. The manpower standard for Fuels can be used as an independent comparison factor 
for the fuels function.  The standard is not being used as a manpower adjustment 
tool as it is designed.   
 Objective 1: Cost Growth of Labor Rates 
The first objective is to compare the labor cost growth in the various types of pay 
structures: military, civilian, contractor under SCA, and contractor under CBA.  The purpose 
of this comparison was to determine if CBA wages increased at a higher rate than SCA 
wages and to compare that wage growth to military and civilian wage growth.  The 
development of this comparison involved several steps. 
The analysis was conducted by location because the pay scales and wage increases 
for SCA, and CBA employees varied by location.  The first step was to identify AETC bases 
that had multiple CBAs.  This is important because while the other three pay types are 
widespread, there are a limited number of CBAs.  Some installations had just one CBA.  
Requiring a location to have multiple CBAs in order to be included is a precaution to prevent 
one aberrant CBA from skewing the location’s comparison.  After that, the pay increases 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 319 - 
=
= =
were calculated for each position and compared.  The wages were also combined to 
analyze the wage growth for each type of pay over all of AETC. 
The analysis of wage increases was conducted on base-pay rates and composite-
pay rates.  For base-pay rates, there are no fringe benefits (e.g., health and welfare costs) 
or overhead (e.g., FICA, SUDA, FUDA, etc.) costs included in the wages.  For military 
wages, the base-pay rates did not include BAH, BAS, or any other fringe costs.  For 
composite-pay rates, fringe benefits are included for all pay types, but the overhead costs 
are only included in the military pay rates.  The overhead costs would be the same for SCA 
and CBA-determined wages because the contractor employing each position would not 
change.   
 Objective 2: Contractor vs. Military Cost Growth 
The second objective was to compare actual contractor costs and actual 
military/civilian costs for a specific function to the manpower standard cost for that function.  
Although manpower standards are not recommended for A-76 competitions or reverse A-76 
actions, this study used the manpower standard to contrast how in-house and contractor 
functions related to the standard.  The manpower standard was used because manpower 
data was usually unavailable, outside of a limited timeframe, after the completion of an A-76 
competition.  The end result of this objective is a comparison of the actual costs of the 
function performed by military, civilian, and CBA employees to a calculated cost using the 
manpower standard. 
The first step was to identify a function that, within AETC, is performed in-house at 
some locations while contracted out at others under collective bargaining agreements.  The 
function had to have a relatively stable workload that could be easily quantified.  The fuels 
function at AETC bases met these requirements, and as such was selected as a 
representative function for this study. 
The next step was to calculate the manpower standards based on the Fuels 
Management Manpower Standard outlined in AFMS 41DA.  The resulting manpower 
standards for each base were then converted to positions as described in AFMS 41DA.  
These positions were next converted to total cost.  After that, the actual costs of the fuel 
functions at each base were compared with their respective manpower standard costs.  For 
in-house costs, the assigned personnel numbers obtained from the AFPC Authorized and 
Assigned database were matched to position-costs to compute the actual costs of the in-
house organization.  For contracted-out costs, the actual contract costs were used. 
Finally, the cost ratios of actual cost to projected costs using the manpower standard 
were calculated.  These results were presented numerically and graphically.   
Analysis 
 Objective 1: Cost Growth of Labor Rates 
Of the AETC bases, seven bases provided data on three or more collective 
bargaining agreements: Columbus, Keesler, Lackland, Laughlin, Randolph, Sheppard, and 
Tyndall.  Personnel at these locations provided the actual wage tables from the CBAs.  
Military base-pay and composite-pay tables were obtained through the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) website (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
2007).  The civilian pay was comprised of Non-appropriated Funds (NAF) pay tables, 
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Appropriated Funds (AF) pay tables and General Schedule (GS) pay tables.  These civilian 
base-pay tables were obtained from the Department of Defense (DoD) Civilian Personnel 
Management Service Website, and the fringe rates were obtained from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) transmittal M-07-02 (Civilian Personnel Management, 
2007). The SCA pay tables and fringe rates were obtained from the DoL– SCA Wage 
Determinations website (Wage, 2007).  
Next, all the base and composite pay tables were aggregated by year and the pay 
increases for individual positions or grades were calculated.  The mean increase for each 
position or grade was computed to form an overall rate of increase for each year.  This 
process was repeated for the civilian, SCA and CBA pay at the seven different bases and 
the results were tabulated and graphed.41  
Analysis of the four pay types occurred in three phases.  First, the average pay 
increases, by position, for each pay type were analyzed by year.  This analysis was not 
conclusive because pay types such as SCA didn’t get pay raises every year.  Often, the 
SCA pay increases occurred every two years in large increments.  Thus, the graphs 
resulting from this phase of analysis were not static and did not reveal any significant trends.   
The next phase of the analysis was to calculate the cumulative wage increases for 
each pay type.  This was done by compounding each pay increase by that of previous years 
to reveal the overall growth over time for each position.  A challenge was encountered in this 
phase of the analysis: not all bases had CBA wage history from FY99 to FY06.  Thus, the 
cumulative wages for these bases did not start until the CBA history began, which created a 
lag in the graphs. 
The final phase of the analysis was to adjust the CBA wage increases for years 
without CBA wage history.   To better represent the CBA wage increases, the CBAs were 
assumed to follow SCA wage increases for the years that the CBAs were not in effect.  This 
was a safe assumption because contracted employees would have followed SCA wage 
rates before unionization.  Also, Tyndall AFB did not have any SCA or CBA wage history 
available for FY00 or FY01.  To account for this, SCA and CBA wage increases were each 
conservatively assumed to be 3.0% for both years. 
The results for all seven bases were combined and are shown in Figures 1 and 2.  
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) line on each graph represents the DoL-reported wage 
inflation rate, nation-wide, for each year. 
 
                                                
41 Individual results for each base are available from the authors. 
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Figure 9. AETC Composite-pay Increases by Year 
 
The next step was to look at the cumulative pay increases over time.  To do this, the 
rate of increase for every year is compounded by the rates of increase for the previous 
years.  This step assists in showing the total increase over time for each category of 
employee.  The results of this analysis are shown in Figures 3 and 4.42   
 
 
                                                
42 Individual results for each base are available from the authors. 
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Figure 10. AETC Cumulative Base-pay Increases 
 
 















Figure 11. AETC Cumulative Composite-pay Increases 
 
One challenge existed in this cumulative-pay analysis; some bases did not have any 
CBAs for FY00, FY01 or FY02.  To better represent the CBA wage increases, the CBAs are 
assumed to follow SCA wage increases for the years that the CBAs were not in effect.  This 
is a safe assumption because contracted employees would have followed SCA wage rates 
before unionization.  Also, as mentioned previously, Tyndall AFB did not have any SCA or 
CBA wage history available for FY00 or FY01.  To account for this, SCA and CBA wage 
increases are each conservatively assumed to be 3.0% (lower than the BLS) for both years.  
The results of these adjustments are shown in Figures 5 and 6.   
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Figure 12.  AETC Cumulative Base-pay Increases (CBA Adjusted) 
 















Figure 13. AETC Cumulative Composite-pay Increases (CBA Adjusted) 
 
Figures 5 and 6 show that CBAs have increased at a slightly higher rate than the 
SCA wages, and the military pay rates have increased at a higher rate than any of the other 
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Military 38.98% 50.03% 
CBA 34.99% 38.87% 
Civilian 28.21% 31.65% 
SCA 22.63% 32.35% 
BLS 24.60% 24.60% 
Table 1.  AETC Cumulative Pay Increases from FY99 to FY06 
 
Objective 2: Contractor vs. Military Cost Growth 
Seven AETC bases have contracted out for their fuels support (Columbus, Laughlin, 
Maxwell, Randolph, Sheppard, Tyndall, and Vance).  All of these workforces operate under 
collective bargaining agreements.  However, two of these bases (Maxwell and Tyndall) 
operate under BOS (Base Operations Support) contracts that combine many functional 
areas under one contract line-item.  This made the fuels costs at these two bases difficult to 
clearly identify. As a result, Maxwell and Tyndall AFBs were eliminated from the study.  Six 
AETC bases perform the function in-house with military and/or civilian personnel (Altus, 
Goodfellow, Keesler, Lackland, Little Rock, and Luke).   
The manpower standard for the fuel function is not an accurate predictor of the 
number of personnel required for smaller workloads because it starts with ~27 positions as a 
baseline regardless of the workload.  Thus, because Goodfellow AFB handles considerably 
less fuel than the other AETC bases (which skews the data), it was excluded from the 
analysis.43  The remaining pool for analysis consisted of five in-house bases and five 
collective bargaining agreement bases.  With the assistance of the Manpower flight at 
Maxwell AFB and the fuels functional chief at AETC, the standard manpower costs for each 
of these ten organizations were calculated using the composite-pay figures for military and 
civilian personnel.  The results are in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 indicates that the Fuels function is varied at the eight bases examined.  
From Altus, with an annual calculated manpower standard cost of nearly $5 million dollars, 
to Keesler, with an annual calculated manpower standard cost of just over $2 million, the 
workload is wide-ranging at AETC locations. 
                                                
43 At Goodfellow, all fuels functions are performed by one person, a GS-7. 
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Figure 14. Manpower Standard Cost 
 
The fuels function at ten AETC bases was analyzed by comparing actual FY06 costs 
to their respective manpower standard-derived costs.  Five of the bases analyzed had 
contracted fuel organizations, and the other five had in-house fuel organizations.  In the first 
step, manpower standards were calculated using the Fuels Management Manpower 
Standard outlined in AFMS 41DA.  The resulting manpower standards were then converted 
to positions as described in AFMS 41DA, and the positions were next converted to total 
cost.   
Next, the actual cost of each organization was compared to the calculated manpower 
standard cost.  For contracted organizations, the actual FY06 contract costs were used in 
the comparison.  For in-house organizations, the assigned personnel numbers obtained 
from the AFPC Authorized and Assigned database were used to compute the total 
personnel costs. 
Finally, the cost ratios of actual cost and manpower standard-calculated costs were 
calculated, revealing that contractor costs remain economically advantageous to the Air 
Force.   
The next step in the calculation was to calculate the actual cost of manpower at 
those locations that are manned by in-house personnel.  With assistance from AETC fuels 
personnel and the Air Force Personnel Center’s Assigned/Authorized data source, the 
actual cost for labor for FY06 was calculated for each of the five bases.  Again, the 
composite pay rates are used in this calculation.  The results are in Figure 8. 
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Figure 15. Manpower Standard Costs vs. In-house Costs at In-house Organizations 
 
A similar comparison was then made between the contracted organizations and their 
calculated manpower standard costs.  This comparison is shown in Figure 9.  Table 2 then 
compares the percentage of the calculated manpower standard cost to the actual 
organization cost.  This comparison uses the assigned-personnel cost for in-house 



















Figure 16. Manpower Standard Cost vs. Contract Cost at Contracted Organizations 
 
Base In-house Contracted Percentage 
Altus X  97.8% 
Columbus  X 66.2% 
Keesler X  69.2% 
Lackland X  127.2% 
Laughlin  X 46.1% 
Little Rock X  147.5% 
Luke X  162.2% 
Randolph  X 59.4% 
Sheppard  X 54.6% 
Vance  X 76.6% 
Table 2. Percent of Actual Cost vs. Manpower Standard Cost 
 
The in-house bases averaged 123.0% of the hypothetical manpower standard cost.  
As seen in Table 2, Keesler AFB is the only in-house organization to perform the function at 
a considerably lower cost than dictated by the manpower standard.  This is possibly a result 
of the inherent flaw in the manpower standard for organizations with smaller workloads.  The 
contracted organizations averaged 60.7% of the hypothetical manpower standard cost.  
Thus, using the manpower standard cost simply to contrast how in-house and contractor 
actual costs compared to the standard, contractor costs are still economically advantageous 
overall for the sampled fuel functions.   
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 Objective 1: Cost Growth of Labor Rates 
There was an observed trend of CBA wages growing at a faster rate than SCA 
wages.  Typically, annual CBA base-pay increases were 1.76% higher than the SCA base-
pay increases.  The analysis showed that the annual composite-pay increases were ~1% 
higher in CBA positions than in SCA positions.  This trend is probably more significant than 
shown considering the initial jump in wages that often occurs when SCA positions unionize.  
When positions unionize, the CBA usually negotiates a one-time spike in wages before 
leveling off.  This SCA-to-CBA wage jump was not captured by our analysis because the 
conversion usually involved a position-name change, preventing direct comparison. The 
military and CBA wage increases appeared to be the fastest growing of the four pay-types 
investigated at the seven bases.   
Objective 2: Contractor vs. Military Cost Growth 
There was a trend that contractors performed fuel functions at a lower cost than in-
house in comparison to their calculated manpower standard costs.  For contracted services, 
the actual cost of contractors averaged ~40% less than the cost derived from the manpower 
standard.  For in-house services, the actual in-house cost averaged over 20% higher than 
the cost derived from the manpower standard.  Thus, in these cases, the A-76 actions still 
appear to be economically advantageous to the government.  
 
Limitations 
1. Manpower data is difficult to obtain outside of a limited timeframe.  This limits the ability 
to develop an in-house organization comparable to a contracted organization without 
significant investment of time and expertise. 
2. Contract data is limited in its timeframe.  Contracting files are maintained in accordance 
with the Federal Acquisition Regulation.  The timeframe of the study is limited to the 
years that the data is available. 
3. There is a limited sample size available for the study.  It only includes those service 
contracts within AETC that have CBAs.  The size was further constrained to those 
locations where multiple contracts exist.  This limitation and constraint restricts the 
general application of the results of the study. 
4. Changes in position names/job titles when contractor positions unionize prevent a direct 
comparison of SCA and CBA wage growth. 
5. All military and civilian pay grades were analyzed, but not all pay grades would typically 
be converted to service contract positions. 
Conclusion 
This study takes important preliminary steps toward determining whether an 
additional A-76 competitive sourcing process factor to account for future contract cost 
growth should be developed.  We found the research highly challenging due to the lack of 
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historical documentation in all areas.  The documents recording the manpower assessment 
at the heart of the A-76 process is almost never available.  The assumptions used by 
evaluators relative to future labor cost growth at the time of the A-76 decision are difficult to 
acquire, if not impossible. As such, it is difficult if not impossible (perhaps by design) to 
conduct an assessment of how closely the assumptions at the time of the A-76 track the 
actual post-decision labor increases.  As such, it would be difficult to develop a factor to 
adjust the assumptions used by evaluators if we cannot determine what the initial 
assumptions were. 
A common perception in the DoD is that CBA cost growth in the out-years makes 
outsourcing less attractive financially.  This study finds that while CBA cost growth is 
substantial, in our sample functional area, CBA cost growth lagged behind the cost growth 
of military labor.  One explanation may be that while commanders are forced to deal with the 
realities of increasing contract costs at the MAJCOM and local level, they may be less aware 
of the challenges of dealing with the even more substantial increases in military personnel 
costs, which are often dealt with at the Air Staff level. 
A final finding of note is that government service civilian cost growth lagged behind 
both military and contract labor growth, indicating that over time, civilian labor may prove to 
be the most stable of the three labor types considered.  Our findings do indicate that future 
cost growth is not stable; however, it appears to be instable in both military and contractor 
labor pools.  As such, should a factor be pursued to provide better insight into the future cost 
of contractor labor, one should also be pursued to provide better insight into military labor 
cost. 
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Executive Summary 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, Performance of 
Commercial Activities, has been around for over 40 years.  A-76 was commonly used to 
refer to the process of outsourcing non-inherently governmental jobs in the 1990’s.   The A-
76 circular was substantially revised to simplify and standardize implementation guidance 
and was released in its current form on May 29, 2003.  The OMB now uses A-76 to help 
implement the competitive sourcing initiative on President Bush’s Management Agenda.  
The stated policy objective in the revised circular is, “To ensure that the American people 
receive maximum value for their tax dollars, commercial activities should be subject to the 
forces of competition” (OMB, 2003, May 29).  The purpose of this study is to determine if A-
76 competitions have resulted in saving the taxpayers money.  More specifically, has A-76 
saved the Department of Defense (DoD) money over the long term?  
The thinking goes that by subjecting the non-inherently governmental jobs being 
performed by government employees to the “forces of competition,” the American taxpayer 
should benefit in the form of better service at lower cost.  As stated in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), “Commercial activities should be subjected to the forces of 
competition” (Part 7.302).  In this study, I will be primarily concerned with the lower cost 
expectation and some of the broader policy implications of this strategy.   
So the question is: have A-76 competitions saved the DoD money?  A General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report in 2000 on A-76 studies in the DoD concluded that the 
Department had saved $290 million dollars on 286 studies conducted from 1995 to 1999.  
However, the study goes on to say that there were some problems in the way the 
Government calculated baseline costs, which were often based on authorized positions 
rather than on actual positions, and that the cost-savings estimates did not include the costs 
of conducting the studies or the cost of implementing and managing them (GAO, 2000).  In 
other words, true cost savings must consider the costs of conducting the studies and the 
costs of administering the contracts or otherwise monitoring performance.  It was also, 
“noted that the level of savings will be difficult to track in the long term because workload 
requirements change, affecting program costs and the baseline from which savings are 
calculated” (2000).  
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A more recent study conducted by the IBM Center for The Business of Government 
found that competition results in significant savings.  This study examined competitions 
conducted from 1994 though the first quarter of 2004 and used the DoD’s own data-
collection system to conclude that there was, “an average estimated savings of 44 percent 
of baseline costs, for a total savings of $11.2 billion” (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2004, October, p. 
28, 32).  The study also found that although there were relatively few government civilian 
employees involuntarily separated, most of the savings associated with the competitions 
came as a result of reducing the number of positions by 24,852 (2004, October).  The 
number of positions was reduced regardless of who won the competition—the government 
or a contractor.  The savings estimate was also based on estimated cost and did not 
consider the cost of conducting the study or administering the contracts. 
In another report (GAO-04-367), the GAO indicates that although the DoD has 
achieved savings though competitive sourcing, it is difficult to estimate precisely the amount 
of these savings (2004).  Further, the Office says significant challenges face the agencies 
implementing competitive sourcing, including: difficulty in identifying non-inherently 
governmental positions for competition, a constantly changing environment, insufficient staff 
to plan and carryout the competitions and a lack of funding to implement and administer the 
program (2004).    
In a widely publicized White Paper, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
looked at 217 competitive sourcing studies conducted in FY 2004 and estimated these 
studies would “generate a net savings,” or cost avoidance of $1.4 billion over three to five 
years (2005, January).  They claim that the data suggests the savings are primarily because 
of larger competitions and more frequent use of standard competitions that require in-house 
teams to come up with a most efficient organization.  Put another way, “competition drives 
bid prices down and efficiencies up” (2005, January).  It remains to be seen whether or not 
this will remain true over the life of the contracts. 
An interesting study by David Galley (2002), an adjunct faculty member at George 
Washington University, examined the impact of public-private competitions on the costs of 
providing maintenance and repair services for buildings on 104 Army installations from 1989 
to 1999.  He says that the study, “shows conclusively that the impact of those A-76 
competitions on costs depended on the category of the winner” (pp. 3-18).  If the private 
sector won, there was significant cost savings; but if the work was kept in-house, there was 
not (2002).  One offered explanation for this was that the Army did not monitor the in-house 
work force’s performance like it did when a contractor was involved.  
A study at the US Air Force Academy examined five different studies conducted 
during FY 2001 to 2003 which resulted in significantly reducing the number of employees 
performing competitive sourcing functions.  However, a survey of employees and managers 
familiar with the competitive sourcing programs indicated that 80% felt the services were 
worse than before the studies had been done and only about half thought the program 
saved money for the Air Force (Green, Heppard & Forrester, 2004, pp. 4-11).  In one 
conclusion, this study also indicated that, “Estimates used to compute savings omit many 
costs, e.g., study costs, retraining costs, loss of productivity, severances packages, etc.” 
(2004).  
In a briefing paper entitled Show Me The Money, Max Sawicky of the Economic 
Policy Institute investigated the evidence presented by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) in support of the Revised A-76 Circular that purported to show that A-76 
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competitions saved money.  One of the studies cited in this paper was conducted at the 
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and involved 16 competitions for 2,800 jobs.  His findings 
indicated that in every case, the “observed cost” (or the actual cost of performance) 
exceeded the bid price.  The “effective cost” (the actual cost taking into consideration the 
change in the scope of work) exceeded the bid price in nine out of fourteen cases (Sawicky, 
2003).   An interesting observation in this study was that even if there are apparent savings, 
they are not returned to the taxpayer.  In effect, competitions are really a vehicle for 
expanded government because, “agency savings do not translate into budget savings” 
(2003, p. 8, 12).       
In light of these and other studies on outsourcing in the DoD, it is interesting that a 
recent article in the Federal Times asserts that according to a Pentagon official, “it’s unclear 
if the military always saves money when it contracts with private companies to perform 
support services.”  Claude Bolton, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics 
and technology, is quoted as saying that, “While it may be clear that a particular contract will 
save millions of dollars right away, there is no simple way to determine if that remains true 
four or five years down the road” (as cited in Lubold, 2006, p. 13).  In other words, estimated 
savings at the beginning may not translate into actual savings in the end.   
 “Ah, there’s the rub.”  Federal employees unions and others have been making this 
case for years.  Testifying before Congress, the president of the American Federation of 
Government Employees, Bobby Harnage (2001, March 15), indicated that even as the 
number of federal government employees in the DoD steadily decreased by over 280,000 
from 1992 to 1999, the cost of service contracts increased from $39.9 billion to $51.8 billion 
(p. 1).   In the DoD, service contracts are now the largest segment of DoD procurements and 
make up over 50% of all contract dollars awarded (Lubold, 2006, April 24, p. 13).  In fact, 
according to a recent congressional report, spending on federal contracts has been the 
fastest growing part of the discretionary budget for the last five years, and service contracts 
are leading the way (US House, 2006).  As anyone familiar with the federal budget can tell 
you, the budget has not gone down regardless of how many jobs are contracted out or how 
many activities are turned over to contractors.  In the DoD, budgets have increased almost 
every year since 1994, and they are not expected to go down anytime soon (OMB, 2005).  
So, does outsourcing or competitive sourcing really save the taxpayer money?  It 
may save money on some contracts, but there is a question about whether the government 
customer is getting the same or better service.  Also, projected savings and actual savings 
are two entirely different things.  The comptroller general of the United States, David Walker, 
was quoted recently as saying, “they (contractors) often fail to deliver the promised 
efficiency and savings.  Private companies cannot be expected to look out for taxpayers’ 
interests” (as cited in Shane, 2007, February 4).  Generally, it does not appear A-76 is 
saving the taxpayer money overall.  As pointed out above, the federal budget is not 
decreasing, in spite of the hundreds of thousands of jobs that have been contracted out.  
Both Congress and the Executive branch like to tell voters they are cutting the bureaucracy, 
but in reality they are merely transferring government functions to private contractors.  This 
growing “shadow workforce” has been identified by many writers, but Paul Light of the 
Brookings Institute has been a leader in this area; he has an excellent book on the subject 
entitled The True Size of Government, in which he concludes, “the true size of the 
government is much larger than the federal employee headcount suggests” (1999, p. 44).     
There is an old saying in Washington that, “there are two kinds of contractors, those 
with government contracts and those that want government contracts.”  The fact that the 
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federal government is the largest purchaser of goods and services in the world makes it a 
very attractive customer.  The implication that by subjecting non-inherently governmental 
jobs to the forces of competition somehow captures market efficiencies is on its face 
plausible; but on closer examination, this implication may be more apparent than real.  First, 
as stated by Professor Dan Guttman of Johns Hopkins University in a recent article, 
although, “we associate the utility of contractors with the notion that the private sector brings 
market forces to bear on government activities, this is only true where a commercial market 
exists for the government purchases” (2004, p. 24).  He goes on to say, “where government 
is the primary or predominant purchaser of services or goods the picture is less clear” 
(2004). As has been demonstrated by Peck and Sherer (1962) in their classic analysis of 
weapon system procurement, markets are difficult to duplicate in a governmental setting 
primarily because the government entity really doesn’t have any market competition for 
many of the products they buy.  As they point out, the government is often the only buyer (p. 
60).  This rational can also be applied to services the government purchases.  For instance, 
typically the work (services) is to be performed on a government installation; the work will be 
performed during certain hours, and the work is controlled by a performance work statement 
or statement of work with some type of government monitoring.  The services may even be 
performed in a combat environment.  This is not exactly “market conditions.”   
Secondly, as has been asked by others and included in Dan Guttman’s article, “In 
what respect is a contractor that earns nearly 100% of its income from doing government 
work engaged in a commercial activity?” (2004, p. 29, quoting from the “Bell Report”).  Third, 
if the government can manage its organization better by creating a “most efficient 
organization,” why isn’t it doing so already?—because, as has been shown (See IBMCBG 
study cited above), most of the alleged savings comes from reducing the number of 
employees. Fourth, the whole debate about what is inherently governmental varies from 
time to time and place to place.  There is conflicting guidance from agencies on what is 
inherently governmental, and some of it even seems to be in conflict with the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations.  And finally, social and economic policies like equal employment 
opportunity, veteran’s preference, providing jobs for the handicapped and disabled, health 
insurance and retirement benefits for employees are now discounted in the name of 
competition.  Is this really what “competitive sourcing” is supposed to be about?   
Competitive sourcing (or, as it used to be called, “commercial activities”) is about 
private-sector contractors doing commercial work.  This should not be that hard to define.  
Like Lt. General Donald Hoffman, military deputy in the office of the assistant secretary of 
the Air Force said, “We don’t need Air Force plumbers and Air Force electricians when right 
outside the gate there is a contractor to do that stuff” (as cited in Lubold, 2006, p. 13).  I 
think he is right.  Those are excellent examples of commercial activities.  But simply 
because some contractors want more government work, and some government officials 
want to give it to them (for a variety of reasons), that still doesn’t make almost everything the 
government does a commercial activity.  It is high time that the public and their elected 
representatives recognize that reducing the size of government is about more than 
eliminating federal employees before it’s too late.  In fact, a good first step might be for 
congress to take the recommendation of their own analysts and, “further prescribe that 
certain government activities are to be considered inherently governmental” (Grasso, 2003, 
October 20, p. 23).  This would remove the arbitrary discretion of understaffed agencies 
looking for a way to outsource their work, and perhaps save us from ourselves, while making 
sure all the agencies use the same criteria when determining what jobs are to be 
outsourced. 
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Although it may be unpopular to say that the government has a higher calling than 
the purely monetary incentive of business to make a profit, it is nevertheless true.  The 
government typically has a mission to accomplish, and it may not be financially feasible from 
a business point of view.  When this is the case, why should taxpayers be expected to not 
only pay for the service but to also pay a profit?  This is especially true when the services 
being performed are not really commercial services.  For competitive sourcing to really work, 
the first step must be, as Professor Steven Schooner has indicated, “to determine which 
functions are inherently governmental and which are not” (2004, p. 295).  It should not be 
that difficult to identify a commercial service or activity.  Then, “the government should begin 
outsourcing those services that are most readily available in the private sector” (2004, p. 
296).  This is the only way the government can truly benefit from “market forces.”  To try to 
compete jobs that are not typically performed in the private sector is not in the public interest 
and will not save the taxpayer money in the long run.   
Beyond the cost savings or cost avoidance that may or may not be associated with 
competitive sourcing, there is the question of what is in the best interest of the government 
and the public.  On this point, an outsourcing survey conducted by Deloitte Consulting 
Corporation of 25 world class organizations found that, “outsourcing is an extraordinarily 
complex process and the anticipated benefits often fail to materialize” (2005, April, pp. 3-4).  
Further, they say, “In the long run, organizations that continue to outsource will experience a 
loss of bargaining power to vendors as the supply side consolidates” (2005, April).  Both of 
these phenomena have occurred in the Defense industry in over the past 20 years and, “it is 
unlikely that the defense industry will ever approximate a competitive market” (Driessnack & 
King, 2004, January-April).  As the supply side continues to consolidate domestically and 
internationally, is it really in our national interest to contract out more and more government 
activities?  Perhaps the debate we should be having is what is in our national best interest 
from the taxpayer’s point of view—because as we have seen, the cost of government is not 
going down.           
References 
Deloitte Consulting. (2005, April). Calling a change in the outsourcing market (The realities 
for the world’s largest organizations), pp. 3, 4. 
 
Driessnack, J.D., & King, D. (2004, January-April). An initial look at technology and 
institutions on defense industry consolidation. Defense Acquisition Review Journal, 
11(1), 62-77.   
 
Federal Acquisition Regulation. Contractor versus government performance, Part 7.302. 
Retrieved from http://farsite.hillaf.mil/vffara.htm 
 
Galley, D. (2002, July). Impact of A-76 competitions on facilities-related maintenance and 
repair costs, an assessment. Public Works Management & Policy, 7(1), 3-18. Sage 
Publications. Retrieved from http://pwm.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/7/1/3.  
 
Gansler, J.S., & Lucyshyn, W. (2004, October). Competitive sourcing: What happens to 
federal employees? Washington, DC: IBM Center for The Business of Government.  
 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 335 - 
=
= =
GAO. (2004). Competitive sourcing: Greater emphasis needed on increasing efficiency and 
improving performance (GAO-04-367). Washington, DC: author. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/atext/d04367.txt.  
 
GAO. (2000). DOD competitive sourcing:  Results of A-76 studies over the past 5 years 
(GAO-01-20). Washington , DC: author.    
 
Grasso, V.B. (2003, October 20). Defense outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 policy 
Congressional research service report. Retrieved from 
http://www.thememoryhole.org/crs/more-reports/RL30392.htm 
 
Green, S., Heppard, K., & Forster, W. (2004). Measuring mission impact of competitive 
sourcing activities. In Proceedings of the 2004 SCEA national conference (pp. 4-11). 
Los Angeles, CA. 
 
Guttman, D. (2004). Governance by contract: Constitutional vision; Time for reflection and 
choice (Accepted paper.) Public Contract Law Journal, 33(2), p. 24-29. Washington, 
DC: George Washington University Law School.  
 
Harnage, B. (2001, March 15). Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 
Regarding: Problems in outsourcing. Retrieved from 
http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=CongressionalTestimony&file=1_031501.htm  
 
Light, P.C. (1999). The true size of government.  Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
 
Lubold, G. (2006, April 24). Army: Does outsourcing save money? Federal Times, 42(12), 
13. 
 
OMB. (2003, May 29). Circular A-76: Performance of commercial activities. Washington, 
DC: author. 
 
OMB. (2005, January). Competitive sourcing: Results in action. An initiative update.  White 
Paper. Retrieved from http://whitehouse.gov/OMB/procurement/comp-
src/cs_results_2005pdf. 
 
OMB. (2005). The Budget for fiscal year 2005. Historical Tables, Table 5.2: Budget authority 
by agency: 1976-2009. Washington, DC: author. 
 
Peck, M., & Scherer, F., (1962). The weapons acquisition process: An economic analysis 
Boston, MA: Harvard University. 
 
Sawicky, M.B. (2003). Show me the money: Evidence is sorely lacking that the Bush 
Administration’s proposed A-76 rules for contracting will bring budget savings 
(Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper). Washington, DC: Economic Policy 
Institute. 
 
Schooner, S.L. (2004). Competitive sourcing policy: More sail than rudder? (Accepted 
paper.) Public Contract Law Journal, 33(2), 295-296. Washington, DC:  The George 
Washington University Law School. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=488266.   
 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 336 - 
=
= =
Shane, S. (2007, February 4). In Washington, contractors take on biggest role ever. New 
York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04washinton/04contract.html . 
 
Shakespeare, W. (1980). Hamlet, III,i,56. In Bartlett’s familiar quotations (p. 221). Boston, 
MA: Little Brown and Company.    
 
US House of Representatives. (2006). Dollars, not sense: Government contracting under 
the Bush Administration. Washington, DC: author. 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 337 - 
=
= =
Panel 10 - Evolving Technologies in DoD Acquisition 
 
Wednesday, 
May 16, 2007 
Panel 10 - Evolving Technologies in DoD Acquisition 




Lorna B. Estep, Deputy Director for Supply, Directorate of Logistics and 
Sustainment, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command 
Discussant:  
Michael A. Schwind, Vice President, Federal Sector, UGS Corporation 
Papers:  
Optimal Inventory Policy for Two-echelon Remanufacturing 
Geraldo Ferrer, Naval Postgraduate School 
B2B Models for DoD Acquisition 
Magdi N. Kamel, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Chair: Lorna B. Estep, Deputy Director for Supply, Directorate of Logistics and Sustainment, 
Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, is responsible for the Materiel Support Division of the 
Supply Management Activity Group, a stock fund with annual sales of $7 billion. She directs a wide 
range of logistics services in support of Air Force managed spare parts, to include transformation 
programs, requirements determination, budgeting, acquisition, provisioning, cataloging, distribution 
and data management policy. She also provides supply chain management policy, guidance and 
direction in support of headquarters, air logistics centers, and U.S. Air Force worldwide customers. 
Ms. Estep started her career as a Navy logistics management intern. She has directed the Joint 
Center for Flexible Computer Integrated Manufacturing, was the first program manager for Rapid 
Acquisition of Manufactured Parts, and has served as Technical Director of Information Technology 
Initiatives at the Naval Supply Systems Command. In these positions she has developed logistics 
programs for the Department of Defense, implemented one of the first integrated and agile data-
driven manufacturing systems, and directed the development of complex technical data systems for 
the Navy.  
As the Director of Joint Logistics Systems Center, Ms. Estep had the duties of a commanding officer 
for a major subordinate command. In addition, she acted as the Logistics Community Manager, an 
emerging organization to coordinate and implement the revised Defense Department logistics 
strategy for achieving Joint Vision 2010 through modern information techniques and processes. She 
has also served as Chief Information Officer for the Naval Sea Systems Command in Arlington, Va., 
and Executive Director of Headquarters Materiel Systems Group at Wright-Patterson AFB. Prior to 
her current assignment, she served as Deputy Director for Logistics Readiness at the Pentagon, 
where she developed combat support concepts, doctrine, and sustainment policy with the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders. 
 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 338 - 
=
= =
Optimal Inventory Policy for Two-echelon 
Remanufacturing 
 
Presenter:  Geraldo Ferrer, Naval Postgraduate School. Professor Ferrer’s areas of expertise 
include global operations, supply-chain management, sustainable technologies, product stewardship, 
reverse logistics and remanufacturing. He also has studied the reverse logistics required in recycling 
and remanufacturing operations, and inventory problems affecting products made in small batches for 
frequent just-in-time deliveries.  
He has published on these topics in Management Science, European Management Journal, Naval 
Research Logistics, IIE Transactions, Production and Operations Management, European Journal of 
Operational Research, International Journal of Production Economics, Ecological Economics, 
Business Horizons and Resources Conservation and Recycling.  He is a contributor in the Handbook 
of Environmentally Conscious Manufacturing and Handbook of Industrial Ecology.  
He has presented his research in national and international conferences in four continents, and in 
invited seminars in various academic institutions.  Dr. Ferrer serves as reviewer in many academic 
journals, for the National Science Foundation and for the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of 
Canada.  He has also reviewed textbooks in the areas of operations management, inventory 
management and project management. 
Dr. Ferrer has consulted for companies in the United States on waste reduction and reverse logistics 
issues.   He was founder and director of Superserv Ltd., a company that promoted technology 
transfer ventures between North American and Brazilian business, introducing innovative technology 
products in Brazil. 
He received his PhD from INSEAD, MBA from Dartmouth College, a mechanical engineering degree 
from the Military Institute of Engineering in Rio de Janeiro and a BA in Business Administration from 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. 
Prof. Geraldo Ferrer was in the faculty of the Kenan-Flagler Business School at the University of 
North Carolina for seven years and is now a faculty member of the Naval Postgraduate School.   
Geraldo Ferrer 
Phone: (831) 905-4432 
Email: gferrer@nps.edu  
 
Abstract 
We present a two-echelon remanufacturing facility subject to constant demand, 
in which the disassembly process and the repair process observe stochastic yield.  We 
develop an intuitive scheduling policy and perform a robustness test. 
 
 Keyword: inventory management, multi-echelon, remanufacturing, product 
recovery, stochastic process yield, financial holding cost, physical holding cost 
Introduction 
Yano and Lee (1995) revised several lot-sizing models in which production yield is 
random.  A large number of those models were inspired by the difficulties faced in the 
production of electronic components, where the production yield in some stages may be 
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very low.  A similar situation occurs in remanufacturing sites.  Cores entering the 
remanufacturing shop enter a pre-selection stage in which some disassembly takes place.  
The disassembly modules are stocked close to the renovation area, where they are repaired 
and made ready to reuse.  One particularity of the remanufacturing shop is the different 
ways that the inventory held in stock affects the operating cost, whether it is before or after 
the final production stage.  Most of the holding cost in the upstream operation refers to the 
physical handling of a large number of assemblies that occupy a significant amount of 
space, but might not survive the remanufacturing process.  Meanwhile, most of the holding 
cost in the downstream operation refers to the opportunity cost of the resources committed 
to adding value to the sub-assembly renovation. 
The remanufacturing shop that we described has not been modeled yet.  The paper 
we propose contributes in this literature by providing a simple policy with two control 
variables:  the lot size in the upstream operation, and the echelon multiple used to identify 
the lot size in the renovation station. Moreover, it identifies the conditions under which the 
remanufacturing shop will not hold inventory between the two processes, thus renovating all 
cores immediately after disassembly. 
We assume that demand is constant, and the lead time of both processes is zero.  
We develop the optimal nested policy and perform numerical tests. 
 Stochastic Process Yield, Deterministic Demand 
Consider a remanufacturing shop where the stock of cores is unlimited and freely 
available for recovery.  The recovery process generates remanufactured units of the widget 
corresponding to these cores.  This demand for the remanufactured widget is fairly stable:  
initially, we consider a constant demand of D remanufactured goods per unit time.  The 
recovery procedure includes two stages:  a disassembly process and a renovation process.  
Both operations are costly, require some setup and are subject to a stochastic output yield.  
The manager has to decide the operating policy that determines the frequency of the two 
operations (disassembly and renovation) and the size of the respective lots, such that 
demand is always satisfied at the lowest operating cost.  Figure 17 illustrates this scenario in 















Figure 17.  Material Flow in a Tire Retreading Facility 
One of the practical problems faced by remanufacturing shops is the constraint in 
storage space.  A large number of used cores arrive at the facility to be processed, but only 
some of them become re-usable goods.  Hence, physical handling may represent a 
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significant fraction of the holding cost, especially in the earlier stages of the operation.  The 
typical representation of echelon stocking, with nested saw-tooth patterns, represents the 
value added in each stage.  However, this does not completely reflect the importance of 
physical handling in remanufacturing.  Hence, it is useful to identify separately which stage 
is burdened by the financial and the physical inventory.  Figure 18 reflects the two-process 
environment, where both physical and financial stocks are present in a situation in which 
there are 3 renovation cycles per disassembly event. 
If the remanufacturing operation pays for the cores received at the time of delivery, 
the financial holding cost lasts until the recovered good is finally delivered to the customer.  
That is reflected in the downward slope of the financial inventory level in both processes.  
However, the physical inventory follows a staircase shape in the first process, and a saw-
tooth shape in the lower process.  That behavior is the same as most other multi-echelon 
systems.  However, the remanufacturing operation is better represented if the two holding 
costs are treated separately. 
In Figure 18, the first station disassembles Q machines, subject to a certain yield, pd.  
We propose a nested policy such that the output of the upstream station is split into n equal  
lots to be processed in the downstream operation.  Table 3 shows the notation used in the 
optimization of this policy. 
Table 3. Notation 
Costs incurred in the renovation (downstream) process 
Considering the yield in the disassembly operation, pd Q ready-to-recover items are 
available for renovation in the second step.  We choose equal lot sizes of pd Q / n cores in 
each of the next n cycles in the renovation process.  If the yield realization in the first 
renovation cycle is pr, we have that pr pd Q / n items are produced in the first cycle, which 
are gradually consumed. Moreover, the renovation cycle lasts pr pd Q / n D time units.  
Hence, the holding costs incurred in the renovation cycle are given by the expressions: 












DISASSEMBLY ECHELON RENOVATION (REPAIR) ECHELON 
kd setup cost of disassembly kr setup cost of renovation 
hf,d 
financial holding cost of 
disassembled items hf,r 
financial holding cost of renovated 
items 
hph,d 
physical holding cost of 
disassembled items hph,r 
physical holding cost of renovated 
items 
pd 
yield of the disassembly 
operation pr yield of the renovation operation 
Q core disassembly lot-size n number of renovation cycles per disassembly event 
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There are different reasons driving the yield in each process.  Generally, the yield in 
the renovation process is due to process failures, while the yield in the disassembly process 
depends on the quality of the incoming material, the used cores.  Hence, we may assume 
that the two yield distributions are not correlated. The setup cost per renovation cycle equals 
kr. Therefore, the expected value of the renovation cost per time unit can be expressed as: 
  
























pr pd Q / n







Figure 18. Financial and Physical Level in a Two-process System 
Costs incurred in the disassembly (upstream) process 
Prior to the renovation process, the used goods inventory is processed and pre-
selected during the disassembly process. The duration of the disassembly process depends 
both on the yield of this operation, as well as on the yield of each subordinate renovation 
cycle, pr,i (i = 1, … n).  Hence, 





Separating the financial and the physical holding cost, we obtain the expressions: 
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The setup cost per disassembly cycle equals kd.  Considering that the yield 
distributions are not correlated, and that the expected duration of the disassembly cycle is n 
times longer than the expected duration of the renovation cycle, the expected disassembly 
cost per time units equals: 
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Choice of optimal lot-size at the disassembly process 
Equations 3 and 7 provide the closed-form expressions for the relevant inventory 
costs at each process as a function of the lot-size of the disassembly process (Q) and the 
number of renovation cycles per disassembly cycle (n).  Hence, we can define K(n) and H(n) 
as follows: 
 Equation 8. K n( )= kd + nkr( )E 1 pd[ ]E 1 pr[ ]  
 Equation 9. H n( )= h f ,d + E pd[ ]n hph,d n −1( )+ h f ,r + hph,r E pr[ ]( )  
In addition, we may write in compact form the expected operating cost per unit time as: 




Obviously, the expression is convex in Q.  For a given value of n > 0, the optimal lot-
size is: 
Equation 11. Q* n( )= 2DK n( )
H n( )   
and the respective minimum cost is:  
Equation 12.  C * n( )= 2DK n( )H n( ) 
Now, we have to identify the integer value of n that minimizes this cost expression.  It 
is simple to show that such minimization is equivalent to minimizing X(n) given by the 
expression: 
 Equation 13. X n( )= E pd[ ]
n
h f ,r − hph,d + hph,r E pr[ ]( )kd + hf ,d + hph,d E pd[ ]( )nkr   
The value nreal ∈ R  that satisfies the first-order condition in the minimization of the 
X(n) expression is: 
 Equation 14. nreal =
E pd[ ] hf ,r − hph,d + hph,r E pr[ ]( )




The value above is generally not integer.  If nreal ≤1, the minimizing value is n* = 1.  
Otherwise, we examine two approximations of nreal.  Define nlo and nhi, integer numbers such 
that nlo = max n ∈ Integer Numbers n ≤ nreal{ } and nhi = nlo +1. 
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Clearly, X nlo( ) ≤ X nhi( ) ⇒ n* = nlo minimizes the cost function.  Otherwise, n* = nhi is 
the cost minimizer.  Now, we can identify the lot-size at the disassembly process that 
minimizes the operating cost in the remanufacturing site.  It suffices to substitute n* in the 
expression for K(n) and H(n) and, subsequently, substitute them in the expression for Q*(n) 
to solve the cost minimization problem. 
Discussion 
Equations 11 and 14, combined with the integrality constraint, identify the decision 
variables that optimize the nested policy suggested for this problem.  It gives proper weight 
to the financial and physical holding costs faced by the remanufacturing firm.  Equation 14 
shows that the number of renovation cycles is proportional to the ratio between the setup 
costs of both processes.  The same result is observed with the basic two-echelon problem 
with deterministic production output.  Other results are less intuitive:  Let the financial 
holding cost at the disassembly process be relatively low, and the physical holding cost be 
the same in both processes.  In this case, equation 14 may be approximated by the 
expression 
 Equation 15. nreal ≈ hfhph





where hf is the financial holding cost, incurred at the renovation process only, and hph is the 
physical holding cost, of the same magnitude in both processes.  Hence, 
 The number of renovation cycles increases with the financial cost of the 
remanufacturing operation.  This happens because by increasing the number of 
cycles, the size of finished goods inventory reduces, which drives the financial 
holding cost. 
 The number of renovation cycles decreases with the physical handling cost.  This is 
an indirect effect.  Increasing the number of renovation cycles implicitly reduces the 
lot-size in the disassembly process, hence, reducing the physical holding cost at this 
level. 
 If the expected renovation yield is low, and the physical holding cost is relatively 
high, there will be as many renovation cycles as disassembly cycles.  This happens if 
the expression inside the square root is less than 1 (or even negative), implying that 
n* = 1. 
The last effect clarifies why, in some remanufacturing operations, the manager 
chooses not to hold inventory between the two events.  In these environments, once the lot 
of used goods is disassembled, it proceeds immediately to the renovation area.  This 
behavior is justifiable because handling an excessive stock of disassembled goods may be 
quite problematic if storage space is at a premium.  However, if physical handling is not 
costly, it is likely that the renovation station will process smaller lots than the disassembly 
station. 
Example  
A remanufacturing facility faces an annual demand of 600 units of a certain electric 
motor series.  The facility has access to an ample supply of used motors to repair at a small 
cost.  Holding costs have been estimated as hf,d = 0.5, hf,r = 4, hph,d = hph,r = 2.  Moreover, 
ordering and setup costs have been estimated as kd = 30 and kr = 6. Pre-inspection yield for 
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each lot is uniformly distributed between 0.5 and 0.95.  Final inspection yield is also 
uniformly distributed—between 0.75 and 0.95.  Under these conditions, we find that nlo = 2 
and nhi = 3.  Since X(3) = 61.9 < 63.6 = X(2), we conclude that n* = 3.  Hence, K(3) = 80.9 
and H(3) = 2.84, leading to Q(3) = 185; and expected inventory management cost is 
minimized at C(3) = 525.  The following graph shows the expected inventory costs at 
different (Q, n) combinations. 
Figure 3 illustrates that the operating cost does not change significantly close to the 
optimal value solution (185, 3).  The cost increase for erring in just one dimension (either lot 
size or number of renovation cycles) is quite minor, but simultaneous errors in both 
dimensions can easily increase operating costs by 50% or more.  Consequently, the 
remanufacturing facility must be careful deciding the inventory policy associated with its 
production process to ensure that the operating cost is remains close to its theoretical 
optimum. 
Figure 3. Expected Inventory Costs at Different (Q, n) Combinations 
Conclusion 
We have proposed an inventory policy for multi-echelon remanufacturing operations 
in which the first echelon corresponds to the product disassembly and sorting operations, 
and the second echelon corresponds to the repair, renovation and final inspection 
operations.  The separation between these two sets of operations is important because they 
present sizable yield, affecting the holding cost at each level of the process.  We find a 
simple inventory policy built upon the familiar structure of the economic order quantity, 
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This policy is useful in DoD depots, where large remanufacturing programs are 
engaged periodically for the recovery of valuable durable assets.  We intend to extend this 
study by testing the policy provided herein in actual remanufacturing operations in the DoD. 
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A central vision of B2B e-commerce is that of an electronic marketplace that would bring 
suppliers with major buyers of goods and services for the purpose of conducting “frictionless” 
commerce. The hope is that these suppliers would compete on price, transactions would be 
automated and low cost, and as a result, the price of goods and services would fall. Numerous 
Internet marketplaces came into being during the Internet boom; however, an almost equal 
number disappeared following the Internet bubble burst. Still, many survive today based on a 
variety of models that are quite successful. If a right model is selected, it could help large 
organizations, like the DoD, achieve great efficiencies for their acquisition and procurement 
processes. 
The objective of the paper is to examine models for classifying and differentiating the 
business functionality provided by Internet marketplaces and to investigate the impact of the 
various models on government and DoD acquisition. The models will consider such variables as 
types of goods and services purchased, how these goods and services are purchased, pricing 
mechanisms, the characteristics of the markets, and ownership of marketplace. 
Introduction 
Business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce refers to transactions between businesses 
conducted electronically over the Internet, intranets, extranets, or private networks. Such 
transactions may be conducted between a business and its suppliers or between a business 
and any other business. 
It is estimated that in 2003, B2B e-commerce in the United States was a $1.5 trillion 
business. This represents about 11% of the total B2B trade estimated at $13.5 trillion (Laudon & 
Traver, 2004). Gartner group predicts this percentage to grow steadily to reach over 40% in 
2010. Forrester’s research predicts a higher percentage of 53%. 
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There are many potential benefits of B2B e-commerce. These benefits depend on the 
model used, but are thought to include the following: 
 Significant cuts in acquisition cost 
 Expediting cycle-time 
 Reducing errors and improving quality of service 
 Seamless integration with suppliers 
 Ability to have purchasing data instantly 
 Reducing inventory levels and costs 
 Immediate response to changes in customer purchasing patterns 
 Facilitating mass customization 
 Increasing opportunities of collaboration between buyers and sellers 
In this paper, we examine models for classifying and differentiating the business 
functionality provided by B2B e-commerce and examine the impact of the various models on 
government and DoD acquisition. The models will consider such variables as types of goods 
and services purchased, how these goods and services are purchased, pricing mechanisms, 
the characteristics of the markets, and ownership of marketplace. 
B2B Characteristics 
There are many ways to characterize B2B transactions. In this paper, we differentiate 
between different types of B2B transactions based on the following characteristics: Parties to 
the transaction, types of transactions, types of products and services procured, the direction of 
trade, and number and form of participation. 
Parties to the Transaction 
B2B commerce can be conducted directly between a buyer and seller or through a third-
party intermediary. 
Types of Transactions 
There are two types of transactions: Spot purchases and long-term sourcing. Spot 
purchases refer to the purchasing of goods and services as they are needed at the prevailing 
market prices. Long-term sourcing refers to purchases made through long-term contracting 
agreements that are negotiated between the buyers and the sellers. 
Types of Products and Services 
There are two types of Products and Services: Direct and Indirect. Direct products and 
services are used directly in making the product, such as wood in furniture or paper in a book. 
Direct products and services are usually purchased in large quantities using long-term sourcing. 
Indirect products and services (such computer equipments, lights, or tools) support production, 
but are not directly involved in creating the end product. They are usually referred to as 
maintenance, repairs, and operations (MROs). 
Direction of Transactions 
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B2B transactions can be classified as either vertical or horizontal. A vertical market is 
one that provides products and services for a specific industry. Examples include cars, steel, or 
electronics. Horizontal markets refer to markets that serve many different industries. Examples 
are office supplies, computers, and tools. 
Number and Form of Participation 
There are four types of electronic marketplace participation: 1) Sell-side, 2) Buy-side, 3) 
Exchanges, and 4) Collaborative commerce.  
In sell-side commerce, there is one seller that does all the selling to many buyers. In 
buy-side commerce, there is one buyer that does all the buying from many sellers. Both types 
are collectively referred to as company-centric electronic commerce, because they address a 
single company buying or selling needs.  
Exchanges are many-to-many electronic marketplaces, where many buyers and many 
sellers meet in electronic markets to conduct business transactions. Exchanges are usually 
owned and managed by a third party or by a consortium, and are open to all interested parties, 
and are, thus, considered public electronic marketplaces. 
Collaborative commerce goes beyond selling and buying activities and includes activities 
that represent more than financial transactions—such as communication and sharing of 
information, planning, design, manufacturing, and management. Collaborative commerce is 
relationship-based rather than transactions-based and bears resemblance to internal workgroup 
collaborative environments. 
Buy-side Electronic Marketplaces Models 
Under these models, a buyer opens an electronic marketplace on its own servers and 
invites potential suppliers to bid on the products and services that the buyer needs. This 
invitation could take the form of: 1) a request for Quote (RFQ), or 2) an invitation for a reverse 
auction. An example of the former is FedBizOpps (2007) and GSA e-buy (2007). An example of 
the latter is NAVSUP NavyAuctions (2007). 
FedBizOpps is the single government point-of-entry (GPE) for Federal government 
procurement opportunities over $25,000. Government buyers are able to publicize their 
business opportunities by posting information directly to FedBizOpps via the Internet. Using the 
same portal, commercial vendors seeking Federal markets for their products and services can 
search, monitor and retrieve opportunities solicited by the entire Federal contracting community. 
E-buy is an electronic Request for Quote (RFQ)/Request for Proposal (RFP) system 
designed to allow Federal buyers to request information, find sources, and prepare RFQs/RFPs, 
online, for millions of services and products offered through GSA's Multiple Award Schedule 
(MAS) and Government-wide Acquisition Contracts (GWAC). 
Navy Auctions is a secured Internet portal that allows online suppliers to compete in 
real-time for contracts by lowering their prices as they see other offers. In its first reverse 
auction, the Navy estimates that they achieved savings of 28.9% over the historical price for 
these items. The auction lasted 51 minutes, and the contract, valued at $2.375 million, was 
awarded within an hour of the reverse auction closing. 
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As discussed earlier, exchanges are electronic marketplaces where many buyers and 
sellers meet to buy and sell goods and services. Exchanges are known under different names: 
e-marketplaces, e-markets, Internet exchanges, Net marketplaces, and B2B portals. 
Classification of Exchanges 
There are numerous ways of classifying exchanges. We use an approach similar to that 
suggested by Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) and Kerrigan, Roegner, Swinford and Zawada 
(2001). The classification model consists of a 2x2 matrix, as shown in Figure 1. The x-axis 
represents the types of goods and services purchased (indirect goods vs. direct goods), and the 
y-axis represents how these goods and services are purchased (spot purchases vs. long-term 
contractual agreement). The intersection of these dimensions produces four cells representing 
four types of exchanges: Horizontal exchanges (also known as e-distributors), horizontal 
distributors (also known as e-procurement), vertical exchanges (also known as independent 
exchanges), and vertical distributors (also known as industry consortia). Each of these 
exchanges seeks to provide value to customers in different ways. We discuss each type of 
exchange in more detail in the following sections. 
  What Organizations Buy 
  Indirect Goods and 
Services (MROs) 





























Figure 1. Types of Internet Marketplaces 
Horizontal Exchanges 
Horizontal exchanges are independently owned intermediaries that offer individual 
customers a single source from which to make spot purchases of indirect or MRO goods. They 
operate in a horizontal market that serves many different industries with products from many 
different suppliers. Horizontal exchanges are usually “public” markets that any firm can 
participate in. They usually charge fixed prices, and their owners make money by charging a 
markup on products they distribute. The primary benefits to customers are lower search costs, 
lower transaction costs, wide selection, rapid delivery, and low prices. An example of a 
horizontal exchange is Grainger (2007) and the DoD Emall (2007). 
The DoD Emall was launched by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in 1998 as the 
DLA Emall. It was created to leverage purchasing power across agencies to provide the Military 
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Services and other Federal Government Agencies with volume discounts from Military and 
Commercial suppliers. Its mission is indicated in the FY99 DoD Authorization Act which states, 
“the Joint Electronic Commerce Program Office of the Department of Defense shall develop a 
single, defense-wide electronic mall system, which shall provide a single, defense-wide 
electronic point of entry and a single view, access, and ordering capability for all Department of 
Defense electronic catalogs.” DLA was named the executive agent for the DoD Emall, which 
remains dedicated to its DoD-wide mission. 
There are currently over 28,000 user accounts on the DoD Emall with 500 new users 
added each week. These users represent the DoD (All Services, National Guard, Reserves) as 
well as other Federal Agencies (DHS, FBI, etc.). More than 850 Commercial Contracts are 
currently hosted on DoD Emall, with additional catalogs added weekly. The DoD Emall has 
shown tremendous growth—with a sales increase from $14M in FY02 to $336M through April of 
FY05. 
Horizontal Distributors 
Similar to horizontal exchanges, horizontal distributors are independently owned 
intermediaries connecting hundreds of online suppliers offering millions of MRO goods to 
thousands of business firms. They differ from horizontal exchanges in that they operate in a 
horizontal market in which long-term contractual purchasing agreements are used to buy 
indirect goods. Another important difference is that horizontal distributors usually provide value-
chain management services, which could include the automation of a firm’s entire procurement 
process on the buyer side and the automation of the selling business processes on the seller 
side. For buyers, this includes the automation of purchase orders, requisitions, invoicing, and 
payments. For suppliers, it includes the automation of catalog creation, content management, 
order management, order fulfillment, invoicing and shipment. Horizontal distributors make 
money by charging a percentage of each transaction, licensing consulting services and 
software, and assessing network use fees. 
The two largest horizontal distributor players are Ariba (2007) and Perfect Commerce, 
previously CommerceOne (2007). Although some Government and DoD initiatives include some 
characteristics of this model (e.g., e-buy), there is no Government or DoD effort that provides a 
full automation of the acquisition process on the buyer side and the automation of the selling 
process on the seller side. 
Vertical Exchanges 
Vertical exchanges are independently owned online marketplaces that connect hundreds 
of suppliers to potentially thousands of buyers in a dynamic real-time environment. They are 
typically vertical markets in which spot purchases can be made for direct inputs (both goods and 
services). Similar to horizontal exchanges, the benefits for buyers include reduced search costs 
and lower prices, while the benefits for sellers include access to the global purchasing 
environment and opportunity to unload production overruns. Vertical exchanges make money by 
charging a commission on each transaction; pricing can be through an online negotiation, 
auction, RFQ, or fixed prices. Vertical exchanges are “public” markets and are biased in favor of 
the buyer. An important measure of success for vertical exchanges is their liquidity—which is a 
measured by the numbers of buyers and sellers in the market, the volume of transactions, and 
the size of transactions. If there is a small number of participants, a low volume of small 
transactions, an exchange usually fails.  
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Examples of Vertical Exchanges include E-steel (2006), a spot market for steel products 
and Foodtrader (2003), a spot market for the food-products industry. 
Vertical Distributors 
Vertical distributors, also known as industry consortia, are industry-owned vertical 
markets in which long-term contractual purchases of direct inputs can be made from a limited 
set of invited participants. They serve to reduce supply-chain inefficiencies by unifying the 
supply chain for an industry through a common network and computing platform. They make 
money through: 1) Industry members who pay for the creation of the site and contribute initial 
operating capital and 2) Buyer firms who pay transaction and subscription fees. The pricing 
mechanism of this model ranges from auctions to fixed prices to RFQs. The bias of industry 
consortia is toward large buyers who benefit from competitive pricing. Benefit to suppliers is 
from access to large-buyer-firm procurement systems, long-term stable relationships, and large-
order sizes. 
There are numerous vertical distributors in many industries, with many industries having 
more than one. The industries with the most common consortia are metals, chemicals, and 
retail. The long-term viability of Vertical Distributors is yet to be seen. 
Examples of Vertical Distributors are Covisint (2007) for the automotive industry and 
Exostar (2007) for Defense and Aerospace. 
How Are Exchanges Evolving? 
Exchanges’ capabilities are evolving rapidly and growing increasingly sophisticated. 
Figure 2 depicts some of these changes. Horizontal exchanges are moving away from being 
simple electronic marketplaces toward more active and sustained relationships with buyer 
companies by providing added-value services and participating in industry consortia as 
suppliers of indirect goods. These added-value services include the automation of part or the 
entire procurement process on the buyer side and the automation of the selling business 
processes on the seller side. For example, selling value-added services could include Web 
store fronts, the ability to configure and price products, and customer support, such as order-
status monitoring, demand planning and collaboration.  
Similarly, vertical exchanges are being absorbed into industry consortia as many were 
not attracting enough players to achieve liquidity. Another important trend in exchanges is the 
movement from simple transactions of spot purchases to longer-term sourcing agreements 
involving both direct and indirect goods (Wise & Morrison, 2000). 
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Figure 2. Evolution of Exchanges 
Collaborative Commerce 
Collaborative commerce is used to describe Web-based communication environments 
that extend beyond procurement to include coordinating trans-organizational business 
processes. Collaborative Commerce permits buyer firms and principle suppliers to share 
product design and development, marketing, inventory, production scheduling, and unstructured 
communications. It generally starts as an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system in a single 
firm that is then expanded to include the firm’s major suppliers. This fact differentiates private 
industrial networks from consortia, which are usually owned collectively by major firms through 
equity participation. Collaborative commerce is considered a buyer-side solution with buyer 
biases. It is the most prevalent form of Internet-based B2B. 
A good example of the benefits of collaborative commerce is its collaborative resource 
planning, forecasting, and replenishment (CPFR)—which require the collaborating members to 
forecast demand, develop production scheduling plans, coordinate shipping, warehousing, and 
replenishment activities to ensure retail and warehouse shelf spaces are replenished “just in 
time.” This approach could potentially realize hundreds of millions of dollars in excess inventory 
and production savings and, therefore, produce large benefits to justify the cost of developing 
the collaboration network. 
A second example of collaborative commerce is demand-chain visibility, in which excess 
capacity and supplies in the supply-and-distribution chain is visible to all members of the chain. 
Adjustments could then be made in real-time to production capacities to avoid excess 
inventories that usually create pressure to discount merchandise, reducing profits to all parties 
involved. 
Collaborative commerce faces many implementation barriers. First, participating firms 
are required to share sensitive data with their business partners. This is a particularly major 
impediment for government and DoD organizations. Second, integrating collaborative networks 
into existing ERP systems and EDI networks is expensive and time-consuming. Third, 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 353 - 
=
= =
collaborative commerce requires a change in mind-set and behavior of employees, which 
constitutes a major paradigm shift. 
Conclusions 
While B2B e-commerce today accounts for a small percentage of the total B2B, it is 
growing steadily and expected to reach 40% – 50% of the total B2B trade in a few years. B2B 
transactions promise to help organizations run more efficiently by achieving significant cost 
savings and reductions in cycle-time. 
Many models of B2B e-commerce have emerged, each providing different functionality 
for the business it supports. Initially, B2B models’ focus was commerce and transaction 
execution. However, newer models’ focus is increasingly on value-added services and support 
for cross-enterprise collaboration. It is important for the DoD to examine these models, their 
characteristics, and trends in order to leverage the future of B2B and, therefore, to do business 
more efficiently. 
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